Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's convictions for multiple bribery charges and obstruction of justice. Defendant was a self-styled Brooklyn "liaison" to the NYPD, selling preferred outcomes to encounters with law enforcement.The court rejected defendant's contentions that: (1) evidence collected from his electronic devices should have been suppressed because it was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (2) the district court prejudiced him by correcting a misstatement of law made by co-defendant Grant’s attorney; (3) evidence of uncharged conduct should have been excluded as unfairly prejudicial; (4) the government disclosed certain documents in an untimely fashion, prejudicing his defense; (5) the temporary admission of a phone call (GX-300A) against his co-defendant generated spillover prejudice against him; (6) the admission of his non-testifying co-defendant’s statements against that co-defendant violated defendant's Confrontation Clause rights; (7) the district court abused its discretion in excluding two proposed expert witnesses for the defense; (8) the district court erred by failing to hold a hearing to investigate his attorney's potential conflict of interest; (9) the jury was wrongly instructed on the relevant law; and (10) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. The court concluded that all of defendant's arguments are without merit. View "United States v. Reichberg" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to reduce his sentence under section 404 of the First Step Act. Defendant was sentenced to 360 months in prison based on his conviction on charges including conspiracy to distribute, and to possess with intent to distribute, more than 50 grams of cocaine base.The court concluded that district courts are not required to consider the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors when reducing a sentence under section 404 of the First Step Act. The court found unpersuasive the reasoning of sister circuits that have adopted a differing view. The court explained that relief under the First Step Act is discretionary and the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to reduce defendant's terms of imprisonment and supervised release.The court rejected defendant's assertion that the emphasis on his career-offender status, combined with the boilerplate language on Form AO 247 (referencing factors irrelevant to First Step Act motions), reflects that the district court misapprehended its authority to grant a sentence reduction under the First Step Act. Rather, the court concluded that the district court did not misconstrue eligibility as depending on career-offender status; the form is titled "Order Regarding Motion for Sentence Reduction Pursuant To First Step Act And 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2);" and, although the form contains boilerplate that is irrelevant to defendant, the written decision makes clear that the district court used the proper framework. View "United States v. Moyhernandez" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit granted counsel's motion to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), in defendant's appeal from the district court's final order denying his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). Because a defendant has no constitutional or statutory right to assistance of counsel on a compassionate release motion or an appeal from the denial of such a motion, the court held that an attorney seeking to be relieved before it in that context need not file a motion and brief that comply with the requirements of Anders. Instead, counsel's motion to be relieved must adhere to Rule 27 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and Local Rule 27.1 by stating with particularity the grounds for the motion, the relief requested, and the legal argument supporting that request, as well as attaching an affidavit indicating that counsel has advised the defendant of the process for obtaining court-appointed counsel or proceeding pro se. Counsel in this case complied with the requirements of Rule 27. The court also denied the government's motion for summary affirmance of the district court's decision. View "United States v. Fleming" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit vacated the district court's order granting defendant's motion to suppress evidence found during a search of his house. Defendant was on parole at the time of the search where parole officers were tipped by an anonymous informant that defendant may have been in possession of guns. During the search, the officers found multiple firearms, a box of ammunition, and illegal narcotics. The district court concluded that the search violated defendant's Fourth Amendment rights because it was executed without reasonable suspicion. However, the court concluded that, under the Special Needs Doctrine jurisprudence, the parole search was proper because it was reasonably related to the parole officers' duties. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Braggs" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit held that the discretionary concurrent sentence doctrine continues to apply when a defendant collaterally attacks one of his convictions, and exercised its discretion to decline review in this case. Petitioner is currently serving numerous concurrent sentences, including two life terms in prison. Petitioner challenges one of his convictions under Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018). The court concluded that, no matter the outcome of his claim, petitioner will remain in prison for the rest of his life on other counts of conviction, and a favorable decision would not shorten the amount of time he will spend incarcerated. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment without prejudice to petitioner renewing the claim if the validity of his life sentences changes in the future. View "Kassir v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of conspiring to participate in a racketeering enterprise, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962(d) (Count One); conspiring to distribute narcotics, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A), 846 (Count Two); and possessing or aiding and abetting the possession of firearms in furtherance of either the racketeering conspiracy or the narcotics conspiracy charged in the prior two counts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c) (Count Three). The jury specially found that the pattern of racketeering activity charged in Count One encompassed both narcotics and murder conspiracy conduct. The jury also found that a firearm relevant to Count Three was discharged in furtherance of the Count One racketeering conspiracy but was not discharged in furtherance of the separate Count Two narcotics conspiracy. The district court sentenced defendant to 120 months' imprisonment for Count Three, to be served consecutive to his concurrent 120-month sentences for Counts One and Two.The Second Circuit concluded that its recent decisions in the wake of United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), preclude section 924(c) from being applied to a murder conspiracy. Therefore, given the possibility that defendant's section 924(c) conviction was based on murder conspiracy conduct rather than on a qualifying drug-trafficking offense, the court held that his conviction on Count Three is invalid. Accordingly, the court vacated defendant's section 924(c) conviction and remanded for further proceedings. The court rejected defendant's contention that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions on the racketeering conspiracy and narcotics conspiracy charges. View "United States v. Heyward" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for one count of possessing a firearm after being convicted of a felony but remanded for resentencing. For the reasons stated in a summary order filed simultaneously with this opinion, the court held that (1) the challenged rulings of the district court at trial were not an abuse of discretion, and (2) although it was clearly erroneous not to require the government to prove that defendant knew of his status as a felon, that error does not warrant reversal.In this opinion, the court held that, contrary to the conclusion of the district court, NYPL 120.05(1) is a "crime of violence" under the force clause of USSG 4B1.2(a)(1) in light of the court's recent decision in United States v. Scott, 990 F.3d 94, 99 (2d Cir. 2021) (en banc). In Scott, the court made clear that a predicate offense is to be categorically recognized as a "crime of violence" under section 4B1.2(a)(1) where conviction requires that the defendant "intentionally caus[e] at least serious physical injury—crimes necessarily involving a use of force—. . . whether committed by acts of omission or by acts of commission." View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed Defendants Eldridge and Allen's convictions and sentences for offenses arising from their participation in a drug-dealing enterprise that operated in Buffalo, New York, from 2003 to 2005.The court concluded that the district court’s decision to install a waist-high black curtain around the defense tables before trial did not violate defendants' rights to a fair trial. The court further held that, although United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), and United States v. Barrett, 937 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2019), have invalidated at least one of the three theories upon which Eldridge's second 18 U.S.C. 924(c) conviction might have been premised, Eldridge has failed to show that any error affected his substantial rights in light of the evidence supporting the third, valid theory—namely, that Eldridge participated in an attempted Hobbs Act robbery. In reaching this conclusion, the court held that even in cases where an unpreserved claim of error is based on a supervening change in case law, the defendant bears the burden of establishing all four prongs of the plain-error standard. Finally, the court held that Section 403(a) does not apply to Eldridge because the district court imposed his sentence before Congress passed the First Step Act, and that the pendency of his direct appeal does not change that fact. The court affirmed defendants' remaining claims in a separate summary order. View "United States v. Eldridge" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a civilly confined person under Article 10 of the New York Mental Hygiene Law, filed claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, challenging the constitutionality of aspects of his Article 10 proceedings. The district court dismissed the complaint because he filed his claims after the expiration of the applicable three-year statute of limitations. During the pendency of his appeal, the Second Circuit has deducted court fees from plaintiff's institutional account at the Central New York Psychiatric Center pursuant to the filing fee requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) that applies to a "prisoner" proceeding in forma pauperis. Plaintiff now moves for restoration of those fees.The Second Circuit granted plaintiff's motion for restoration of fees deducted from his patient account and directed the Clerk of Court to refund those fees and to cease further collections. The court concluded that plaintiff, as a civil detainee who completed his criminal sentence, was no longer a "prisoner" under the PLRA when he filed his lawsuit. Therefore, he is not subject to the fee provisions under the PLRA. View "Jones v. Cuomo" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of a petition for habeas relief to petitioner, who was convicted by a jury in state court of first degree manslaughter. The court concluded that the admission of the autopsy report at petitioner's trial through a surrogate witness was an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 40 (2004); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009); and Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011). Furthermore, the unreasonably erroneous admission of the autopsy report was not harmless where the report was the strongest evidence in the State's case and was not cumulative of other inculpatory evidence connecting petitioner to the victim's death. View "Garlick v. Lee" on Justia Law