Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment for MIA in an action alleging salary discrimination under the Equal Pay Act (EPA), 29 U.S.C. 206(d). The court held that the EEOC established a prima facie violation of the EPA, and that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether the pay disparity was due to factors other than gender. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "EEOC v. Maryland Insurance Admin." on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal of a motion for post-conviction relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The court held that the standards for plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel were distinct and did not necessarily result in equivalent outcomes for the defendant. In this case, defendant's trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to understand the required legal analysis, and by failing to make an obvious objection to the career offender designation. The court held that these failures by counsel resulted in prejudice to defendant by increasing his sentence by more than seven years' imprisonment. Accordingly, the court remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Carthorne" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his criminal conviction years after the Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b)(1)(A) filing deadline and nearly three months after the district court denied his motion to vacate the conviction under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The Government did not object to the appeal's untimeliness. The Fourth Circuit held that it had the authority to dismiss untimely criminal appeals sua sponte but that it should exercise that authority only in extraordinary circumstances. In this case, given the procedural history of defendant's case, the court found that such extraordinary circumstances were present and thus dismissed the appeal. View "United States v. Oliver" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the revocation of defendant's supervised release. In this case, the district court revoked defendant's original term of supervised release for a technical violation and imposed a second term of supervised release. The district court subsequently revoked the second term of supervised release for a substantive violation. The court held that the district court retained jurisdiction to revoke defendant's supervised release a second time, and properly prescribed the maximum sentence permitted under 18 U.S.C. 3583(e)(3). View "United States v. Harris" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief for petitioner where he challenged his state court conviction for computer solicitation of acts of sodomy from a minor under the age of 15, in violation of Va. Code Ann. 18.2-374.3(C)(3) (2007). The court held that Virginia's anti-sodomy statute, as authoritatively construed by the Supreme Court of Virginia, did not criminalize conduct that Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), declared to be protected by the liberty interests guaranteed by the Due Process Clause, and it was thus not facially unconstitutional. The state court's decision to adopt this narrowing construction, under its jurisprudence, was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of applicable Supreme Court precedent. Therefore, the court rejected petitioner's claim that Lawrence required the invalidation of his conviction under section 18.2-374.3(C)(3) merely because it referenced the anti-sodomy statute. View "Toghill v. Clarke" on Justia Law

After Anderson complained that a fellow inmate, Rilee, had threatened him, Anderson was moved to another cell block in Virginia’s Gloucester County Jail. Jail personnel did not put Rilee on the jail’s “enemies” list. Two days later, Rilee attacked Anderson in the hall, causing him serious injury. Anderson filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against two deputies, alleging that they acted with deliberate indifference to his health and safety, in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishments.” The district court instructed the jury that “[d]eliberate indifference is established only if the defendants . . . had actual knowledge of a substantial risk that Anderson would be injured . . . and if the defendants recklessly disregarded that risk by intentionally refusing or failing to take reasonable measures to deal with the risk.” Anderson objected to the inclusion of the word “intentionally.” The Fourth Circuit affirmed a verdict for the defendants, holding that the district court’s instruction adequately and fairly stated the controlling law. Deliberate indifference is the intentional taking of a risk that the defendant knows might cause harm while lacking any intent to cause such harm. View "Anderson v. Kingsley" on Justia Law

Stitz, charged with distribution of child pornography by computer, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(2)(A), pled guilty, stipulating to the factual basis for the plea. The agreement noted that Stitz understood the stipulation, which states that on three occasions FBI investigators used the ARES file-sharing network to connect Stitz’s IP address and download child pornography and that during an interview, Stitz acknowledged that he was aware his computer was sharing child pornography on that network. At a plea colloquy, Stitz confirmed the stipulation. The court calculated a sentencing range of 151-188 months. Stitz argued that he was entitled to a lower sentence based on the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors because his distribution of child pornography was passive and he did not have the specific intent to distribute, but repeatedly stated that he knew the file-sharing system made his child pornography available to others. The court sentenced Stitz to 121 months, considering that the two-level enhancement (U.S.S.G. 2G2.2(b)(6)) for the use of a computer to distribute child pornography was put in place when the use of a computer was more significant, Stitz’s “horrific childhood,” and rehabilitative efforts. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court erred in finding a factual basis for his plea because there is no published law in the circuit concluding that use of a peer-to-peer file-sharing program constitutes “distribution” under the statute and that Stitz lacked mens rea. View "United States v.Stitz" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit vacated defendant's 272-month sentence after he pleaded guilty to armed bank robbery and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence. The court agreed with defendant that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the district court failed to adequately explain the sentence imposed in light of his nonfrivolous arguments for a downward departure. In this case, the district court failed to acknowledge or explain six additional arguments that defendant raised in his sentencing briefs and at his hearing. Accordingly, the court remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Blue" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence after he pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon. The court held that defendant's prior North Carolina common law robbery conviction categorically qualified as a felony conviction for a crime of violence, as provided in USSG 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) and defined in USSG 4B1.2(a). The court also held that the evidence was sufficient to support the district court's application of a two-level enhancement under USSG 2K2.1(b)(1)(A), based on the number of weapons involved in the offense, and a four-level enhancement under USSG 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), based on the use or possession of a firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony offense. View "United States v. Gattis" on Justia Law

After Melvin Lawhorn was fatally shot by police, his personal representative filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and various state laws against the county, the sheriff's office, and others. In this case, an officer leaned inside the passenger-side window to grab Lawhorn when Lawhorn successfully shifted the truck into drive and the truck began moving forward. The officer shot Lawhorn. The court affirmed the district court's grant of qualified immunity to defendants, holding that existing law did not clearly establish that an officer leaning into the window of a moving truck violated the Fourth Amendment by using deadly force. The court also affirmed the district court's fee sanction award that was imposed for defendants' discovery misconduct. View "Brown v. Elliot" on Justia Law