Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves Ronald Cox, who was convicted of first-degree murder and three firearm offenses based primarily on the testimony of a jailhouse informant. The informant claimed that Cox and his co-defendant confessed their involvement in the murder. Cox's trial counsel declined to introduce jail records that suggested Cox and the informant were not in the same area of the jail when the alleged conversation took place. Cox sought postconviction relief on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel, which was denied by the state postconviction court.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland also denied Cox's petition for habeas relief but issued a certificate of appealability on Cox's ineffective assistance claim. Cox appealed the district court's denial of his petition, and the State cross-appealed the district court's issuance of the certificate of appealability.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Cox's petition. The court found no reason to dismiss the certificate of appealability and, due to the highly deferential standard governing petitions alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, affirmed the district court's denial of Cox's petition. The court concluded that the state postconviction court's denial of Cox's ineffective assistance claim was not objectively unreasonable. View "Cox v. Weber" on Justia Law

Valentino Darosa was convicted of Hobbs Act robbery and related offenses. The case revolved around a robbery at Atlantic Metals Xchange, a store that buys and sells metals, coins, jewels, and currency notes. The robber, wearing a mask and gloves, handcuffed and duct-taped the store owner, Matthew Schipani, and stole several items. The robber also took Schipani’s backpack, which contained his firearm and wallet. A notebook and roll of duct tape left at the scene were found to have Darosa's fingerprint and DNA respectively.Darosa was indicted on one count of Hobbs Act robbery, one count of brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence, and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. He moved to suppress the evidence seized during the search of his vehicle and home, arguing that the search warrant affidavit failed to establish probable cause. The district court denied the motion, finding that Darosa’s fingerprint on the notebook was sufficient to suspect him as the robber.At trial, the government presented evidence connecting Darosa to the crime, including his fingerprint on the notebook, his DNA on the roll of duct tape, and items found in Darosa’s home and vehicle that were stolen from the store. The jury returned a guilty verdict on all counts.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Darosa challenged the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress, failure to give his proposed jury instruction, and admission of certain testimony. He also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence. The appellate court affirmed the district court's decision, finding no reversible error. View "US v. Darosa" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Lokheim Jeralle Campbell, who was sentenced to 28 months in prison for violating his supervised release. Campbell had previously served a term for Hobbs Act robbery and using a firearm during a crime of violence. After his release, he attempted to rob Cyril Lowery during a drug deal, which led to a revocation motion filed by his probation officer. Campbell admitted to attempted armed robbery but objected to its classification as a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines Chapter 7 policy statement.The district court overruled Campbell's objection and sentenced him to 28 months' imprisonment, to be served consecutively to the 120-month sentence he had already received for the new criminal charges. Campbell appealed his revocation sentence, arguing that the district court incorrectly determined that his attempted armed robbery violation qualified as a crime of violence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that South Carolina attempted armed robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under the residual clause in the Sentencing Guidelines. The court reasoned that since the completed crime of armed robbery is categorically a crime of violence, attempts to commit such a crime similarly qualify. The court also noted that the Guidelines' commentary, which includes inchoate crimes in the definition of a crime of violence, is consistent with the language of the guideline. Therefore, the district court did not err in determining that Campbell's conduct constituted a Grade A violation of his supervised release. View "US v. Campbell" on Justia Law

David Orlando Marquez Cruz, a Salvadoran national and lawful permanent resident of the United States, was convicted of attempted second degree child sexual abuse under Washington, D.C., law. The conviction stemmed from a sexual relationship he had with a fifteen-year-old child. Following his conviction, the Department of Homeland Security charged him with removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) on the grounds of being a noncitizen convicted of a crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment, and as an aggravated felon. Cruz denied that he was removable and requested that his removal be cancelled as a matter of discretion.The immigration judge found Cruz removable based on his conviction of a crime of child abuse, but dismissed the aggravated felony removal charge. The judge declined to cancel Cruz’s removal and ordered him removed. Cruz appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), challenging the immigration judge’s finding that his D.C. conviction qualified as a crime of child abuse. The BIA agreed with the immigration judge and dismissed the appeal. Cruz then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for review.The Fourth Circuit held that Cruz’s conviction for attempted second degree child sexual abuse under D.C. law qualifies as a removable crime of child abuse. The court rejected Cruz’s arguments that a crime of child abuse under the INA does not cover attempts and that statutes imposing strict liability as to a victim’s age cannot satisfy the mens rea requirement because they do not require a culpable mental state. The court concluded that a crime of child abuse requires a culpable mens rea and an actus reus of conduct that either injures a child or creates a sufficiently high risk that a child will be harmed. The court denied Cruz's petition for review. View "Marquez Cruz v. Garland" on Justia Law

The case involves a group of Ghanaian investors who placed their funds with a Ghanaian private investment firm, Gold Coast, owned by the Nduom family, who are domiciled in Virginia. The Nduom family allegedly used a network of shell companies in Ghana and the United States to illicitly transfer the investors' funds out of their reach. The investors sued in a federal district court in Virginia, invoking a provision of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) that authorizes a private cause of action for any person injured in his business or property by a violation of RICO’s substantive prohibitions.The district court dismissed the action, ruling that the plaintiffs had not alleged a domestic injury, which is a requirement for a private RICO plaintiff. The court considered the residency of the plaintiffs and the location of the money when it was misappropriated, both of which were in Ghana. The court also dismissed the plaintiffs’ state law claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, as there was no diversity jurisdiction over the claims and the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims after dismissing the only federal claim in the case.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court agreed that the plaintiffs had not alleged a domestic injury, which is a requirement for a private RICO plaintiff. The court noted that the case involved Ghanaian victims who entrusted Ghanaian funds to a Ghanaian entity, with no expectation that their money would end up in the United States. The defendants’ unilateral use of American entities to complete their scheme did not domesticate an otherwise foreign injury. View "Percival Partners Limited v. Paa Nduom" on Justia Law

Andre Ricardo Briscoe was involved in the purchase and sale of narcotics in Baltimore. He learned from a contact, Kiara Haynes, that Jennifer Jeffrey had received a large supply of heroin. Briscoe and Haynes decided to rob Jeffrey. Briscoe went to Jeffrey’s house, robbed her of at least 80 grams of narcotics, shot and killed her, and shot and killed her seven-year-old son, K.B., whom Briscoe feared might testify against him. Briscoe was arrested and initially charged with possession with intent to distribute narcotics, conspiracy to distribute narcotics, and possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. A later superseding indictment added three new counts: two counts of murder with a firearm during the commission of a drug trafficking crime and one count of killing a witness to prevent communication with law enforcement. After a twelve-day jury trial, Briscoe was convicted on all charges.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland denied Briscoe's motion to dismiss the indictment as barred by the statute of limitations, concluding that the indictment related back to the earlier filed information. The court also denied Briscoe's motion to suppress evidence obtained through the use of a cell site simulator, finding that the police had obtained a tracking order which authorized them to use the simulator. The court further found that the police had obtained consent to search the apartment where Briscoe was found and that their subsequent actions were part of a lawful protective sweep of the apartment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the government properly tolled the statute of limitations by filing an information within the five-year period and that the subsequent indictment related back to that filing. The court also held that the police had authority to use a cell site simulator to obtain Briscoe's location information and to search the apartment where he was found. The court rejected Briscoe's arguments that the government committed a Brady violation by failing to follow up on whether any footage was contained on a broken camera and that the government knowingly relied upon false testimony to secure his conviction. The court further held that the evidence was sufficient to convict Briscoe on all counts. View "United States v. Briscoe" on Justia Law

The defendant, Bobby Lee Minton, who has a history of mental illness and substance abuse, was convicted of possessing a firearm after being convicted of a felony. The incident began when Minton knocked on a stranger's door asking for water and ended with him pulling out a gun. Minton appealed his conviction, arguing that the district court erred in not dismissing the indictment under the Speedy Trial Act.The district court had found Minton incompetent to stand trial on June 11, 2020, and his competency was restored on September 27, 2021. The dispute in this appeal was about how much of the 473-day period between these two dates should be included in the Speedy Trial Act calculation. Minton argued that 129 days of the incompetency period should be included, as he was not transported to a facility for competency restoration until 139 days after the court committed him to the Attorney General's custody. He based his argument on 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F), which presumes delays of more than 10 days in transporting a defendant to be unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit disagreed with Minton's argument. The court held that the entire period of Minton's legal incompetency was excluded from the Speedy Trial Act's 70-day trial clock under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(4), which excludes any period of delay resulting from the fact that the defendant is mentally incompetent or physically unable to stand trial. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that the district court correctly denied Minton's motion to dismiss under the Speedy Trial Act. View "United States v. Minton" on Justia Law

The case involves Donald Herrington, who was charged with multiple counts of perjury, obtaining money by false pretenses, filing false or fraudulent income tax returns, failure to file an income tax return, and drug possession. Herrington chose to represent himself in court, waiving his right to counsel. He was eventually convicted on several charges and sentenced to twelve years' imprisonment. Herrington appealed his conviction, arguing that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated and that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to bring two meritorious arguments on direct appeal.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, which rejected Herrington's arguments and denied his petition. Herrington then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions. The court found that Herrington knowingly, unequivocally, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel, thus affirming that aspect of the district court's decision. However, the court agreed with Herrington that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that the jury was erroneously instructed on the requirements for a conviction for failure to file a tax return. The court reversed this part of the district court's decision and remanded the case with instructions to issue a writ of habeas corpus unless Herrington is afforded a new state court appeal in which he may raise this claim. View "Herrington v. Dotson" on Justia Law

The case involves Austin Kyle Lee, who was found guilty of several federal drug and firearm offenses. After serving over four years in a New York prison for selling cocaine, Lee was released in late 2015 and moved to North Carolina, where he resumed selling drugs. A search of his residences revealed distribution quantities of a fentanyl–heroin mixture, cocaine, and marijuana; handguns and ammunition; packaging material; and over $200,000 in cash. A federal grand jury returned a superseding indictment charging Lee with multiple offenses, including conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute one kilogram or more of heroin, five kilograms or more of cocaine, and a quantity of marijuana, among others.The district court found Lee guilty on all counts. The court also found additional facts that increased Lee’s mandatory minimum sentence for those crimes. Lee appealed, arguing that this judicial factfinding violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. The Government agreed but contended that the district court’s procedural error was harmless because proof of the relevant facts was overwhelming and uncontroverted.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court agreed with the Government that any procedural error in the district court’s determination that the serious drug felony enhancement applied to increase Lee’s statutory sentencing range was harmless. The court noted that Lee conceded that, under existing law, the judge could decide the fact of his prior conviction without a jury. Furthermore, the Government’s proof of the other two elements—concerning the duration and recency of his incarceration for that offense—was overwhelming and uncontroverted. View "United States v. Lee" on Justia Law

The case involves David Thurston, a registered sex offender, who moved to Avery County, North Carolina, where Kevin Frye served as Sheriff and Lee Buchanan was the Deputy in charge of sex-offender registrations. Thurston informed Sheriff Frye that he had been invited to his nephew’s wedding in Spokane, Washington, and sought advice on how to comply with the law and asked for permission to attend the wedding. Sheriff Frye gave Thurston permission to travel and instructed him to email a copy of his Washington visitor-registration form within ten days of his arrival. However, while Thurston was away, the Sheriff’s Office mailed his verification form. Thurston contacted Sheriff Frye for guidance, but Sheriff Frye never responded. Deputy Buchanan began investigating Thurston and obtained a warrant alleging three different criminal violations. Thurston was arrested upon his return to North Carolina.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina denied the officers' motion for summary judgment, arguing that they were entitled to qualified immunity because their arrest of Thurston did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights. The officers appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that Thurston’s arrest was unconstitutional and that the officers failed to prove that they acted objectively reasonably in seeking Thurston’s arrest warrant. The court also concluded that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity because Thurston’s right to be free from unlawful arrest was clearly established. View "Thurston v. Frye" on Justia Law