Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
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Defendant was convicted, pursuant to a guilty plea, of conspiracy to engage in a pattern of racketeering activity, in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”).  The charge was based on his membership in the Syracuse-based 110 Gang and, more specifically, his distribution, in five separate transactions, of a total of 42.2 grams of cocaine base (“crack cocaine”). Defendant apparently received less than $2500 for these sales, which ultimately resulted in a sentence of ninety-two months’ imprisonment—the low end of the Sentencing Guidelines ranges the district judge calculated.   On appeal, Defendant challenged two factors upon which his sentence was based: (1) the district judge’s decision to apply a two-level increase for possession of a dangerous weapon in connection with narcotics distribution, see U.S.S.G. Section 2D1.1(b)(1), and (2) the district judge’s refusal to apply a mitigating role adjustment.   The Second Circuit vacated Defendant’s sentence. The court explained that Defendant’s conviction and sentence stem from his role in furthering the 110 Gang’s violent and extensive criminal enterprise. Yet the district judge failed to analyze Defendant’s criminal conduct against the backdrop of the criminal conduct of other 110 Gang members even though such an analysis might well have qualified Defendant for a mitigating role adjustment. View "United States v. Wynn" on Justia Law

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Defendant appealed the district court’s judgment of conviction on charges including racketeering conspiracy, in violation of the Racketeer-Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. Section 1962(d) and conspiracy to commit murder in aid of racketeering and attempted murder in aid of racketeering, in violation of the Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering Act (“VICAR”), 18 U.S.C. Section 1959(a)(5). Defendant argued that his firearms conviction should be vacated because the predicate offenses on which the conviction was based are not “crimes of violence” in light of United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019).   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and concluded that Defendant’s section 924(c) conviction remains valid even after Davis because one of the predicate offenses underlying the conviction – attempted murder in aid of racketeering – is a categorical crime of violence. The court explained that to determine whether Defendant’s section 924(c) charge is properly based on a crime of violence, it must determine whether any one of section 924(c) predicate offenses listed in his indictment – racketeering conspiracy, conspiracy to commit murder in aid of racketeering, attempted murder in aid of racketeering, and murder-for-hire conspiracy – “categorically involve[s] the use of force.” Further, because second-degree murder under New York law is a crime of violence, there can be no doubt that attempt to commit second-degree murder under New York law is itself categorically a crime of violence. This conviction for attempted murder in aid of racketeering serves as one of the predicate offenses underlying Defendant’s section 924(c) conviction. View "United States v. Pastore" on Justia Law

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Defendant was sentenced to a 40- month term of imprisonment for being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(1). In calculating Defendant's advisory sentencing range under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, the district court concluded that Defendant’s prior conviction for attempted second-degree gang assault in violation of New York Penal Law Sections 120.06 and 110.00 was a qualifying “crime of violence” for which his base offense level would be raised from 14 to 20. On appeal, Defendant argued that his conviction is not a crime of violence under the categorical approach because New York courts have deemed attempted second-degree gang assault a legal impossibility.   The Second Circuit vacated Defendant’s sentence and remanded for resentencing. The court held (1) Defendant’s conviction for attempted second-degree gang assault is not a crime of violence within the meaning of U.S.S.G. Section 4B1.2(a)’s force clause. Further, the court could discern no coherent element that constitutes the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. (2) Defendant’s intent to have the presence and aid of others actually present does not categorically involve the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. (3) Defendant’s conviction does not fall within the definition of “attempt[]” as that term is used in Application Note 1 to U.S.S.G. Section  4B1.2. (4) Attempted second-degree gang assault is not enumerated as “aggravated assault” as that phrase is used in U.S.S.G. Section 4B1.2(a)’s enumerated offenses clause. View "United States v. Castillo" on Justia Law

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Petitioner participated in the bombings of American embassies in Africa. The attacks killed 224 people. In 2001, he was convicted of 266 counts and sentenced to 264 concurrent life terms of imprisonment, to be followed by a consecutive 10-year term of imprisonment, in turn, to be followed by a consecutive 30-year term of imprisonment. He later filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 to vacate his conviction for using an explosive device during a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c). That conviction yielded the 30-year sentence that is to follow his other terms of imprisonment. Petitioner argues that the conviction’s predicate offense no longer qualifies as a “crime of violence” following United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019).   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and declined to consider Petitioner’s claim. The court held that the concurrent sentence doctrine allows a court to decline to review a challenged sentence when another is valid and carries the same or greater duration of punishment, such that the overall sentence would not change even if the challenge were successful. Here, the doctrine applies because he is challenging a conviction and resulting sentence that runs consecutively to one or more unchallenged life sentences. View "Al-'Owhali v. United States" on Justia Law

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Defendant was arrested for various federal crimes based on his participation in a global crime ring. Before his sentencing hearing, the Covid-19 pandemic hit the United States, closing down courts. Eventually, and with Defendant's and his attorney's consent, the district court sentenced defendant via video. On appeal, defendant claims that the district court's procedures under the CARES Act was insufficient to find he waived his right to an in-person sentencing.The Second Circuit rejected defendant's claims on appeal. Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 43 generally compels the defendant’s physical presence in the courtroom and a defendant can waive this right under only very limited circumstances. However, the CARES Act permits a district court to hold a felony sentencing hearing by videoconference if all conditions are met. See United States v. Coffin, 23 F.4th 778 (7th Cir. 2022).Here, defendant orally consented to the hearing after being told by the court that his sentencing may be delayed if he insisted on an in-person hearing. The district court's decision that immediate video sentencing was in defendant's best interest was reasonable because defendant was asking for a time-served sentence, and an immediate sentence would allow him to more quickly appeal an adverse sentence. View "United States v. Leroux" on Justia Law

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Defendant appealed the district court’s judgment revoking his term of supervised release and sentencing him to a total term of 28 months imprisonment for violations of multiple conditions of his supervised release. On appeal, Defendant challenged his revocation on Specification Four, which alleged that, on May 12, 2019, Defendant committed the state crime of second-degree assault in violation of New York Penal Law Section 120.05(2) by striking his ex-girlfriend (“J.D.”) with a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument—namely, a glass bottle.The Second Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Defendant committed Specification Four by a preponderance of the evidence or by finding good cause to admit the out-of-court statement under Rule 32.1(b)(2)(c). In addition, the majority disagreed with the dissent’s conclusion that because the charged supervised release violations subjected Defendant to imprisonment for more than one year based on new conduct for which he was never federally indicted, the violation proceedings constitute a new prosecution that violated Defendant Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. Finally, as to Specification Nine, the court agreed with the parties that the written judgment conflicted with the district court’s oral ruling that the alleged violation had been proven, and that the oral ruling controls. View "United States v. Peguero" on Justia Law

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Petitioner was convicted of manslaughter for administering a fatal dose of prescription medication to her son. The courtroom was closed to spectators for fifteen minutes, during which the prosecutor addressed a website and an email detailing complaint by Petitioner that her trial was unfair. Petitioner moved to set aside her conviction on the ground that her Sixth Amendment right to a public trial had been violated. The district court, on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, concluded that the Appellate Division had unreasonably applied clearly established federal law in holding that there was no Sixth Amendment violation.   The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting Petitioner’s writ and remanded with instructions to the district court to deny the petition. The court held that the ruling of the New York Appellate Division was not "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”  The court reasoned that Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") claims are "adjudicated on the merits" if the state court ruled on the substance of the claim rather than on a procedural ground. Further, a writ cannot be granted "simply because . . . the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." The court concluded that based on the relevant Supreme Court decisions, there are at least reasonable arguments supporting the Appellate Division's ruling, which is enough to preclude habeas relief. View "Jordan v. Lamanna" on Justia Law

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Defendant appealed a judgment entered in district court following a jury trial, convicting him of conspiracy to restrain trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred by failing to consider his proffered evidence that the illegal trading activity lacked anticompetitive effects and had procompetitive benefits and by refusing to conduct a pre-trial assessment as to whether the per se rule or the rule of reason applies. He further contended that the district court abused its discretion in precluding his competitive effects evidence from admission at trial and in conducting only a limited post-trial inquiry into juror misconduct.   The Second Circuit affirmed the ruling, concluding that the district court was not required to make a threshold pre-trial determination as to whether the per se rule or the rule of reason applies to the alleged misconduct in this case. The court reasoned that the grand jury indicted Defendant for a per se antitrust violation and the government was entitled to present its case to the jury. The district court properly assessed the sufficiency of the evidence of the alleged per se violation and the sufficiency decision upholding the verdict is not challenged on appeal. In addition, the district court acted within its broad discretion in strictly limiting the admission of Defendant’s competitive effects evidence at trial. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in ending its post-trial investigation into alleged juror misconduct. View "United States v. Aiyer" on Justia Law

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Defendants appeal from judgments of the district court convicting them of crimes arising from their participation in a street gang known as the Six Tre Outlaw Gangsta Disciples Folk Nation. All three were convicted of violating the Racketeer-Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) (Count One), of conspiring to violate RICO (Count Two), and of unlawful use of firearms “during and in 12 relation to a crime of violence . . . .” in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c) (Count 13 Three). In addition Defendant 1 was convicted of murder in aid of racketeering 14 (Count Four), Defendant 2 was convicted of assault with a dangerous weapon in aid of racketeering (Count Six) as well as additional violations of Sec 924(c) 16 (Counts Seven and Ten), and both Defendant 2 and Defendant 3 were convicted of Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy and attempted Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy (Counts Eight, Nine, Eleven, and Twelve).   While this appeal was pending, the Second Circuit Court concluded that RICO conspiracy could not be a crime of violence for purposes of Sec. 924(c). The court then vacated Defendant 3’s Count Three conviction, reasoning that the court could not be confident that the jury’s Section 924(c) conviction rested on a valid predicate. Further, the court reversed Defendant 2’s Count Ten conviction with prejudice, because Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy cannot be a crime of violence under Sec. 924(c). Finally, the court rejected Defendants’ other 26 challenges. View "United States v. Laurent" on Justia Law

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Petitioner was convicted of second-degree murder and other offenses in New York state court. During jury selection, Petitioner’s lawyer exercised peremptory strikes against two male jurors, but the prosecutor raised a “reverse-Batson” challenge; which is a claim that the defendant (rather than the prosecution) was using strikes in a discriminatory manner. The state court disallowed the two strikes, and Petitioner was convicted. Petitioner petitioned unsuccessfully for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254 in the United States District Court. On appeal, Petitioner renews his challenge to the state court’s reverse-Batson ruling.   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that it need not determine whether the state court properly applied Batson or erred in disallowing the two peremptory strikes because those claims are not cognizable under Section 2254. The court reasoned that the Supreme Court has held that a state defendant has no freestanding federal constitutional right to peremptory strikes, and so a state court’s mistaken disallowance of such a strike does not, standing alone, form a basis for federal habeas relief. Thus,  any procedural error by the state court in following the three-step Batson framework would not, without more, constitute a violation of a federal constitutional right. View "Murray v. Noeth" on Justia Law