Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendants were prosecuted under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (“MDLEA”) for conspiring to traffic drugs on the high seas using a stateless vessel. Before ultimately pleading guilty to the offense, Defendants filed a joint motion to dismiss their indictments on the ground that conspirators operating from a foreign country who were never physically on the high seas and who had no ties to the United States could not constitutionally be subject to prosecution under the MDLEA.The district court denied Appellants’ motion to dismiss. On appeal, Defendants argued that their prosecution under the MDLEA violated due process because their conduct lacked a nexus with the United States and that, by applying the MDLEA to their conduct, Congress exceeded its Article I powers.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Defendants’ motion to dismiss. View "United States v. Antonius" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to drug trafficking in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sections 841 and 846 and concealment money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). During his plea colloquy, speaking through a Spanish-English interpreter, Defendant repeatedly failed to acknowledge that he had intended to conceal the proceeds of his drug trafficking, an element of concealment money laundering. On appeal, Defendant contends that his conviction for concealment money laundering should be reversed because an insufficient factual basis existed for his guilty plea pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.   The Second Circuit vacated Defendant’s Section 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) conviction and sentence and remanded. The court explained that the district court’s error is “plain.” In this case, Defendant did not admit to a concealment purpose—an offense element—and the other evidence did not establish that intent either. Thus, it is clear and obvious that Rule 11(b)(3) was not satisfied. Second, the district court’s error prejudicially affected Defendant’s substantial rights. The court reasoned that it appears likely that Defendant would not have pled guilty to violating Section 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) had he understood its mens rea requirement and been told that he needed to state a concealment purpose. Defendant was consistent and persistent in maintaining that his purpose was otherwise. Last, the plain and prejudicial error seriously harmed the legitimacy of the judicial proceeding. The district court’s acceptance of the guilty plea without Defendant’s acknowledgment that he intended to conceal the source of his funds casts serious doubt upon the “fairness, integrity and public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” View "U.S. v. Aybar-Peguero" on Justia Law

On April 10, 2008, Petitioner was convicted of murder in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree by a New York state-court jury. The court sentenced him to concurrent indeterminate prison terms of twenty years to life for the murder count and five to fifteen years for the weapon possession count. Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Respondent, the Warden of the facility in which Petitioner is imprisoned, moved to dismiss a subset of the claims in the petition on the ground that they were time-barred under 28 U.S.C. Section 2244(d)(1). The district court agreed and entered an order supported by a memorandum decision granting the motion. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal and sought a certificate of appealability. The Second Circuit granted a certificate of appealability. Petitioner contends that under Section 2244(d)(1), all the claims raised in his petition were timely because at least one claim asserted therein was timely filed within the applicable one-year limitations period.   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s order. The court concluded that Section 2244(d)(1)’s statute of limitations requires a claim-by-claim approach. The court explained that Petitioner’s sole argument in support of his entitlement to equitable tolling is that his lawyer told him the wrong deadline for filing a habeas petition that included the arguments that he advanced in his direct appeal. But this argument has been squarely foreclosed by the Supreme Court. Accordingly, the district court correctly determined that Petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling and properly dismissed his claims as time-barred. View "Clemente v. Lee" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, pro se and incarcerated, appealed from the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action. The district court dismissed his complaint, concluding that Plaintiff was barred from proceeding in forma pauperis (“IFP”) because he had accumulated three “strikes” under 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(g) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). At issue on appeal is whether (1) a res judicata dismissal and (2) a dismissal of an entire complaint on several alternative grounds—one of which qualifies as a strike under existing precedent—can constitute strikes under Section 1915(g).   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Section 1915(g) bars a prisoner from proceeding IFP, absent a showing of imminent danger, if on three or more occasions while incarcerated, he has brought an action or an appeal that was “dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” The court reasoned that Section 1915(g) does not provide Plaintiff an opportunity to relitigate his prior cases. The court considered Plaintiff’s remaining arguments and concluded they are meritless. The district court correctly concluded that Griffin was barred by the PLRA’s three strikes provision from proceeding IFP, and, therefore, properly dismissed his complaint. View "Griffin v. Carnes" on Justia Law

Petitioners filed successive habeas corpus petitions challenging their convictions and mandatory sentences imposed by the district court. The district court held that their substantive RICO convictions, on which their Section 924(c) convictions were based, were valid “crimes of violence.”This appeal focuses on their convictions under Count Thirteen of the indictment, which charged them with using and carrying firearms during and in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c), based on an offense charged in Count One, racketeering activity in violation of RICO.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the jury was instructed that it could base Petitioners’ Section 924(c) convictions upon a predicate offense, which, according to the Supreme Court’s subsequent interpretations of the term, was not a “crime of violence.” The jury’s findings rendered under those (later determined to be erroneous) instructions do not specify whether it found that the defendants committed a variation of New York larceny by extortion that necessarily requires the actual or threatened use of force. Nor did the written jury findings specify whether the predicate offense related to second-degree grand larceny by extortion was the substantive offense or conspiracy or attempt to commit the offense. Nonetheless, reviewing the jury’s verdict in relation to the evidence presented at trial, the court concluded with a high degree of confidence that, if properly instructed, the jury would have predicated Petitioners’ Section 924(c) convictions on a valid crime of violence. View "U.S. v. Colotti" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought a review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing her appeal, ordering her removed, and denying her application for cancellation of removal. The BIA ordered that she be removed under 8 U.S.C. Section 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (“CIMT”). Specifically, the BIA and Immigration Judge (“IJ”) determined that a conviction under Arkansas Code Annotated (“ACA”) Section 5-60-101 is categorically a CIMT.   The Second Circuit reversed. The court concluded that a conviction under ACA Section 5- 60-101 is not categorically a CIMT because the statute criminalizes conduct that is not “inherently base, vile, or depraved.” The court explained that the BIA did not conduct an elements-based categorical inquiry. Instead, it applied an inapposite “realistic probability” test. That test “operates as a backstop when a statute has indeterminate reach, and where minimum conduct analysis invites improbable hypotheticals.” It applies only when there is a match between the state statute and federal standard, but a petitioner posits imaginative scenarios in which the state statute would be violated in such a way that does not meet the requirements of a CIMT. View "Giron-Molina v. Garland" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from a judgment of conviction on multiple counts of substantive and conspiratorial Hobbs Act robbery and of the brandishing of a firearm during two crimes of violence (i.e., the charged robberies). Defendant argued that the district court erred (1) in relying on the inevitable discovery doctrine to deny his motion to suppress evidence obtained through warrants supported by concededly defective affidavits and (2) in charging the jury that a gun constitutes a firearm and refusing to give his requested jury instruction.   The Second Circuit vacated Defendant’s firearms convictions. The court agreed with Defendant that the inevitable discovery doctrine does not apply in the circumstances of this case, and because the conceded misstatements in the affidavits were material to the issuing magistrate judges’ probable cause determinations, remand is required for the district court to conduct a hearing to determine if the challenged evidence was admissible under the standard identified in Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). As to the jury charge, the district court erred in instructing the jury that a gun is a firearm. The court wrote that it cannot conclude that this error was harmless as a matter of law. View "United States v. Lauria (Molina)" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for possession with intent to distribute controlled substances after a search warrant was executed against his residence. The district court denied his motion to suppress the evidence law enforcement seized from the search. Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea preserving his right to appeal the district court’s decision. Defendant challenged the search warrant’s validity. He argued that the district court should have given him a Franks hearing because the warrant relies on knowingly false statements in the supporting affidavit.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant has not made a substantial preliminary showing that any of the three statements Defendant scrutinized were false material statements that the Officers knowingly or recklessly included in the search warrant affidavit. He succeeds only at identifying inconsistent statements—and discrete details within them—that is immaterial to a finding of probable cause. Further, Defendant impugns only the CI’s veracity, not the Officers’. Accordingly, the court held that he is not entitled to a Franks hearing. View "United States v. Domenico Sandalo" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from a district court judgment imposing, among other things, special conditions of supervised release making Defendant’s internet and computer access contingent on his compliance with computer monitoring terms devised by the U.S. Probation Office. Defendant challenges both the court’s special conditions themselves and the computer monitoring terms they contemplate on procedural reasonableness, substantive reasonableness, and improper delegation grounds.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that although Defendant’s appeal raises legitimate concerns, nearly all of those concerns can be resolved by construing his computer monitoring restrictions to avoid the troublesome implications that, in a few cases, an expansive reading might suggest. The court wrote that although “the defendant, the public, and appellate courts should not be required to engage in guesswork about the rationale for a particular sentence,” it requires no “guesswork” to understand why the district court imposed the conditions it imposed in this case. Given the nature both of Defendant’s underlying offense and of his repeated violations of supervised release, the longstanding general computer monitoring requirement that Defendant has never (including now) objected to, and the officer’s justification for the recommended updates, the district court’s rationale for imposing this sort of computer monitoring program was apparent on this record. Thus, the court discerned no procedural error in the sentence it imposed. View "United States of America v. Kunz" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed a jury verdict finding him guilty of nine narcotics and money-laundering offenses, including operating a continuing criminal enterprise (“CCE”). Defendant challenged his conviction primarily on two grounds. First, he argued that his indictment insufficiently stated the CCE count because it did not identify the conduct constituting the “continuing series of violations” that 21 U.S.C. Section 848(c)(2) requires. Second, Defendant argued that the district court improperly instructed the jury when it construed Section 848(b)(2)(A) to allow aggregation of drug amounts across the continuing series of violations rather than requiring that a single narcotics offense “involve” at least 150 kilograms of cocaine.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court held that the indictment was sufficient under the court’s previous decision in United States v. Flaharty, 295 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2002). The court wrote it was not persuaded by Defendant’s challenge to his indictment because the indictment satisfies the test the court announced in United States v. Flaharty, 295 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2002). In fact, the indictment here is not meaningfully different from the one the court considered in Flaharty. The court agreed, however, with Defendant’s interpretation of Section 848(b)(2)(A). That provision requires the threshold drug amount to be “involved” in a single felony violation of the drug laws. The district court’s interpretation, which permitted aggregation, was erroneous. Nevertheless, the court concluded that the error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence introduced against Defendant. As a result, the court affirmed Defendant’s conviction on all counts. View "United States v. Montague" on Justia Law