Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Mongol Nation is an unincorporated association whose members include the official, or “full-patch,” members of the Mongols Gang. A jury convicted the association of substantive RICO and RICO conspiracy violations; it also found various forms of Mongol Nation property forfeitable. That property included the collective membership marks—a type of intellectual property used to designate membership in an association or other organization. The district court denied forfeiture of those marks, holding that the forfeiture would violate the First and Eighth Amendments.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court explained that in Mongol Nation’s appeal, it argued for the first time that it is not an indictable “person” under RICO because the indictment alleges that the association was organized for unlawful purposes only. The panel concluded that this unpreserved argument is non-jurisdictional. The panel did not resolve the Government’s contention that Mongol waived it. The panel wrote that regardless of the merits of Mongol Nation’s argument, it mischaracterizes the allegations in the indictment.    On the Government’s cross-appeal of the order denying its second preliminary order of forfeiture, the panel did not need to decide whether forfeiture of the membership marks would violate the First and Eighth Amendments. Nor did the panel reach the question of whether the marks may be forfeitable without the transfer of any goodwill associated with the marks. The panel held that the forfeiture was improper for a different reason—the Government effectively sought an order seizing and extinguishing the Mongols’ right to exclusive use of its marks without the Government itself ever seizing title to the marks. View "USA V. MONGOL NATION" on Justia Law

Defendant asserted that permitting a juror to participate remotely via Zoom violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, that the error was structural and could not be waived, and that he is therefore entitled to a new trial without having to show prejudice. Defendant asserted that the alleged error is akin to depriving him of his right to a jury trial, depriving him of his right to a fair and impartial jury, depriving him of a representative jury, and/or depriving him of his right to confront witnesses   The Ninth Circuit affirmed his robbery convictions. The court assumed without deciding that criminal defendants have a constitutional right to the in-person participation of jurors during their trial. The panel wrote that none of these comparisons is apt, as there is no indication in the record—and no reason to suppose—that the remote participation of a duly empaneled juror interfered with the functioning of the jury, somehow made that juror partial or unrepresentative, or impacted the procedures used for the presentation of witnesses. The panel wrote that allowing remote juror participation does not impact the entire framework of the trial in ways that cannot be accurately measured on review. The court explained that none of those errors Defendant alleged will necessarily arise simply because a juror is participating remotely. The panel wrote that there is no case law or record evidence to support a presumption that the remote participation of a juror will always render a trial unfair and the judgment unreliable. View "USA V. EDWARD KNIGHT" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for panel rehearing and denied on behalf of the court a petition for rehearing en banc. Judge VanDyke, joined by Judges Callahan, Ikuta, Bennett, R. Nelson, and Bumatay, dissented from the denial rehearing en banc. Judge VanDyke wrote that the term “clearly established Federal law” under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act only refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of the Supreme Court’s decisions; and that the Supreme Court has emphasized that if this court must extend a rationale before it can apply to the facts at hand, then by definition the rationale was not “clearly established.” View "FREDDIE CRESPIN V. CHARLES RYAN, ET AL" on Justia Law

Defendant was stopped for a license-plate violation, and deputies from the San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department (SBCSD) discovered that he had an expired driver’s license and a long criminal history. The deputies conducted an inventory search before towing Defendant’s truck, and, after finding a handgun under the driver’s seat of his truck, arrested Defendant for being a felon in possession of a firearm.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order denying Defendant’s motion to suppress a handgun found during an inventory search of his truck, vacated a condition of supervised release, and remanded.  The panel held that the district court did not err in concluding that the government established that a valid community caretaking purpose existed for impounding and inventorying Defendant’s truck before the search was conducted. The panel wrote that the deputies had an objectively reasonable belief that Anderson’s truck, which he had parked in a private driveway, was parked illegally. The panel disagreed with Defendant’s assertion that the deputies’ inventory search was invalid because they failed to comply with the SBCSD’s standardized inventory search procedures.   The panel wrote that the inventory search was conducted pursuant to a standard policy, and was performed in good faith, not solely for the purpose of obtaining evidence of a crime; therefore, the government’s interest in the protection of property and protection of the police outweighed Defendant’s expectation of privacy in the contents of his car, and the search was reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes. View "USA V. JONATHAN ANDERSON" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for attempted enticement of a child by means of interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 2422(b). Defendant’s challenges to the conviction principally concern the use of an adult intermediary and the lack of any direct communication with a person believed to be a child.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction for attempted enticement of a child by means of interstate commerce but remanded for the district court to narrow a special condition of supervised release on computer possession and use. Challenging the use of an adult intermediary for his communications, Defendant contended that Section 2422(b) required the government to prove direct communication with someone he believed to be a minor. Noting that no circuit has agreed with Defendant’s position, the panel took the opportunity to stress that so long as the government proves the defendant’s intent was to obtain sex with a minor, it does not matter that the phone or internet communications occurred only between the defendant and the adult intermediary.   The panel rejected Defendant’s contention that the government improperly relied on evidence that Defendant arrived at the anticipated rendezvous with children’s gift bags and sex toys. Regarding Defendant’s claim that the government presented an invalid legal theory to the jury by arguing that Defendant could be convicted of violating Section 2422(b) based only, or primarily, on his in-person activities at the house, the panel wrote that, considering the record as a whole, the government did not convey an improper theory nor claim that Defendant’s online activities were inessential or irrelevant. View "USA V. NOEL MACAPAGAL" on Justia Law

Defendant solicited others to deliver a bomb to the home of a witness who had testified against him at his criminal trial. He was charged with retaliating against a trial witness (Count 1); soliciting the transportation of an explosive device in commerce with the knowledge or intent that it would be used to kill, injure, or intimidate a person or damage property (Count 2); and soliciting the use of facilities of commerce with the intent that a murder be committed (Count 3).  The jury acquitted Defendant on Count 1, but convicted him on Counts 2 and 3. Before his sentencing, Defendant renewed his arguments for acquittal for a third time, but the district court again denied his motion. The district court sentenced Defendant to consecutive 60-month sentences on Counts 2 and 3, for a total term of 120 months’ imprisonment, to be followed by three years of supervised release.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed conviction for soliciting the transportation of an explosive device in commerce with the knowledge or intent that it would be used to kill, injure, or intimidate a person or damage property, reversed his conviction for soliciting the use of facilities of commerce with the intent that a murder be committed, and remanded for resentencing. The panel held that a violation of Section 844(d) is a categorical match to Section 373(a). The panel concluded that a violation of Section 844(d) requires the defendant to have undertaken a substantial step toward the use of violent force, which means that a violation of Section 844(d) categorically requires the attempted use of physical force within the meaning of Section 373(a). View "USA V. DAVID LINEHAN" on Justia Law

Defendants challenged their convictions for various sexual offenses against children, under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Defendants first argued that the district court erred in denying their first motion to suppress because a detective’s affidavit supporting a 2016 warrant to search the residence contained material, intentionally false and/or reckless statements and omissions that misled the issuing judge; specifically, that the affidavit misstated the contents of a CyberTipline Report, drew conclusions unsupported by the Report, and ignored exculpatory factors.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s orders denying Defendants joint motions to suppress evidence. The panel held that Defendants failed to show that the affidavit contained any materially false statements or omissions (much less any such statements knowingly or recklessly made). The panel wrote that Defendants misstated the factual record by insisting that only one IP address was relevant, and that Defendants do not substantively address the results from a Tumblr search warrant referenced in the affidavit, which further supports the probable cause determination.   Defendants further argued that the district court erred in denying their second motion to suppress evidence derived from a 2018 search. The panel held that the district court did not clearly err by finding that Defendants abandoned the devices. The panel wrote that Defendants’ failure to ensure that their brother recovered the devices before the home was sold, and their subsequent failure to take any additional action, is sufficient to support a finding of abandonment, even if Defendants ceased their efforts only because they feared detection by law enforcement. View "USA V. JOSHUA FISHER" on Justia Law

Defendants recruited several “nannies” to live and work in their home. These nannies were subjected to a range of conditions, including: eighteen-hour workdays, limited food, isolation from their families, verbal and physical abuse, threats of violence, threats to call the authorities, and no pay. After an eleven-day jury trial, Defendants were convicted of conspiracy to commit forced labor in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1594(b) and two substantive counts of forced labor in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1589(a). Defendants challenge their convictions and sentences. Defendants proposed an instruction that would have told the jury that they must be unanimous as to which of the four prohibited means Defendants used to compel forced labor. The district court rejected the proposed instruction. The jury returned a unanimous guilty verdict on the operative counts.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and concluded that he general unanimity instruction was sufficient. The court explained that all that was required for the jurors to convict Defendants under the forced labor statute was for the jurors to unanimously agree that Defendants knowingly obtained forced labor by one or more of the prohibited means listed in 18 U.S.C. Section 1589(a). The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to give a specific unanimity instruction to the jury. View "USA V. SHARMISTHA BARAI" on Justia Law

Two Coast Guard employees were shot and killed at a Coast Guard station on Kodiak Island, Alaska. A jury found that their co-worker, Defendant, had committed the murders. Defendant contends contention that under the Fifth Amendment, statements he made to government investigators should have been suppressed because they were made under the threat of loss of employment.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s convictions, vacated the district court’s restitution order, and remanded for further proceedings. The panel’s independent review of the record confirmed that the investigators did not explicitly threaten Defendant’s job security if he refused to incriminate himself, and Defendant did not argue otherwise. Instead, Defendant advanced a theory of implicit coercion by virtue of an employment manual, and a letter of caution he received after allegedly using a fuel card for his personal vehicle, which, he argued, operated in the background of his interviews to create “an impermissible penalty situation.” The panel held that in the absence of a direct threat of loss of employment, the appropriate framework for the court is to consider both the public employee’s subjective belief and the objective reasonableness of that belief to determine whether the employee’s statements were improperly coerced; it is only when both elements are satisfied that the employee is, under Garrity, entitled to suppression of his statements absent a grant of immunity. The panel vacated the restitution order and remanded for the district court to determine whether each of Defendant’s benefit payment streams constituted “earnings” under Section 1673; if so, the MVRA limited garnishment of those funds to 25%. View "USA V. JAMES WELLS" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a native of El Salvador, was detained by immigration authorities. An immigration judge (IJ) denied bond, and an IJ later denied him relief under the Convention Against Torture and ordered his removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed his appeal, and this court denied his petition for review. In April 2021, Plaintiff moved the BIA to reopen, and the BIA denied a stay of removal. In May 2021, Plaintiff filed a habeas petition with the district court, which denied his motion to enjoin his removal until his motion to reopen and habeas petition were decided. On June 14, 2021, the district court denied Plaintiff subsequently-filed motion for a TRO, and the government voluntarily agreed to stay removal up to and including August 13, 2021.   The Ninth Circuit filed: 1) an order amending the opinion filed August 13, 2021; and 2) an amended opinion affirming the district court’s denial of Plaintiff’s request for a temporary restraining order (TRO) to prevent the government from removing him. The panel concluded that the district court correctly determined that jurisdiction was barred by 8 U.S.C. Section 1252(g), which provides that “no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien.” The panel rejected Plaintiff’s claim that the Constitution’s Suspension Clause preserves judicial review here. View "WILLIAN RAUDA V. DAVID JENNINGS, ET AL" on Justia Law