Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for habeas relief and petitioner's accompanying request for supplemental expert funding. The court granted a Certificate of Appealability (COA) on five issues.The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner's supplemental expert funding request. In regard to petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC), the court concluded that petitioner's jury sentencing claim was without merit and there is no flaw in the district court's conclusion that the record establishes that petitioner was fully advised of his rights to a jury trial and sentencing, as well as the possibility that a jury could sentence him to life; the district court did not err in denying relief on petitioner's mitigation evidence claim where petitioner could not overcome the procedural bar for his defaulted subclaims and the evidence does not fundamentally alter his claim; counsel's performance in investigating and presenting mitigation evidence was not deficient and petitioner failed to establish prejudice; the record leaves no doubt that petitioner admitted to two aggravating circumstances in his guilty plea and knowingly and voluntarily waived any challenge to judicial factfinding by the trial court and that challenge would have been futile; and petitioner procedurally defaulted his guilty plea claim. View "Mahdi v. Stirling" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for possessing heroin with intent to distribute and three offenses related to possessing a firearm. The court concluded that defendant lacked standing to raise his Fourth Amendment claim where he had neither a privacy interest in the car nor a personal interest in being free from detention since he was nowhere in or near the car at the time of its seizure. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by instructing the jury on the lesser-included offense of simple possession under 21 U.S.C. 844 where defendant's intent was not sufficiently in dispute to warrant a jury instruction on simple possession. Finally, there was more than sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

After an explosion at Massey’s West Virginia coal mine killed 29 miners, Blankenship, then Massey’s Chairman of the Board and CEO, was convicted of conspiring to willfully violate federal mine safety and health standards, 30 U.S.C. 820(d) and 18 U.S.C. 371. The evidence indicated that Blankenship had willfully failed to address numerous notices of mine safety violations that Massey had received, favoring production and profits over safety. Following the trial and in response to Blankenship’s ongoing requests, the government produced documents to Blankenship that it had not produced before trial and that it should have produced under applicable Department of Justice policies. The suppressed documents fell broadly into two categories: memoranda of interviews conducted of seven Massey employees and internal emails and documents of the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) showing, among other things, some MSHA employees’ hostility to Massey and Blankenship.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of Blankenship’s 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate his conviction. While the documents were improperly suppressed, they were not material in that there was not a reasonable probability that they would have produced a different result had they been disclosed before trial. The verdict that Blankenship conspired to willfully violate mandatory mine standards was supported by ample evidence. View "United States v. Blankenship" on Justia Law

Officers, investigating drug trafficking at a shopping plaza, abandoned their surveillance and followed Dennis and Guess, who had stopped to talk with their suspect. Guess ran a stop sign. Officers activated their emergency equipment, A high-speed chase ensued. Officer McAndrew saw Dennis discard a gun and a bag containing a white substance. Guess eventually stopped. Officers found a bag concealed in Guess’s anal cleft and a scale in the door pocket. Nothing was found on Dennis. A loaded gun and another bag containing apparent narcotics were found where McAndrew indicated they would be. Officers did not investigate ties the men might have had to broader criminal enterprises nor arrest the original suspect. The discarded packet contained heroin; the substance Guess concealed constituted crack cocaine. The scale had traces of cocaine, heroin, and fentanyl. There was no fingerprint analysis. The men were charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin, cocaine base, and fentanyl; possession with intent to distribute heroin; possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking; and being felons in possession of a firearm.The Fourth Circuit affirmed Dennis’s conviction and 96-month sentence, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and to the court allowing the prosecutor to peremptorily strike a Hispanic juror and instructing the jury there is no legal requirement that the government use specific investigative techniques to prove its case. The court noted the “ease with which our law permits conspiracy convictions for conduct that overlaps almost entirely with underlying substantive offenses,” but stated that it was constrained by its precedent. View "United States v. Dennis" on Justia Law

Moss filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that while he was a pretrial detainee, jail officials put him in disciplinary confinement without a hearing, in violation of his procedural due process rights, and that they delayed his access to urgent medical care, again violating his due process rights. Moss claims that he informed the intake officer that he was taking a medication for a thyroid condition, Vyvanse for attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and Zoloft for PTSD and alleges delays in providing him with those medications while he was detained.The district court granted the defendants summary judgment, finding that Moss failed to exhaust available administrative remedies for his procedural due process claim and that any delay in the provision of medical treatment did not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Moss argued that jail officials made administrative remedies unavailable by denying him access to the grievance system while he was in disciplinary confinement but undisputed record evidence establishes that Moss was able to use the grievance system during that time, compelling the conclusion that administrative remedies were available to him. There is no evidence that the defendants knew of but deliberately ignored a substantial risk to Moss’s health. View "Moss v. Harwood" on Justia Law

Lewis and two others robbed a pawnshop. Lewis pointed his firearm at the manager and struck him in the back of the head three times, causing him to fall to the floor. The robbers stole 28 firearms, more than $61,000 worth of jewelry, and $2,000 in cash. The police found a “red spot” on the back of the manager’s head, which was not bleeding. The manager felt “dizzy” and was taken to the hospital. His medical expenses totaled $3,676.92. Lewis pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a), Hobbs Act robbery, and brandishing a firearm in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). The PSR recommended a two-level enhancement because a victim sustained bodily injury. Lewis objected that an injury must be “significant” to sustain the enhancement and that an injury must have “more than momentary consequences” to be “significant.”The district court “guess[ed]” that the manager had suffered a “mild concussion,” applied the enhancement and sentenced Lewis to 46 months followed by 84 months for Count III. The Fourth Circuit vacated. The court erred in imposing the injury enhancement. The prosecution failed to produce police reports, medical records, photographs, or testimony with respect to the injury to establish that the manager received more-than-precautionary medical attention. Nor did it establish that the manager’s injuries lasted for a “meaningful period.” View "United States v. Lewis" on Justia Law

Burr was convicted for the 1991 murder of an infant, “Susie.” Burr was living with Susie’s mother, Bridges, and was physically abusive to Bridges. Bridges had returned home to find Susie unconscious, having seizures, bruised, and with broken bones. Burr was sentenced to death. Burr has pursued habeas remedies before the state and federal courts. In 2020, the district court declined to grant habeas relief on the basis of claims under "Brady" and "Napue," related to transcripts of interviews with two witnesses, Susie’s brother, Scott, and Bridges.The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Burr has not demonstrated that the state court’s decision was “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts,” 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(2). The state court did not unreasonably apply Brady when it concluded that “any inconsistencies between the trial testimony of [Bridges and Scott] and their pre-trial comments to the prosecutors are of de minimis significance.” Burr did not explain how the transcript would have allowed him to impeach that testimony. The jury could make its own determination of how much weight to give the statements of a young child who repeatedly stated that he could not remember key details. Burr has not pointed to any “false impression” about Scott’s testimony that prosecutors should have been aware of and flagged but that the jury would not also have been aware of after listening to that testimony. View "Burr v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Defendants Williams, Bennett, Johnson, and Farris pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine. Although defendants' pleas did not specify that the methamphetamine was of Ice-level purity, the district court at sentencing found that the conspiracy involved Ice and that each was responsible for its distribution. The district court sentenced defendants using the drug-quantity table in USSG 2D1.1(c) .The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendants' sentences, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding not to reject the Ice Guidelines because of the vastness of this conspiracy and the danger posed by Ice and the appropriateness of treating higher purity methamphetamine more seriously than lower purity methamphetamine. The court concluded that the district court must have latitude to consider whatever reliable evidence is available to make its 80% purity determination. While such evidence may be used, it must be sufficiently reliable and specific that it actually supports the government's position that the drug's purity is 80% or above. The court explained that, given the evidence presented as to each of the defendants, it was not clearly erroneous for the district court to determine that the government met its burden of proving the conspiracy involved Ice. Finally, there was no error in sentencing Johnson under criminal history category II. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

During an automobile stop in Richmond, Virginia, Ball struggled with a Virginia law enforcement officer, pulled out a gun, and shot the officer in the forehead at close range, killing him. Virginia prosecutors charged him with capital murder. Pursuant to a plea agreement, he was sentenced to life imprisonment with all but 36 years suspended. Following community outrage over the sentence, federal prosecutors charged Ball with possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The district court sentenced Ball to the statutory maximum of 10 years’ imprisonment and, as a variance, required that the 10 years be served consecutive to the state sentence.The Fourth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the federal indictment should have been dismissed because that prosecution violated the Double Jeopardy Clause, was unnecessarily delayed within the meaning of FRCP 48(b), having been initiated more than two years after the shooting, and constituted vindictive prosecution under the Due Process Clause because the federal prosecution and sentence were “intended to punish him for negotiating a favorable deal with state prosecutors.” The federal government articulated valid federal interests in prosecuting Ball for his violation of federal law, pointing to its prioritization of felon-in-possession cases, and the serious nature of Ball’s conduct. View "United States v. Ball" on Justia Law

Walters entered his ex-girlfriend’s home, struck her with a hammer, and left with her cell phone and $700. Walters was arrested and charged in West Virginia state court with first-degree robbery, malicious assault, and burglary. Public defender Stanley represented him. In March, the state extended a plea offer. Stanley’s office timely received the offer, set to expire in April, but failed to communicate it to Walters until July. Despite Walters’s requests for a new attorney, Stanley continued to represent Walters. In July, the state extended another plea offer. Stanley communicated that offer to Walters and secured a 30-day extension. The July plea offer lapsed.Walters filed an ethics complaint. Stanley explained that Walters refused to respond to the July plea offer and had indicated that he would only “plead[] guilty to a misdemeanor, serve a year in jail, and make restitution." After negotiating a plea with new representation Walters pleaded guilty to reduced charges. The court sentenced Walters to 43-65 years’ incarceration, citing Walters’ criminal history, the seriousness of the offense, and the danger he posed to the community,After exhausting state remedies, Walters sought federal habeas relief. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of his petition, which alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. The state court appropriately concluded that Walters failed to show a reasonable probability that he would have accepted the March plea offer had Stanley timely communicated it. Walters cannot demonstrate prejudice. View "Walters v. Martin" on Justia Law