Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Randy Price was charged with possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number and possession of a firearm by a felon. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, Price moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that both statutes were facially unconstitutional. The district court denied the motion regarding the felon-in-possession charge but granted it for the obliterated serial number charge, finding that the analysis required under Bruen rendered the statute an impermissible restriction on the Second Amendment.The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia denied Price's motion to dismiss the felon-in-possession charge but granted it for the obliterated serial number charge. The court concluded that the conduct prohibited by the statute was protected by the Second Amendment and that there was no historical tradition of firearm regulation consistent with the statute. The Government appealed the dismissal of the obliterated serial number charge.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The Fourth Circuit held that the conduct regulated by the statute does not fall within the scope of the Second Amendment because a firearm with a removed, obliterated, or altered serial number is not a weapon in common use for lawful purposes. The court concluded that there is no compelling reason for a law-abiding citizen to possess such a firearm, and such weapons are primarily used for illicit purposes. Therefore, the statute's regulation of these firearms does not violate the Second Amendment. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "United States v. Price" on Justia Law

In early 2022, FBI and IRS agents investigated John Doe and his businesses for suspected wire fraud, money laundering, and tax fraud. They obtained three search warrants to search Doe’s apartment, office, and vehicle. The warrants included a filter protocol to protect potentially privileged materials. During the searches, agents seized various paper materials and electronic devices. The government later contacted Doe to assist in segregating potentially privileged material, but Doe’s counsel did not respond. Negotiations between Doe and the government failed, leading Doe to file a motion to establish a filter protocol to protect his legal privileges.The magistrate judge granted Doe’s motion to intervene but denied his substantive motion for a new filter protocol, finding that Doe did not meet the requirements for a preliminary injunction. The district court reviewed the magistrate judge’s decision and also denied Doe’s motion, agreeing that Doe was not entitled to an injunction. Doe then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.The Fourth Circuit dismissed Doe’s appeal, holding that it lacked appellate jurisdiction. The court explained that under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, it generally only has jurisdiction over final decisions of district courts. The court applied the DiBella test, which states that orders resolving pre-indictment suppression motions are not immediately appealable unless the motion is solely for the return of property and not tied to a criminal prosecution in esse. The court found that Doe’s motion was not solely for the return of property and was tied to an ongoing grand jury investigation. Therefore, the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction under both § 1291 and § 1292(a)(1) and dismissed the appeal. View "United State of America v. Doe" on Justia Law

Ahmad Hashimi was indicted on four counts in the Eastern District of Virginia, including drug-related charges and charges involving violence against his ex-girlfriend. Hashimi and his court-appointed lawyer, Bruce Johnson, had a contentious relationship, with Hashimi repeatedly complaining about poor communication and the lack of a plea deal. Despite these issues, the district court did not replace Johnson. During the trial, Johnson attempted to negotiate a plea deal for the violence charges, but the court rejected it, and the case proceeded to the jury. In his closing argument, Johnson conceded Hashimi's guilt on the violence charges without Hashimi's explicit consent, focusing his defense on the drug charges. The jury found Hashimi guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to 300 months in prison.Hashimi appealed his conviction, arguing that Johnson's concession of guilt without his consent violated his Sixth Amendment rights. The Fourth Circuit initially affirmed the conviction but reconsidered after the Supreme Court's decision in McCoy v. Louisiana, which established a defendant's right to maintain innocence. On remand, the Fourth Circuit again affirmed but allowed Hashimi to raise his claim in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. Hashimi filed the motion, presenting evidence that he did not consent to the concession and highlighting his poor communication with Johnson.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied Hashimi's § 2255 motion without an evidentiary hearing, reasoning that Hashimi did not explicitly object to the concession. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in denying the motion without a hearing. The appellate court held that the record did not conclusively show that Hashimi was informed of and consented to the concession, as required by McCoy. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's decision and remanded the case for further factual development. View "US v. Hashimi" on Justia Law

Kenneth Watkins, an Atlanta-based rap musician, was convicted of conspiracy to possess a controlled substance with intent to distribute. Investigators, suspecting drug activities linked to a Charlotte-based record label operated by Steven “Ziggy” Cloud, obtained a wiretap on Cloud’s phone. Evidence showed that Watkins was involved in drug transactions with Cloud, including three trips where couriers transported pills from Atlanta to Charlotte. The couriers, Jonquilla Sanders and Latisha Anderson, testified about their trips, with intercepted calls and other evidence linking Watkins to the drug deliveries.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina tried the case. Watkins was convicted by a jury and sentenced to ten years in prison, three years of supervised release, and a $100 fine. Watkins appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the admission of his song lyrics as evidence, the jury instructions, the calculation of drug quantity, and the denial of a downward departure in sentencing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the evidence was sufficient to support Watkins’s conviction, as a rational jury could infer his knowledge and participation in the conspiracy. The court also held that the district court did not err in allowing the prosecution to question Watkins’s wife about his song lyrics, as Watkins had introduced character evidence. The court affirmed the district court’s jury instructions, finding no abuse of discretion. The court upheld the drug quantity calculation and the use of the 1-to-380-gram conversion ratio for eutylone. Finally, the court ruled that the district court’s discretionary denial of a downward departure was not reviewable. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. View "US v. Watkins" on Justia Law

Stephen Stanko appealed the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition challenging one of his two South Carolina capital convictions and sentences. Stanko argued that his trial counsel, William Diggs, had a conflict of interest due to a pending ineffective assistance claim from a previous trial. Despite this, Stanko insisted on retaining Diggs for his second trial. The trial court held several hearings to ensure Stanko’s waiver of any conflict was knowing and voluntary. Stanko was convicted and sentenced to death. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the conviction and sentence, finding Stanko’s waiver valid.In his state post-conviction relief (PCR) petition, Stanko raised claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing that Diggs’s conflict of interest and his performance during the penalty phase were constitutionally deficient. The PCR court rejected these claims, finding that Stanko had knowingly waived any conflict and that Diggs’s performance was within professional norms. Stanko’s petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court of South Carolina was denied.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina reviewed Stanko’s federal habeas petition and applied the deferential standard of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). The court found that Stanko’s claims were either procedurally barred or meritless under AEDPA’s standards. The court also addressed Stanko’s complaints about docket management decisions, finding no merit in one and lacking jurisdiction over the other. The district court granted summary judgment for the state and denied Stanko a certificate of appealability.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that Stanko’s waiver of conflict-free counsel was valid and that the state court’s decision was not an unreasonable application of federal law. The court also found that Stanko’s ineffective assistance claims related to the penalty phase were procedurally barred and that Martinez v. Ryan did not apply to overcome the default. The court dismissed Stanko’s appeal regarding the district court’s denial of his Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration, as it lacked jurisdiction without a certificate of appealability. View "Stanko v. Stirling" on Justia Law

Dolores Ortega-Cordova, a native and citizen of El Salvador, entered the United States without inspection in 2002. In 2012, he was arrested in Norfolk, Virginia, and charged with solicitation of prostitution under Virginia Code § 18.2-346(B). He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 90 days’ imprisonment, with 86 days suspended, and fined. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him. Ortega-Cordova conceded removability but applied for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1).The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied Ortega-Cordova’s application, finding him ineligible for cancellation of removal because his conviction for solicitation of prostitution was deemed a crime involving moral turpitude under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). The IJ relied on the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) long-standing position that prostitution-related offenses are morally turpitudinous. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision, noting that Ortega-Cordova failed to prove that solicitation of prostitution is no longer considered morally reprehensible by society.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the BIA’s decision. The court concluded that solicitation of prostitution under Virginia law categorically involves moral turpitude because it debases a moral norm against treating sex as a commercial transaction. The court rejected Ortega-Cordova’s arguments that societal views on prostitution are evolving and that the statute criminalizes consensual conduct between adults. The court also dismissed his procedural arguments, including the claim that the BIA abused its discretion by not referring his case to a three-member panel. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit denied Ortega-Cordova’s petition for review. View "Ortega-Cordova v. Garland" on Justia Law

An elderly couple in Greenville, North Carolina, reported a breaking-and-entering at their residence around 4:00 a.m., hearing glass break and a male voice yelling. Officer David Johnson, who was nearby, responded to the call. Upon arrival, Johnson heard loud yelling and saw Sean Rambert running towards him while yelling. Johnson commanded Rambert to get on the ground eight times, but Rambert did not comply and continued to charge at Johnson. Johnson fired multiple shots at Rambert, who continued to advance even after being shot. Rambert eventually fell and later died from his injuries.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina denied Johnson’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The court found genuine disputes of material fact regarding the reasonableness of Johnson’s conduct and concluded that a jury could determine that Johnson violated Rambert’s Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force. The court also denied summary judgment on the remaining federal and state law claims against Johnson and the City of Greenville.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Johnson was entitled to qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment claim. The court found that Johnson’s use of deadly force was not objectively unreasonable given the circumstances, including Rambert’s aggressive behavior and failure to comply with commands. The court also determined that the law did not clearly establish that Johnson’s conduct was unconstitutional at the time of the incident. Consequently, the court reversed the district court’s denial of summary judgment on the § 1983 claim against Johnson. However, the court dismissed the appeal regarding the related state and federal claims and claims against the City of Greenville, remanding those issues for further proceedings. View "Rambert v. City of Greenville" on Justia Law

Eunice Nkongho was investigated for her involvement in a munitions export and money laundering conspiracy. Federal agents stopped her at the airport and seized her electronic devices. Nine days later, they obtained a warrant to search her phone, uncovering incriminating text messages. Nkongho was charged with money laundering and conspiracy to launder money. She moved to suppress the evidence from her phone, but the district court denied the motion. At trial, the government used her text messages and call history as key evidence. A jury convicted her, and she was sentenced to twenty-four months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised release.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland denied Nkongho’s motion to suppress, holding that the seizure of her devices fell within the border search exception, which does not require a warrant. The court found that the scheme involved the theft and international transfer of military equipment, justifying the seizure. The court also rejected her argument that the nine-day delay in obtaining a search warrant was unreasonable, emphasizing the government’s heightened interest in the devices.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the agents had probable cause to believe Nkongho was part of an international munitions export conspiracy, justifying the seizure of her devices under the border search exception. The court also found that the nine-day delay in seeking a search warrant was not unreasonable, given the agents’ need to consult legal counsel. Additionally, the court upheld the district court’s calculation of Nkongho’s sentence, including the loss amount attributed to her and the denial of a role reduction in the offense level. View "United States v. Nkongho" on Justia Law

The case involves Jamie Christopher Henderson, who was convicted and sentenced following a jury trial for conspiracy to distribute cocaine and cocaine base, possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, and possession of firearms in furtherance of his drug trafficking crimes. Henderson appealed his convictions and sentence, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support these convictions, and that his sentence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable.The case originated from an incident on April 30, 2019, when law enforcement officers executed a search warrant at Henderson’s residence. They witnessed Henderson toss items underneath a vehicle, including a gun. The officers recovered a loaded handgun, a plastic bag with cocaine and crack cocaine, a cigarette lighter, and a glass crack pipe from underneath the vehicle. Henderson was arrested. Inside the trailer, police found a loaded rifle, a loaded handgun, cocaine powder and crack cocaine in a toilet tank, and a second loaded handgun in a kitchen trash can. They also seized three digital scales and a digital video recorder containing footage from security cameras showing Henderson and other men, armed with multiple handguns and a rifle, standing in the front yard of the residence as cars and people would approach it.Henderson was charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine and cocaine base, possession of a firearm in furtherance of the drug-distribution conspiracy, possession with intent to distribute cocaine and cocaine base, possession of a firearm in furtherance of the possession-with-intent offense, and possession of a firearm as a felon. He pleaded not guilty. At trial, the Government presented the testimony of the law enforcement officers, Henderson’s videotaped confession, the security footage from the trailer, and a letter Henderson had written to his brother. Henderson presented the testimony of his mother and daughter who claimed that Henderson was a drug user, thief, and liar—but not a drug dealer. The jury convicted Henderson on all counts.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentence. The court found that there was substantial evidence to support the conviction and that the sentence was not procedurally or substantively unreasonable. The court noted that Henderson faced a heavy burden in challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and that the court's role was limited to considering whether there was substantial evidence to support the conviction. The court found that there was abundant independent evidence that Henderson was engaged in a large-scale drug trade, which supported the trustworthiness of his confessions. The court also found that the district court did not err in calculating the quantity of drugs attributable to Henderson for sentencing purposes. The court concluded that Henderson's sentence was substantively reasonable and that he failed to overcome the presumption of reasonableness that applies to a below-Guidelines sentence. View "United States v. Henderson" on Justia Law

The case involves Zackary Sanders, who was convicted for violating federal child pornography laws. Sanders had engaged in communications with underage boys, some as young as 13 years old, through various social media and communication applications. He had the minors send him explicit videos and pictures of themselves, some of which he later used as blackmail. Sanders stored these videos and photos, as well as other depictions of child pornography downloaded from the Internet, on the same electronic devices that he used to communicate with the minors. Sanders was indicted in 12 counts for the production, receipt, and possession of child pornography.The district court ordered the forfeiture of nine electronic devices on which Sanders stored child pornography and with which he committed the crimes. Sanders objected to the forfeiture, contending that the forfeiture statute did not reach so broadly as to require the forfeiture of non-contraband items that were also stored on the electronic devices. He requested that the district court order the government to allow his forensic expert to segregate and make digital copies of non-contraband items. The district court refused his request.On appeal, Sanders challenged the district court’s reading of the forfeiture statute. He also claimed, for the first time on appeal, that the forfeiture order’s inclusion of his non-contraband items was “plainly excessive under the Eighth Amendment.” The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the forfeiture statute required the forfeiture of electronic devices that contain visual depictions of child pornography. The court also concluded that the forfeiture of the nine electronic devices, with the data contained on them at the time of forfeiture, was not grossly disproportional to the gravity of the offenses for which Sanders was convicted. View "U.S. v. Sanders" on Justia Law