Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for possession with intent to distribute a mixture containing fentanyl and heroin. The court concluded that police had probable cause to search the shoebox for drugs under the automobile exception where the officers used a reliable informant who had provided accurate information in the past and where officers corroborated significant parts of the informant's information. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting a video that showed defendant opening a heroin package under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 where it was highly probative to the government's case and to undermining defendant's defense. Finally, the court concluded that there was no error in the district court's application of a two-level sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice under USSG 3C1.1 for perjury during sentencing. View "United States v. Gondres-Medrano" on Justia Law

A week after a gunman opened fire inside a Parkland, Florida school with an AR-15-style assault rifle, a 911 call reported a man with an assault rifle walking along Route 33 in Putnam County. Corporal Donahoe and Deputy Pauley were dispatched, knowing that a k-12 school was less than a mile ahead of the armed man (Walker), who was wearing military-style clothing. Seeing Walker, the officers believed that he could be under the age of 18. It is generally legal in West Virginia for persons over the age of 18 to openly carry firearms. Walker challenged the officers’ authority to stop and detain him and initially declined to produce identification, He relented but refused to provide information about his gun and his reason for carrying it. Donahoe did not restrain Walker, pat him down, or otherwise touch him. Donahoe called for a criminal history check, telling Walker “I have the absolute legal right to see whether you’re legal to carry that gun,” indicating that Walker could not leave. Learning that Walker was 24 and only had a misdemeanor conviction, Donahoe returned Walker’s identification papers and told him that he was free to go. The encounter lasted less than nine minutes.The Fourth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Donahoe in Walker’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. There was reasonable suspicion supporting Donahoe’s investigatory detention of Walker. Lawful conduct can contribute to reasonable suspicion; the circumstances of Walker’s firearm possession were unusual and alarming enough to engender reasonable suspicion. View "Walker v. Donahoe" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for one count of illegal reentry after deportation for an aggravated felony in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326(a), (b)(2), holding that section 1326 is constitutional. The court rejected defendant's contention that section 1326 violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendment right to a jury by splitting factual findings between the jury and an administrative agency. Rather, the court explained that United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 837 (1987), remains binding where section 1326 does not incorporate, as an element, the facts supporting the underlying removal order. Therefore, those facts need not be found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury. The court also rejected defendant's contention that section 1326 violates the Fifth Amendment right to due process because it allows reliance on a discretionary decision by an executive officer, concluding that the Supreme Court has sanctioned such reliance in the context of section 1326.However, the court remanded for resentencing on procedural reasonableness grounds. In this case, the district court's sentence was procedurally unreasonable to the extent that it failed to consider defendant's argument regarding his stale drug convictions and his argument regarding sentencing disparities. View "United States v. Perez-Paz" on Justia Law

In 1998, defendant was sentenced to 570 months' imprisonment following his conviction on numerous counts of racketeering and related offenses. Over 20 years later, one count constituting a 360-month component of his sentence was vacated because of a change in the law. Defendant was resentenced to 360 months' imprisonment, which was an upward variance from the recommended Sentencing Guidelines range of 188 to 235 months' imprisonment. Defendant appealed, contending that his new sentence violates the Ex Post Facto Clause and the Due Process Clause and that it is procedurally and substantively unreasonable.The Fourth Circuit rejected defendant's ex post facto challenge and concluded that defendant's argument against the retroactive application of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), has been universally rejected. The court also rejected defendant's contention that the district court's imposition of a sentence on his remaining seven convictions that is greater than the sentence he received on those convictions at his original sentencing violated the Due Process Clause, and concluded that defendant did not receive an increased aggregate sentence and his attempt to establish a presumption of vindictiveness failed. Finally, the court concluded that defendant's law of the case argument is at odds with the Supreme Court’s decision in Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476 (2011).The court also concluded that the record demonstrates that the district court imposed the above-Guidelines sentence at issue here as a variance, not a departure; there was no ground for reversal based on defendant's claim of unwarranted sentencing disparities; the district court did not erroneously fail to take defendant's military service and PTSD into account; the district court adequately articulated its reasons for imposing the upward variance; and the record reflects that the district court considered both the mitigation and rehabilitation evidence presented and weighed it against the seriousness of the offense. Accordingly, the court affirmed defendant's sentence. View "United States v. Abed" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's resentence for charges related to a series of violent carjackings, which defendant actively participated in when he was fifteen-years old.The court concluded that defendant's punishment was carefully tailored and there was no Eighth Amendment violation. In this case, defendant's 52-year sentence did not violate Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 212 (2016). The court rejected defendant's contention that his sentence amounts to a de facto life sentence, concluding that defendant would be released in his sixties, which allows him "a limited period of freedom."The court also concluded that defendant's 52-year sentence was procedurally reasonable where the district court discussed each of defendant's mitigating arguments; gave defendant some credit for his maturation in prison; and addressed defendant's concerns regarding sentence disparities. However, the district court also highlighted the brutal nature of the carjackings and murders. The court also concluded that the sentence was substantively reasonable where the district court imposed a sentence many years below the advisory Guidelines range; did not abuse its discretion by placing significant weight on the seriousness of defendant's offense; and weighed the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors. View "United States v. Friend" on Justia Law

In 2007, Crawley and two codefendants invaded a home and attacked and robbed a man they believed to be a drug dealer. A woman and two children were also in the home. Crawley pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951 and using, carrying, and brandishing firearms during and in relation to a crime of violence and a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). Other counts were dismissed, including for attempting to possess with intent to distribute a Schedule II Controlled Substance, 21 U.S.C. 846. The court sentenced Crawley to 150 months on Count One and 84 months on Count Three, to run consecutively. Crawley later unsuccessfully moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255.The Fourth Circuit subsequently permitted Crawley to file a second 2255 motion challenging his 924(c) conviction and sentence in light of the Supreme Court’s 2015 holding that the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), is unconstitutionally vague. While Crawley’s motion was pending, the Fourth Circuit concluded that conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence under section 924(c)’s force clause and the crime of violence definition in section 924(c)’s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague. The Fourth Circuit affirmed that Crawley’s 924(c) conviction remained valid because it was predicated on the use, carrying, and brandishing of firearms during the charged drug trafficking crime. View "United States v. Crawley" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed Defendants Moody and Carter's convictions for several drug and firearm counts arising out of an early morning traffic stop in Newport News, Virginia. The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support defendants' convictions for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute where the government established constructive possession of cocaine for both defendants. The court also concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support defendants' convictions for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense under 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A), (c)(2).The court further concluded that there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find both knowledge of and an agreement to enter the conspiracy. And a jury could find knowing and voluntary participation in this conspiracy based on evidence that Carter drove the car containing the drugs and firearms as well as Moody’s possession of drug-related cash. The court noted its reluctance in reaching this conclusion where there is little to distinguish joint possession of the drugs and guns from some independent agreement or scheme on the part of the defendants. In this case, there is ultimately a sufficient quantum of circumstantial evidence of an agreement to justify the conspiracy conviction. Finally, the court rejected Moody's challenges to two jury instructions given by the district court regarding Rehaif-related errors and aiding-and-abetting liability. View "United States v. Moody" on Justia Law

Stuart entered a U.S. Post Office and robbed the clerk of $173 and a cell phone, brandishing an Airsoft pellet gun. The next day he surrendered. Stuart pleaded guilty to robbing an individual lawfully in charge of mail matter, money, or other property belonging to the United States and, during the course of that robbery, assaulting the postal employee “by the use of a dangerous weapon,” 18 U.S.C. 2114(a). Stuart’s PSR assigned three points to a 2015 North Carolina state offense: possession with intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver methamphetamine (Paragraph 27 Offense) and another three points for a second state methamphetamine offense (Paragraph 28). Stuart objected, arguing that the two should be treated as a “single sentence” because the Paragraph 27 Offense sentence was “activated” at the same sentencing hearing at which the Paragraph 28 Offense sentence was imposed: His post-release supervision began for both on January 14, 2017, and the final release date for both cases was March 15, 2018.The district court overruled the objection, calculated a Guidelines range of 130-162 months’ imprisonment, and sentenced Stuart to 130 months’ imprisonment. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, citing USSG 4A1.1(a) and 4A1.2(a)(2). Stuart was arrested for the Paragraph 27 Offense on July 30, 2015, for conduct committed on that date; he was arrested on November 21, 2015, for the Paragraph 28 Offense, for conduct that occurred in September 2015. View "United States v. Stuart" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a sex offender incarcerated at Augusta Correctional Center, filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action challenging the prison's decision for twice denying him in-person visitation privileges with his minor daughter. Plaintiff alleged that for years before 2015, he enjoyed in-person visitation with the child without incident. However, consistent with amendments to prison Operating Procedures adopted in March 2014, the child was removed from his in-person visitation list in 2015. As amended, Operating Procedure 851.1 prohibits those inmates required to register on Virginia's Sex Offender and Crimes Against Minors Registry from having in-person visits with minors unless the offender receives an exemption from prison officials.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of the VDOC's motion to dismiss, concluding that the right of association protected by the Constitution does not require a prison to allow an inmate who has committed a sex offense against a minor to have in-person visitation with his minor daughter. In this case, defendant did not plausibly allege that the VDOC's denial of his applications for exemptions for in-person visitation with his minor daughter under Operating Procedure 851.1 violated any aspect of the right to association that may have survived incarceration. The court rejected defendant's contention that the VDOC's denial of his two applications for exemption violated his procedural and substantive due process rights. Finally, defendant failed to plead a plausible equal protection claim. View "Desper v. Clarke" on Justia Law

After wrecking his car while intoxicated, Ziegler falsely, unsuccessfully claimed to be an Assistant U.S. Attorney in an attempt to avoid charges and retrieve his impounded car. He made those claims to deputies, the magistrate judge, and the towing company. In his prosecution for impersonating a federal officer, 18 U.S.C. 912.1, Ziegler, though not a lawyer waived his right to counsel and represented himself.The Fourth Circuit affirmed his conviction, rejecting Ziegler’s claims that the court erred in permitting Ziegler to represent himself because he was incapable of doing so and failed to make necessary inquiries into his mental competency and that the evidence does not show that he “acted” as a federal officer. The district judge thoughtfully evaluated Ziegler’s request to represent himself. The public defender, initially appointed to Ziegler’s case, said that he did not “have any questions with [Ziegler’s] legal competency” based on Ziegler’s “base of experience.” The court repeatedly counseled Ziegler that he should allow the public defender to represent him. Ziegler claimed to be an Assistant U.S. Attorney and told police officers that, as a result of this position, the officers lacked jurisdiction over him, the charges would get dismissed, and he did not need a license. This is a sufficient show of authority to “act” as an official. View "United States v. Ziegler" on Justia Law