Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment against defendant after a jury found him guilty of four counts of aiding and abetting Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2, 1951(a); four counts of carrying a firearm in connection with a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c); and one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2).The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to sequester the co-defendant witnesses. The court noted that this was not the easiest situation in the world to manage, what with four codefendant witnesses and limited holding cells; in the context of defendant's requests and the building's constraints, the district court handled this issue with care; at no point did defendant move for a mistrial or request a limiting instruction with regards to sequestration; and the district court suggested removing a co-defendant from the building and allowed fulsome cross-examination, which was a fully sufficient response to defendant's request. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's motion for a new trial. The court explained that, given the ample evidence that was adduced at trial against defendant, the new evidence that defendant proffered in support of his Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 motion came very late and would have hardly made any kind of difference. Finally, the court concluded that the uncertainty as to the predicate offenses for the section 924(c) convictions did not render them invalid. In this case, considering the overwhelming weight of the evidence the government presented at trial, defendant cannot meet his burden of establishing that the outcome would have been different absent the improper instruction. View "United States v. Ali" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment of acquittal after a jury convicted defendant, a former executive of the now-dissolved Flynn Intel Group, of two counts. In Count One, the grand jury charged defendant with criminal conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. 371. The conspiracy charge had two objects: (a) acting as an undisclosed Turkish agent, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 951; and (b) making a materially false Foreign Agents Registration Act filing, in violation of 22 U.S.C. 618(a)(2). In Count Two, the grand jury charged defendant with a substantive section 951 violation—i.e., for acting as a foreign agent in the United States without first notifying the Attorney General.The court largely agreed with the district court that, similar to common-law conspiracy, section 951’s definition of "agent" envisions a mutual agreement to operate subject to foreign direction or control. However, the court disagreed with the district court as to the degree of foreign involvement required to violate section 951. The court concluded that, to be an "agent of foreign government," a person must "agree[] to operate . . . subject to [foreign] direction or control." The court explained that such an agreement cannot be one-sided, and a person does not become an "agent" for purposes of section 951 simply by acting in accordance with foreign interests or by privately pledging allegiance. Nonetheless, a foreign principal's involvement does not need to mirror an employer's control over the workings of an employee; a lesser degree of "direction" is sufficient, as it would be under the common law. The court also conculded that the "legal commercial transaction" exception found in section 951(d) provides for an affirmative defense—which must be raised first, if at all, by a defendant—rather than an essential element of the offense.In this case, the court concluded that the jury heard sufficient evidence that defendant acted as "an agent of a foreign government" in violation of section 951. The court explained that a rational juror could conclude that Project Truth was synonymous with Project Confidence; that the Turkish government was, in fact, behind the project; that, through a Turkish businessman, Turkey communicated both general and specific instructions; and that defendant hewed to those directions over the life of the engagement—all without notifying the Attorney General. The court also concluded that a reasonable jury could conclude that defendant conspired to act subject to Turkey's direction without first notifying the Attorney General. Finally, the court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in conditionally granting a new trial and the district court's reasons for granting a new trial provided insufficient justification for doing so. Accordingly, the court vacated the conditional grant of a new trial and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Rafiekian" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by a jury of coercing a minor into illegal sexual activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2422(b) and of multiple counts related to the sexual abuse of several other child victims. Defendant filed a 28 U.S.C. 2255 petition challenging his conviction of coercing a minor, but the district court denied the petition.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the section 2255 petition, concluding that the court need not decide whether section 2422(b)'s text meets the standard for impermissible extraterritorial application, because defendant's conviction involved a permissible domestic application of section 2422(b). In this case, defendant's Virginia victim received his messages and was coerced into sexual activity in the United States, and defendant himself was in the United States when he sent some of those messages. View "United States v. Harris" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion, alleging that he repeatedly asked his trial counsel to file a motion to suppress certain incriminating statements he made to law enforcement officers before his arrest, and that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to do so. Defendant was convicted by a jury of thirteen counts resulting from his participation in a cocaine distribution conspiracy and related financial crimes.The Fourth Circuit remanded for an evidentiary hearing, concluding that the record is unclear regarding what facts counsel knew before trial, and whether his decision not to file a suppression motion was an objectively reasonable choice based on trial strategy. Furthermore, the record contains disputed facts regarding whether defendant was subject to custodial interrogation, thereby triggering the Miranda protections. View "United States v. Pressley" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for conspiracy to manufacture, distribute, or possess with the intent to distribute controlled substances or to use a communication facility in committing and causing the facilitation of any felony controlled substance offense.The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions. The court also concluded that defendant has not demonstrated he is entitled to have his conviction vacated for a new trial because he has not shown error or prejudice. In this case, the court discerned no obvious problem with the verdict form despite the use of the "and/or" construction. Furthermore, because the conspiracy conviction can stand based on the first object of the conspiracy (drug distribution), the court need not consider defendant's challenge to the verdict form's wording of the second object of the conspiracy (use of a communication facility). The court further concluded that defendant has not met his initial burden of showing that he was entitled to a Franks hearing. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not commit reversible error in holding defendant responsible for between four and eight pounds of methamphetamine in determining his base offense level, and the district court did not err by imposing a two-level sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice under USSG 3C1.1. View "United States v. Seigler" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to lower his Sentencing Guidelines range. The court concluded that the Sentencing Guidelines generally prohibit courts from reducing a defendant's sentence where, as here, the original term of imprisonment is "less than the minimum of the amended guideline range." In this case, defendant was sentenced to a 180-month term of imprisonment for conspiring to distribute methamphetamine. The court explained that defendant's original 180-month sentence is well below the 210-month minimum of the amended Guidelines range for his offense. The court also concluded that USSG 1B1.10(b)(2) does not irreconcilably conflict with 28 U.S.C. 991(b), and that section 1B1.10(b)(2) does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. View "United States v. Spruhan" on Justia Law

Respondent — who was civilly committed in 2015 to the custody of the Attorney General under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 as a sexually dangerous person — was properly released under government-proposed conditions that prescribe a "regimen of medical, psychiatric, or psychological care or treatment," 18 U.S.C. 4248(e)(2). The Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court did not clearly err in finding that respondent would be sexually dangerous to others without the conditions and that the district court did not procedurally err in imposing the conditions. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Shea" on Justia Law

Defendants Young and Volious were convicted of (1) a criminal conspiracy with several objectives; (2) aiding and abetting the transportation of an explosive in interstate commerce to kill an individual; (3) aiding and abetting the mailing of a non-mailable item with intent to kill; and (4) aiding and abetting the carrying of an explosive during the commission of a felony. Defendants' convictions stemmed from their plan to kill Young's ex-wife by mailing her a bomb.The Fourth Circuit concluded that, as a matter of law, an inert bomb that contains explosives qualifies as a nonmailable item under 18 U.S.C. 1716, and that sufficient evidence supported defendants' convictions for aiding and abetting the mailing of a nonmailable item. Furthermore, because mailing a nonmailable item with intent to kill under section 1716(j) was the predicate felony, the court upheld the jury's convictions for aiding and abetting the carrying of an explosive during the commission of a felony in violation of 18 U.S.C. 844(h). Finally, the court rejected Volious's challenges to the indictment, the jury instructions, and the district court's denial of his pre-trial motion to sever. View "United States v. Young" on Justia Law

Movant seeks authorization to file a successive 28 U.S.C. 2255 application based on the holding in Davis v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), that the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)'s crime-of-violence definition was unconstitutionally vague. The Fourth Circuit joined its sister circuits in holding that Davis applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. The court also found that movant has stated a plausible claim for relief that warrants review by a district court. Accordingly, the court granted the motion. View "In re: Dearnta Thomas" on Justia Law

After plaintiff was convicted in 1993 for misdemeanor assault and battery of a family member, he was prohibited for life under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9) from possessing a firearm unless he obtains a pardon or an expungement of his conviction. Plaintiff filed suit seeking a declaration that section 922(g)(9) is unconstitutional as applied to him.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants, holding that section 922(g)(9) is constitutional as applied to plaintiff. The court applied a two-prong approach in considering as-applied Second Amendment challenges. First, the court assumed without deciding that domestic violence misdemeanants are entitled to some degree of Second Amendment protection. Second, the court applied intermediate scrutiny to consider plaintiff's challenge. Applying United States v. Staten, 666 F.3d 154 (4th Cir. 2011), which rejected an as-applied Second Amendment challenge to section 922(g)(9), the court concluded that the evidence showed "a reasonable fit" between the statute and the substantial governmental objective of reducing domestic gun violence. In reaching this conclusion, the court adopted the approach of its sister circuits and declined to read into the statute an exception for good behavior or for the passage of time. View "Harley v. Wilkinson" on Justia Law