Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Andrew Davis was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute marijuana, possession with intent to distribute marijuana, possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and conspiracy to commit money laundering. Davis trafficked large quantities of marijuana in Bridgeport, Connecticut, using a method involving shipping marijuana from California via FedEx. Upon his arrest, he was found with over 136 pounds of marijuana, numerous handguns, and approximately $412,000 in cash. A co-conspirator cooperated with the government, leading to Davis's conviction.The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut sentenced Davis to 295 months’ imprisonment. Davis appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for conspiracy to commit money laundering. He also raised ten additional arguments in pro se supplemental briefs, including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence for his other convictions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that the evidence at trial was sufficient to support Davis’s conviction for conspiracy to commit money laundering. The court found that the government provided ample circumstantial evidence linking the cash used in financial transactions to Davis's drug trafficking operations. The court also determined that Davis's pro se arguments either lacked merit, were forfeited, or were premature. Consequently, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

The case involves Ryan M. Maher, who was convicted in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York for receiving and possessing child pornography. Maher uploaded a digital file to his Google email account, which Google identified as containing child pornography based on a hash value match to a previously identified image. Google reported this to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC), which forwarded the report to the New York State Police. Without obtaining a warrant, a police investigator opened and visually examined the file, confirming it contained child pornography.The district court denied Maher's motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the warrantless search, relying on the "private search" doctrine. The court held that Google's hash match search was sufficient to justify the police's warrantless visual examination of the file. Alternatively, the court ruled that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied because the police reasonably believed no warrant was required.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with Maher that the district court erred in applying the private search doctrine. The court held that Google's hash match did not justify the police's warrantless visual examination of the file, as it exceeded the scope of Google's search. However, the court affirmed the conviction based on the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The court concluded that at the time of the search, the police had a reasonable basis to believe that no warrant was required, given the existing legal precedents.Thus, the Second Circuit affirmed Maher's conviction, holding that while the warrantless search violated the Fourth Amendment, the good faith exception applied, preventing the suppression of the evidence. View "U.S. v. Maher" on Justia Law

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and State Farm Fire and Casualty Insurance Company (collectively, “State Farm”) provide automobile insurance in New York and are required to reimburse individuals injured in automobile accidents for necessary health expenses under New York’s No-Fault Act. State Farm alleges that several health care providers and related entities engaged in a scheme to fraudulently obtain No-Fault benefits by providing unnecessary treatments and services, and then pursued baseless arbitrations and state-court proceedings to seek reimbursement for unpaid bills.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted State Farm’s motion for a preliminary injunction in part, enjoining the defendants from proceeding with pending arbitrations and from initiating new arbitrations and state-court proceedings, but denied an injunction of the pending state-court proceedings. The district court found that State Farm demonstrated irreparable harm due to the fragmented nature of the proceedings, which obscured the alleged fraud, and the risk of inconsistent judgments and preclusive effects.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision to grant the preliminary injunction in part. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that State Farm demonstrated irreparable harm, serious questions going to the merits, a balance of hardships tipping in its favor, and that the injunction was in the public interest. The court also concluded that the Federal Arbitration Act did not bar the injunction of the arbitrations because the arbitrations would prevent State Farm from effectively vindicating its RICO claims.Additionally, the appellate court reversed the district court’s decision not to enjoin the pending state-court proceedings, finding that the Anti-Injunction Act’s “expressly-authorized” exception applied. The court determined that the state-court proceedings were part of a pattern of baseless, repetitive claims that furthered the alleged RICO violation, and that enjoining these proceedings was necessary to give RICO its intended scope. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "State Farm Mutual v. Tri-Borough" on Justia Law

In 2008, Charles Anthony Giovinco pleaded guilty to enticement of a minor and possession of child pornography. He received concurrent sentences of 235 months for enticement and 120 months for possession. The First Step Act of 2018 (FSA) allows eligible prisoners to earn time credits for participating in certain programs, but excludes those serving sentences for specific offenses, including possession of child pornography.Giovinco argued that he should be eligible for FSA time credits after completing the sentence for the ineligible offense. The Bureau of Prisons (BOP) denied his request, stating that his entire term of imprisonment must be considered as a single, aggregated sentence, making him ineligible for FSA time credits. Giovinco filed a habeas petition, which the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut denied, deferring to the BOP's interpretation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that under 18 U.S.C. § 3584(c), multiple terms of imprisonment must be treated as a single, aggregate term for administrative purposes, including the administration of FSA time credits. Therefore, a prisoner serving any part of an aggregated sentence for an ineligible offense is not eligible to earn FSA time credits. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, agreeing that the BOP correctly aggregated Giovinco's sentences and determined his ineligibility for FSA time credits. View "Giovinco v. Pullen" on Justia Law

In December 2019, the defendant and a co-conspirator robbed a woman in a Bronx hotel room, taking $4,000 in cash, credit cards, cell phones, and a watch. The victim, a prostitute, had earned the cash through her business. The defendant was convicted of Hobbs Act Robbery and Conspiracy to Commit Hobbs Act Robbery after a jury trial.The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York sentenced the defendant to two concurrent 96-month terms of imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release. The court also imposed a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice, based on the defendant's alleged false testimony about his drug use at a suppression hearing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the interstate commerce element of the Hobbs Act offenses and the obstruction of justice enhancement. The appellate court affirmed the convictions, finding sufficient evidence that the robbery affected interstate commerce by depleting the victim's business assets. However, the court vacated the obstruction of justice enhancement, noting that the district court did not make a sufficient finding that the defendant's false testimony was willful. The case was remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the defendant acted with willful intent to provide false testimony. View "United States v. Orelien" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Varian Lefebvre pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute heroin and fentanyl and possession of a firearm after a prior felony conviction. The case began when Vermont State Police responded to a 911 call reporting an assault at a Holiday Inn in Rutland, Vermont. Officers located Lefebvre at the hotel and transported him to the nearby Vermont State Police barracks for identification by the purported victims, where he was then arrested. Lefebvre argued that all physical evidence seized from his backpack after his arrest should have been suppressed, claiming that his seizure ripened into a de facto arrest unsupported by probable cause when he was transported to the police barracks.The United States District Court for the District of Vermont denied Lefebvre’s motion to suppress the physical evidence. The court found that the seizure did not rise to the level of a de facto arrest and was supported by probable cause. Lefebvre entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that Lefebvre’s seizure did not become a de facto arrest when he was transported to the police barracks because the transportation was a reasonable and non-dilatory investigative step given the unique circumstances. The court also found that even if the transportation did rise to the level of an arrest, it was supported by probable cause based on the totality of the circumstances, including the 911 call, witness descriptions, and Lefebvre’s behavior. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States of America v. Lefebvre" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was involved in a scheme to defraud the City of West Haven, Connecticut, of COVID-19 relief funds. The defendant, along with co-conspirators, submitted fraudulent invoices for equipment and services that were never provided. The City paid over $400,000 based on these false invoices. The defendant was the only one among his co-defendants to go to trial, while the others pled guilty.The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut convicted the defendant of wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud. The court sentenced him to 96 months in prison, which was above the recommended guidelines range. The defendant appealed, challenging the sentence as substantively unreasonable, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the district court’s evidentiary rulings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court had provided a detailed explanation for the above-guidelines sentence, emphasizing the severity of the crime, the defendant’s financial gains, and the need for deterrence. The court also noted that the defendant did not receive a trial penalty, as the district court had explicitly stated that the sentence was not influenced by the defendant’s decision to go to trial. The court further found that the evidentiary rulings were not erroneous and that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the conviction.The Second Circuit concluded that none of the defendant’s challenges had merit and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Trasacco" on Justia Law

Eric Tompkins was convicted of failing to register as a sex offender and possessing child pornography. During his arrest, a Samsung cellular phone with an SD card was seized. A search warrant was obtained to examine the phone for evidence related to his failure to register. During the search, child pornography was found on the SD card. A second warrant was then obtained to search the phone and SD card specifically for child pornography, leading to the discovery of additional images.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York denied Tompkins's motion to suppress the images found on the SD card, ruling that the search was conducted in good faith. Tompkins argued that the initial search warrant did not specifically authorize the search of the SD card, making the search unlawful and tainting the subsequent search.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the initial search warrant, which authorized the search of the cellular phone for electronically stored information, included the SD card as it is a form of electronic storage. The court concluded that the search of the SD card fell within the scope of the warrant. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment, rejecting Tompkins's argument that the search was unauthorized. View "United States v. Tompkins" on Justia Law

Ghislaine Maxwell was convicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York of conspiracy to transport minors with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity, transportation of a minor with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity, and sex trafficking of a minor. She was sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment of 60 months, 120 months, and 240 months, respectively, followed by concurrent terms of supervised release. Maxwell appealed her conviction on several grounds, including the applicability of Jeffrey Epstein’s Non-Prosecution Agreement (NPA), the statute of limitations, jury impartiality, constructive amendment of the indictment, and the reasonableness of her sentence.The District Court denied Maxwell’s motion to dismiss the indictment, holding that Epstein’s NPA with the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida did not bar her prosecution by the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York. The court also found that the second superseding indictment complied with the statute of limitations, as the relevant statute extended the time to bring charges of sexual abuse for offenses committed before its enactment. Additionally, the District Court denied Maxwell’s Rule 33 motion for a new trial, finding no abuse of discretion in its handling of a juror’s erroneous answers during voir dire. The court also rejected Maxwell’s claim that its response to a jury note resulted in a constructive amendment of, or prejudicial variance from, the indictment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The appellate court held that Epstein’s NPA did not bind the Southern District of New York, the indictment was timely, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial, and the response to the jury note did not result in a constructive amendment or prejudicial variance. The court also found Maxwell’s sentence to be procedurally reasonable. View "United States v. Maxwell" on Justia Law

Manuel Antonio Suquilanda was convicted of unlawfully reentering the United States after being deported, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He challenged his conviction on two grounds: first, that the initial removal proceedings were invalid because the Notice to Appear (NTA) he received lacked the place of hearing and address-of-filing information, thus stripping the Immigration Court of jurisdiction; and second, that § 1326 is unconstitutional as it discriminates against Latin Americans, violating the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied Suquilanda’s motion to dismiss the indictment. The court held that any defect in the NTA did not deprive the Immigration Court of jurisdiction, referencing the Second Circuit’s precedent in Banegas Gomez v. Barr. The court also concluded that the address-of-filing requirement was a non-jurisdictional, claim-processing rule. On the constitutional challenge, the court found that while the 1929 Act had discriminatory intent, Suquilanda failed to show that the 1952 reenactment of § 1326 was motivated by racial animus.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the missing hearing information in the NTA was cured by a subsequent notice, and the address-of-filing requirement was non-jurisdictional. On the constitutional issue, the court applied the Arlington Heights framework and found that Suquilanda did not demonstrate that racial discrimination was a substantial or motivating factor in the 1952 enactment of § 1326. Consequently, the court concluded that § 1326 does not violate the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee. View "United States v. Suquilanda" on Justia Law