Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2006, petitioner was convicted under New York's child endangerment statute, N.Y. Penal Law 260.10(1). In 2017, the United States initiated removal proceedings against him, citing as a ground of removal defendant's conviction of a crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(E)(i). In 2010, the BIA held that this provision included convictions under child-endangerment statutes for which "actual harm" is not an element of the crime.The Second Circuit held that the holding in Matter of Soram, 25 I. & N. Dec. 378, 381 (B.I.A. 2010), applies retroactively, rendering petitioner removable. The court also held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the denial of petitioner's cancellation of removal because the agency retains discretion to weigh the probative value of uncorroborated arrest reports. Accordingly, the court denied in part and dismissed in part. View "Marquez v. Garland" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit securities fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371. Defendant, as a broker-dealer in the over-the-counter securities market, executed fraudulent trades for a co-defendant client with the effect of artificially inflating the share price of a sham company, Cubed. While defendant was involved in that activity, his co-defendants arranged the sale of Cubed shares outside the public market in a private placement. The district court concluded that defendant was liable under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 for restitution, both to purchasers of Cubed shares in the public market (in the amount of $479,000) and to purchasers in the private placement (in the amount of $1.85 million).The Second Circuit reversed and remanded, agreeing with defendant that the Government did not show that the private placement losses are attributable to his offense of conviction, as the MVRA requires. The court explained that the MVRA authorizes restitution only for losses "directly and proximately" caused by a covered "offense" of conviction, 18 U.S.C. 3663A(a)(2), (c). This proximate cause element requires that the Government prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the losses for which restitution compensates were foreseeable to the defendant in the course of committing the offense of conviction. In this case, because the Government has not adduced sufficient evidence that the private placement losses were foreseeable to defendant during his participation in the conspiracy to manipulate the public share price of Cubed, the MVRA does not authorize the $1.85 million in restitution for these losses. View "United States v. Goodrich" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence on four counts of using a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A) and 2. After the Second Circuit vacated defendant's original 2011 sentence, the district court resentenced defendant to a mandatory minimum term of 115 years' imprisonment. On appeal, defendant argues that his section 924(c) convictions, predicated on his commission of Hobbs Act robbery and attempted Hobbs Act robbery (as well as aiding and abetting the same), are invalid in light of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), because the predicate offenses do not constitute crimes of violence; his revised 115-year sentence violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments following Congress's passage of the First Step Act of 2018; and, even if there is no Davis error or Eighth Amendment violation, this court should nonetheless vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing so that the district court can reconsider his sentence in view of the First Step Act.The Second Circuit reviewed all defendant's arguments on appeal and found them to be without merit. The court concluded that its decision in United States v. McCoy, 995 F.3d 32 (2d Cir. 2021), in which it held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery and aiding and abetting Hobbs Act robbery categorically qualify as crimes of violence, precludes plaintiff's Davis challenge to his section 924(c) convictions. In regard to plaintiff's remaining arguments, the court held that the passage of the First Step Act does not render his sentence cruel and unusual or otherwise warrants remand to the district court for yet another resentencing. View "United States v. Waite" on Justia Law

In tandem appeals, Plaintiffs Smalls and Daniel filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that defendants deprived them of their rights to a fair trial by fabricating evidence against them. Daniel also asserted other claims under section 1983 and claims under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and sought equitable tolling of the statute of limitations applicable to some of his section 1983 claims. The district courts ultimately granted defendants' motions, concluding that Smalls and Daniel could not establish favorable terminations within the meaning of McDonough v. Smith, 139 S. Ct. 2149 (2019).The Second Circuit concluded that the district courts erred in dismissing Smalls and Daniels' section 1983 fabricated-evidence claims and entering judgment for defendants. The court explained that McDonough's accrual rule does not import malicious prosecution's favorable-termination requirement onto section 1983 fair-trial claims; where the plaintiff asserts a section 1983 fair-trial claim based on fabricated evidence, all that is required is that the underlying criminal proceeding be terminated in such a manner that the lawsuit does not impugn an ongoing prosecution or outstanding conviction; and this requirement may be satisfied where a criminal conviction has been invalidated or a criminal prosecution has been terminated in the criminal defendant's favor because, in such circumstances, there is no risk that a section 1983 plaintiff's claim will impugn an existing conviction or the basis for an ongoing prosecution. In this case, Smalls and Daniel's criminal proceedings terminated in their favor. Finally, the court also concluded that Daniel's section 1981 claims were properly dismissed, and Daniel's equitable tolling motion was properly denied. Accordingly, the court reversed with respect to the fair-trial claims, affirmed the dismissal of Daniel's other claims, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Smalls v. Collins" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization—the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) (also referred to as the Islamic Sate of Iraq and the Levant or ISIL)—in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2339B(a). Defendant violated conditions of her presentence release by resuming contact with known supporters of ISIS and other extremist groups, attempting to conceal these communications from law enforcement authorities, and then lying to the FBI about her conduct. Defendant also pleaded guilty to obstruction of justice.The Second Circuit vacated defendant's 48 month sentence, concluding that defendant's far-below-Guidelines range is substantively unreasonable. In this case, defendant faced a total Sentencing Guidelines range of 360 to 600 months' imprisonment, and her far-below-Guidelines sentence was outside the bounds of what was reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances of this case. The court explained that the district court assigned defendant's need for rehabilitation from years of trauma and abuse overwhelming weight while failing to give adequate consideration to the competing goals of sentencing—including the need for the sentence to protect the public, deter criminal conduct of the defendant specifically and others generally, promote respect for the law, and reflect the seriousness of the offense committed. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion and the court remanded for resentencing consistent with the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. View "United States v. Ceasar" on Justia Law

The en banc court concluded that, based on the facts of this case, the officer's pat-down search of a suspect for weapons was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The en banc court wrote to confirm several fundamental, and well-settled, principles of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence: 1) a police officer's verbal directives to a suspect do not transform a stop into a search when they do not amount to a physical trespass or intrusion into an area subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy, irrespective of any reasonable belief by a suspect as to whether a search is occurring; 2) a police officer's subjective intent bears no weight in determining when that officer's interaction with the suspect constitutes a search; and 3) in evaluating whether an officer has reasonable suspicion that a suspect is armed, courts must look to the totality of the circumstances confronting the officer, as viewed objectively by a reasonable and cautious officer on the scene. The en banc court explained that when the circumstances give rise to reasonable suspicion that a suspect has a weapon, an officer need not rule out alternative explanations—whether innocent or otherwise—for a suspect's behavior before deciding to conduct a pat-down for his safety. Accordingly, the en banc court vacated the panel decision and affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Weaver" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction of bank fraud, making false statements in support of a passport application, and aggravated identity theft. Defendant argues that the district court erred by failing to grant her motion for an acquittal based on her failure to complete the passport application paperwork and swear an oath affirming to its veracity.The court agreed with the district court's determination that submitting a fraudulent passport application, even when unsigned and without swearing the required oath, satisfies the elements of 18 U.S.C. 1542. The court explained that defendant's argument that an oath and signature on the passport application form are required to establish criminal liability is not supported by the statute and regulations defining a passport application. Furthermore, the statute and regulations define a passport application as the submitted application form and supporting documents. Because submission occurs when a person provides a federal official with an application form and any supporting materials for review, and defendant acknowledged submission of a falsified application form to a passport officer, the district court did not err by failing to grant defendant's motion for acquittal. View "United States v. Gu" on Justia Law

Defendant is a French banker who is charged with transmitting false, misleading, and knowingly inaccurate commodities reports, and with conspiracy to do the same, in violation of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA). On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's application of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine and denial of her motions to dismiss the indictment.The Second Circuit concluded that it has jurisdiction to review the disentitlement ruling, but none to review the merits of extraterritoriality or due process. The court concluded that defendant is not a fugitive and, even if she were a fugitive, the district court abused its discretion in disentitling her. In this case, given her innocent residence as a foreign citizen abroad, given the nature of the charged offense and her remoteness from the alleged harm that it caused, given her line of work, and given her nonfrivolous challenge to the extraterritoriality of the criminal statute, the exercise of discretion to disentitle her was an abuse. Accordingly, the court reversed the order disentitling defendant and remanded for further proceedings to consider or reconsider the merits of her motions to dismiss. The court dismissed this appeal insofar as it seeks review of the (alternative) rulings on extraterritoriality and due process. View "United States v. Bescond" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit vacated the district court's order denying defendant's motion for a reduced sentence pursuant to Section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018. The court held that defendant's multi-object conspiracy conviction, with a crack cocaine object that included a drug-quantity element triggering the statutory penalties set forth in 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A), qualifies as a "covered offense" eligible for a sentence reduction pursuant to the First Step Act. Therefore, defendant's 254-month sentence on his multi-object conspiracy conviction is eligible for a sentence reduction under Section 404(b). The court remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Jordan" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit vacated the district court's denial of defendant's motion for compassionate release, holding that 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)'s exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional.The court clarified that the administrative exhaustion requirement is not a jurisdictional limitation on a court's power to consider an inmate's motion for compassionate release. Rather, section 3582(c)(1)(A)'s exhaustion requirement is a claim-processing rule that may be waived or forfeited by the government. In this case, the government withdrew any defense based on defendant's prior failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. The court remanded for the district court to consider his motion on the merits. View "United States v. Saladino" on Justia Law