Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Defendant Buzzard and Martin's motions to suppress evidence found when police searched a car they occupied. Given the totality of the circumstances, the court concluded that the officers' question asking whether there was anything illegal in the vehicle related to officer safety and was therefore related to the traffic stop's mission. In any event, the court concluded that the officer's question did not extend the stop by even a second.The court also affirmed the district court's denial of Martin's motion for acquittal at trial and the revocation of his term of supervised release at sentencing. The court concluded that the evidence was more than sufficient for the jury to conclude that Martin possessed the guns. Furthermore, because Martin's challenge to the revocation of his prior term of supervised release is based entirely on his assertion that there was no substantial evidence for his conviction, the court likewise affirmed that decision. View "United States v. Buzzard" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for drug and firearm offenses. The court concluded that, even if the district court plainly erred by failing to give the 18 U.S.C. 3501(a) instruction to the jury, the error did not affect defendant's substantial rights. The court explained that any prejudice defendant suffered was minimized by the instructions the district court did give, and defendant did not meaningfully challenge the voluntariness or veracity of his confession. The court also concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm as a felon (Count 3) and possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking (Count 4). Finally, the court concluded that there was no reversible error in the district court's sentencing procedures and the substantive sentence. View "United States v. Hardy" on Justia Law

Defendants Simmons, Mitchell, and Lassiter were charged in a 38-count Second Superseding Indictment (SSI) for crimes related to their membership in the Nine Trey gang. A jury ultimately convicted defendants of 37-counts charged in the SSI. One of those offenses, Count 30, alleged a violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c), with the predicate "crime of violence" being what the Government characterizes as an "aggravated" form of a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) conspiracy, the charge alleged in Count One. The district court granted defendants' motion to set aside the verdict as to Count 30.The Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court that a RICO conspiracy, even when denominated as "aggravated," does not categorically qualify as a "crime of violence." In regard to defendants' cross-appeals, the court found merit in two of their contentions: first, the court held that the district court constructively amended Counts 8, 15, 18, 27, and 29 by instructing the jury on the elements of a state law predicate offense not alleged in the SSI; and second, the court held that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions on one of the Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering (VICAR) attempted murder offenses, which also requires reversing their convictions for the related section 924(c) offense. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Simmons" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit granted the government's motion to dismiss defendant's appeal of the district court's orders of restitution and forfeiture, which were imposed based on his involvement in a scheme of unlawful "short sales" of three residential properties in Virginia. Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1349, and was sentenced to a three-year term of probation, including orders of restitution and forfeiture, each in the amount of $227,512.07. The court concluded that the appeal waivers in his plea agreement barred his challenges to the restitution and forfeiture orders. View "United States v. Boutcher" on Justia Law

Defendant was found in the United States after having previously been removed under the expedited removal procedure of 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1). Defendant was charged with reentry without permission after having been removed, in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326(a).The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment, rejecting defendant's claim that his 2016 expedited removal order was "fundamentally unfair" for lack of representation by counsel during the removal proceeding, as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause and afforded by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and therefore was invalid. The court concluded that the Due Process Clause did not entitle defendant to counsel when apprehended at the border and promptly removed. Furthermore, the court rejected defendant's contention that the APA requires — as an additional procedural right in removal proceedings — that the alien have the opportunity to obtain counsel in expedited removal proceedings under section 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). View "United States v. Guzman" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part defendant's sentence for one count of receiving child pornography. The court concluded that defendant's prior conviction for Tennessee statutory rape categorically qualifies under the federal child pornography statute for the recidivist enhancement as relating to abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 2252A(b)(1). Therefore, the district court properly applied the statutory recidivist enhancement. However, the court vacated the district court's imposition of a life term of supervised release and associated conditions because the district court failed to explain its reasoning. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Hardin" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder and armed robbery, and sentenced to death for the murder and 20 years' imprisonment for the robbery. After exhausting his state remedies, petitioner sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court vacated petitioner's death sentence, concluding that the state postconviction court (1) unreasonably determined that a juror who was hearing impaired was competent to sit on the jury and unreasonably applied clearly established federal law in so concluding; and (2) unreasonably concluded that petitioner's state trial counsel was not ineffective in allowing the hearing-impaired juror to sit on the jury. However, the district court rejected a claim by petitioner that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to press a Batson challenge.The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's rulings on petitioner's claims relating to the hearing-impaired juror, concluding that the postconviction court did not unreasonably apply federal law in determining that the juror's presence on the jury did not violate petitioner's right to a competent jury. In this case, the postconviction court found that the juror heard all testimony during the guilty phase and was able to compensate for her hearing deficiencies. Furthermore, there was not a sufficient showing that the juror missed material testimony at trial or that her hearing difficulty was of such degree as to indicate she missed material testimony. Furthermore, the state postconviction court's denial of petitioner's related ineffectiveness claim was not unreasonable. Finally, the court concluded that petitioner failed to satisfy the requirement of Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 17 (2012), that his underlying Batson-based claim of ineffective assistance was sufficiently substantial to allow the district court to excuse his procedural default of that claim. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's rulings on petitioner's claims relating to the hearing-impaired juror and otherwise affirmed. The court remanded with instructions to deny petitioner's application for habeas relief under section 2254 with prejudice. View "Bryant v. Stephan" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court ruled that defendant had two prior convictions for controlled substance offenses and imposed an increased base offense level pursuant to USSG 2K2.1.The court concluded that South Carolina Code section 44-53-375(B)'s permissive inference does not remove the "intent to distribute" element from defendant's conviction for possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine. Therefore, defendant's February 2003 conviction for possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine under section 44-53-375(B) is categorically a controlled substance offense under the Guidelines. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit reversed defendant's conviction and sentence for using "abusive language" in violation of Virginia Code 18.2-416, as assimilated by 18 U.S.C. 13. The court explained that the First Amendment permits criminalization of "abusive language," but only if the Government proves the language had a direct tendency to cause immediate acts of violence by the person to whom, individually, it was addressed.The court concluded that the ugly racial epithet used by defendant undoubtedly constituted extreme "abusive language," but the Government failed to prove (or even to offer evidence) that defendant's use of this highly offensive slur tended to cause immediate acts of violence by anyone. In this case, the record contains no evidence that defendant employed other profanity, repeated the vile slur, or issued any kind of threat, let alone one dripping with racism. Furthermore, the Government failed to offer any contextual evidence that defendant's "mode of speech" was likely to provide violence by the store employee or the African American man or anyone else present. View "United States v. Bartow" on Justia Law

In 2010, Lancaster was sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment for conspiracy to traffic in crack cocaine and cocaine powder. In 2020 he sought a sentence reduction under the First Step Act of 2018, 132 Stat. 5194, to the sentence that would have been imposed, had the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 been in effect at the time of his offense. The district court denied Lancaster’s motion, concluding on the merits that it would have imposed the same sentence on him had the Fair Sentencing Act been in effect. The court did not recalculate Lancaster’s Guidelines range and apparently did not consider the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors in light of current circumstances. Lancaster argued that he no longer qualifies as a career offender for purposes of sentencing.The Fourth Circuit vacated. Additional analysis was required. Lancaster was convicted under 21 U.S.C. 846, a statute for which sentences were modified by the Fair Sentencing Act, and is eligible for discretionary relief under the First Step Act, which made the Fair Sentencing Act retroactive. The court was, therefore, required to consider that Lancaster no longer could be sentenced as a career offender and consider section 3553's factors. View "United States v. Lancaster" on Justia Law