Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2015, the SEC initiated enforcement proceedings in the District of Arizona against appellant for illegitimate investment activities. In 2017, appellant entered into a consent agreement with the SEC, and the United States District Court for the District of Arizona ultimately held appellant liable for disgorgement in the amount of $4,494,900. Then the grand jury in the Eastern District of Virginia returned an indictment charging appellant with, inter alia, securities fraud and unlawful sale of securities, based in part on the same conduct underlying the SEC proceeding. Appellant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, which the district court denied.The Fourth Circuit joined with every other circuit to have decided the issue in holding that disgorgement in an SEC proceeding is not a criminal penalty pursuant to the Double Jeopardy Clause, such that an individual cannot be later prosecuted for the conduct underlying the disgorgement. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of appellant's motion to dismiss the indictment. View "United States v. Bank" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit vacated defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm after officers discovered guns and drugs in the bedroom of a private home where defendant was arrested. The court held that, because the district court made no findings linking defendant's possession of a firearm to his felony drug possession, the district court clearly erred when it applied USSG 2K2.1(b)(6)(B)'s four-level enhancement on the ground that defendant possessed a firearm "in connection with" the felony possession of cocaine. View "United States v. Bolden" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's decision finding that petitioner was removable because he had been convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude. The court held that neither of petitioner's convictions for leaving an accident in violation of Va. Code Ann. 46.2–894 and for use of false identification in violation of Va. Code Ann. 18.2–186.3(B1) is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude. The court explained that petitioner's failure-to-stop conviction lacked the required culpable mental state and there is no morally reprehensible conduct. Regardless of the required culpable mental state, the court was not convinced that the offense of false identification has the required moral reprehensible conduct to qualify as a crime involving moral turpitude. Accordingly, the court vacated the BIA's order of removal and remanded with instructions that the government be directed to return petitioner to the United States. View "Nunez-Vasquez v. Barr" on Justia Law

After the district court sentenced defendant to an above-Guidelines revocation sentence, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2373 (2019)(Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment), that a different mandatory revocation provision, 18 U.S.C. 3583(k), was unconstitutional in an as-applied challenge. Defendant relied on Haymond and appealed the revocation of his supervised release, arguing that 18 U.S.C. 3583(g) similarly violates his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. Defendant also alleged that his prison sentence is plainly unreasonable.The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence, holding that any constitutional error is not plain at the time of this appeal. The court held that section 3583(g) likely does not meet Justice Breyer's controlling test, and given that no majority of the Supreme Court endorsed the application of Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), in the supervised release context, the court remained bound by this court's prior decision that it does not. The court also held that defendant's sentence was not plainly unreasonable because it reflected his repeated violations of supervised release. View "United States v. Coston" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for multiple criminal offenses related to drug trafficking and money laundering. However, the court vacated defendant's life sentence and held that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the district court failed to address his non-frivolous mitigation arguments against a life sentence. In this case, there is no mention in the district court's brief explanation of the sentence of defendant's argument that given his age, a shorter, 20-year sentence would be sufficient to incapacitate him until he is in his 60s and thus less likely to recidivate. Furthermore, the district court did not address defendant's arguments regarding sentencing disparities with his coconspirators. Accordingly, the court remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Webb" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against various correctional officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging a violation of his procedural due process rights. Plaintiff's claims stemmed from the four years that he spent in solitary confinement in prison. The district court granted summary judgment to the officials on the ground that plaintiff had failed to establish a protected liberty interest.The Fourth Circuit vacated and held that plaintiff has presented evidence demonstrating that his confinement conditions were severe in comparison to those that exist in general population and that his segregation status may have had collateral consequences relating to the length of his sentence. Furthermore, although the duration of plaintiff's segregated confinement is not as long as the substantial periods of segregated confinement that this court has found sufficient to support a protected liberty interest in the past, prisoners need not languish in solitary confinement for decades on end in order to possess a cognizable liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In this case, the four-plus years that plaintiff spent in administrative segregation is significant enough to tip the scales in his favor, particularly in light of the other evidence of indefiniteness that he relies upon in this case. Therefore, the court held that there is at least a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether plaintiff's conditions of confinement imposed a significant and atypical hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Smith v. Collins" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit held that petitioner's prior misdemeanor conviction under Virginia Code 18.2-280(A), for willful discharge of "any firearm" in a public place without resulting bodily injury, qualifies as a federal "firearm offense" for purposes of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(C). The court held that the plain language of the Virginia statute, as supported by later acts of Virginia's legislature and by decisions of its appellate courts, prohibits conduct involving the use of a "any firearm," including antique firearms. Therefore, petitioner was not required to identify a prosecution under the Virginia statute involving an antique firearm to defend against removal. Accordingly, the conduct punishable under Virginia Code 18.2-280(A) is broader than the conduct encompassed by the federal definition of a "firearm offense." View "Gordon v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon. The court was bound by its prior decision in United States v. Mungro, 754 F.3d 267, 272 (4th Cir. 2014), holding that the North Carolina breaking and entering statute "sweeps no more broadly than the generic elements of burglary" and therefore its violation qualifies as an Armed Career Criminal Act predicate conviction. Therefore, defendant's previous conviction for breaking and entering, in violation of North Carolina General Statutes 14-54, qualifies as an ACCA predicate conviction under 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). View "United States v. Dodge" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence of a firearm after defendant conditionally pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon. The court held that the officer had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity when he stopped and frisked defendant. In this case, a bystander called 911 to report a large fight and assault, with a victim knocked out laying on the ground; the area was known to be a problem area; and officers could reasonably infer from the report that the person with the gun was involved in the fight. The court rejected defendant's contention that the tip from the bystander was unreliable and that the tip insufficiently alleged illegal conduct. View "United States v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed Defendants Gutierrez, Baxton, and Gilmore's convictions and sentences for various charges related to their membership in the United Blood Nation (UBN) gang.The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by empaneling an anonymous jury; the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying recusal; the district court did not abuse its discretion in regard to jury selection; the district court properly denied Gilmore's motion to suppress; the evidence was sufficient to support defendants' convictions for conspiracy to participate in a racketeering enterprise; the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to issue a special jury verdict form; and the district court properly instructed the jury. The court upheld the district court's denial of Gilmore's motion for a new trial; held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's civil forfeiture findings; and held that defendants' respective sentences were not procedurally and substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Gutierrez" on Justia Law