Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In schemes involving Sonoma County, California real estate, attorney Lonich conspired with Sonoma Valley Bank (SVB) officers Melland and Cutting to obtain fraudulent loans. The Ninth Circuit affirmed their convictions but vacated their sentences.The Sixth Amendment’s Speedy Trial Clause was not violated with respect to charges first brought in a superseding indictment. Even assuming the clock started with the original indictment, the delay caused no relevant prejudice. With respect to money laundering (18 U.S.C. 1957) and misapplication of bank funds (18 U.S.C. 656) charges, the district court’s general “knowingly” jury instruction was permissible. Sufficient evidence supported Melland’s conviction for bribery by a bank employee (18 U.S.C. 215(a)(2)). The district court appropriately instructed the jury that, to find Melland “acted corruptly,” the jury must determine he “intend[ed] to be influenced or rewarded in connection with any business or transaction of” a financial institution. Sufficient evidence also supported Lonich’s conviction for attempted obstruction of justice (18 U.S.C. 1512(c)(2)) by encouraging a straw buyer to mislead the grand jury about his role in the scheme.The district court applied several enhancements that dramatically increased the recommended Guidelines sentencing ranges, premised on a finding that defendants caused SVB to fail, making them responsible for associated losses. The court applied a “clear and convincing evidence” standard and noted the district court made no independent findings about the cause of the bank’s collapse. Restitution orders ($20 million) were premised on the same theory. View "United States v. Lonich" on Justia Law

Madjlessi owned PLV, a Sonoma County real-estate development, with a $30 million IndyMac construction loan. Madjlessi defaulted. IndyMac was in FDIC conservatorship. The FDIC auctioned the loan; its rules prohibited Madjlessi from bidding on his own note. Lonich (Madjlessi’s lawyer) and Madjlessi had a straw buyer (House) bid on the loan. Madjlessi owed House $200,000 for contracting work. Lonich created Houseco as an LLC, owned, on paper, by House but controlled by Lonich. Madjlessi and Lonich conspired with Sonoma Valley Bank (SVB) officers to obtain a fraudulent loan for Houseco to bid at the auction. After Houseco prevailed at the auction, it foreclosed on the Madjlessi note and acquired clear title to PLV. Although convicted on federal criminal charges, Lonich continued to receive monthly payments from PLV revenue, After House pleaded guilty and Lonich and others were convicted of federal crimes, the district court entered a preliminary order forfeiting PLV under Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2(b). Houseco filed third-party petitions opposing the forfeiture, arguing that neither Lonich nor House owned PLV.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Houseco’s petitions. A third party in a criminal forfeiture proceeding may not relitigate the antecedent forfeitability question but is restricted to the relief that 21 U.S.C. 853(n)(6) confers. Section 853(n)(6) does not violate Houseco’s procedural due process rights; if Houseco had a valid interest in the property, 853(n)(6) allowed it to vindicate that interest, but because Houseco was created to perpetuate a fraud, section 853(n)(6) provides no relief. View "United States v. House" on Justia Law

Togonon, a citizen of the Philippines, was admitted to the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident. He was later convicted of arson (California Penal Code 451(b)). DHS initiated removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) based on his conviction for "an aggravated felony," “an offense described in” 18 U.S.C. 844(i). The BIA upheld a removal order.The Ninth Circuit vacated. The California statute is not a categorical match to its federal counterpart, under which a defendant acts “maliciously” if he either intentionally damages or destroys property covered by section 844(i) or acts with “willful disregard” of the likelihood that damage or injury would result from his acts; acting with “willful disregard” requires that a defendant be subjectively aware of the risk that his actions will damage or destroy property. California courts have interpreted the term “maliciously” in section 451(b) more broadly. A defendant may be convicted under the California statute for engaging in an intentional act that results in the burning of an inhabited structure or property even if he was not subjectively aware of the risk that his actions would result in that harm. View "Togonon v. Garland" on Justia Law

Hyde, a 26-year-old with bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, and ADHD, took six prescription medications. After his arrest on suspicion of DUI, Hyde submitted to a blood draw. He tested negative for alcohol but positive for amphetamines, consistent with his prescriptions. After several hours without his medications, Hyde charged the door, fell, and injured his head. Hyde emerged from his cell calmly, then sprinted away. He reached a dead end, Officers deployed their Tasers multiple times, then tackled Hyde. After Hyde was in a restraint chair, Pralgo again used his Taser. Callahan-English used her arms to force Hyde’s head into a restraint hold. Minutes later Hyde rolled his head back, gasping for air, as officers passed by. He stopped breathing. Officers tried to revive him. Days later, Hyde died. Hyde’s causes of death included blunt force injuries, kidney damage caused by muscle breakdown, enlarged heart, and coronary artery atherosclerosis.The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part the denial of a motion to dismiss a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit. Officers Pralgo and Callahan-English used excessive force and violated clearly established law when they used a Taser and put Hyde in a head restraint after Hyde, handcuffed and shackled, posed no threat. Other officers reasonably used force when Hyde resisted. The complaint did not adequately allege that the officers knew of Hyde’s mental health condition or that he was in distress after the altercation; qualified immunity barred the claim that they violated Hyde’s right to adequate medical care. With respect to the failure-to-train and municipal liability claims, the court stated that an inadequate training policy itself cannot be inferred from a single incident. View "Hyde v. City of Wilcox" on Justia Law

Jackson pleaded guilty to conspiracy to engage in sex trafficking in exchange for the government’s promise to recommend a sentencing range of 120–180 months’ imprisonment. Despite assuring the court during the plea colloquy that there was no “side agreement,” Jackson later argued that he relied on the government’s oral promise that it would not offer his codefendant (Young) a lesser sentence. Young was offered a 90-month sentence. Jackson also claimed ineffective assistance based on his attorney’s failure to ensure that the government’s oral promise was made a part of the record. The district court denied Jackson’s 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion. The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, first holding that Jackson’s notice of appeal was valid because his requests for a certificate of appealability, received before the FRAP 4(a)(1)(B) deadline, made clear his intention to appeal; his 2255 motion was not an improper “second or successive” motion because the underlying factual circumstances did not occur until after an earlier 2255 motion was resolved. The record was not sufficient to overcome the presumption that Jackson’s written plea agreement and his sworn plea colloquy statements described the complete agreement. Jackson’s claim was also barred by a collateral attack waiver. The district court abused its discretion by failing to consider Jackson’s pro se letter as a request to amend his section 2255 motion to add a claim of ineffective assistance. View "United States v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Based on his participation in a scheme to issue California commercial driver’s licenses to persons who had not passed the requisite tests, Turchin was convicted of fraud involving identification documents, 18 U.S.C. 1028(a)(1) and under 18 U.S.C. 371, for conspiracy to violate the prohibitions on bribery concerning a program receiving federal funds under 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1)(B) and (a)(2) and to commit fraud involving identification documents under section 1028(a).The Ninth Circuit reversed in part. Turchin’s actions fell within the scope of conduct covered by section 1028(a)(1) but the district court erred in instructing the jury. Section 1028(c)(1) provides that the requisite federal nexus exists if “the identification document . . . is or appears to be issued by or under the authority of the United States or a sponsoring entity of an event designated as a special event of national significance.” “United States” refers only to the national government, and does not refer broadly to the United States and all of its component parts. The district court erroneously instructed the jury that the federal nexus was automatically satisfied by showing that the identification document was issued by a state government. A reasonable jury could conclude that Turchin’s production of California driver’s licenses to the particular unqualified drivers at issue affected interstate commerce under 1028(c)(3)(A) and there was sufficient evidence supporting the federal nexus element of the alleged conspiracy to violate section 666. View "United States v. Turchin" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit filed (1) an order withdrawing the opinion and dissent filed on June 23, 2021, denying a petition for panel rehearing, and denying on behalf of the court a petition for rehearing en banc; and (2) an amended opinion denying the petition for review of a decision of the BIA.In the amended opinion, the panel held that, in determining whether a conviction satisfies the thirty-gram limit of the personal-use exception to the ground of removability based on drug convictions, the circumstance-specific approach applies to determining the amount of marijuana involved in the conviction. In this case, the circumstance specific to petitioner clearly established that the amount of marijuana in his possession exceeded thirty grams. View "Bogle v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit granted the petition for review of the BIA's decision agreeing with the IJ that petitioner's convictions were crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs) and that she was not entitled to cancellation of removal. The panel concluded that petitioner's convictions are not CIMTs and therefore she was not removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).In 2010, petitioner was convicted of solicitation to possess for sale less than two pounds of marijuana, in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-1002 (solicitation), 13-3405(A)(2) (possession for sale), and (B)(4) (less than two pounds). Shortly thereafter, petitioner was convicted of offering to transport less than two pounds of marijuana for sale, in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-3405(A)(4) (offer to transport) and (B)(10) (less than two pounds). The panel concluded that Arizona Revised Statutes 13-3405(A)(4), which prohibits certain conduct relating to marijuana, is overbroad and divisible; petitioner's section 13-3505(A) convictions, which involved categories in the statute involving the smallest quantity of marijuana, were not CIMTs; and petitioner was therefore not removable. View "Walcott v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision dismissing petitioner's appeal of the IJ's order pretermitting his application for cancellation. The BIA held that petitioner failed to establish that he had not been convicted of offenses with an aggregate sentence of at least 5 years.The panel concluded that the phrase "an offense" in 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1)(C) includes the multiple criminal convictions described in 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(B) that render an alien inadmissible. The panel rejected petitioner's contention that because the statutory disqualification is phrased in the singular, his multiple offenses do not trigger ineligibility. The panel also rejected petitioner's contention that the BIA erred in finding that his multiple convictions resulted in aggregated sentences of at least five years because the agency relied on the 2013 judgment, a record not clearly related to petitioner. Rather, substantial evidence supports the agency's determination that petitioner did not satisfy his burden to show that he had not been convicted of the qualifying offenses. View "Ramirez-Medina v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit withdrew its previous opinion; filed a replacement opinion affirming the prejudice portion of the district court's order denying a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion in which defendant challenged his felon-in-possession guilty plea on the ground that he was not informed of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1)'s knowledge-of-status element; and otherwise denied a petition for rehearing and, on behalf of the court, a petition for rehearing en banc. In this case, defendant fails to show actual prejudice from any error as nothing in the record objectively demonstrates that he would have not pled guilty had he known of section 922(g)(1)'s knowledge-of-status element. View "United States v. Pollard" on Justia Law