Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Artak Ovsepian participated in a healthcare fraud scheme at Manor Medical Imaging, Inc., a sham clinic in Glendale, California. The clinic generated prescriptions for unnecessary medications, which were billed to Medicare and Medi-Cal. Manor employees used the identifying information of Medicare and Medi-Cal beneficiaries, often without their knowledge, to fill these prescriptions. Ovsepian joined the conspiracy in 2010, managing drivers who transported beneficiaries to pharmacies to fill fraudulent prescriptions.The government charged Ovsepian with conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud and aggravated identity theft under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). At trial, the government narrowed the aggravated identity theft charge to the possession of one victim’s identifying information. The jury found Ovsepian guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to 180 months, including a mandatory 24-month sentence for aggravated identity theft. Ovsepian’s direct appeals were unsuccessful, and the Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of certiorari.Ovsepian filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate his aggravated identity theft conviction, arguing actual innocence. The district court denied the motion, and the Ninth Circuit initially denied a certificate of appealability. However, the Supreme Court remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Dubin v. United States, which clarified the interpretation of the aggravated identity theft statute.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Ovsepian’s § 2255 motion. The court held that a petitioner convicted under a divisible statute must demonstrate actual innocence only for the prong under which they were convicted. The court found that the jury instructions were erroneous because they did not convey that possession of another’s identifying information must be central to the healthcare fraud to sustain a conviction. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit vacated Ovsepian’s conviction and sentence for aggravated identity theft. View "USA V. OVSEPIAN" on Justia Law

Derek Steven Trumbull pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. He was found with a Glock 17 loaded with a magazine containing seventeen rounds of nine-millimeter ammunition, and he also had two spare magazines. Trumbull had multiple prior felony convictions. He was indicted on federal charges and pled guilty without a plea agreement.The United States District Court for the District of Montana calculated Trumbull’s base offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B), which includes an increase for offenses involving a semiautomatic firearm capable of accepting a large capacity magazine. The court applied Application Note 2 of the commentary to § 2K2.1, which defines a large capacity magazine as one that can accept more than fifteen rounds. Trumbull objected, arguing that Application Note 2 was an invalid interpretation under Kisor v. Wilkie. The district court overruled his objection and sentenced him to twenty-four months’ imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Application Note 2’s definition of “large capacity magazine” warrants deference under Kisor because the term is ambiguous, the interpretation is reasonable, and it meets the criteria for deference. The court found that the district court did not err in applying § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B) as interpreted by Application Note 2 to Trumbull’s base offense level. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. View "United States v. Trumbull" on Justia Law

In early 2018, the DEA began investigating drug smuggling at San Francisco International Airport (SFO) and received a tip implicating Lemack Bellot. Using a confidential source (CS), the DEA conducted a series of recorded meetings and phone calls with Bellot, who indicated he had previously smuggled drugs through the airport. Bellot and the CS agreed on plans to smuggle cocaine through SFO on two occasions, with the CS using fake cocaine provided by the DEA. Bellot advised the CS on how to package the drugs and introduced an associate to assist. The CS successfully smuggled the fake cocaine through airport security both times, paying Bellot fees for his assistance.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California charged Bellot with two counts of attempting to aid and abet possession with intent to distribute cocaine. Bellot was convicted by a jury on both counts. He then moved for a new trial, arguing that the jury instructions and the evidence presented at trial constructively amended the indictment, effectively convicting him of a different crime than the one for which he was indicted. The district court denied his motion, and Bellot appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed Bellot’s conviction. The court held that the indictment was not constructively amended. It explained that whether Bellot was charged with aiding and abetting an attempt to possess cocaine or attempting to aid and abet possession of cocaine, the crime charged remained the same: knowingly attempting to possess with intent to distribute cocaine. The court also found that the government’s statements during closing arguments did not alter its theory of the case or constructively amend the indictment. The court concluded that Bellot had sufficient notice of the charges against him and that the jury instructions were appropriate. The conviction was affirmed. View "USA V. BELLOT" on Justia Law

Gail Manney was convicted for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6), which criminalizes making false statements in connection with the acquisition of firearms. On April 21, 2021, Manney visited Hi-Cap Firearms in Reno, Nevada, and selected seven handguns to purchase. She filled out the required ATF Form 4473, certifying she was the actual purchaser. However, after her purchase, a Hi-Cap employee suspected her of being a straw purchaser and contacted the ATF. Upon investigation, ATF Special Agent Joshua Caron found incriminating messages on Manney’s phone indicating she was buying the firearms for her son, Razaaq, a convicted felon prohibited from possessing firearms.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada indicted Manney on May 27, 2021, for making false statements on ATF Form 4473. She was convicted after a jury trial. Manney appealed, arguing that 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) violated her Second Amendment rights and that her false statement was not material under the statute.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court rejected Manney’s Second Amendment challenge, stating that the Second Amendment does not protect false statements. The court emphasized that § 922(a)(6) regulates false statements made during firearm acquisitions, not the possession of firearms. The court also dismissed Manney’s argument regarding the materiality of her false statement, citing Abramski v. United States, which held that a false statement about the actual purchaser of a firearm is material even if the actual purchaser could legally possess a firearm.The Ninth Circuit affirmed Manney’s conviction, concluding that § 922(a)(6) did not violate her Second Amendment rights and that her false statement was material under the statute. View "USA V. MANNEY" on Justia Law

Patrick Neiss was convicted in Montana state court of deliberate homicide and evidence tampering, based on circumstantial evidence. He filed a pro se federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, claiming ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. Neiss argued that his trial counsel failed to challenge the particularity of a search warrant, which led to the discovery of silencer-related internet searches on his computer, and that his appellate counsel failed to raise this issue on appeal.The United States District Court for the District of Montana dismissed Neiss’s habeas petition under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, which allows for preliminary screening of habeas petitions. The district court adjudicated the petition on the merits, concluding that Neiss’s trial counsel was not deficient because they had made multiple attempts to suppress the evidence, albeit not on the particularity grounds. The court did not find the petition procedurally defective or frivolous.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court misapplied the Rule 4 standard, which is intended to screen out only those petitions that are procedurally defective or frivolous. The court emphasized that Rule 4 does not permit summary dismissal on the merits. The Ninth Circuit found that Neiss’s petition alleged a cognizable, non-frivolous claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, which should not have been dismissed summarily. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "NEISS V. BLUDWORTH" on Justia Law

The petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in 1990. In 1999, she was convicted of possession for sale of methamphetamine in California. In 2015, upon returning from a trip to Mexico, she was detained and later charged with inadmissibility due to her drug conviction. She sought cancellation of removal and later moved to terminate the removal proceedings.The Immigration Judge (IJ) sustained the charges of removability and denied her relief, ordering her removal to Mexico. The petitioner appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), requesting remand to the IJ to pursue derivative U visa status based on her husband's pending U visa application. She also moved for administrative closure of her removal proceedings. The BIA dismissed her appeal and denied both motions, finding it speculative whether she would receive U visa relief and noting the need for an inadmissibility waiver due to her conviction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of the petitioner’s motions for remand and administrative closure due to the criminal jurisdiction bar under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C). The court found that the petitioner’s motions merged with her final order of removal and that judicial review does not extend to factual challenges to the final removal order. The court also noted that the decision did not disturb the result in Alvarez-Santos v. INS, which requires an agency determination of removability based on a covered conviction for the criminal alien bar to apply. The petition for review was dismissed. View "CORIA V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Tahawwur Hussain Rana, a Pakistani national, was tried in a U.S. district court for his involvement in supporting a terrorist organization responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attacks. He was convicted of providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization and conspiring to support a foiled plot in Denmark but was acquitted of conspiring to support the Mumbai attacks. After serving seven years in prison and being granted compassionate release, India requested his extradition to face charges related to the Mumbai attacks.The magistrate judge certified Rana as extraditable, rejecting his arguments that the U.S.-India extradition treaty's Non Bis in Idem (double jeopardy) provision protected him from extradition and that India failed to provide sufficient evidence of probable cause. Rana then filed a habeas corpus petition in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, which upheld the magistrate judge's decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's denial of Rana's habeas corpus petition. The court held that the term "offense" in the extradition treaty refers to a charged crime defined by its elements, not the underlying acts. Therefore, the Non Bis in Idem exception did not apply because the Indian charges contained distinct elements from the crimes for which Rana was acquitted in the U.S. The court also found that India provided sufficient competent evidence to support the magistrate judge's finding of probable cause that Rana committed the charged crimes. View "RANA V. JENKINS" on Justia Law

In December 2017, the U.S. Coast Guard intercepted Victor Gaspar Chichande and his co-defendants on a small boat near the Galapagos Islands, carrying approximately 1,230 kilograms of cocaine. The defendants attempted to evade capture by throwing items overboard and fleeing, but the Coast Guard disabled their boat. The discarded packages were later found to contain cocaine. Chichande was convicted by a jury of conspiring to distribute cocaine on a vessel, possession with intent to distribute, and aiding and abetting.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California initially sentenced Chichande to 180 months in prison. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed his conviction but vacated the sentence, remanding for resentencing due to an error in the district court's analysis of whether Chichande was entitled to a minor role reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b). The district court had incorrectly compared Chichande to a single average participant rather than the average of all participants in the crime.Upon remand, the district court again denied the minor role reduction, finding that Chichande was not substantially less culpable than the average participant. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, clarifying that the district court correctly identified all participants, calculated a rough average level of culpability using the five factors from the Mitigating Role Guideline, and compared Chichande’s culpability to that average. The court also declined to remand for resentencing based on a retroactive amendment for zero criminal history points, noting that Chichande could seek relief through the established protocol in the Southern District of California. The court held that the district court did not err in denying the minor role reduction and affirmed the 180-month sentence. View "USA V. CHICHANDE" on Justia Law

A Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department deputy entered the curtilage of Harson Chong’s home without a warrant, leading to the discovery of drugs, guns, and money. Chong and Tac Tran, who was present at the home, were subsequently charged with federal drug and gun offenses. They claimed ineffective assistance of counsel because their attorneys did not object to the search on Fourth Amendment grounds.The United States District Court for the Central District of California initially denied their suppression motions, ruling the search justified by the parole-search exception. However, after the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Grandberry, the district court reversed, finding insufficient probable cause that Tran resided at Chong’s home. Despite this, the court upheld the search based on exigent circumstances. Chong and Tran were convicted, and their convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. They then filed post-conviction motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which the district court denied, finding no ineffective assistance of counsel.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the deputy’s entry onto the curtilage without a warrant, consent, or exigency was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The court found Chong’s counsel ineffective for not moving to suppress the evidence, as the search was clearly unlawful. However, Tran lacked standing to challenge the search, as he did not reside at Chong’s home and was merely a visitor. Consequently, the court reversed the district court’s denial of Chong’s § 2255 motion and remanded for relief, but affirmed the denial of Tran’s motion. View "Chong v. United States" on Justia Law

In 1984, Roger Scott Helm, Jr., then 14 years old, murdered his adoptive parents and stepsister. He was arrested and charged with multiple counts, including first-degree murder. Helm pleaded guilty to one count of first-degree murder, two counts of second-degree murder, and one count of armed robbery. The trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment for the first-degree murder with eligibility for parole after 25 years, followed by consecutive sentences totaling an additional 42 years for the other counts.Helm's case was transferred from juvenile to adult court, and he was sentenced after a detailed hearing where the court considered mitigating factors such as his age and drug influence, as well as aggravating factors like his lack of remorse and dangerousness. The Arizona Supreme Court upheld the consecutive sentences on direct appeal.Helm later filed for post-conviction relief, arguing that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment under Miller v. Alabama, which prohibits mandatory life without parole for juveniles. The Arizona trial court and the Arizona Court of Appeals rejected his claim, stating that Miller does not apply to consecutive sentences for multiple crimes. The Arizona Supreme Court denied review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed Helm's habeas corpus petition. The court assumed, for argument's sake, that Helm's sentence was the functional equivalent of life without parole. However, it concluded that Helm's sentence complied with Miller because the trial judge had discretion and considered Helm's youth before imposing the sentence. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Helm's habeas corpus petition, holding that Helm's sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment as interpreted in Miller and clarified in Jones v. Mississippi. View "Helm v. Thornell" on Justia Law