Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

A conspiracy that involves the distribution of 50 or more grams of crack cocaine, which is a "covered offense" under the First Step Act of 2018 because the penalties for it were modified by the Fair Sentencing Act, remains a covered offense if the conspiracy also charges distribution of powder cocaine, the penalties for which were not modified.In this case, defendant pleaded guilty to knowingly and willfully conspiring with others to unlawfully possess with intent to distribute and to distribute 50 grams or more of crack cocaine and 5 kilograms or more of powder cocaine. Because defendant's sentence involved a covered offense under Section 404(a) and Section 404(c)'s limitations do not apply, the district court should have reviewed defendant's motion on the merits, applying its discretion under Sections 404(b) and (c). Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's order and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Gravatt" on Justia Law

Drugs distributed for the "personal use" of an accomplice may be included as relevant conduct for the crime of aiding-and-abetting the distribution of a controlled substance. The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to one count of aiding-and-abetting the distribution of methamphetamine. The court held that the district court did not err in including quantities that the accomplice used recreationally in defendant's sentence. The court also held that the district court did not commit clear error in its sentencing analysis, rejecting defendant's claims to the contrary. View "United States v. Williamson" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence as an armed career criminal subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years in prison. On appeal, defendant argued that reliance in his 2019 sentencing on a prior conviction that had not been designated as an Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) predicate in his 2008 presentence report violated United States v. Hodge, 902 F.3d 420 (4th Cir. 2018).The court held that Hodge was not controlling in this case, because Hodge is grounded on the defendant's lack of notice and opportunity to contest an ACCA predicate identified for the first time during a collateral proceeding. In this case, defendant had both notice and a meaningful opportunity to challenge the designated predicate convictions prior to the resentencing hearing. The court also held that the district court did not clearly err in finding that, taken together, the documents demonstrated that defendant was in fact convicted of unlawful wounding in 1979. Furthermore, a conviction of Virginia Code 18.2-51 is a violent felony for the purpose of applying ACCA's sentencing enhancement, as it involves the use of physical force required by 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(i). View "United States v. Rumley" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his 24-month sentence for illegally reentering the United States subsequent to conviction for an aggravated felony, in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326(a) and (b)(2).The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that defendant's prior conviction for Texas burglary is a burglary offense under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G), and was therefore an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act. However, the court held that the district court committed a procedural error in applying the 2016 Guidelines Manual at sentencing and the error was not harmless. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Moreno Pena" on Justia Law

After the district court reduced defendant's sentence under the First Step Act, the district court denied defendant's request for a sentence of 120 months' imprisonment, which would have allowed defendant to bank approximately 57 months toward a future sentence of incarceration if he violated his supervised release.The Fourth Circuit affirmed and held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in reducing defendant's sentence to time served and ordering his immediate release, but denying his request to bank time for credit against future supervised release violations. In this case, the district court considered defendant's ability to bank time against future supervised release revocations in its analysis of the need to protect the public and the need for deterrence, two factors a court considers under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) in imposing a sentence. View "United States v. Jackson" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of appellant's 28 U.S.C. 2241 petition seeking relief from his sentence via the savings clause. In United States v. Wheeler, the court set forth a four part test to determine whether an individual can seek relief from an erroneous sentence in a section 2241 habeas corpus petition via the savings clause of 28 U.S.C. 2255(e). The district court concluded that appellant could not meet the second prong of the Wheeler test because he filed his first section 2255 motion after the applicable change in settled substantive law, even though that section 2255 motion was resolved before that change in law was deemed to apply retroactively on collateral review.The court held that, in the unique circumstance where the change in settled substantive law occurred before a petitioner filed his or her first section 2255 motion, but such change was deemed retroactive after the resolution of petitioner's first section 2255 motion, petitioner satisfies the second prong of the Wheeler test. Accordingly, the court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Braswell v. Smith" on Justia Law

Defendant was stopped at a routine traffic checkpoint where officers discovered a substantial amount of illegal drugs. After defendant pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute twenty-eight or more grams of crack cocaine, defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained by officers, holding that the routine traffic checkpoint fully complied with Fourth Amendment requirements. In this case, the primary purpose of the checkpoint was valid; the roadblock adequately advanced a significant public interest; and the checkpoint was minimally intrusive. View "United States v. Moore" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence and his conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon. The court held that the officers had probable cause to believe that a crime was being committed in defendant's house, and thus the warrant appropriately authorized the search of the house for evidence of that crime. The court found unpersuasive defendant's argument that the warrant should have been limited in geographic scope because the smoldering marijuana cigarette in the trash can was the likely source of the marijuana odor. Rather, the court held that the presence of one marijuana cigarette in the kitchen did not negate the fair probability that other evidence of the crime of marijuana possession would be found in the house. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of a petition for habeas corpus relief based on two ineffective assistance of counsel claims previously rejected by the state post-conviction court. The court held that petitioner defaulted on his claims because he failed to raise them to the state court and thus they are unexhausted. Because the new evidence does not fundamentally alter the heart of the two ineffective assistance of counsel claims presented to the state court, the court held that the district court properly deferred to the state court rejection of these claims. Likewise, the court rejected petitioner's third ineffective assistance of counsel claim, holding that he defaulted on this claim by not presenting it to the state court and he failed to make a substantial showing that his trial counsel were ineffective. View "Moore v. Stirling" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, and four other drug-trafficking and firearms-related offenses. The court held that there was no error in denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence gathered from the traffic stop, because the detective had ample reasonable suspicion of drug distribution, justifying the full length of the stop under the Fourth Amendment; there was no Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause violation by admitting evidence relating to a recorded phone call between defendant and an informant who did not testify at trial; and the district court did not err by holding that section 403 of the First Step Act does not apply retroactively to cases pending on direct appeal when it was enacted. View "United States v. Jordan" on Justia Law