Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs are U.S. service members wounded in terrorist attacks in Iraq and the families and estates of service members killed in such attacks. They appealed from the dismissal of their claims under the Antiterrorism Act (the “ATA”) as amended by the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (the “JASTA”), against various financial institutions in the United States and abroad (the “Banks”). As relevant to this appeal, Plaintiffs alleged that the Banks conspired with and aided and abetted Iranian entities to circumvent sanctions imposed by the United States and channel funds to terrorist groups that killed or injured U.S. service members. The district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ JASTA conspiracy claims primarily because Plaintiffs failed to plausibly plead a direct connection between the Banks and the terrorist groups. The district court also declined to consider Plaintiffs’ JASTA aiding-and-abetting claims because they were raised for the first time in Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration.   The Second Circuit explained that while it disagreed with the district court’s primary reason for dismissing Plaintiffs’ JASTA conspiracy claims, it affirmed the district court’s judgment because Plaintiffs failed to adequately allege that the Banks conspired – either directly or indirectly – with the terrorist groups, or that the terrorist attacks that killed or injured the service members were in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy to circumvent U.S. sanctions. The court agreed with the district court that Plaintiffs forfeited their JASTA aiding-and-abetting claims by raising them for the first time in a motion for reconsideration. View "Freeman v. HSBC Holdings PLC" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from a judgment of conviction entered after a jury found him guilty on counts related to a drug distribution conspiracy, the discharge of a firearm during a drug trafficking crime, and the unlawful possession of a firearm. Defendant committed these crimes while on supervised release following prior convictions. On appeal, Defendant asserted primarily that two alleged district court errors require vacatur of his conviction. First, relying on Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 2 U.S. 545 (1977), Defendant contended that the government violated his Sixth Amendment rights by eliciting testimony from his former cellmate concerning what Defendant told the cellmate about Defendant planned defense. Second, Defendant submitted that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when the officer supervising Defendant during his period of supervised release coordinated a search of his residence and rental car. Accordingly, Defendant argued that the district court erred by admitting his former cellmate’s testimony and evidence seized during the search of his residence and rental car.   The Second Circuit affirmed hold that on plain error review of the Sixth Amendment claim, the court identified no error, never mind plain error. Nothing in the record suggests that the government learned privileged information or intentionally invaded Defendant’s relationship with his attorney. On de novo review of the Fourth Amendment challenge, the court concluded that the district court properly denied Defendant’s motion to suppress. The officer monitoring Defendant had reasonable suspicion to search his residence and rental car based on credible reports that Defendant unlawfully possessed a firearm and was engaged in drug trafficking. View "United States v. Chandler" on Justia Law

On appeal to the Second Circuit from remand from the United States Supreme Court, the court vacated Defendants’ convictions conversion of government property, wire fraud, and securities fraud; and convicting certain Defendants on various counts of conspiring to engage in conduct violating one or more of the above sections, all originating from misappropriation of confidential information from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services ("CMS").   On remand: (A) Defendants contend that their argument that the CMS information at issue does not constitute "property" or a "thing of value" within the meaning of the above statutes is supported by the Supreme Court's decision in Kelly; (B) the government, concurring in that contention, confesses error as to the substantive counts and as to a count charging only conspiracy to violate Sections 1343 and 1348 (Count Two); and it agrees that either Defendants' convictions on those counts should be reversed, or the cases should be remanded to the district court so that the government can dismiss those counts pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 48(a); and (C) the government seeks affirmance on the remaining conspiracy counts (Counts One and Seventeen).   The Second Circuit explained that given the Supreme Court's decision in Kelly and the prosecutorial discretion to which the Executive Branch of the government is entitled, the court granted the government's request to remand the cases to the district court for dismissal of the substantive counts and Count Two. View "USA v. Blaszczak" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with five counts of an eight-count indictment in connection with the murders of two victims. Counts Four, Five, and Six charged Defendantwith conspiring to commit, and committing, murder for hire in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1958. Counts Seven and Eight charged Defendant with use of a firearm to commit murder in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 924(j). Defendant was convicted on all five counts and received a sentence of five concurrent life terms, one for each count. In response to intervening Supreme Court precedent, Defendant filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 asserting that his two Section 924(j) convictions on Counts Seven and Eight should be vacated. The district court agreed, and granted the motion. The court declined, however, to resentence Defendant de novo.   Defendant argued that this was an error, either because de novo resentencing was mandatory, or because the district court abused its discretion in declining to resentence Defendant de novo. The Second Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that Section 2255's statutory text vests district courts with the discretion to decide when to conduct a de novo resentencing and that de novo resentencing was not mandatory here. The court also concluded that because resentencing Defendant would have been “strictly ministerial,” resulting in the same sentence of mandatory life imprisonment that he received in the first instance, the district court did not abuse its discretion. View "United States v. Peña" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial Defendant was convicted of numerous crimes related to his leadership of two organizations, a self-styled executive coaching and self-help organization called NXIVM and a secret society called DOS. On appeal, Defendant challenged his convictions for sex trafficking crimes. At the center of his appeal is the meaning of “commercial sex act,” which Section 1591 defines as “any sex act, on account of which anything of value is given to or received by any person.” He contended that evidence the Government submitted at trial showing that individuals received benefits, such as privileged positions within an organization, is insufficient to sustain his sex trafficking convictions.   The Second Circuit affirmed, concluding that Section 1591 requires neither that a “[]thing of value” have a monetary or financial component nor that the sexual exploitation is conducted for profit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the October 30, 2020 judgment as it concerns Defendant’s sex trafficking offenses: the sex trafficking conspiracy (Count 5), the sex trafficking of N  (Count 6), the attempted sex trafficking of J (Count 7), and the racketeering act of sex trafficking of N (Act 10A).   The court further explained that the phrase “anything of value” need not have a monetary or financial component, and the actionable sexual exploitation need not have been conducted for profit. The jury was neither misinformed nor misled. Moreover, the court concluded that the evidence was strong enough to reach a jury and that Defendant was afforded at least “the minimum that due process requires.”. View "United States v. Raniere" on Justia Law

The United States appealed the district court’s judgment sentencing Defendant to 60 months' imprisonment following his plea of guilty to bank robbery, entering the banks with intent to commit larceny, bank larceny, and interstate communication of a threat to injure. The district court declined to sentence Defendant as a career offender under Sentencing Guidelines Section 4B1.1, ruling that a predicate advanced by the government for the enhancement—Defendant’s 2002 conviction of third-degree attempted criminal sale of a  controlled substance under New York Penal Law Sections 220.39(1) and 110--was not a proper predicate because New York's controlled substances schedule included naloxegol, which was removed from the federal controlled substances schedules. On appeal, the government contended that the district court misinterpreted the Guidelines by failing to compare the New York schedule to the federal schedules as they existed at the time of Defendant’s state-law conviction in 2002.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court found no merit in the government’s contention. The court explained that while there is much to be said for looking to federal criminal law as it stood at the time Defendant engaged in the conduct that constitutes his present offense, rather than at the time of sentencing for his present offense, the court need not decide between the two in this case because either leads to affirmance. Federal criminal law--both at the time of this conduct and at the time of sentencing for it--was narrower than the state law that governed Defendant’s 2002 conviction. View "USA v. Gibson" on Justia Law

Defendant, indicted for participating in a successful murder-for-hire scheme, was ordered detained pending trial. Defendant appealed the district court’s decision not to reopen his detention hearing under 18 U.S.C. Section 3142(f) after the U.S. Department of Justice confirmed that it would not seek the death penalty against him.   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision not to reopen Defendant’s detention hearing and denied Defendant’s motion for bail. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to revisit its detention ruling. In its initial detention determination, the district court had assumed that the death penalty would not be sought, and so the government’s later confirmation of that point did not materially change the detention calculus. Moreover, the district court’s consideration of the strength of the evidence that Defendant committed the charged offense, as part of its assessment of whether Defendant posed a danger to the community or a risk of flight, was consistent with the Bail Reform Act and did not undermine the presumption of innocence, which is a trial right. View "United States v. Zhang" on Justia Law

Defendant challenged the sentence imposed following his guilty plea for conspiring to support a terrorist group and the denial of his Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(a) motion to correct the sentence. The Second Circuit addressed whether the Rule 35(a) motion is barred by the appeal waiver in his plea agreement. Defendant argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to correct its alleged sentencing errors.   The Second Circuit dismissed Defendant’s appeal. The court explained that in this case, Defendant did not identify any arithmetical, technical, or similar errors with the sentence. Instead, he alleged that the district court failed to properly apply the sentencing factors and failed to adequately consider his objections, resulting in a prison term that was “unreasonable, cruel and unusual, . . . and greater than necessary to accomplish [its] purpose.” The motion’s arguments thus plainly fall outside of Rule 35(a)’s “very narrow” scope. Instead of filing a genuine Rule 35(a) motion, Defendant simply stated his objections to the district court’s sentence. The terms of this appeal waiver plainly bar consideration of the motion. Defendant’s arguments are plainly beyond the scope of Rule 35(a) and thus are barred by his appeal waiver. View "United States v. Rakhmatov" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted after a jury trial of conspiracy to commit mail, wire, and bank fraud. On appeal, Defendant argued that her pretrial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to transmit a plea offer from the government to Defendant before it expired, thereby depriving her of the chance to plead guilty under the terms of the offer.   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment of conviction. The court concluded that Defendant has waived any claim that the alleged error violated her Sixth Amendment rights. Unlike the defendant in Frye, Defendant learned of her expired plea offer and received new court-appointed counsel two months before trial. She nonetheless chose to go to trial rather than to plead guilty or to petition the court for reinstatement of the offer. This knowing and the voluntary choice was inconsistent with seeking the benefit of the expired plea offer and thus constitutes waiver.
The court further found that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of Defendant’s other fraudulent activity that was similar and/or related to the charged conduct; the court did not err by allowing the government to introduce certain “red flag” emails from an outside attorney for the limited purpose of proving her knowledge, and the court’s decision to instruct the jury on conscious avoidance was proper. View "United States v. Graham" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from a judgment of conviction following his guilty plea to one count of transmitting a threat in interstate commerce, one count of threatening to assault a federal law officer, and one count of obstruction of justice. At a sentencing proceeding conducted by videoconference and under seal, the district court sentenced Defendant principally to eighty-four months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the government breached the plea agreement, (2) his sentence was procedurally unreasonable, and (3) the district court erred in conducting his sentencing by videoconference.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court held that (1) the plea agreement expressly provided for the government to take the very actions Defendant now characterizes as breaches of that agreement, (2) the district court provided adequate notice and factual support for the sentencing variances and enhancements it applied, and (3) Defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to be physically present at sentencing. The court also held as a matter of first impression – that sealed sentencings conducted by videoconference do not implicate Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 53’s prohibition on “the broadcasting of judicial proceedings from the courtroom” or the procedural requirements associated with the CARES Act’s exception to Rule 53. View "United States v. Sealed Defendant One" on Justia Law