Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

North Carolina inmate Moskos asked Officer Hardee for permission to cross the prison yard to get cold water. Hardee denied this request. Shortly thereafter, Moskos encountered Officer Butler, who allowed him to use a nearby cooler. Returning, Moskos encountered Hardee again. According to Butler and Hardee, Moskos attacked Hardee. Officer Horne ran to the scene and used pepper spray when Moskos refused to stop. According to Moskos, he had threatened to file a grievance against Hardee and Hardee struck him in the head without warning. Moskos complained that his eyes were burning, and according to an officer, he was given a shower within 30-45 minutes, subjected to a full medical assessment, then transferred to a medical center. Moskos disputes the timing and claims that when he returned from the hospital, he was placed in a segregation unit with horrible conditions and not allowed to shower or shave for about 20 days. Moskos was found guilty of assault on an officer, profane language, and disobeying an order. He lost 15 good-credit days, was sentenced to 60 days in segregation, and was transferred to a maximum-level security facility,Moskos unsuccessfully submitted a prison grievance then filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Fourth Circuit affirmed judgment as a matter of law for the defendants on his deliberate indifference and due process claims and a defense jury verdict on the remaining claims. View "Moskos v. Hardee" on Justia Law

Moses was convicted of two counts of drug trafficking. The district court sentenced him as a career offender under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1, based on two prior drug-trafficking convictions. Moses argued that the conduct involved in one prior conviction was part of the same course of conduct as his current offenses and should have been considered “relevant conduct” under section 1B1.3, rather than as criminal history. Application Note 5(C) to section 1B1.3 states that “conduct associated with a sentence that was imposed prior to” the conduct of the instant offense “is not considered” to be relevant conduct. Moses argued that Application Note 5(C) is not entitled to controlling weight.The Fourth Circuit affirmed, declining to apply the Supreme Court’s 2019 “Kisor” rule, which limited controlling deference to an executive agency’s reasonable interpretation of its own regulations to where “the regulation is genuinely ambiguous.” The court applied the 1993 “Stinson” ruling, which held that Guidelines commentary, even when the related Guideline is unambiguous, is authoritative and binding on courts unless the commentary is inconsistent with law or the Guideline itself. Noting disagreement among the circuits, the court reasoned that subjecting Guidelines commentary to the Kisor framework would deny courts the benefit of much of the Guidelines commentary. The Guidelines themselves state that the failure to follow commentary could result in “an incorrect application of the guidelines” and subject sentences to “possible reversal on appeal,” U.S.S.G. 1B1.7. View "United States v. Moses" on Justia Law

Skaggs was indicted, along with 20 others, in a 39-count indictment. Two counts related to Skaggs, charging him with possessing with intent to distribute methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); (b)(1)(C) and a related conspiracy offense, sections 841(b)(1)(A); 846. The government notified Skaggs that it intended to seek a sentencing enhancement under section 841(b)(1)(A), based on a prior “serious drug felony”: a July 2015 Virginia conviction for distributing a schedule-III controlled substance. Skaggs pleaded guilty, conceded the fact of his 2015 conviction but reserved the right to challenge whether it qualified as a “serious drug felony.” Skaggs argued that he had not “served a term of imprisonment of more than 12 months,” 21 U.S.C. 802(57)(A), although the state court sentenced him to 26 months’ imprisonment as part of six concurrent sentences.The court concluded that Skaggs’s 2015 Virginia drug-distribution conviction was a “serious drug felony,” so his mandatory minimum on his conspiracy charge increased from 120 to 180 months and his Guidelines sentencing range increased to 180-188 months. The Fourth Circuit affirmed his 180-month sentence. Skaggs “served a term of imprisonment of more than 12 months” on his Virginia drug-distribution conviction, notwithstanding its concurrent nature, and qualified for section 841(b)(1)(A)’s enhanced mandatory-minimum sentence of 180 months. View "United States v. Skaggs" on Justia Law

Porter was convicted of capital murder in Virginia state court for killing a police officer in 2005. He was sentenced to death. After unsuccessfully pursuing direct and collateral review of his conviction and sentence in state court, Porter filed a 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas petition in 2012, asserting claims of actual juror bias and that juror Treakle failed to disclose in response to voir dire questioning that his brother, Pernell was a law enforcement officer. The district court dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing or any further discovery. The Fourth Circuit remanded. The district court again dismissed without an evidentiary hearing or any discovery. The Fourth Circuit again remanded. Discovery following remand revealed that Juror Treakle also withheld information in response to other voir dire questions about being the victim of a violent crime and about whether relatives had ever been arrested or prosecuted.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief, deferring to the district court’s finding that the juror was credible when he testified that he did not intentionally withhold information in response to those questions. Porter did not establish that Juror Treakle would have been dismissed for cause if he had not withheld any information in response to the voir dire questions. View "Porter v. White" on Justia Law

Campbell, convicted of possession with intent to distribute opiates, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C), received an enhanced sentence as a career offender, U.S.S.G. 4B1.1. The district court identified only two predicate “controlled substance offense[s]” justifying the enhancement: a West Virginia conviction for delivery of crack cocaine in violation of a statute that criminalizes attempt offenses, and a federal conviction for aiding and abetting the distribution of cocaine base within 1,000 feet of a school. The career offender enhancement increased Campbell’s recommended imprisonment range from 63-78 months to 210-240 months. Campbell objected, arguing that the Sentencing Guidelines did not include attempt crimes within its definition of “controlled substance offense.”The Fourth Circuit vacated Campbell’s 180-month sentence. The plain text of U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(b) is inconsistent with the Commission’s Commentary to that Guideline, and the only “reasonable construction of” U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(b) is that “controlled substance offense” does not include an "attempt" crime. Campbell’s West Virginia conviction is not a controlled substance offense and so cannot support a career offender sentence enhancement View "United States v. Campbell" on Justia Law

Perez violated the conditions of an initial supervised release sentence. The district court revoked that release, imposed a six-month term of imprisonment, and sentenced him to an additional 36 months of supervised release. Perez argued that this new supervised release sentence would exceed the maximum term set by 18 U.S.C. 3583, a provision generally authorizing courts to include supervised release as part of a sentence. The district court disagreed, holding that Perez’s supervised release sentence was governed instead by 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(D), the controlled-substance statute under which he originally was convicted, which imposes no maximum on terms of supervised release.The Fourth Circuit affirmed, noting that 11 courts of appeals have concluded that section 3583(b) does not limit the length of supervised release sentences authorized by section 841(b)(1). Rather, the provisions of section 841(b)(1) itself, which expressly apply “[n]otwithstanding section 3583 of title 18,” alone set the bounds on supervised release in 841(b)(1) cases. Section 841(b)(1)(D) establishes a 24-month minimum but no maximum term of supervised release; the district court’s 36-month sentence falls squarely within the statutory range. View "United States v. Perez" on Justia Law

Sitton pled guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm. The district court calculated an enhanced base offense level under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a)(3) based on his South Carolina first-degree assault and battery (A&B) conviction. The enhancement applies if a defendant has a prior felony conviction for either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense; a “felony conviction” is “an adult conviction" under that jurisdiction's laws.Sitton appealed, arguing that his A&B conviction arose from an incident when he was 16 years old; he pled guilty and was sentenced under South Carolina's Youthful Offender Act (YOA) at age 18. The YOA defines “youthful offender” as an offender who is under 17 years of age and has been charged with a non-violent crime. Upon conviction of a youthful offender in general sessions court, the court may: place the youthful offender on probation; sentence the youthful offender to an indeterminate sentence not to exceed six years; or, if the court finds that the offender will not benefit from treatment, sentence the youthful offender “under any other applicable penalty provision.”The Fourth Circuit affirmed the sentence. The South Carolina Supreme Court and statutes distinguish juvenile adjudications in family court from adult convictions in general sessions court. Where, as here, a defendant is convicted in general sessions court, that conviction is an “adult conviction” for purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines even if the defendant committed the offense before turning 18. View "United States v. Sitton" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Defendant argued that his pre-existing medical conditions placed him at a heightened risk for contracting and suffering severe complications from COVID-19. The record compelled the court to conclude that the delay between the filing of the form order and memorandum opinion was merely a clerical error. Therefore, both the form order and the memorandum opinion may be considered on appeal. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion where the district court determined that the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors weighed against granting relief in this case. View "United States v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254, seeking to apply retroactively a federal procedural rule first announced in 2019 to overturn the result of his state disciplinary proceedings that took place in 2015. At issue is whether the principles articulated in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), prohibiting the retroactive application of procedural rules on federal collateral review, apply to bar the inmate's effort in the circumstances of this case.The Fourth Circuit concluded that the retroactivity principles stated in Teague do indeed apply and that they preclude retroactive application of Lennear v. Wilson, 937 F.3d 257, 273–74 (4th Cir. 2019), to this case. The court concluded that Virginia made judicial relief available, even though no Virginia court addressed the relief claimed, and thus petitioner's assertion that the district court was his only "opportunity" for judicial review is a misstatement. Furthermore, defendant's argument that federal habeas review in this case is "direct review" in which new procedural rules apply is also not legally supportable. In regard to petitioner's alternative argument, the court concluded that, at bottom, petitioner's section 2254 petition is a federal collateral proceeding, not direct review of a state administrative proceeding, and therefore Teague's principle that a new procedural rule does not apply retroactively on federal collateral review governs. In this case, the court concluded that all the requirements of Teague have been met. The court rejected petitioner's remaining arguments and affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief. View "Wall v. Kiser" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's 120 month sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to distribution of a detectable amount of fentanyl. Defendant's conviction was related to Trevor Nelson's death stemming from a drug overdose.The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing an upward variance under the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors where the district court cited defendant's awareness of the risk involved with distribution of fentanyl, his pattern of recidivism, and the need for general deterrence to support the variance. The court also concluded that defendant's sentence was substantively reasonable where the substantial upward variance was supported by the record and the district court's lengthy sentencing explanation. The court noted that, when drug dealers knowingly ply their customers with what could well be lethal doses, district courts do not abuse their discretion by taking behavior simultaneously destructive of society and individual life into account. View "United States v. McKinnie" on Justia Law