Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

About a year after High was released from state prison, where he had served 20 years for murder, he began trafficking in illegal drugs. In 2017-2018, he distributed at least 168 grams of crack cocaine, 6.61 grams of marijuana, and 10,325 grams of cocaine powder. He pleaded guilty to distributing crack cocaine and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime and was sentenced to 84 months’ imprisonment, which represented a downward departure under U.S.S.G. 5K1.1 of over 60 months based on "substantial assistance." In May 2020, 16 months after his sentencing, High (age 42) sought compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). He cited as “extraordinary and compelling reasons” the Covid-19 pandemic confronting the prison system and argued that he is not a danger to the community. High had been diagnosed with cardiovascular conditions. The government noted the absence of any infection at the institution where he was confined.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to reduce High’s term of imprisonment by approximately two-thirds, based on its consideration of the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. The court was aware of the arguments, considered the relevant sentencing factors, and had an “intuitive reason” for adhering to what was already a below-Guidelines sentence; its explanation for denying High’s motion for compassionate release was adequate. View "United States v. High" on Justia Law

Officer Richardson stopped a car driven by Davis because he believed that the vehicle’s windows were tinted too dark. Davis had a history of felony drug charges and convictions. Other officers arrived. About three minutes into the stop, while Richardson talked with the other officers, Davis drove off without his license or proof of insurance, which were in Richardson’s possession. The officers gave chase. Davis raced through a residential neighborhood until he reached a dead-end, drove between houses and into someone’s backyard, got out of his vehicle carrying a backpack, ran into a swamp, and got stuck. Richardson drew his service weapon and ordered Davis to come out.Davis returned to dry land, dropping the backpack, and lying down on his stomach. Richardson patted Davis down and found a large amount of cash. Richardson handcuffed Davis, placed him under arrest, then unzipped the backpack and discovered large amounts of cash and plastic bags containing what appeared to be cocaine. A search of Davis’s vehicle revealed a digital scale and bundles of cash. The officers also received a report that Davis tossed a firearm out of his car window, then recovered a handgun from Davis’s path through the residential area. The district court denied Davis’s motion to suppress.The Fourth Circuit vacated. Incident to an arrest, a vehicle may be searched without a warrant if it was reasonable for the police to believe that the arrestee “could have accessed his car at the time of the search.” The court extended that holding to the search of the backpack. Davis was handcuffed and lying on his stomach during the search. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

DHS Agent Swivel saw someone whom he thought he recognized from a prior case. It was Santos-Portillo, a Honduran national who was in the U.S. illegally, having been deported in 2011. Agents staked out Santos-Portillo’s house, arrested Santos-Portillo. and took him to an ICE office, where he was fingerprinted. Agent Swivel then gave Santos-Portillo Miranda warnings and interrogated him. Santos-Portillo admitted he was from Honduras, that he had previously been deported, and that he had not obtained permission to return to the U.S. Santos-Portillo was charged with violating 8 U.S.C. 1326(a). At Santos-Portillo’s detention hearing Swivel testified that he neither sought nor secured an administrative arrest warrant to detain Santos-Portillo. Santos-Portillo unsuccessfully moved to suppress all post-arrest evidence, citing 8 U.S.C. 1357(a), which permits warrantless arrests only if agents have probable cause and have a “reason to believe . . . there is [a] likelihood of the person escaping before a warrant can be obtained.”Santos-Portillo was convicted and deported again. The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Section 1357(a) does not authorize courts to suppress evidence for violations of the provision. Based on a “proper respect for Congress’s role in determining the consequences of statutory violations,” the court rejected a request to exercise its discretion to create a suppression remedy. View "United States v. Santos-Portillo" on Justia Law

Defendants Johnson and Stewart were convicted of distributing heroin that, when used, resulted in the death of an 18-year-old, Jorge Armando Mercado-Medrano. Johnson was also convicted of a second offense, for distributing heroin to 22-year-old, Joel Custer.In regard to defendants' challenges to the Government's failure to disclose and preserve Medrano's cell phone, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court erred by relying on an incomplete evidentiary record to reject defendants' claim that the Government's failure to disclose and preserve the cell phone constituted a denial of due process. The court discussed the district court's refusal to instruct the jury that it could draw an adverse inference from the loss of the cell phone, but the court did not resolve whether the district court thereby committed further error. In regard to Johnson's contention that the prosecution's presentation of evidence that Custer, like Medrano, died soon after using heroin provided by Johnson, the court concluded that the district court erred in allowing the irrelevant and prejudicial evidence of Custer's death. Accordingly, the court vacated defendants' convictions and sentences, remanding for further proceedings. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Green was sentenced as a career offender under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1, after the district court found that Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951, to which Green pled guilty, qualified as a crime of violence under that provision. Five federal courts of appeals have concluded that Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a crime of violence. The designation increased his sentencing range from 77-96 months to 151-188 months’ imprisonment.The Fourth Circuit vacated Green’s sentence and remanded for resentencing. A robbery offense that, like Hobbs Act robbery, may be committed through force or threats of force against property as well as against persons is not a categorical match with any portion of the Guidelines definition of “crime of violence” set out in section 4B1.2(a). Nor is Hobbs Act robbery a categorical match for “extortion” as enumerated under section 4B1.2(a)(2). View "United States v. Green" on Justia Law

After petitioner was convicted of drug and firearm offenses in Georgia, the state pardoned him. However, DHS sought to remove petitioner based on his convictions before the pardon. The IJ ordered petitioner's removal and the BIA dismissed the appeal.The Fourth Circuit dismissed in part and denied in part the petition for review, concluding that petitioner failed to exhaust his argument that pardoned offenses do not qualify as convictions under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq. The court also concluded that a pardon waives only the removal grounds specifically enumerated in the Act, and petitioner's pardon does not waive all of the removal grounds proven by the government. View "Tetteh v. Garland" on Justia Law

In 2010, defendant was sentenced to 30 years' imprisonment after pleading guilty to various federal narcotics and firearm offenses. In 2019, defendant moved for a reduced sentence under section 404(b) of the First Step Act, contending that his sentence was ten years longer than the current statutory maximum.The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's denial of defendant's motion for a reduced sentence under the Act, concluding that, in light of United States v. Chambers, 956 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 2020), the district court may only exercise its discretion to reduce or not reduce any given sentence after faithfully considering a number of resentencing factors. The court held that one of those criteria—as is typically true in sentencing—is the applicable statutory maximum sentence. The court explained that, if sentenced today, defendant would be subject to the sentencing ranges set forth in 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(C). And as the district court correctly stated in its order, that range sets a maximum mandatory term of 20 years' imprisonment. Therefore, the district court erred by not resentencing defendant to, at most, 20 years' imprisonment. The court also held that when a court exercises discretion to reduce a sentence, the imposition of the reduced sentence must be procedurally and substantively reasonable. On remand, the court instructed the district court to comply with its substantive and procedural reasonableness requirements, including its requirement that it adequately explain its sentencing decision. View "United States v. Collington" on Justia Law

After defendant pleaded guilty to forced labor, in violation of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA), the district court sentenced defendant to 120 months' imprisonment and ordered him to pay restitution of roughly $273,000, representing unpaid minimum wages and overtime compensation computed under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). In this case, defendant forced the victim to work at his restaurant over 100 hours per week without pay from 2009 to 2014.The Fourth Circuit vacated the award of restitution and concluded that the district court erred in failing to include liquidated damages under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. 216(b), for when minimum wages and overtime compensation have not been paid as required, in the restitution award. At bottom, the court concluded that the value of the victim's labor as guaranteed under the minimum wage and overtime guarantees of the FLSA includes liquidated damages provided by the FLSA. The court explained that this fulfills defendant's obligation to compensate the victim for the full amount of the victim's losses, which includes the full value of his labor. Accordingly, the court remanded for recalculation of the restitution award. View "United States v. Edwards" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's 60-month sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to knowingly possessing an unregistered silencer. The court concluded that defendant need not be convicted of a terrorism felony for USSG 3A1.4, an enhancement for committing a felony intended to promote terrorism, to apply. Therefore, the district court did not err by including the section 3A1.4 enhancement in defendant's Guidelines calculation. In this case, the district court did not clearly err by finding that defendant intended to promote the destruction of federal property when he named the Terry Sanford Federal Building as a target; defendant obtained (and suggested using) his unregistered silencers to facilitate those attacks, as established by the conversations recorded by the informant; and the district court relied on the "Patriots Against Tyrants" manifesto and defendant's statement that he would "disrupt the plans" of evil as evidence of his intent to influence by intimidation (or retaliate) against the government. The court also concluded that USSG 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), a sentencing enhancement for possessing a firearm with the intent that it be used in connection with another felony, has no impact on the length of defendant's sentence, rendering any alleged error as to its application harmless. View "United States v. Kobito" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254, seeking relief from his convictions in Maryland state court for attempted first degree murder, first degree assault, use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence, and second degree assault. Petitioner's conviction stemmed from domestic abuse incidents involving his ex-wife where he ultimately shot her.Petitioner claims that he is entitled to habeas relief because (1) he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to a jury trial, in violation of Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930); (2) the prosecution suppressed material evidence, in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); and (3) he received ineffective assistance from his legal counsel, in violation of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The district court granted relief in part on the Patton and Brady claims, dismissing the Strickland claims without prejudice.The Fourth Circuit held that the district court's decision to grant petitioner habeas relief runs contrary to the deference that federal courts are required to afford state court adjudications of federal constitutional claims. In regard to the Patton claim, the court concluded that the state court's adjudication of petitioner's challenge to his waiver was not unreasonable under the standards of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). The court explained that petitioner failed to make a plain showing that his waiver was not knowing and voluntary.In regard to the Brady claims, the court concluded that petitioner was not entitled to relief in regard to his paid informant claim, more lenient treatment claim, claims arising out of the government witness and the ex-wife's affidavit, as well as petitioner's claim regarding the alleged confession of other deaths. Finally, because the district court declined to consider petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland, and dismissed them without prejudice, the court also vacated this judgment. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Horner v. Nines" on Justia Law