Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the defendant, José Gambino-Ruiz, was convicted and sentenced for illegal re-entry into the U.S. under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Gambino-Ruiz appealed his conviction, arguing that the removal order, which was the basis for his charge, was improper under the Immigration and Nationality Act. He also contested his sentence, claiming that the district judge considered impermissible factors in denying a downward sentencing adjustment for acceptance of responsibility.The Court ruled that Gambino-Ruiz was properly subject to expedited removal under § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) and therefore did not violate his due process rights when he was removed via expedited proceedings in 2013. He was properly convicted of illegal re-entry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Furthermore, the Court affirmed his sentence, ruling that Gambino-Ruiz did not demonstrate that his was a rare circumstance where the adjustment for acceptance of responsibility is due after the defendant has proceeded to trial.The facts of the case are as follows: Gambino-Ruiz, a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the U.S. illegally several times. Each time, he was apprehended by border patrol agents and subsequently deported through expedited removal proceedings. In 2020, he was again found in the U.S. illegally and was charged with illegal re-entry of a removed alien. His motions to dismiss the charges and to suppress his admissions to the border patrol agents were denied, leading to a trial where he was found guilty. At sentencing, Gambino-Ruiz's request for a downward sentencing adjustment for acceptance of responsibility was denied, leading to his appeal. View "USA V. GAMBINO-RUIZ" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed two defendants’ convictions for violating the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA), which prohibits the possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute while on board a covered vessel. The defendants were arrested after their speedboat, which was carrying at least 1,000 kilograms of cocaine, was intercepted by the U.S. Coast Guard off the coast of Ecuador. The vessel carried no nationality flag, but both defendants verbally claimed Ecuadorian nationality for the vessel. The Ecuadorian government neither confirmed nor denied the nationality. The United States treated the vessel as stateless and exercised jurisdiction. The defendants challenged the government’s jurisdiction, arguing that the relevant provision of the MDLEA under which jurisdiction was exercised is unconstitutional because it conflicts with international law regarding when a vessel may be treated as stateless. The court held that the definition of “vessel without nationality” under the MDLEA does not conflict with international law, and thus affirmed the lower court’s denial of the defendants’ motion to dismiss the indictment. View "USA V. MARIN" on Justia Law

In the case reviewed, Mario Gonzalez-Godinez was convicted for attempted illegal entry under 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) after being found near a border fence and admitting to being a Mexican citizen without documentation. After his arrest, a Border Patrol agent read him his Miranda rights as well as his immigration-related administrative rights. Gonzalez waived both sets of rights and then confessed to having been smuggled across the border. Gonzalez argued on appeal that the Miranda warning was inadequate and his conviction should be vacated under the corpus delicti doctrine. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected both arguments.Firstly, the court ruled that the Miranda warning was not inadequate despite also warning Gonzalez that the post-arrest interview may be his only chance to seek asylum. While these two warnings may have posed difficult decisions for Gonzalez, the court found them to be neither contradictory nor confusing. The court held that the government did not need to provide further clarification to the Miranda warning.Secondly, the court held that the corpus delicti doctrine, which requires some evidence to support a confession, did not require vacating Gonzalez's conviction. The court found that sufficient evidence supported Gonzalez’s confession, as he had twice admitted to being a Mexican citizen and his behavior at the border supported his confession. Thus, the court affirmed Gonzalez’s conviction. View "USA V. GONZALEZ-GODINEZ" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant, Myron Motley, was convicted and sentenced for his involvement in a conspiracy to distribute controlled substances—oxycodone and hydrocodone. Motley appealed his conviction, arguing that the evidence obtained from two GPS tracking warrants and a wiretap warrant was obtained illegally.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision to deny Motley's motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the GPS tracking warrants. The court held that Motley had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his opioid prescription records maintained in Nevada's Prescription Monitoring Program database due to the government's long-standing and pervasive regulation of opioids. Therefore, the Fourth Amendment challenge to the GPS tracking warrants failed.Additionally, the court affirmed the lower court's determination that the wiretap warrant was supported by probable cause and was necessary. The court found that the affidavit supporting the wiretap warrant application contained sufficient evidence establishing probable cause that Motley was engaged in a conspiracy to illegally distribute prescription opioids. The affidavit also contained enough information for the court to reasonably conclude that a wiretap was necessary to identify the full scope of the conspiracy.The court dismissed Motley's counterarguments, stating that the government's need for a wiretap was not negated simply because it managed to obtain some evidence of a conspiracy without a wiretap. The court explained that the government has a powerful interest in identifying all conspirators and the full scope of the conspiracy. For these reasons, the court affirmed the lower court's decisions. View "USA V. MOTLEY" on Justia Law

In this case, Robert Sproat was convicted on ten counts of securities fraud. On appeal, Sproat argued that the district court improperly coerced the jurors into reaching a unanimous guilty verdict by instructing them to return the next day after they had reported an impasse in their deliberations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction, rejecting Sproat's argument. The court held that merely instructing a jury that reported an impasse to return the next day is not unconstitutionally coercive. The court found that the district court's instruction to return did not amount to an Allen charge, an instruction encouraging jurors to reach a unanimous verdict. The court explained that no such encouragement was explicit or implicit in the district court's instruction.The court also observed that the district court had not asked the jury to identify the nature of its impasse or the vote count before excusing them for the evening, and that any theoretical risk of coercion was cured by the partial Allen instruction the district court gave the following day, emphasizing the jurors' freedom to maintain their honest beliefs and their ability to be excused if they could not overcome their impasse. The court concluded that the district court's instruction to return the next day and the partial Allen instruction the following day did not coerce the jurors into reaching a unanimous guilty verdict. View "USA V. SPROAT" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the drug-trafficking and money-laundering convictions of Benjamin Galecki and Charles Burton Ritchie for their distribution of "spice," a synthetic cannabinoid product. The defendants were found guilty of manufacturing and distributing spice through their company, Zencense Incenseworks, LLC. The drug-trafficking charges were based on the premise that the cannabinoid used, XLR-11, was treated as a controlled substance because it was an "analogue" of a listed substance. The court rejected the defendants' arguments that their convictions should be set aside due to Fourth Amendment violations, insufficient evidence, and vagueness of the Controlled Substance Analogue Enforcement Act of 1986. However, the court reversed their mail and wire fraud convictions due to insufficient evidence. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "USA V. GALECKI" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the conviction of former congressman Jeffrey Fortenberry for making false statements during an investigation into illegal campaign contributions. Fortenberry was interviewed by federal agents in his Nebraska home and his lawyer's office in Washington D.C., who were based in Los Angeles, California, where the alleged illegal contribution activity occurred. He was charged in California, tried, and convicted there. Fortenberry argued that the district court incorrectly denied his motion to dismiss the case because venue was improper in the Central District of California. The district court held that a violation of making a false statement under 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) occurs not only where the false statement is made, but also where it has an effect on a federal investigation. The Ninth Circuit rejected this interpretation, holding that such an effects-based test for venue in a § 1001 offense has no support in the Constitution, the text of the statute, or historical practice. The court held that the false statement offense is complete when the statement is made, and it does not depend on subsequent events or circumstances, or whether the recipient of the false statement was in fact affected by it in any way. The court reversed Fortenberry's conviction without prejudice to retrial in a proper venue. View "USA V. FORTENBERRY" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant, Christopher De Leon Guerrero, was convicted on two counts of attempted enticement of a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) and 18 U.S.C. § 2, and was sentenced to ten years in prison and five years of supervised release. Guerrero appealed his conviction and sentence.Guerrero's conviction was based on his online conversations with a fictional 13-year-old girl named "Emily," who was actually a federal agent. He made plans to meet "Emily" at Andersen Air Force Base for sexual activities. Guerrero argued that he could not be charged under Guam law for actions that took place on a federal enclave, Andersen Air Force Base. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit disagreed, citing a precedent set in United States v. Lopez.The court affirmed Guerrero’s convictions under § 2422(b) by referencing another predicate offense, not specified in the indictment, with which he could have been charged. They concluded that both of Guerrero’s convictions could be supported by § 13.10, the Guam criminal attempt statute.As for the sentence, the court agreed with both parties that Guerrero’s sentence should be reversed, vacated, and remanded to the district court for reconsideration of three special conditions imposed on his supervised release. These conditions were that Guerrero must not go to places where children under the age of 18 are likely to be, must not view or possess any visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct, and must participate in a sex offense-specific treatment program.The court affirmed the convictions but reversed, vacated, and remanded the sentence to the district court for reconsideration of the three special conditions of supervised release. View "USA V. GUERRERO" on Justia Law

In a case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, plaintiff Spencer Elden, who as a baby was photographed naked in a pool for the cover of Nirvana’s album Nevermind, sued Nirvana L.L.C., Universal Music Group, and others. Elden claimed that he was a victim of child pornography due to the photograph and sought personal injury damages under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 (2018). The district court dismissed Elden's lawsuit, stating that it was barred by the ten-year statute of limitations, 18 U.S.C. § 2255(b)(1) (2018).However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and held that because each republication of child pornography may constitute a new personal injury, Elden’s complaint alleging republication of the album cover within the ten years preceding his action was not barred by the statute of limitations. The court drew a parallel between the personal injury caused by defamation and the injury caused by republication of child pornography, noting that victims of child pornography may suffer a new injury upon the republication of the pornographic material. The court remanded the case back to the district court for further proceedings. View "ELDEN V. NIRVANA L.L.C." on Justia Law

In the Central District of California, defendant-appellant Christopher Esqueda was convicted for possession of a firearm as a felon, following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence collected during an undercover operation. Undercover agents, with Esqueda's consent, entered his motel room to conduct a controlled purchase of a firearm. The agents secretly recorded the encounter using audio-video equipment concealed on their persons. Esqueda argued that the secret recording of the encounter exceeded the scope of the "implied license" he granted when he consented to the officers' physical entry, hence infringing upon his Fourth Amendment rights.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that no Fourth Amendment search occurred. It relied on longstanding Supreme Court precedents asserting that an undercover officer who physically enters a premises with express consent and secretly records only what he can see and hear by virtue of his consented entry does not trespass, physically intrude, or otherwise engage in a search violative of the Fourth Amendment. The court noted that the Supreme Court's decisions in Florida v. Jardines and United States v. Jones, which outline a property-based, trespassory test for Fourth Amendment violations, do not disturb this principle. View "USA V. ESQUEDA" on Justia Law