Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner seeks relief from his sentence, which was enhanced based on the "death results" provision of the Sentencing Guidelines, USSG 2D1.1(a)(1), based on the Supreme Court's decision in Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204 (2014). Petitioner argues that he meets the four-part test for relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241 from the court's decision in United States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d 415 (4th Cir. 2018). The district court determined that it lacked jurisdiction over the petition, concluding that because Burrage had not previously been applied to the Sentencing Guidelines, petitioner's invocation of Burrage was premature.The Fourth Circuit agreed and concluded that neither the Supreme Court nor this circuit had applied Burrage's statutory interpretation to the Sentencing Guidelines. However, the court now concludes that Burrage's interpretation does, in fact, apply to the "death results" provision of the Sentencing Guidelines, at least those in effect prior to the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). Accordingly, while the court found no fault with the district court's dismissal of the petition, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings based on its decision today. View "Young v. Antonelli" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of petitioner's 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition as untimely. The court rejected petitioner's contention that McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018), extended his limitations period by recognizing a new constitutional right retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review. Rather, the court explained that McCoy refines the Gideon rule, but it is an extension of a watershed rule rather than a watershed rule itself. Therefore, the rule announced in McCoy is not retroactively applicable on collateral review. View "Smith v. Stein" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of making false statements on an ATF form (Count One) and possessing a firearm after being "adjudicated as a mental defective" (Count Two). On appeal, defendant challenged his firearms conviction, arguing that Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), renders the indictment and jury instructions deficient, that the conviction runs afoul of the Second Amendment, and that the district court imposed an unreasonable sentence.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the conviction, holding that because defendant had notice of the allegations against him and has not demonstrated that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different without the indictment error, his challenge to the indictment cannot survive plain-error review. The court also held that the jury found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant was guilty of Count One. In doing so, it necessarily found that defendant knew he had been committed to a mental institution, satisfying Rehaif's knowledge-of-status element in Count Two. The court rejected defendant's Second Amendment claim where United States v. Midgett, 198 F.3d 143 (4th Cir. 1999), foreclosed his argument that his commitment under W. Va. Code 27-6A-3(f) does not fall within the realm of ordinary 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(4) challenges because a different West Virginia statute, W. Va. Code 27-5-1 to -11, governs "final commitment proceedings." Rather, defendant's commitment to restore him to competency under W. Va. Code 27-6A-3(f) falls squarely within the definition of committed as used in section 922(g)(4). Finally, the court held that defendant's sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Collins" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of defendants' motions to reduce their sentences under the First Step Act and reduce their sentences to time served. In these consolidated appeals, defendants were convicted of robberies and accompanying firearms violations under 18 U.S.C. 924(c).The court concluded that the district courts appropriately exercised the discretion conferred by Congress and cabined by the statutory requirements of 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). The court saw no error in the district courts' reliance on the length of defendants' sentences, and the dramatic degree to which they exceed what Congress now deems appropriate, in finding "extraordinary and compelling reasons" for potential sentence reductions. In this case, the district courts took seriously the requirement that they conduct individualized inquiries, basing relief not only on the First Step Act's change to sentencing law under section 924(c) but also on such factors as defendants' relative youth at the time of their offenses, their post-sentencing conduct and rehabilitation, and the very substantial terms of imprisonment they already served. The court concluded that these individualized determinations were neither inconsistent with any "applicable" Sentencing Commission guidance nor tantamount to wholesale retroactive application of the First Step Act's amendments to section 924(c). View "United States v. McCoy" on Justia Law

Ayon-Brito was prosecuted and convicted in the Eastern District of Virginia of reentering the U.S. without permission after having been removed, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a). The district court had denied his pretrial motion to dismiss for improper venue. Ayon-Brito argued that although the indictment alleged that he was first “encountered” after his reentry by officers in Virginia, it also alleged, as an element of the offense, that he was “found” in the Middle District of Pennsylvania where he was first accurately identified. He argued that the crime charged was committed in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, so that venue was appropriate only there; 8 U.S.C. 1329 establishes venue for a section 1326 violation in the district where the violation “occurred.”The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss. The violation of 1326(a) was a continuing offense that began when he reentered the U.S. and continued wherever he was present until he was found and arrested. Because “found” does not itself refer to an act or conduct of the defendant, it does not describe a conduct element; the crime at issue is “being in” the U.S. If Ayon-Brito believed that he faced prejudice or inconvenience, he could have sought a transfer; he did not. He elected a bench trial in Virginia and was dealt with fairly. View "United States v. Ayon-Brito" on Justia Law

Varner’was having an alcoholic drink and lunch at a restaurant. Deputy Roane approached and requested that he leave the restaurant with him. Varner complied. Roane had previously arrested Varner on drug charges. Outside, Roane asked Varner to empty his pockets. Finding nothing, Roane patted Varner down. No incriminating items were found. Roane asked him to submit to a breath test. Varner stated he would not be driving and refused. K-9 officer Johnson then approached Varner’s car with a drug-sniffing dog, Zeke. Zeke and Johnson had successfully completed Police Narcotic Detection Training. Zeke gave a positive alert. Varner alleges that Johnson manufactured this alert by smacking the side of his car and that Zeke displayed erratic behavior. Johnson contradicted those assertions. No drugs were found in the car.Varner sought damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court dismissed Varner’s claim that he had been unlawfully seized during the pat-down, reasoning that Varner had failed to demonstrate the encounter was anything but consensual. After discovery, the court granted Roane summary judgment on the remaining Fourth Amendment claim, finding no evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Johnson had manufactured Zeke’s alert. The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Roane did not use or threaten force, did not restrain Varner, and did not make any misrepresentation as to a warrant. There is nothing to suggest a conspiracy to manipulate Zeke’s behavior. View "Varner v. Roane" on Justia Law

Ka was convicted of possessing a firearm during a drug trafficking crime. While serving five years of supervised release, he tested positive for drug use three times. Ka stated, in the presence of his probation officer, Padilla, and her partner, that he had been helping friends sell drugs to make money. Padilla examined Ka’s phone, finding text messages related to drug sales. Ka then signed a statement admitting to selling marijuana and cocaine with an averment that “[t]hese are my own words and [are] given voluntarily.” Ka did not invoke his right against self-incrimination. Padilla petitioned to revoke Ka’s supervised release, 18 U.S.C. 3583(e).Ka moved to suppress statements he had made to Padilla concerning his possession and sale of drugs, citing the Fifth Amendment and arguing that the “penalty exception” applied to his situation. His terms of supervision required him to “answer truthfully all inquiries by the probation officer and follow the instructions of the probation officer” so he would have been penalized for any assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of Ka’s motion to suppress, having previously held that the use of compelled, self-incriminating statements in a supervised release revocation hearing does not violate the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment. View "United States v. Ka" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement that contained a waiver of appeal, to coercion and enticement of a minor and possession of child pornography. On appeal, defendant argued that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable and that the district court violated his due process rights.The Fourth Circuit found that defendant's challenges to his sentence fall squarely within the waiver's scope. The court explained that, by its express terms, the appeal waiver is applicable to any sentence imposed "for any reason," including "the weighing of the sentencing factors, and any constitutional challenges to the calculation and imposition of any term of imprisonment . . . ." Therefore, the appeal waiver bars any appeal of defendant's sentence based on an alleged failure to consider his nonfrivolous statistical argument or any purported due process violation. Because defendant's 264 month sentence was far below the advisory Guidelines range of life in prison, the court dismissed defendant's appeal. View "United States v. McGrath" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction under two administrative regulations for repeatedly refusing to comply with directions from an immigration judge and a courtroom bailiff to cease distracting conduct during an immigration proceeding. The charges stemmed from an incident where court personnel requested defendant, who works as an immigration attorney, to stop using her cell phone. When defendant refused, she received a citation from Federal Protective Service officers. Count One charged defendant with failing to comply with the lawful direction of an authorized individual while on property under the authority of the GSA in violation of the Direction Regulation. See 41 C.F.R. 102-74.385. Count Two charged defendant with impeding and disrupting the performance of official duties by government employees while on property under the authority of the GSA in violation of the Conduct Regulation. See 41 C.F.R. 02-74.390. The regulations were promulgated pursuant to 40 U.S.C. 1315.The court concluded that the district court properly rejected defendant's vagueness challenge; the district court properly concluded that section 1315 is a constitutional delegation of authority and that the regulations do not exceed the scope of that authority; the district court properly concluded that the regulations do not violate the Tenth Amendment; the district court properly interpreted the Direction Regulation; and the district court properly found that sufficient evidence supports defendant's conviction under Count Two. View "United States v. Moriello" on Justia Law

Brinkley was subject to an arrest warrant. An ATF analyst identified possible addresses. Because a water bill for one address was in Brinkley’s name, Agent Murphy believed that address was Brinkley’s most likely residence. Another address was an apartment. Detective Stark also found multiple addresses, including the apartment. Brinkley’s Facebook page led Starck to believe that Brinkley was dating Chisholm, who was associated with the apartment.Officers went to the apartment. Chisholm opened the door, denied that Brinkley was there, grew “very nervous” and looked behind her. The officers saw another woman and heard movement from a back room. Chisholm stated that she did not want the officers to enter and asked whether they had a warrant. Murphy later testified that the sounds and the women’s reactions led him to believe that Brinkley was in the apartment. Five uniformed, armed officers entered and found Brinkley in a bedroom, then conducted a protective sweep and saw digital scales, a baggie containing cocaine base, and a bullet. They obtained a search warrant and seized firearms. Brinkley was charged with felon-in-possession counts, possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, and firearm possession in furtherance of a drug offense.The Fourth Circuit reversed the denial of a motion to suppress. Though the officers developed a well-founded suspicion that Brinkley might have stayed in the apartment at times, they failed to establish probable cause that he resided there. Because they entered the apartment pursuant solely to the authority of the arrest warrant, their entry was unlawful. When police have limited reason to believe a suspect resides in a home, generic signs of life inside and understandably nervous reactions from residents, without more, do not amount to probable cause that the suspect is present within. View "United States v. Brinkley" on Justia Law