Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted by a jury of sixteen counts of attempted sexual exploitation of a minor under 18 U.S.C. Section 2251(a) and one count of possession of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. Section 2252A(a)(5)(B). At trial, the jury heard extensive evidence that Defendant placed a hidden camera in his bathroom with the purpose of secretly recording and amassing a collection of nude videos of his then fourteen-year-old stepdaughter. Defendant asserts there was insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions, arguing on appeal (1) that he did not “use” his stepdaughter in a way that violates Section 2251(a) and (2) that the videos did not depict “sexually explicit conduct,” as defined by 18 U.S.C. Section 2256(2)(A)(v), which applies to both Sections 2251(a) and 2252A.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel concluded that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the videos reasonably fell within the definition of sexually explicit conduct. The panel wrote that the district court did not clearly err in determining that a reasonable jury could find (1) that the focal point of the videos was on T.A.’s genitals or pubic area, (2) that T.A. is fully nude in the videos, and (3) that the videos were intended or designed to elicit a sexual response in the viewer. The panel reached the same result under a de novo review of the sufficiency of the evidence. View "USA V. TEL BOAM" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for panel rehearing and denied on behalf of the court a petition for rehearing en banc in a case in which the panel held that federal courts lack jurisdiction to review the discretionary determination that a particular noncitizen in immigration detention poses a danger to the community, and so is not entitled to release on bond. Judge Berzon, joined by Chief Judge Murguia and Judges Wardlaw, W. Fletcher, Paez, Christen, Hurwitz, Koh, Sung, Mendoza, and Desai, disagreed with the Court’s refusal to reconsider the panel opinion en banc. View "JAVIER MARTINEZ V. LOWELL CLARK, ET AL" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for possessing a Jimenez Arms .380 semiautomatic handgun in violation of the felon in possession of a firearm statute. He was not tried until August 30, 2021— 557 days after his indictment—largely because of the COVID-19 pandemic. Over Defendant’s objection, the district court excluded much of this time from Defendant’s Speedy Trial Act calculation using the “ends of justice” provision of the Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 3161(h)(7)(A), and as a result, denied Defendant’s Sixth Amendment and Speedy Trial Act motions to dismiss his indictment. At trial, the district court rejected Defendant’s request for a jury instruction requiring the jury to find that he knew that the handgun he possessed had traveled in interstate commerce. Defendant appealed both the speedy-trial and jury instruction issues.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel held that the district court properly excluded time under the ends of justice provision. The panel held that the non-exhaustive factors set forth in United States v. Olsen, 21 F.4th 1036 (9th Cir. 2022), support the district court’s exclusion of time and that the district court did not err in its ends of justice determination. The panel wrote that the district court acted commendably in doing its best to balance speedy trial rights and public safety in the face of what is hopefully a once-in-a-lifetime pandemic. The panel held that the district court did not err by refusing to give Defendant’s requested mens rea instruction. The panel rejected his challenge to the revocation of supervised release. View "USA V. TOMMY WALKER" on Justia Law

In his habeas corpus petition, Petitioner claimed that he was denied effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment by his trial counsel waiving closing argument and failing to consult a forensic pathologist expert.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Petitioner’s 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 habeas corpus petition challenging his conviction and 10-to-25-year sentence for the second-degree murder. The panel agreed with Petitioner that his counsel’s decision to waive the closing argument was not based on strategy and that he was prejudiced by counsel’s waiver. Addressing deficient performance, the panel wrote that neither reason offered by trial counsel during post-conviction proceedings testimony—that he chose to waive closing argument to cut off the possibility that the lead prosecutor would give a more powerful rebuttal closing argument, and to preclude the prosecutor from arguing for first-degree murder—is supported by the record.   The panel wrote that trial counsel’s decision to waive closing argument was also unreasonable under prevailing professional norms. The panel held that Petitioner successfully showed that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s waiver of closing argument. Had trial counsel made a closing argument, he could have explained that Petitioner’s actions were not the proximate cause of the victim’s death and asked the jury to convict, if at all, on a lesser offense. The panel also agreed with Petitioner that trial counsel’s decision not to consult a forensic pathologist expert was not based on strategy and that Petitioner was prejudiced by this decision. View "ZACHARY KELSEY V. TIM GARRETT, ET AL" on Justia Law

Petitioner, an Arizona prisoner, appealed the district court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 habeas petition as untimely. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) established a one-year statute of limitations for filing a federal habeas petition.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order dismissing as untimely Petitioner’s 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 habeas petition. The panel held that a post-conviction relief application in Arizona ceases to be “pending” under 28 U.S.C. Section 2244(d)(2) for purposes of tolling AEDPA’s one-year limitation period as long as a state avenue for relief remains open, whether or not a petitioner takes advantage of it. Applying the same statute, the panel also held that Petitioner’s post-conviction application ceased to be pending when the time for him to seek further relief in the state courts expired, which was not precisely when the Arizona Court of Appeals issued its mandate. Applying those principles and correcting some misunderstandings as to when certain events occurred and certain periods expired, the panel reversed the dismissal of the petition and remanded for further proceedings. View "PAUL MELVILLE, JR. V. DAVID SHINN, ET AL" on Justia Law

A California jury sentenced Petitioner to death for a 1988 murder. The California Supreme Court affirmed his conviction on direct appeal, and the United States Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of certiorari. This appeal arose from the district court’s decision granting penalty phase relief on Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The State appealed that decision, and Petitioner cross-appealed the denial of guilt phase relief.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of habeas relief on Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase and affirmed the district court’s denial of relief on claims at the guilt phase. Reviewing under 28 U.S.C. Section 2254(d), the panel held in the government’s appeal that the California Supreme Court unreasonably applied the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), in evaluating Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance at the penalty phase. The panel concluded that had the three categories of evidence that counsel should have discovered been presented to the jury, there is a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have voted against the death penalty. The panel did not need to reach whether the denial of relief on Petitioner’s penalty-phase claim that he was deprived of due process by the State’s presentation of false evidence violated 28 U.S.C. Section 2254(d). On Petitioner’s cross-appeal from the denial of relief at the guilt phase, the panel held that the California Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), and its progeny in upholding the admission of Petitioner’s confession. View "TAUNO WAIDLA V. RON DAVIS" on Justia Law

Defendant, a citizen of Mexico, was indicted for illegally reentering the United States following prior removal, in violation of 8 U.S.C. Section 1326. He successfully moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that Section 1326 violates the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment and is, therefore, facially invalid.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting Defendant’s motion to dismiss. The court wrote that Defendant did not carry his burden of proving that Section 1326 was enacted with the intent to be discriminatory towards Mexicans and other Central and South Americans. The court held that the district court erred factually and legally in holding otherwise. Further, the court reasoned that Defendant’s equal protection challenge fails even under the usual test for assessing such claims set forth in Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), the panel declined to address whether immigration laws should be evaluated through a more deferential framework. As drafted, Section 1326 is facially neutral as to race. The panel, therefore, turned to the question of whether Defendant carried his burden of showing that racial discrimination was a motivating factor in enacting Section 1326. The panel disagreed with Defendant’s argument that a Senate Report, the basis for the 1952 legislation, is replete with racism. The panel held that the district court clearly erred when it relied on Congress’s decision to override President Truman’s veto of the INA as evidence that Section 1326 was enacted in part by discriminatory animus. View "USA V. GUSTAVO CARRILLO-LOPEZ" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for attempted illegal reentry after deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. Section 1326. He contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss his information for violations of the Speedy Trial Act.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the district court did not clearly err in excluding periods of delay resulting from ends-of-justice continuances granted due to events caused by the global COVID-19 pandemic. The panel concluded that the district court complied with the applicable statutory requirements. First, the district court’s finding that the ends of justice were best served by granting continuances during the period from August 14, 2020, until December 1, 2020, was timely because the district court put this finding on the record during the July 12, 2021, hearing on Defendant’s motion to dismiss under 18 U.S.C. Section 3162(a)(2). The continuances were also specifically limited in time to successive 30-day periods. Next, the district court made the requisite findings under Section 3161(h)(7)(A). The panel rejected Defendant’s argument that the district court erred by not dismissing his information on the ground that 8 U.S.C. Section 1326 violates the Equal Protection Clause. View "USA V. ARMANDO OROZCO-BARRON" on Justia Law

In this case, multiple defendants alleged that one Assistant U.S. Attorney engaged in potential professional misconduct. Rather than screening out the accused Assistant U.S. Attorney, the district court disqualified all 180 federal prosecutors from the Arizona U.S. Attorney’s Office from defending against the misconduct allegations. The district court then ordered the Department of Justice to supply an attorney from outside Arizona to litigate Defendants’ motions.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order disqualifying the entire District of Arizona U.S. Attorney’s Office and directing the Department of Justice to supply an attorney from outside Arizona to represent the government in pending motions. The panel held that the district court’s sweeping disqualification order was an abuse of discretion. The panel wrote that based on separation-of-powers principles and the consensus among courts, disqualification of an entire U.S. Attorney’s Office is an extreme remedy—only appropriate in the most extraordinary circumstances. e panel held that the record does not support an officewide disqualification, and without any evidence of officewide involvement, it was pure speculation to conclude that any conflict or misconduct pervaded the entire U.S. Attorney’s Office. The panel also held that no clear violation of law or ethics supports an officewide disqualification. The panel wrote that the district court—whose decision to disqualify was informed, in part, by a comparison to an internal investigation of a private company—does not appear to have sufficiently appreciated the separation-of-powers concern. View "USA V. DAVID WILLIAMS, ET AL" on Justia Law

Appellant (the “Warden”) conceded that the Ninth Circuit Court could no longer provide meaningful relief to Petitioner after the state court’s complete vacatur of his original conviction. Although the Warden continued to contest mootness, he did so only on the ground that the district court’s alleged legal error was capable of repetition yet evading review.   The Ninth Circuit dismissed as moot an appeal by the Warden and remanded with instructions that the district court vacates its orders granting habeas relief and dismiss Petitioner’s habeas corpus petition. The panel was not persuaded by this argument as the purported error could be presented on appeal following a district court's rejection of a similar argument by another petitioner or after a grant of habeas relief by a district court that was stayed by the district court or by this court, or after a grant of relief that was challenged by the Warden in that case with sufficient promptness to permit the Ninth Circuit’s effective review before release was required under the terms of the district court's order, or under other circumstances. View "MARIO ARCIGA V. SCOTT FRAUENHEIM" on Justia Law