Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Charles Clements was convicted by a California state jury of two counts of aggravated kidnapping, three counts of second-degree robbery, and related enhancements. His convictions were based in part on the testimony of a jailhouse informant, Donald Boeker, who claimed Clements had solicited him to murder a key witness. Boeker testified that he received no benefits for his cooperation and that his motives were altruistic. However, it was later revealed that Boeker did receive parole consideration for his testimony, which the prosecution knew or should have known.Clements appealed the denial of his federal habeas corpus petition, which was filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The district court had denied his claims, including one under Napue v. Illinois, which asserts that the prosecution knowingly used false testimony. The district court reviewed the Napue claim de novo but ultimately denied it, finding no reasonable likelihood that Boeker’s false testimony affected the jury’s judgment.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Clements’s Napue claim, holding that the prosecution violated Napue by allowing Boeker to falsely testify about not receiving any benefits for his cooperation. The court found that Boeker’s testimony was highly probative of Clements’s consciousness of guilt and identity on the aggravated kidnapping counts. The court concluded that there was a reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the jury’s judgment. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case with instructions to grant Clements’s habeas petition with respect to the aggravated kidnapping charges. The court did not address Clements’s Brady claim or his request for an evidentiary hearing, as the relief sought was already granted under the Napue claim. The court also affirmed the denial of Clements’s Massiah and prosecutorial misconduct claims, finding that the state court’s determinations were not objectively unreasonable. View "Clements v. Madden" on Justia Law

Heraclio Osorio-Arellanes was involved in a firefight with U.S. Customs and Border Patrol agents in Arizona, resulting in the death of Agent Brian Terry. Osorio fled to Mexico, where he was later arrested and interrogated by U.S. officials in a Mexico City prison. During this interrogation, he confessed to key elements of the government's case on the advice of a Mexican attorney, Juan Salvador Pimentel. Osorio's confession was later used against him in court.The District Court for the District of Arizona initially suppressed Osorio's confession on Sixth Amendment grounds but later reversed this decision following a government motion for reconsideration. Consequently, the confession was admitted at trial, leading to Osorio's conviction on multiple charges, including first- and second-degree murder, conspiracy to interfere with commerce by robbery, and assault on a federal officer.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that Pimentel's advice during the interrogation was deficient and prejudicial under the framework established in Strickland v. Washington. Specifically, Pimentel erroneously advised Osorio that robbing drug smugglers was not a crime, leading Osorio to confess. The court held that this advice was legally unjustifiable and that there was a reasonable probability that, absent this advice, Osorio would not have been convicted.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's order reconsidering the suppression of Osorio's confession, vacated his convictions and sentences, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court did not address Osorio's Fifth Amendment claim, as the Sixth Amendment claim was sufficient to decide the case. The dissenting judge would have affirmed the conviction and required Osorio to pursue his ineffective assistance of counsel claim through a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion in the district court. View "United States v. Osorio-Arellanes" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Cambodian villagers, alleged they were victims of human trafficking while working at seafood processing factories in Thailand. They claimed the factories, owned by Thai corporations Phatthana Seafood Co., Ltd. and S.S. Frozen Food Co., Ltd., subjected them to abusive conditions. Rubicon Resources, LLC, a U.S. company, was accused of knowingly benefiting from these violations by attempting to sell shrimp processed at these factories.The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted summary judgment in favor of Rubicon, holding that the plaintiffs failed to provide evidence that Rubicon knowingly benefited from the trafficking venture. The court also found no evidence that Rubicon knew or should have known about the violations. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, interpreting the statute to exclude liability for attempts to benefit from trafficking violations.Subsequently, Congress amended the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) through the Abolish Trafficking Reauthorization Act (ATRA), which expanded liability to include those who "attempt or conspire to benefit" from trafficking violations. The plaintiffs filed a motion under Rule 60(b)(6) to reopen the judgment based on this legislative change, arguing that the amendment clarified the original intent of the TVPRA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's denial of the Rule 60(b)(6) motion. The Ninth Circuit held that ATRA did not apply retroactively to events that occurred before its enactment. The court reasoned that the lack of an express statutory command for retroactive application and the forward-looking nature of the amendment indicated that ATRA was not intended to clarify the original statute but to change it. Therefore, the district court did not err in declining to reopen the final judgment. View "RATHA V. RUBICON RESOURCES, LLC" on Justia Law

Darrel Eston Lee, an Arizona prisoner sentenced to death for murder and other offenses, filed a federal habeas petition claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Lee argued that his counsel allowed him to testify falsely and failed to present mitigating evidence. He sought to introduce new evidence not presented in state court.The Arizona state postconviction relief court held a four-day evidentiary hearing and rejected Lee's claims. The court found no evidence that Lee had confessed to his attorney, Stephen Politi, and concluded that Politi's actions were reasonable given Lee's conflicting stories. The court also determined that Politi had conducted a reasonable mitigation investigation and that the lack of mitigating evidence was due to its nonexistence rather than Politi's incompetence. The Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied review.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona denied Lee's habeas petition, refusing to consider new evidence Lee presented for the first time in federal court. The court found that Lee's postconviction counsel had not acted diligently in state court, thus triggering the restrictions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e). The district court concluded that the state court's findings were reasonable based on the state-court record.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the state court reasonably rejected Lee's claim that Politi was ineffective for allowing him to testify falsely, as there was no clear evidence that Politi knew the alibi was false. The court also found that Lee failed to show that Politi's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or that he was prejudiced by it. Regarding the failure to present mitigating evidence, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Lee did not qualify for an evidentiary hearing under § 2254(e)(2) and that the state court's rejection of this claim was not objectively unreasonable. View "LEE V. THORNELL" on Justia Law

Roberto Yepez, while serving a state sentence, was transferred to federal custody to face a federal drug trafficking charge. He was later convicted and sentenced in federal court. While serving his federal sentence, Yepez filed a pro se motion arguing for sentence credit for the time spent in federal custody before his federal sentencing. He later argued through counsel that this motion should be construed as one for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The district court held that a legal claim for sentence miscalculation must be brought through a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, not a compassionate release motion. The court dismissed the motion, noting it could not proceed as a § 2241 petition because Yepez was incarcerated in a different jurisdiction.Yepez appealed the district court's decision. However, before the appeal was fully briefed, he was released from prison and began serving his term of supervised release. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and held that Yepez’s appeal became moot upon his release from prison. The court noted that the compassionate release provision under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) could not be used to shorten Yepez’s term of supervised release. The court also rejected Yepez’s argument that the appeal was not moot because its outcome could affect a later motion under § 3583(e) for modification of his term of supervised release.The Ninth Circuit concluded that since Yepez was no longer incarcerated, the relief he sought—a reduction in his term of imprisonment—was no longer available. Additionally, the court determined that the compassionate release provision could not be used to alter the term of supervised release. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as moot. View "USA V. YEPEZ" on Justia Law

The petitioner, Socorro Colin-Villavicencio, a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the United States lawfully in 1988. Her mother became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 1998. Colin-Villavicencio applied for adjustment of status but missed fingerprint appointments, leading to the abandonment of her application. In 2015, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings after she was convicted of multiple felonies, including child abuse and drug possession. Representing herself, she claimed derivative citizenship based on her mother’s naturalization, but an Immigration Judge (IJ) denied this claim, finding she did not become a lawful permanent resident as a minor. The IJ also denied her relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision, agreeing that Colin-Villavicencio did not establish a likelihood of torture if returned to Mexico. The BIA found that the country conditions and her brother’s attack did not sufficiently demonstrate a particularized risk of torture or police acquiescence. The BIA also upheld the IJ’s determination that her prior convictions precluded asylum and withholding of removal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court denied Colin-Villavicencio’s derivative citizenship claim, concluding she did not meet the requirements under 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a)(3) because her parents never married, and her father’s paternity was established by legitimation under Baja California law. The court also found substantial evidence supporting the BIA’s denial of CAT relief, noting she did not show a particularized risk of torture or police acquiescence. The Ninth Circuit thus denied her petition for review. View "COLIN-VILLAVICENCIO V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

The case involves Robert Paul Rundo and Robert Boman, who were charged with conspiracy to violate the Anti-Riot Act and with substantively violating the Act. The indictment alleges that Rundo is a founding member of the "Rise Above Movement" (RAM), a militant white supremacist group. Rundo and Boman, along with other RAM members, attended several political rallies where they violently attacked counter-protesters. The indictment details their involvement in rallies in Huntington Beach, Berkeley, San Bernardino, and Charlottesville, where they engaged in organized violence and later boasted about their actions online.The United States District Court for the Central District of California initially dismissed the indictment, finding the Anti-Riot Act unconstitutional due to facial overbreadth under the First Amendment. The Ninth Circuit reversed this decision, holding that the Act was not facially overbroad except for certain severable portions. On remand, the district court dismissed the indictment again, this time based on a claim of selective prosecution. The district court concluded that the government selectively prosecuted RAM members while ignoring the violence of Antifa and related far-left groups, suggesting that the prosecution was based on the offensive nature of RAM's speech.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that Rundo did not meet his burden to demonstrate that similarly situated individuals were not prosecuted and that his prosecution was based on an impermissible motive. The court found that the district court erred by comparing collective conduct to individual conduct and by holding that individual Antifa members were similarly situated to Rundo. The Ninth Circuit also held that Rundo failed to show that his prosecution was based on an impermissible motive, noting that timing and other factors cited by the district court were insufficient. The court reinstated the indictment and remanded the case for trial. View "USA V. RUNDO" on Justia Law

Adam Lloyd Livar was convicted of failing to register as a sex offender, a requirement stemming from a prior conviction. He pled guilty and entered a plea agreement with the government, which included a joint recommendation for a mid-range sentence if he demonstrated acceptance of responsibility. However, after making threatening statements during a phone call from prison, the government argued that Livar breached the plea agreement by committing a new crime and recommended a higher sentence.The District Court for the District of Oregon sentenced Livar to thirty months in prison and five years of supervised release, despite the plea agreement. The court found that Livar had accepted responsibility but did not adjudicate whether he committed a new crime. The court also determined that the government had not breached the plea agreement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court first addressed whether the appeal was moot due to Livar's release from prison. It concluded that the appeal was not moot because the district court could modify or terminate Livar's supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e).The Ninth Circuit held that the district court must hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve factual disputes when the government seeks to be relieved of its obligations under a plea agreement. The court unanimously agreed that Livar's sentence should be vacated because the district court did not adjudicate whether he committed a new crime. A majority of the panel concluded that due process does not require the government to seek a judicial determination before submitting a different sentencing recommendation. Another majority determined that the proper remedy is to remand with instructions to enter judgment with a term of imprisonment of time served and maintain the original terms of supervised release. The court vacated Livar’s sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "USA V. LIVAR" on Justia Law

The case involves Delaney Marks, who was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in California in 1994. Marks appealed his conviction, arguing that he was incompetent to stand trial and that he is intellectually disabled, making him ineligible for the death penalty. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court’s judgment denying Marks's federal habeas petition.Marks's claim that he was incompetent to stand trial was denied. The court found that although Marks presented substantial evidence of incompetence, there was a reasonable basis in the record for the California Supreme Court to deny this claim.However, the court held that the district court erred by denying relief on Marks's claim that he is intellectually disabled and thus ineligible for the death penalty. Marks had shown that the California Supreme Court’s rejection of this claim was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.The court also held that the district court properly denied relief on Marks's claim that the judge adjudicating his Atkins claim was biased against him. The California Supreme Court reasonably could have concluded that the judge did not display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.The court affirmed the district court's denial of relief on Marks's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The California Supreme Court reasonably could have concluded that a second competency hearing would have reached the same conclusion as a jury which had already found Marks competent.In sum, the court vacated the district court’s denial of Marks’s Atkins claim and remanded for de novo review of that claim. The court otherwise affirmed the district court's decision. View "Marks v. Davis" on Justia Law

The case involves Keith Atherton, who pleaded guilty to one count of using or attempting to use a minor to produce a visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct. His plea agreement contained an appeal waiver with certain exceptions. Atherton was sentenced to the statutory maximum of 30 years. He appealed, arguing that the district court violated his due process rights during sentencing by relying on false or unreliable information.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the sentence. The court held that a due process challenge to sentencing, like Atherton’s, falls within the appeal waiver limitation set forth in United States v. Wells, for “a challenge that the sentence violates the Constitution.” The court rejected the government’s contention that the Wells exception is limited to constitutional claims targeting the substantive terms of the sentence.Reviewing for plain error, the court held that Atherton’s due process rights were not violated. The court concluded that Atherton did not demonstrate that it is clear or obvious that the challenged information was patently false or unreliable or that the court relied upon the information in imposing sentence. View "United States v. Atherton" on Justia Law