Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

King ran a heroin distribution ring focusing on San Francisco housing projects in 1976-1980. King was convicted of first-degree murder and firearms crimes in California state court in 1981 and was sentenced to serve 27 years to life in prison. Later that year, King was convicted of federal drug trafficking crimes and was sentenced to 45 years of incarceration in 1982. King began serving his federal sentence in 2019 after completing his separate California sentence.Shortly thereafter, King directly filed a motion for compassionate release under the First Step Act, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1), arguing that compassionate release was appropriate because he is 77 years old, highly vulnerable to COVID-19 while incarcerated, and has a wife who is struggling with cancer. The district court denied this motion as procedurally improper because it had been filed by King. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Inmates who committed crimes before November 1, 1987, cannot move for compassionate release under section 3582(c)(1) but are instead subject to the Sentencing Reform Act and can gain compassionate release only if the Bureau of Prisons requests it on the prisoner’s behalf under 18 U.S.C. 4205(g). View "United States v. King" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's convictions for possession of device making equipment (18 U.S.C. 1029(a)(4)), possession of at least fifteen unauthorized access devices (18 U.S.C. 1029(a)(3)), aggravated identity theft (18 U.S.C. 1028A(a)(1)), and possession of stolen mail (18 U.S.C. 1708). Defendant's conviction stemmed from his involvement in an identity theft and mail fraud scheme.The panel agreed with defendant that "intent to defraud" is an intent to deceive and cheat—an intent to deprive the victim of money or property by deception. The panel explained that the plain and ordinary meaning of "intent to defraud" under section 1029(a)(3) and (4) is the intent to deprive the victim of money or property by deception. However, given the overwhelming evidence that defendant had the intent to cheat his victims, the panel concluded that the instructional error was harmless. The panel also concluded that defendant's remaining contentions are either meritless or unsupported. View "United States v. Saini" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of prison officials in an action brought by plaintiff, alleging that the confiscation of his mail violated his rights under the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The panel concluded that genuine issues of material fact exist both as to whether the Arizona Department of Corrections applied its order inconsistently as to the CDs, in violation of plaintiff's free speech rights, and whether the exclusion of his Nation of Islam texts substantially burdened his religious exercise in violation of RLUIPA and the Free Exercise Clause. Accordingly, the panel remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "Jones v. Slade" on Justia Law

Flucas sexually abused his daughters and other minors in his household over several years and was the father of numerous children from his own daughters. The Ninth Circuit affirmed his convictions for transportation of a minor with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity, 18 U.S.C. 2423(a), and transportation of an individual with the intent to engage in criminal sexual activity Section 2421(a). The court rejected Flucas’s arguments that the district court erroneously instructed the jury that he could be convicted of transporting an individual for criminal sexual activity if criminal sexual activity was a motivating purpose of the transportation and that the court was required to instruct the jury that criminal sexual activity must be the dominant purpose in order to establish the requisite intent. The district court properly stated that the government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a dominant, significant, or motivating purpose of the transportation of the defendant’s victims was to engage in criminal sexual activity. A non-retroactive amendment to 18 U.S.C. 2423(b), a statute under which Flucas was not charged, does not undermine the consistent precedent throughout the circuits rejecting the “dominant purpose” mens rea. View "United States v. Flucas" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied consolidated applications for permission to file second or successive 28 U.S.C. 2255 motions. The applicants pleaded guilty to use of a weapon in furtherance of a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c).The panel found that the applicants were convicted of armed bank robbery, that armed bank robbery is a crime of violence under the still valid "elements clause" of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3)(A), and that aiding and abetting a crime of violence is also a crime of violence. The panel also found that the applicants have not met the requirements for filing a second or successive motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255 because, under Ninth Circuit precedent, their claim does not "rely on" a new rule of constitutional law. View "Young v. United States" on Justia Law

In 1982, Sanders was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. Sanders’s attorney, Hoover, had never represented a capital defendant before and conducted a minimal penalty phase investigation. Sanders told Hoover that he viewed a life without parole (LWOP) sentence as unacceptable and that he did not want Hoover to present a penalty defense. Hoover presented no evidence and made no argument during the penalty phase.The Ninth Circuit reversed the denial of habeas relief and remanded for a penalty phase trial. Hoover performed deficiently by failing to perform even a rudimentary investigation into Sanders’s social history, failing to obtain reasonably available records, and failing to ensure that Sanders’s decision to forego a penalty phase defense was informed and knowing. Hoover failed to adequately advise Sanders about the penalty phase. There is a reasonable likelihood that Sanders would have changed his mind had Hoover informed and advised him about the penalty phase, and that there is a reasonable likelihood that at least one juror would have changed her mind and voted to impose an LWOP sentence. View "Sanders v. Davis" on Justia Law

After attempting without success to raise her concerns about unsafe medical practices with her employer (ENTA), Armstrong filed a complaint with the Nevada Occupational Safety and Health Administration (NOSHA). Armstrong alleges that ENTA retaliated against her, leading her to file a second complaint. When Armstrong withdrew her complaint before ENTA learned of it, fearing further retaliation, NOSHA notified ENTA about the complaint. More retaliation followed. When she filed a third whistleblowing complaint, NOSHA ended the investigation. ENTA fired Armstrong.The Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal of Armstrong’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 procedural due process claim. Although Armstrong was an at-will employee, Nevada's whistleblower protections can support a property interest in continued employment. Armstrong might be able to plausibly allege a relationship between Nevada officials and her termination sufficient to sustain a “direct participation” or “setting in motion” theory. Armstrong had a property right in the investigation of her complaint; she plausibly alleged that the process she received was essentially nonexistent. Armstrong did not sufficiently allege a substantive due process claim based on a liberty interest. Armstrong did not plausibly allege that the defendants’ actions entirely precluded Armstrong’s ability to work as a human resources professional elsewhere. The court erred in dismissing a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim. View "Armstrong v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

A 12-year-old girl called 911 to report that her mother's boyfriend, Cortesluna, was threatening her and her family with a chainsaw and that they were hiding from him in a bedroom that he was trying to enter. Cortesluna subsequently brought 42 U.S.C. 1983 excessive force claims concerning his arrest.In 2020, the Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of officer Leon. Even taking Cortesluna's version of the facts as true, a reasonable jury would find that Leon's acts were objectively reasonable in the circumstances. Leon faced an immediate threat; Cortesluna had a knife in his pocket and had lowered his hands towards the knife when the first shot came from the beanbag shotgun; his hands remained near the knife in his pocket at the time of the second beanbag shot. The court found that there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether the force that officer Rivas-Villegas used when he kneeled on Cortesluna's back was excessive. Officer Kensic lacked any realistic opportunity to intercede or to stop the excessive force.On remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the federal claims against Rivas-Villegas and remanded for consideration of the other elements of a Monell claim. With respect to state-law claims relating to Rivas-Villegas’s conduct, and other remaining claims, including against other defendants, the 2020 opinion remains intact. View "Cortesluna v. Leon" on Justia Law

Ponce pleaded guilty to the distribution of methamphetamine in 2015. He was sentenced to the mandatory minimum term of 60 months’ imprisonment plus 48 months of supervised release. While in custody, Ponce pursued his rehabilitation with diligence and graduated from the Bureau of Prison’s nine-month intensive Residential Drug Abuse Program. Ponce began his term of supervised release in August 2018. In October 2020, Ponce sought early termination of supervised release, citing his regular involvement with his church, commitment to his family responsibilities, and stable employment. Ponce had married and early termination would improve his family’s housing options.The Ninth Circuit vacated the denial of Ponce’s motion. The correct legal standard for deciding a motion to terminate supervised release appears in 18 U.S.C. 3583(e), whose expansive phrases “conduct of the defendant” and “interest of justice” make clear that a district court enjoys discretion to consider a wide range of circumstances when determining whether to grant early termination. The text of section 3583(e) does not support a legal standard that categorically requires a petitioner to demonstrate undue hardship. Because it was unclear whether the district court applied an improper “blanket rule” that early termination requires exceptional circumstances, the court remanded for the district court to reconsider Ponce’s motion and clarify the standard applied. View "United States v. Ponce" on Justia Law

In 1995, Buck robbed approached a mail carrier, ordered her at gunpoint to put mail in a bag, and fled. Days later, Buck, with accomplices, shot a mail carrier in the head. Buck was convicted on two counts of assaulting a mail carrier with intent to steal mail, 18 U.S.C. 2114(a); attempted murder of a mail carrier, section 1114; and using a firearm during and in relation to a “crime of violence,” section 924(c)(1). He was sentenced to concurrent 210-month terms on the assault and attempted murder convictions, a consecutive 60-month term for the first 924(c) conviction, and a consecutive 240-month term for the second 924(c) conviction. Section 924(c)(1) then imposed a five-year consecutive term of imprisonment for the first offense, and a 20-year term for the second. In 2016, Buck argued, under 28 U.S.C. 2255, that his 2114(a) convictions did not qualify as crimes of violence under section 924(c)(3) and that his sentence for Count 4 should be limited to 60 months, rather than 240 months. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. Applying the modified categorical approach, the court reasoned Buck was convicted of assault with intent to steal mail with the aggravating element of placing the mail carrier’s life in jeopardy by the use of a dangerous weapon, which satisfies 924(c)(3)(A)’s elements clause. Neither the jury instructions nor section 2114(a) contain any suggestion that mere recklessness would suffice; section 2114(a) requires intentional wrongdoing. View "United States v. Buck" on Justia Law