Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was indicted for knowingly producing child pornography in violation of federal law. He moved to suppress evidence gathered from his electronic devices, arguing that the government’s search warrants lacked probable cause and therefore violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court denied the motion. Defendant then pleaded guilty but reserved the right to appeal the district court’s decision on his motion to suppress.   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment explained that it disagrees with the district court that Defendant’s prior guilty plea to an earlier charge in Tennessee state court precludes him from challenging the search warrants in this case. But the court agreed that even assuming arguendo that the warrants are defective, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies.   The court explained that there was at least arguable probable cause for the Tennessee Warrants, therefore, the Detective acted based on an “‘objectively reasonable good-faith belief’ that [his] conduct [was] lawful.” The court further wrote that the affidavits at issue here are not so devoid of factual support because they detail allegations from State Victim 1’s mother that support the common-sense inference that her daughter told her that Defendant took nude photographs of her. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction following a jury trial in district court in which he was found guilty of racketeering, murder in aid of racketeering, various narcotics offenses, interstate prostitution, and sex trafficking of minors. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred by permitting him to represent himself without a psychiatric evaluation.   The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment holding that while the district court has the discretion to conduct an inquiry into a defendant’s mental competence before granting a motion to proceed pro se, the court is not required to order psychiatric testing and did not err in granting Defendant’s motion. The court explained that where a defendant has been found competent to stand trial Edwards does not require a court to conduct a further competency hearing or order psychiatric evaluations before permitting a defendant to proceed pro se. (Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008).) Further, on the current facts, the court could not say that the district court abused its discretion in failing to sua sponte order a psychiatric evaluation prior to determining that Defendant “knowingly and intelligently” waived his right to counsel. View "United States v. Rivera" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery. Application Note 1 to Section 4B1.2 provides that, among other things, a conspiracy to commit a crime of violence is itself a crime of violence. The district court held that it was not obligated to defer to Application Note 1 because it was inconsistent with 4B1.2(a). The Government appealed.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. The court held that the Hobbs Act robbery is not categorically a “crime of violence” under the career offender provision of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The court explained that Hobbs Act robbery can be committed based solely on violence against property, whereas a “crime of violence” under Section 4B1.2 must be based on violence against people.   Here, the court explained it need not rule upon the validity of Application Note 1 in this context because the object of Defendant’s conspiracy offense (Hobbs Act robbery) was not a crime of violence as defined by Section 4B1.2. And if the object of the conspiracy is not a crime of violence, then the conspiracy itself cannot be one either (at least, not by virtue of Application Note 1).     . View "United States of America v. Chappelle" on Justia Law

After a three-and-a-half-year delay, a jury convicted Appellant of conspiring to launder the proceeds generated by a network of Brooklyn medical clinics. Appellant appealed his conviction and sentence. He argued that the district court erred when it denied his motions to dismiss based on violations of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 3161 et seq. Specifically, Appellant claimed that the district court improperly excluded time based on the complexity of the case without determining, on the record, why the case was complex or that such exclusions outweighed the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. He contended that the excessive pre-trial delay, to which he objected, arose not from the supposed complexity of the prosecution but rather because the Government delayed production of certain documents possessed by state and federal agencies that had participated in the joint investigation and prosecution of Appellant.   The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment of conviction, vacated Appellant’s conviction and sentence, and remanded to the district court. The court held that the district court’s exclusion of time during at least two long periods of delay was insufficient under the Speedy Trial Act.   The court explained that the Speedy Trial Act was designed to enforce the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee that the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy trial. Here, the district court failed in this responsibility. It neither held the Government accountable for its discovery obligations nor appropriately considered the causes and implications of the extraordinary delays introduced by the Government’s dilatory conduct of discovery. View "United States v. Pikus" on Justia Law

Police received reports of a gunshot fired from the roof of a building. Officers responded to the scene within two minutes, at which point they observed Defendants exiting a building. While officers were not sure which building the shots were fired from, the building Defendants were exiting was in the immediate area. Officers noticed one of the Defendants bladed his body away from them, and both Defendants had their hands in their pockets. When asked to remove their hands from their pockets, Defendants complied. However, at this point, officers noticed a bulge in one of the Defendant's pockets. A passerby informed officers that he had seen Defendants coming down from the building's rooftop. Officers frisked one of the Defendants, recovering a firearm.Defendants entered guilty pleas each to a single count of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1) and 2, preserving their right to appeal the court's adverse decision on their motion to suppress.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Defendants' motion to suppress, finding that the police had reasonable suspicion to initiate a pedestrian stop as well as to conduct a pat-frisk of the Defendant who had a bulge in his pocket. View "United States v. Hawkins" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of six counts of criminal contempt for repeatedly defying court orders, for which he was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment. He challenges the conviction, arguing that the district court’s appointment of special prosecutors under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(a)(2) violated the Appointments Clause of the United States Constitution because (1) the special prosecutors are inferior officers who were not supervised by a principal officer, and (2) Rule 42 does not satisfy the Appointments Clause requirement that “Congress . . . by Law” vest the appointment of inferior officers in the courts.   The Second Circuit affirmed Defendant’s convictions. The court first concluded that special prosecutors are officers under the Appointments Clause. Next, the court held that Defendant’s Appointments Clause arguments lack merit. First, the special prosecutors are subject to supervision by the Attorney General, who has broad statutory authority to “conduct” and to “supervise” all litigation involving the United States. This authority includes supervising—and if necessary, removing—the special prosecutors. Second, Plaintiff failed to raise his challenge to Rule 42 below, thus the court concluded conclude that the district court did not commit plain error by appointing the special prosecutors in light of directly applicable Supreme Court precedent Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by initiating prosecution against Defendant for repeatedly defying court orders for years. View "United States v. Donziger" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of possessing marijuana with intent to distribute, and of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute, 100 kilograms or more of marijuana following a jury trial.   On appeal, Defendant argued that (1) the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress marijuana that was obtained during a warrantless search of a private single-engine airplane; (2) the government improperly bolstered the testimony of its cooperating witnesses at trial; and (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing.   The Second Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress, the judgment of conviction, and the sentence. The court held that the vehicle exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement applies to the search of the private aircraft used to transport Defendant’s marijuana and that there was probable cause to search the plane. Further, the court wrote there is no merit to Defendant’s remaining challenges.   The court explained unlike a traffic stop, law enforcement agents may conduct a ramp check absent an antecedent violation or even reasonable suspicion of one. Here, the ramp check by itself was therefore a proper exercise of regulatory authority. Further, the mobility of an airplane in flight is so obvious that it needs no elaboration. And even when a plane is on the ground, it is no less capable of being moved than, say, a non-residential unhitched tractor-trailer. The fact that the search here occurred while the plane was sitting on the tarmac and the pilot was not in the pilot’s seat does not alter the calculus. View "United States v. Capelli" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of (1) conspiracy to commit second-degree murder in aid of racketeering, (2) second-degree murder in aid of racketeering, and (3) using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c). Petitioner filed for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255, contending that his Section 924(c) conviction and its accompanying sentence were unlawful. The district court denied the petition but granted a certificate of appealability.   On appeal, Petitioner argued that his Section 924(c) conviction was unlawful because (1) it was possibly predicated on conspiracy to commit murder, an offense that no longer qualifies as a crime of violence, and (2) even if it were predicated on substantive murder, that offense also does not qualify as a crime of violence.   The Second Circuit found no merit in Petitioner’s challenges and affirmed. The court held that the error of instructing the jury on the now-invalid predicate was harmless to Petitioner because the jury found facts satisfying the essential elements of guilt on the valid predicate of substantive murder in aid of racketeering which would have sustained a lawful conviction on the firearm offense. Further, the elements of first-degree manslaughter and second-degree murder differ only with respect to the intent element. Here, because the intent element played no part in the Petitioner’s court’s analysis of whether first-degree manslaughter is a violent felony, its reasoning binds the court with respect to whether second-degree murder is a crime of violence. Thus, second-degree murder is categorically a crime of violence under Section 924(c). View "Stone v. United States" on Justia Law

Following a disturbance at a hospital, two New York City police officers arrested Plaintiff and transported her to another hospital for a psychiatric evaluation. Plaintiff asserted false arrest claims, alleging that the police officers lacked probable cause to arrest her for a mental health examination. The district court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, holding that because the police officers had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for a misdemeanor trespass, her false arrest claim was precluded. The district court did not reach the issue of the existence of probable cause for a mental health arrest. The district court also held, in the alternative, that the officers were protected by qualified immunity because they had arguable probable cause to make a mental health arrest.   The Second Circuit affirmed, concluding that while the district court erred in its probable cause analysis, the officers were protected by qualified immunity. The court explained that even where actual probable cause does not exist, police officers may be entitled to qualified immunity from a Section 1983 false arrest claim if their actions did not violate "clearly established" rights or if "arguable probable cause" existed at the time of the arrest.   Here, the parties disagree as to whether the officers had probable cause to arrest her for an emergency mental health evaluation. The court held that the existence of probable cause to arrest an individual for a criminal violation does not preclude a false arrest claim based on a wrongful arrest for a mental health evaluation. However, nonetheless, the officers here are protected by qualified immunity. View "Guan v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Defendant filed his compassionate release motion after exhausting his administrative remedies. The Government conceded that Defendant’s medical conditions arguably met the threshold requirement of an extraordinary and compelling reason but opposed the motion on the grounds that the Section 3553(a) factors weighed against release. Defendant contended primarily that the district court erred in denying his motion pursuant to Section  3582 by refusing to consider new evidence that he says calls into question the validity of his conviction.   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling.  The court concluded that when considering a motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to Section 3582(c)(1)(A), a district court does not have the discretion to consider new evidence proffered for the purpose of attacking the validity of the underlying conviction in its balancing of the Section 3553(a) factors. Facts and arguments that purport to undermine the validity of a federal conviction must be brought on direct appeal or pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 or Section 2241. The court affirmed the finding that the district court properly refused to consider such evidence here as to the Section 3553(a) factors and otherwise did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion for compassionate release. View "United States v. Orena" on Justia Law