Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his conviction following a guilty plea to a narcotics conspiracy charge, alleging that the district court misstated the applicable mandatory minimum term of supervised release in violation of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that the Rule 11 error was harmless. In this case, because both parties wrongly assume that the defendant bears the ultimate burden of persuasion to show that the Rule 11 error affected his substantial rights, the court clarified that where a defendant moved to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing based on a Rule 11 error, it is the government's burden on appeal to show that such error was harmless. Nonetheless, the court found that plaintiff's substantial rights were not violated by the error in his plea agreement and colloquy. The court concluded that defendant's plea was knowing and voluntary and he did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel. View "United States v. Freeman" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit dismissed defendant's appeal challenging his new sentence, holding that the Government can invoke the appeal waiver despite having earlier consented to defendant's habeas petition. In this case, defendant pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to conspiring to commit a Hobbs Act robbery and brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence. Although an appeal waiver provision in the agreement barred defendant from challenging his conviction or sentence, the Government consented to his request to vacate the 18 U.S.C. 924(c) conviction as unconstitutional in light of United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 32 (2019). The district court then vacated defendant's conviction and resentenced him on the remaining Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy count.The court held that "partial enforcement" or "partial invocation" of a plea agreement's waiver provision is permitted under limited circumstances, including those present here. Therefore, the valid appeal waiver in this case requires that the court dismiss defendant's appeal rather than address his challenge. View "United States v. Borden" on Justia Law

Halkbank, a commercial bank that is majority-owned by the Government of Turkey, was charged with crimes related to its participation in a multi-year scheme to launder billions of dollars' worth of Iranian oil and natural gas proceeds in violation of U.S. sanctions against the Government of Iran and Iranian entities and persons. Halkbank moved to dismiss the indictment but the district court denied the motionThe Second Circuit held that it has jurisdiction over the instant appeal under the collateral order doctrine. The court also held that, even assuming the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) applies in criminal cases—an issue that the court need not, and did not, decide today—the commercial activity exception to FSIA would nevertheless apply to Halkbank's charged offense conduct. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying Halkbank’s motion to dismiss the Indictment. The court further concluded that Halkbank, an instrumentality of a foreign sovereign, is not entitled to immunity from criminal prosecution at common law. View "United States v. Bankasi" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction directing defendant officials of the DOCCS to rescind changes in the scheduling of certain regularly-held Quaker religious gatherings at Green Haven Correctional Facility. The court agreed with the district court that a preliminary injunction is not warranted because plaintiffs are unable to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims.After determining that it has jurisdiction to address the merits of the appeal, the court concluded that, at least insofar as they challenge substantive restrictions on their ability to conduct religious services and meetings in accordance with their beliefs, plaintiffs have established that any violation of their religious liberties would satisfy the irreparable injury standard. However, the court concluded that the claims of Green Haven Meeting, as well as those of the Incarcerated Plaintiffs suing in their own names, must be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. In regard to the Non-Incarcerated Plaintiffs, the court concluded that the changes in the times of the Quarterly Meetings, and the eventual cancellation of those meetings, did not infringe their rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The court found persuasive defendants' contention that plaintiffs failed to clearly establish that defendants' actions concerning Quarterly Meetings substantially burden plaintiffs' exercise of religion since defendants rescheduled the meetings for Friday evenings and did not terminate them. Furthermore, the record reinforces the district court's conclusion that defendants' rescheduling decision was supported by legitimate concerns. Finally, the court concluded that the balance of equities and the public interest do not tip in favor of granting a preliminary injunction. View "Green Haven Prison Preparative Meeting v. New York State Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit denied petitions for review of the BIA's decisions affirming the IJ's order of removal and denial of Petitioner Graham's motion to reopen. The court concluded that petitioners' narcotics convictions under Connecticut General Statute 21a-277(a) are controlled substance or aggravated felony drug trafficking offenses under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The court also concluded that its jurisdictional holding in Banegas Gomez v. Barr, 922 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 2019), that a notice to appear that omits the hearing date and time is nonetheless sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the immigration courts, survives the Supreme Court's ruling in Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474 (2021). View "Chery v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendants' convictions for multiple drug- and gun-related counts, concluding that the evidence was sufficient to support their convictions. The court rejected defendants' claims of evidentiary errors and Rehaif error.However, in failing to account for the gaps in the government's evidentiary presentation for acquitted conduct, the court concluded that the district court erred in cross-attributing the drugs found in the upper apartment when it sentenced Defendant Willis. Furthermore, the error requires a remand for resentencing and reconsideration of whether the government met its burden of proving jointly undertaken criminal activity between Willis and Pierce by a preponderance of the evidence, and if so, the scope of that activity. The court remanded Willis's sentence to the district court to expressly rule whether the sentence will run concurrently with his state sentence. View "United States v. Willis" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for knowingly and intentionally possessing with intent to distribute controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The court held that the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress where the warrantless dog sniff was not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The court also held that there was sufficient evidence to establish defendant's knowing possession of the cocaine, and the district court was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing to address his claim that police investigators knowingly misled a New York court in an application for a search warrant. Furthermore, the district court did not err in calculating defendant's Guidelines Sentencing Range. The court considered defendant's remaining arguments and found them to be without merit. View "United States v. McKenzie" on Justia Law

Cabrera engaged in four drug transactions with his barber. Cabrera’s sole defense was entrapment. Cabrera and his barber gave opposite accounts of who first proposed partnering in the drug trade. The barber was receiving deferrals of removal while serving as a paid DEA informant. Special Agent Son, who had surveilled Cabrera at two deals, also testified, stating that Cabrera, unlike the “average drug dealer,” appeared to be “experienced” because he had employed counter-surveillance driving techniques (which consisted of really bad driving).The Second Circuit vacated Cabrera’s convictions and remanded for a new trial. Because of the differing versions of who initiated the drug transactions, it was crucial that the charge accurately state Cabrera’s burden: the slight burden of adducing “some credible” evidence that the government initiated the crime. The charge overstated that burden, effectively requiring that the jury weigh the evidence and definitively accept Cabrera’s account as a precondition to considering predisposition. Compounding the prejudice to Cabrera’s defense, the special agent’s testimony that Cabrera was an “experienced” drug dealer was inadmissible as lay opinion and undercut Cabrera’s account of how the transactions with his barber originated, as well as his lack of predisposition to deal. View "United States v. Cabrera" on Justia Law

Percoco, a longtime friend and top aide to former Governor Andrew Cuomo, accepted payment in exchange for promising to use his position to perform official actions. For one scheme, Percoco promised to further the interests of an energy company, CPV; for another, Percoco agreed with Aiello to advance the interests of Aiello’s real estate development company. Aiello was convicted of conspiracy to commit honest services wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1349. Percoco was convicted of both conspiracy to commit honest-services wire fraud and solicitation of bribes or gratuities, 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1)(B). The court had instructed the jury that the quid-pro-quo element of the offenses would be satisfied if Percoco wrongfully “obtained . . . property . . . in exchange [for] official acts as the opportunities arose.”The Second Circuit affirmed. Although the as-opportunities-arise instruction fell short of a recently clarified standard, which requires that the honest-services fraud involve a commitment to take official action on a particular matter or question, that error was harmless. A person who is not technically employed by the government may nevertheless owe a fiduciary duty to the public if he dominates and controls governmental business, and is actually relied on by people in the government because of some special relationship. View "United States v. Percoco" on Justia Law

In 2012, then-Governor Cuomo launched the "Buffalo Billion” initiative to develop the greater Buffalo area through the investment of $1 billion in taxpayer funds. A big-rigging scheme ensued with respect to state-funded projects. Four defendants were convicted of various counts of conspiracy to engage in wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1349, wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, and making false statements to federal officers, 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(2).The Second Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to the charged wire fraud conspiracies, the instructions to the jury regarding the right-to-control theory of wire fraud and the good faith defense, the preclusion of evidence regarding the success of the projects awarded to defendants through the rigged bidding system and the admission of evidence from competitors regarding the range of fees typically charged by other companies in the market, and the district court's denial of a motion to dismiss Gerardi's false statement charge for alleged prosecutorial misconduct. Evidence of actual economic harm is not necessary for conviction in "right-to-control" cases, which require "a showing that the defendant, through the withholding or inaccurate reporting of information that could impact on economic decisions, deprived some person or entity of potentially valuable economic information." View "United States v. Percoco et al." on Justia Law