Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
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The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a habeas corpus petition challenging petitioner's Arizona conviction and death sentence for first-degree murder. Petitioner contends that his counsel did not investigate and present mitigating evidence at the penalty phase, including evidence of diffuse brain damage, childhood abuse, and substance abuse.The panel applied Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and concluded that petitioner has not shown either that his trial counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient or that the deficiencies were prejudicial. In this case, there is no showing that the education records nor the incarceration records contain meaningful mitigation evidence; petitioner has not met his burden of showing that counsel erred by not investigating and presenting evidence of his childhood abuse; petitioner's allegation that counsel erred by not investigating and presenting evidence of his substance abuse fails because counsel was not timely informed of his substance abuse; and petitioner has not shown that counsel erred by not seeking a psychological evaluation. View "Washington v. Shinn" on Justia Law

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Orange County jail inmates brought 42 U.S.C. 1983 and other federal claims based on alleged failure to combat COVID-19. The district court granted provisional class certification and issued a preliminary injunction under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), which automatically expired 90 days after being issued.The Ninth Circuit dismissed an appeal as moot because the injunction and provisional class certification are no longer in effect. While the Supreme Court’s emergency stay of the preliminary injunction may have prevented the injunction from having any further effect, it did not toll the 90-day limit unambiguously detailed in the PLRA. The court rejected the County’s assertion that the appeal fell within an exception to mootness because the issue was capable of repetition but evading review, noting that circumstances had changed since the original injunction issued, Given the Supreme Court’s stay of the injunction, the chance that plaintiffs would successfully acquire another preliminary injunction, at least without significantly worse conditions than previously existed, is remote. The provisional class certification expired along with the preliminary injunction. View "Ahlman v. Barnes" on Justia Law

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Briones was a leader of a violent gang that “terrorized the Salt River Reservation community.” Briones participated in multiple violent crimes, including a 1994 murder that was committed when Briones was 17 years, 11 months, and eight days old.The Ninth Circuit affirmed his life sentence in 1998. Following the Supreme Court’s decisions in "Miller," (2012), that the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) sentences for juvenile offenders, and Montgomery, (2016), that Miller’s rule applied retroactively on collateral review, Briones was resentenced to LWOP in 2016. A Ninth Circuit panel affirmed in 2018. The en banc court subsequently vacated the sentence. The Supreme Court remanded in light of Jones v. Mississippi, (2021), holding that in cases involving LWOP defendants, a discretionary system—where a sentencer can consider the defendant’s youth and has discretion to impose a lesser sentence—is constitutionally sufficient--and that permanent incorrigibility is not an eligibility criterion for the imposition of juvenile LWOP sentences; a sentencer need not provide an on-the-record explanation with an implicit finding of permanent incorrigibility.The Ninth Circuit again affirmed the LWOP sentence. The district court did consider Briones’s post-incarceration rehabilitation and there is no independent requirement that a court imposing juvenile LWOP “meaningfully engage” in a permanent-incorrigibility analysis. Briones waived his as-applied challenge to the substantive proportionality of his sentence. The court rejected “Briones’s wholly speculative arguments advocating for categorical bans on juvenile LWOP.” View "United States v. Briones" on Justia Law

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Cobian first entered the U.S. in 1999. In 2004, he was returned to Mexico after being convicted of DUI. In 2016, Cobian, with his wife and children, presented himself to seek asylum. Cobian was separated from his family and given Notice of Expedited Removal. He sought asylum. Officers provided him with English and Spanish explanations of the credible fear interview process, detention protocols, his rights, and the consequences of removal. Cobian explained that he had been kidnapped for ransom in Mexico and was again being targeted; his captors, allegedly gang members, cut off his finger and sent it to his wife. The asylum officer ruled against Cobian and explained the right to appeal. Cobian declined because he did not want to remain in detention, unable to contact his family. Cobian was deported to Mexico but, in 2018, attempted reentry, and was deported.In 2019, Cobian was again found in the U.S. and was charged with illegal reentry, 8 U.S.C. 1326. Cobian argued that the predicate expedited removal order was entered in violation of his due process rights and even if he waived his right to appeal the asylum claim, his waiver was not considered and intelligent. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of his motion to dismiss. Administrative remedies must be exhausted before an order of removal can be collaterally challenged in a subsequent criminal prosecution for re-entry. Cobian made a considered and intelligent decision to waive his right to appeal the negative credible fear finding. View "United States v. De la Mora-Cobian" on Justia Law

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Defendant appealed her sentence imposed after she pleaded guilty to unlawful importation of methamphetamine and heroin, principally contending that the district court erred by failing to give her advance notice before imposing a special condition of supervised release that requires her to submit to suspicionless searches by any law enforcement officer.The Ninth Circuit concluded that United States v. Wise, 391 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 2004), which held that, where a condition of supervised release is not on the list of mandatory or discretionary conditions in the sentencing guidelines, notice is required before it is imposed, remains good law after Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708 (2008), which held that, before imposing a custodial sentence, a district court is not required to give advance notice that it is considering varying upwards from the applicable sentencing range under the Sentencing Guidelines. Therefore, Wise is controlling here and the district court erred by failing to give notice that it was contemplating imposing its broad search condition prior to imposing that condition in its oral pronouncement of sentence. The panel vacated at least that portion of defendant's sentence. The court affirmed the custodial portion of defendant's sentence, finding no plain error. View "United States v. Reyes" on Justia Law

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Defendant Franklin pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting the possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(i)–(ii) and 2, and robbery affecting interstate commerce (Hobbs Act robbery) in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1951(a).The Ninth Circuit concluded that binding precedent forecloses Franklin's contention that Hobbs Act robbery is not categorically a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3)(A). The panel concluded that there are two distinct questions that this court answers in examining a hearsay statement at sentencing: (1) whether the statement is "procedurally reliable" and (2) whether the statement is "substantively reliable." If the court answers either question in the affirmative, then the statement may be considered at sentencing. The panel explained that this is a disjunctive test: If the court answered either question in the affirmative, then the statement may be considered at sentencing. In this case, the government provided enough specifics so that Franklin was not put to the burden of proving that the enhancement did not apply, and that there were adequate procedural opportunities for Franklin to challenge the extrinsic, nonhearsay evidence corroborating Coconspirator Hiler's hearsay statements. The panel concluded that there was no error in the district court's conclusion that the evidence sufficiently corroborated Hiler's statements and that the admission of those statements at sentencing did not deprive Franklin of due process. Furthermore, the district court did not clearly err in implicitly finding the two coconspirators' statements to corroborate each other enough to be substantively reliable, and that their admission at sentencing thus did not violate due process. View "United States v. Franklin" on Justia Law

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In 2004-2005, the government filed forfeiture actions against a Credit Suisse account, owned by a corporation organized by Kim’s sister . The government alleged the $15 million account included proceeds of fraudulent activities involving Kim’s control of Optional. The district court ordered the seizure of the Account. The putative owners (Kim Claimants) contested the forfeiture. Optional, no longer under Kim's control, and DAS, an alleged victim of Kim's fraud, filed competing claims.In 2011, after years of parallel litigation, the Swiss Attorney General’s Office unfroze the Account and ordered the bank to wire $12.6 million to DAS, which filed a “Notice of Withdrawal of Claims” in the forfeiture proceeding. The court ordered that no party disturb money remaining in the Credit Suisse accounts and requested that the government investigate how the transfer to DAS was accomplished. The court declined to hold DAS in contempt, concluded that it “cannot compel DAS to surrender the funds,” then granted DAS’s opposed motion to be dismissed from the forfeiture proceedings.Optional, the sole remaining claimant, submitted a 2013 proposed final judgment, which the district court adopted. Five years later, Optional sought to hold DAS in contempt for allegedly violating that judgment because DAS failed to surrender the money transferred in 2011; the 2013 judgment had awarded Optional all funds in the Account as of August 2005. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of the contempt motion. The 2013 judgment did not require DAS to turn over $12.6 million to Optional. At the 2013 trial, the court did not have before it, and did not undertake to decide, the competing claims to the transferred money. In awarding Optional “all funds” the district court unmistakably was referring only to the remaining funds. View "Optional Capital, Inc. v. DAS Corp." on Justia Law

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In 2017, Langley pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography and was sentenced to time served and 10 years of supervised release. As required by 18 U.S.C. 3583(d), the conditions of Langley’s supervised release included that he “not commit [a] federal, state or local crime,” “not illegally possess a controlled substance,” and “refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance.” In 2017, Langley unsuccessfully sought amendment of the conditions of supervised release to permit him to use medical marijuana as allowed by California state law, to alleviate pain stemming from the amputation of his lower leg. Langley renewed the motion in 2020. Langley, who submitted a physician's opinion that marijuana was the best medical solution for his pain issues, argued that he has a fundamental Due Process Clause right to use medical marijuana.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of Langley’s renewed motion. The court held that it is bound by precedent that rejected the identical substantive due process claim. Even if state laws decriminalizing marijuana could constitute additional evidence under the test for determining whether a right is protected by the Due Process Clause, the court concluded that it is bound by its 2007 decision until it is overturned by a higher authority. View "United States v. Langley." on Justia Law

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Officers stopped a Cadillac with an expired registration. Jenkins, a passenger, showed no signs of distress. When the officers discovered that Jenkins was subject to an arrest warrant, they handcuffed her and put her in a cruiser, where Jenkins vomited. Officers called for paramedics and asked Jenkins if she was detoxing. Jenkins responded: “No … I’m pregnant.” The call for paramedics was then canceled. During transport, Jenkins groaned and screamed for help. After fingerprinting Jenkins at the police station, officers returned her to the cruiser. Several minutes later they found her unconscious, called for paramedics, and began CPR. Jenkins fell into a coma and died nine days later.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a 42 U.S.C. 1983 lawsuit. The district court validly exercised its discretion in choosing to review a bodycam video that was incorporated by reference into the amended complaint and did not assign the video too much weight. The complaint did not plausibly allege that any city policy or custom “was the moving force” behind the alleged constitutional violations but suggested that that the moving force was the officers’ failure to heed their training. The complaint failed to establish either objective unreasonableness or objective deliberate indifference by individual officers. The alleged violative nature of their conduct, in failing to recognize and respond to Jenkins’ serious medical need, was not clearly established in the specific context of this case, so the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. View "J. J. v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

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In 2002, Munoz digitally penetrated his daughter. He later pleaded guilty to attempted lewdness with a child under the age of 14, acknowledging that “the Court will include as part of [his] sentence . . . lifetime supervision.” A Nevada state court sentenced Munoz to 48–144 months’ imprisonment, required him to register as a sex offender, and imposed a special sentence of lifetime supervision. Munoz filed a federal habeas corpus petition challenging the lifetime supervision under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The lifetime supervision consists of a $30 monthly fee to defray the costs of his supervision; electronic monitoring; and a requirement that Munoz may reside only at a residence approved by his parole officer, and that he keep his parole officer informed of his current address.The Ninth Circuit vacated the denial of the petition for lack of jurisdiction. The conditions, individually and collectively, do not severely and immediately restrain Munoz’s physical liberty, so Munoz is not challenging his “custody,” and his claims are not cognizable in federal habeas. On remand, the district court may determine whether to allow Munoz to file an amended habeas petition that could secure jurisdiction or consider whether it would be appropriate to construe Munoz’s habeas petition to plead a claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983. View "Mounoz v. Smith" on Justia Law