Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit granted in part and denied in part a petition challenging the BIA's finding that petitioner's conviction for theft of a vehicle under California Vehicle Code 10851(a) is an aggravated felony, which renders him ineligible for certain forms of relief. The panel has held, and the parties do not dispute, that section 10851(a) is overbroad because it criminalizes a broader swath of conduct than the generic theft offense.Applying the framework described in Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2248–49 (2016), the panel held that section 10851(a) is indivisible in its treatment of accessories after the fact. Because section 10851(a) does not categorically match the generic theft offense, a conviction under section 10851(a) is not an aggravated felony. The panel overruled Duenas-Alvarez v. Holder, 733 F.3d 812 (9th Cir. 2013), on the ground that it was irreconcilable with Mathis. Therefore, in petitioner's case, he has not been convicted of an aggravated felony and the panel remanded for consideration of his requests for asylum and cancellation of removal. In a concurrently filed memorandum, the panel denied petitioner's requests for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture. View "Lopez-Marroquin v. Garland" on Justia Law

Ferguson and two others robbed Commerce Bank, wearing masks, then fled in a stolen car. Police quickly located the car and attempted a traffic stop. The car crashed. The men fled on foot. They were found nearby. Officers also located bags of cash (approximately $132,000) along their escape path. DNA evidence taken from recovered masks matched the co-conspirators. Charged with bank robbery and conspiracy to commit bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a), 18 U.S.C. 371, they all pleaded guilty.The magistrate advised the defendants of their right to a jury trial, right to confront witnesses, and right against self-incrimination. Ferguson noted that he understood and still wished to plead guilty. The magistrate did not ask Ferguson whether he was entering the plea because of force, threats, or promises, nor inquire if Ferguson was pleading guilty voluntarily. He did not question Ferguson about recent drug or alcohol use, his level of education, his understanding of the proceedings, or if he had any mental impairments but determined that Ferguson’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary and not the result of force, threats, or promises. The Rule 11 plea colloquy for Ferguson and his co-defendants lasted about 10 minutes.The Ninth Circuit affirmed Ferguson’s 84-month sentence, 13 months below the low end of the Guidelines range. A defendant must show the Rule 11 violation’s impact on substantial rights before a court will undo a guilty plea. Ferguson cannot make such a showing. View "United States v. Ferguson" on Justia Law

In 2014, Prigan pleaded guilty to two counts of Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951. Prigan served three years in prison and was released on supervised release. Prigan’s supervised-release conditions and conviction for Hobbs Act robbery prohibited him from possessing any firearm or ammunition. In 2018, federal officers searched Prigan’s residence and vehicle. They found firearms, ammunition, and methamphetamine. He pleaded guilty as a felon and unlawful user of controlled substances who possessed firearms and ammunition, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 922(g)(3), and 924(a)(2), and with possessing an unregistered firearm , 26 U.S.C. 5841. The PSR stated that Prigan’s 2014 conviction for Hobbs Act robbery constituted a crime of violence under Guidelines section 4B1.2(a), which increased Prigan’s Guidelines range from 46-57 months of imprisonment to 57-71 months. The district court overruled Prigan’s objections.The Ninth Circuit vacated his 64-month sentence, joining six other circuits in holding that Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence under section 4B1.2(a). Examining the enumerated offenses in that section, the court concluded that Hobbs Act robbery sweeps more broadly than the “force clause,” “robbery,” and “extortion.” View "United States v. Prigan" on Justia Law

Matias, a native of El Salvador, unlawfully entered the U.S. in 2014. El Salvadoran authorities considered him a member of MS-13, a violent gang. In Maryland, Matias pleaded guilty to assault in the first degree after being involved in a shooting that authorities determined was retaliation for MS-13 gang activity, and identified Matias as an MS-13 “affiliate.” ICE detained Matias in 2018. Matias requested to be housed with a gang aligned with MS-13. An IJ denied him bond and later denied Matias relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and ordered him removed. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed his appeal. The Ninth Circuit denied his petition for review in 2021.Matias moved the BIA to reopen his case so that it could consider “new developments” regarding his request for CAT relief: claimed political changes in El Salvador and an alleged text from an MS-13 gang member labeling him a “snitch” and saying he will be killed if he returns to El Salvador. The BIA denied his request for an emergency stay. Matias filed a habeas petition, asking the court to enjoin the government from removing him until the BIA ruled on his motion to reopen. The district court denied his motion. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court, which denied Matias’s motion for a temporary restraining order, determining that 8 U.S.C. 1252(g)’s jurisdictional limits barred his claims. View "Rauda v. Jennings" on Justia Law

Years ago, Bachmeier was convicted of state crimes. During one telephonic hearing, Bachmeier yelled a graphic, specific threat to gravely harm Judge Moran’s family. Bachmeier remains in state custody. Years later, Bachmeier filed a name change petition in Kenai, Alaska, which was randomly assigned to Judge Moran. The reassignment deadline passed before Bachmeier learned of the assignment. Bachmeier mailed a message to the Kenai Courthouse: Am requesting to cancel ... I would of struck Moran from this case as I have told her in the past Im going to kill her family which I still entend to do.” The clerk’s office forwarded it to Judge Moran’s chambers without reviewing its substance.Bachmeier was charged under 18 U.S.C. 876(c) for mailing a threatening communication. Bachmeier unsuccessfully argued that his request was addressed to the courthouse, not a natural person as 876(c) requires. The court rejected Bachmeier's request that the jury be instructed that it was required to find that “Bachmeier subjectively intended to threaten” Judge Moran, instructing the jury to find either that Bachmeier “intended to communicate a threat... or acted with knowledge that the document would be viewed as a threat.” The Ninth Circuit affirmed his conviction. A rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the judge, a natural person, was the addressee. The jury instruction was erroneous but the evidence overwhelmingly supported a finding that Bachmeier subjectively intended to threaten, so the error was harmless. View "United States v. Bachmeier" on Justia Law

In 1995, Jones was convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of his girlfriend’s mother. After the California Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence and denied his state habeas petition, Jones filed a federal habeas petition, raising multiple challenges to both the guilt and penalty phases of his trial. The district court granted relief on Jones’s claim that the state trial court violated his right to present a complete defense; Jones should have been permitted to testify during the guilt phase about events from his childhood and his mental health history, and the trial court erred by conditioning such testimony on the presentation of a psychiatric expert who would explain the testimony’s relevance to Jones’s mental state during the murder.The Ninth Circuit reversed. The condition the trial court imposed on Jones’s testimony was neither arbitrary nor disproportionate to the valid purposes served by its ruling. The court remanded for the district court to consider Jones’s remaining claims. View "Jones v. Davis" on Justia Law

In 2006, Wilson was sentenced to 352 months’ imprisonment for 11 counts of importation and sale of a controlled substance, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. In 2015, pursuant to a stipulation under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), the court reduced Wilson’s sentence to 347 months, citing Sentencing Guidelines Amendment 782, which retroactively reduced the offense levels assigned to specified quantities of drugs. Wilson unsuccessfully sought reconsideration, arguing that to accomplish Amendment 782’s “full 2-point deduction,” he should have received the low end of the new Guidelines range--295 months.Wilson again sought sentence modification under section 3582(c)(2), arguing that to effectuate the original sentencing judge’s intent to sentence Wilson to a low-end guideline sentence, the court should modify his current term of imprisonment.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. It is unclear whether Wilson is currently serving a term of imprisonment that is based, even in part, on a sentencing range that was lowered by Amendment 782. Assuming that Wilson is eligible to seek relief under 3582(c)(2), the judge considered the applicable section 3553(a) factors. Any error concerning the effect of Amendment 782 on the firearm offense was harmless. The decision was not substantively unreasonable; the judge was not required to give more weight to Wilson’s rehabilitative efforts than to the nature of Wilson’s conduct. View "United States v. Wilson" on Justia Law

In 1982, a court-martial convicted Hubbard of murder and sentenced him to life in prison. He previously filed unsuccessful federal habeas petitions and, in 2019, sought DNA testing under the Innocence Protection Act (IPA), 18 U.S.C. 3600(a), to prove his innocence.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court was not the court that entered the judgment of conviction; Hubbard’s conviction was entered by a general court-martial, which has since dissolved, not in federal court. The court rejected Hubbard’s contentions that the district court had the power to grant his petition for DNA testing under the IPA or that the IPA should nonetheless be construed to allow him to petition for DNA testing in the district court because he would otherwise have no forum in which to seek his relief. The IPA, unlike the federal habeas statutes, does not provide a procedural mechanism for prisoners convicted by courts-martial to seek collateral relief in federal court. View "Hubbard v. United States" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of a 28 U.S.C. 2241 petition in which petitioner challenged two sentencing enhancements—one under 18 U.S.C. 2251(e), another under 18 U.S.C. 3559(e)(1)—applied after his conviction on multiple counts of federal sex offenses.The panel held that petitioner's claim is foreclosed because the legal basis for his claim arose before he had exhausted his section 2255 motion, so he cannot show that he did not have an unobstructed procedural shot at presenting his challenge to the section 3559(e)(1) sentencing enhancement. The panel rejected petitioner's request for an extension of Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), concluding that an extension of Martinez would make little sense. The panel explained that it would open the door for every unsuccessful pro se petitioner under section 2255 to argue that his lack of counsel in his original section 2255 petition meant that he did not have an unobstructed procedural shot at presenting his claim and is therefore entitled to bring an escape hatch petition under section 2241. The panel noted that other circuits have similarly held that prisoners may not utilize Martinez to bring a section 2241 petition. Because petitioner cannot show that he lacked an unobstructed procedural shot with respect to the section 3559(e)(1) mandatory life sentencing enhancement, the panel did not need to reach the actual innocence prong for that enhancement or either prong for the section 2251(e) enhancement. View "Pavulak v. von Blanckensee" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit granted the petition for review of the BIA's decision concluding that petitioner is removeable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) because his two prior convictions for violating Hawaii’s fourth degree theft statute, Haw. Rev. Stat. 708-833(1), constitute crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs).The panel applied the categorical approach and held that section 708-833(1), a petty misdemeanor involving property valued at less than $250, is overbroad with respect to the BIA's definition of a CIMT. The panel explained that Hawaii's definition of "theft" does not always require the government to prove the defendant acted with an intent to permanently deprive or substantially erode the owner’s property rights. Furthermore, section 708-833(1) is indivisible because it proscribes one crime that can be committed eight different ways, not eight distinct crimes. Accordingly, the BIA erred in concluding that petitioner's section 708-833(1) convictions were CIMTs rendering him removable. View "Maie v. Garland" on Justia Law