Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 1989, Oliver went to a Los Angeles church during evening service and shot three people, two of whom died. During a jury selection at Oliver’s trial on two counts of first-degree murder with special circumstances and attempted murder, the defense made four unsuccessful “Batson” motions, alleging that the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to strike prospective jurors on the basis of race. Oliver argued that the prosecutor’s stated reason for striking V.H.—that V.H. acquitted in a rape case in his only prior jury service—was pretextual, as evidenced by the disparate treatment of S.P., who was allegedly similar to V.H. except for her race.The district court granted habeas relief. The Ninth Circuit reversed in part. In substituting its own factual findings for those of the state court, the district court neglected to frame the relevant question as whether a fair-minded jurist could reach a different conclusion. The decision of the California Supreme Court was not unreasonable and did not "rubber-stamp” the prosecutor’s proffered explanations or otherwise misapply the law. No U.S. Supreme Court decision establishes that detailed factual findings are required before an appellate court may give deference to a trial court’s Batson ruling. If the trial court’s inquiry was deficient, it was cured by the California Supreme Court’s searching analysis, which included a de novo comparative juror analysis. The court remanded to allow the district court to assess the strikes of three other prospective jurors. View "Oliver v. Davis" on Justia Law

In 1989, Stevens randomly shot at people on or near Interstate 580 in Oakland, leaving four people dead and six people injured. Stevens was sentenced to death.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of his petition for habeas relief, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(2). The court rejected Stevens’ “Batson” claim concerning the prosecutor’s decision to use seven peremptory challenges to strike black prospective jurors. The California Supreme Court reasonably concluded that the prosecutor’s race-neutral justifications for striking prospective jurors were supported by the record. As required by Batson, the court considered the claims on a strike-by-strike basis, in light of “all of the relevant facts and circumstances.” The Ninth Circuit noted that in reviewing a state court’s decision and the trial court’s findings of fact, its role is limited to guarding against “extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems.” Finding no such malfunction the court declined to substitute its judgments for the factual credibility determinations made almost three decades ago by the state trial court. View "Stevens v. Davis" on Justia Law

Four months after passing the bar exam, Shane was appointed as counsel for Rogers in a 1981 capital case involving a triple murder. She was the only attorney in a Nevada State Public Defender's satellite office. Shane recognized that a “not guilty by reason of insanity” (NGRI) argument was her client’s only meaningfully supported defense. Another inexperienced public defender became co-counsel shortly before trial. Counsel failed to prepare their mental health experts for trial and to rebut foreseeable evidence. They did not even consult the expert appointed to address Rogers’s legal sanity at the time of the offense. Rogers was sentenced to death.The Ninth Circuit affirmed a judgment conditionally granting Rogers’s 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus petition. The ineffective assistance claim was never adjudicated on the merits by the Supreme Court of Nevada. Rogers satisfied the “Strickland” test. Even applying the presumption of reasonableness, counsel’s investigation, preparation, and execution of the insanity defense fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Counsel’s most significant error was failing to consult the expert appointed to assess Rogers’s competency for trial and sanity at the time of the offenses; this error was compounded by the inadequate preparation of counsel’s mental health experts. Counsel's failures to rebut the prosecution’s expert and to explain the NGRI defense to the jury in opening statements fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. There was a reasonable likelihood that Rogers’s NGRI defense would have succeeded if counsel had performed effectively. View "Rogers v. Dzurenda" on Justia Law

Hansen operated AHA, which ran a program that purported to help undocumented immigrants become U.S. citizens through adult adoption. Hansen falsely told victims that many immigrants had become U.S. citizens through the Program. No one had achieved U.S. citizenship through the Program; it is not possible to become a U.S. citizen through adult adoption. At least 471 victims participated in the Program; each paid between $550 and $10,000. Hansen was convicted of 12 counts of mail fraud, three counts of wire fraud, and two counts of encouraging or inducing unlawful immigration for private financial gain.The Ninth Circuit vacated Hansen's convictions for encouraging or inducing an alien to reside in the U.S. for private financial gain, 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv). Subsection (iv) is overbroad and unconstitutional. Subsection (iv) prohibits someone from inspiring, helping, persuading, or influencing, through speech or conduct, one or more specified aliens to come to or reside in the United States in violation of civil or criminal law. The court rejected an argument that subsection (iv) is limited to speech integral to criminal conduct--solicitation and aiding and abetting. Subsection (iv) covers a substantial amount of speech protected by the First Amendment, given that many commonplace statements and actions could be construed as encouraging or inducing an undocumented immigrant to come to or reside in the U.S. Subsection (iv)’s narrow legitimate sweep pales in comparison to the protected expression encompassed by the subsection. View "United States v. Hansen" on Justia Law

At age 15, Mendoza joined the Canta Ranas Organization (CRO), a Californian gang known for violent extortion and drug distribution. The government alleged that Mendoza continued as an active gang member until 2016, when he was arrested during federal law enforcement’s takedown of the CRO, citing incidents in 2013 and 2016 when police caught Mendoza with a handgun and methamphetamine and text message conversations in which Mendoza asked CRO members for methamphetamine. Mendoza admitted to methamphetamine addiction but denied continued CRO membership, claiming that the methamphetamine with which he was found was for his own consumption.The Ninth Circuit vacated his convictions for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 846; RICO conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 1962(d), and carrying a firearm “during and in relation to” or “in furtherance of” a crime of violence or drug-trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A). Even making all reasonable inferences in the prosecution’s favor, the government did not establish the “prolonged and actively pursued course of drug sales” for which the court looks when deciding, absent direct evidence of an agreement, whether there is sufficient evidence of an agreement to distribute drugs. No reasonable jury could determine beyond a reasonable doubt that Mendoza was part of a conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. Because the RICO conspiracy case turned on the same evidence, there is likewise insufficient evidence to support that conviction. Mendoza’s firearm conviction is unsupported by sufficient evidence. View "United States v. Mendoza" on Justia Law

Jackson violently attacked his girlfriend. The entire attack lasted six-seven minutes. Jackson was convicted of assault resulting in serious bodily injury, 18 U.S.C. 113(a)(6), and kidnapping, section 1201(a)(2).The Ninth Circuit reversed the kidnapping conviction. In kidnapping prosecutions under section 1201(a)(2), courts should consider the factors set forth in precedent to evaluate whether the charged conduct constitutes kidnapping. Applying those factors, the court concluded that the government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a kidnapping occurred. The first factor, the duration of the holding, weighs against kidnapping, as a seven-minute holding would be quite brief on the spectrum of possible kidnappings. The second and third factors—the presence of a separate offense and the degree to which the holding was inherent in the other offense—strongly indicate that there was no kidnapping. The primary conduct here was an assault causing serious bodily injury, which inherently requires the defendant to keep the victim in close enough proximity to inflict the injuries. The fourth factor, whether the holding created significant danger independent of the separate offense, also weighs against classifying the conduct as kidnapping. To the extent that there was any confinement separate from the assault, it was not an independent source of danger. View "United States v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Schlenker pled guilty to second-degree murder, 18 U.S.C. 1111 and 1153(a), and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, section 924(c)(1)(A). In his plea agreement, he waived his right to collaterally attack his conviction and sentence, except for ineffective assistance of counsel claims. After his sentencing, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the residual clause of section 924(c)(3), definition of a “crime of violence,” was unconstitutionally vague. The Ninth Circuit then held that second-degree murder is not a “crime of violence” under the elements clause of section 924(c)(3). Schlenker sought to challenge the validity of his section 924(c) sentence in a habeas proceeding but prosecutors responded that the government would consider the filing of such an action to be a breach of the plea agreement.Schlenker then filed a civil action seeking a declaration that filing a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion would not breach the plea agreement and to clarify the terms of the plea agreement. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his suit. The district court lacked jurisdiction because there was no “case or controversy” as required under Article III. Schlenker’s declaratory action and motion to clarify improperly sought to carve out a collateral legal issue—the validity and scope of the collateral attack waiver—from a potential section 2255 motion, and to use the Declaratory Judgment Act as a substitute to challenge his sentence. View "United States v. Schlenker" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed Ceja’s conviction and sentence for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, distribution of methamphetamine in the amount of at least 50 grams, distribution of methamphetamine in the amount of at least five grams, and distribution of methamphetamine within 1,000 feet of a school.Ceja’s oral jury trial waiver was valid, although the district court did not inform him that he could take part in jury selection or that the jurors would be members of his community. The colloquy was adequate to ensure that Ceja knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his trial. Because the jury trial waiver was conducted orally through a court interpreter, Ceja’s language skills were not a barrier; there is no evidence that Ceja suffers from emotional or cognitive disabilities.Upholding the denial of Ceja’s motion for substitute counsel, the court held that, given the colloquy's subject matter (dissatisfaction with Ceja's counsel’s suggested outcomes), the district court did not abuse its discretion in summarizing its ruling using the language of “inadequacy” rather than “conflict.” The court’s inquiry, though brief, was adequate to discern Ceja’s complaints. A rational trier of fact viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government could find that Ceja distributed 50 grams of methamphetamine in one distribution beyond a reasonable doubt. Upholding the application of the career offender sentencing enhancement, the court reasoned that California’s definition of methamphetamine is a categorical match to the definition under federal law. View "United States v. Ceja" on Justia Law

The government accused Orrock of tax evasion for concealing income he received from the sale of a vacant lot that he controlled. Rather than report the sale proceeds on his personal tax return, Orrock belatedly disclosed the sale in the tax return for a partnership that he also controlled. In that return, he significantly underreported the sale proceeds.The Ninth Circuit affirmed his conviction for evading the assessment of taxes, 26 U.S.C. 7201, rejecting Orrock’s argument that the statute of limitations barred his conviction because it ran from the date he filed his false personal tax return, not from the later act of filing the partnership return. Acknowledging that some language in precedent may seemingly support that argument, the court clarified that the statute of limitations for evasion of assessment cases under section 7201 runs from the last act necessary to complete the offense, either a tax deficiency or the last affirmative act of evasion, whichever is later. The court aligned evasion of assessment cases with evasion of payment cases and joined all the other circuit courts that have addressed the issue. The indictment was filed within six years of Orrock’s last affirmative act of evasion, the filing of the partnership tax return, and was timely. View "United States v. Orrock" on Justia Law

In an action brought under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), the district court entered an injunction, requiring Nevada prison officials to allow the plaintiff to possess no more than a half-ounce of scented oil in his cell for personal use with his prayers.The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Noting RLUIPA's expansive protections for religious liberty, the court concluded that Nevada’s regulation banning personal possession of scented oil substantially burdened the plaintiff’s religious exercise and that Nevada failed to show that the regulation was the least restrictive means of serving compelling interests in general prison security and minimizing contraband. The plain language of RLUIPA prohibits courts from evaluating the centrality of a religious practice or belief, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc-5(7)(A); a court can only scrutinize the sincerity of the prisoner’s beliefs. The court, therefore, rejected assertions that scented oil was not “really that important” to the plaintiff’s worship practice or that plaintiff needed to point to textual support or oral history proving that the Prophet Mohammad used scented oil in prayer. The court noted that the regulation prohibited the plaintiff from using scented oil for prayer—the way the plaintiff believes the Prophet Muhammed prayed—for 34 out of his 35 prayers per week. View "Johnson v. Baker" on Justia Law