Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's amended judgment following defendant's conviction for one count of conspiracy to commit securities fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371, one count of securities fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1348 and 2, and six counts of insider trading in violation of 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) and 78ff, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 and 10b5-2, and 18 U.S.C. 2.In viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, the court concluded that defendant's execution of confidentiality agreements with a company whose acquisition he was exploring was sufficient to subject him to prohibitions against insider trading. In this case, there is no dispute that defendant signed two nondisclosure agreements (NDAs) with the company; that in both NDAs, each party agreed not to disclose any confidential or proprietary information of the other; and that the fact that the parties' exploration and evaluation of the potential acquisition of the company was explicitly classified as "Proprietary Information" that was to remain "Confidential." Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to support inferences that defendant knowingly and intentionally breached his duty of confidentiality by disclosing material nonpublic information as to the prospects for a merger agreement between the company and his fund, intending for the third party to make trades based on that information. Furthermore, defendant's challenges to his convictions for securities fraud and conspiracy to commit such fraud also fail. Finally, venue was proper in the Southern District of New York. View "United States v. Chow" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for various crimes stemming from his role in two schemes to automatically subscribe consumers, without their knowledge or consent, to premium SMS text messaging services. Counts One and Five charged defendant with conspiracy to commit wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1349; Counts Two and Six charged defendant with wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1343 and 2; Counts Three and Seven charged defendant with aggravated identity theft in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1028A; and Counts Four and Eight charged defendant with conspiracy to commit money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1956(h).The court held that the district court's conduct did not create an appearance of partiality warranting recusal under 28 U.S.C. 455(a); the district court properly instructed the jury on conscious avoidance because sufficient trial evidence supported that theory of criminal liability; and defendant's conduct, as pled and as proven at trial, fit squarely within the scope of the aggravated identity theft statute. The court explained that, by participating in a scheme that employed victims' cell phone numbers to sign them up for paid text message services without their knowledge or consent by means of an auto-subscribing computer program, defendant used, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person within the meaning of section 1028A. View "United States v. Wedd" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction of two counts of carjacking resulting in death, multiple counts of substantive and conspiratorial Hobbs Act robbery, and related firearms offenses. The court concluded that defendant's challenges to the district court's instructions on the mens rea and causation elements of carjacking resulting in death, both fail because these claims lack merit and the purported errors were in any event harmless. The court also concluded that defendant's evidentiary challenges fail because the district court acted within its discretion in making each of the rulings at issue. Finally, the court concluded that defendant's challenge to his firearms convictions under 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3)(A) fail because the predicate crimes on which these convictions are based, Hobbs Act robbery, and federal carjacking, are categorical crimes of violence. View "United States v. Felder" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging false arrest, malicious prosecution, and the denial of his right to a fair trial. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment to Detective Civil on his false arrest and malicious prosecution claims, and the denial of plaintiff's motion for judgment as a matter of law, asserting errors in the jury instructions, both with respect to his fair trial claim.Although the district court erred by relying on a credibility determination, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the detective on the claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution. In this case, the summary judgment record before the district court was sufficient to establish probable cause without relying on the detective's familiarity with plaintiff's possessions and hence on his credibility. Furthermore, the facts that support probable cause to arrest here were sufficient to "lead a reasonably prudent person to believe the plaintiff guilty," as required for probable cause to prosecute a claim. As to the fair trial claim, the court affirmed the denial of plaintiff's motion for judgment as a matter of law. However, the court vacated the judgment in favor of the detective and remanded for a new trial because the jury instructions contained prejudicial error. View "Ashley v. City of New York" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit held that defendant does not qualify for relief afforded by Section 401(a) of the First Step Act. Defendant was convicted in 2007 of conspiracy to distribute more than 50 grams of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. 812, 841(a), 841(b)(1)(A), and 846 (Count One), among other offenses, and sentenced principally to a 300-month term of imprisonment. The district court reduced his term of imprisonment to 215 months in 2020.The court concluded that the plain text of Section 401(c) limits the retroactive effect of Section 401(a), making its relief available to defendants who committed offenses before the First Step Act became law but only if they have not yet had a sentence imposed as of the date of enactment. The court also concluded that Section 404(b) of the First Step Act does not require a district court to engage in "plenary resentencing" or "recalculate an eligible defendant's Guidelines range, except for those changes that flow from Sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act," United States v. Moore, 975 F.3d 84, 92 (2d Cir. 2020). In this case, because defendant's original sentence on Count One was imposed in 2007—long before the date of the enactment of the First Step Act—he is precluded by Section 401(c) from benefiting from Section 401(a)'s changes to the sentencing enhancement of Section 841(b)(1)(A), which are unrelated to Sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's 2020 order. View "United States v. Bryant" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for asylum fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1546(a), making false statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(2) and (3), and aggravated identity theft in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1028A(a)(1). The court concluded that the evidence at trial was sufficient to sustain a conviction for aggravated identity theft, even under the narrow view of the aggravated identity theft statute promoted by defendant. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in applying a sentencing enhancement for the involvement of 100 or more documents in the relevant offense. View "United States v. Dumitru" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's 20-year sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to participating in the affairs of a criminal enterprise, specifically, the "MS-13" street gang, through a pattern of racketeering consisting of, among other crimes, murder and a separate count of discharging a firearm during a crime of violence. Defendant relied on Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015); United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019); and United States v. Barrett, 937 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2019), arguing for the first time on appeal that neither of the charged racketeering offenses are violent crimes and that his firearm conviction is therefore legally invalid.The court concluded that defendant failed to show plain error because Davis's effect on the court's decision in United States v. Ivezaj, 568 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2009), which held that a RICO offense based on two violent racketeering predicates is a violent crime for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. 924(c), is unclear. The court also concluded that defendant's sentence was not substantively unreasonable where the district court specifically considered defendant's effort to cooperate with the authorities and his personal characteristics. Furthermore, the sentence that was imposed was hardly excessive for such a crime, and was in line with defense counsel's request. View "United States v. Martinez" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit dismissed defendant's appeal of the district court's denial of his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A) as moot. While this appeal was pending, defendant completed his federal prison sentence. The court explained that, although defendant is now on supervised release, he has neither requested that the district court reduce his term of supervision nor advanced any arguments to suggest that such a reduction is warranted. The court noted that dismissal will not result in hardship to defendant. If defendant believes that the arguments that he marshaled in favor of compassionate release would also merit a reduction in his term of supervised release, the court concluded that he is free to make such a motion under 18 U.S.C. 3583(e) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(c). View "United States v. Chestnut" on Justia Law

The United States appeals from the district court's amended judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255, vacating defendant's 22-year sentence for Hobbs Act robbery and related firearms crimes and resentencing him to time served. The district court concluded that it had mistakenly applied the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) and the Career Offender Guideline, USSG 4B1.1, in determining defendant's initial sentence because two prior convictions relied on as predicates for those enhancements were for New York first-degree manslaughter, which the district court ruled is not a categorical "violent felony" (ACCA) or "crime of violence" (Guideline).The Second Circuit, rehearing the case en banc, agreed with the United States that first-degree manslaughter is a categorical violent felony/crime of violence because a person can be guilty of that crime—whether by commission or omission—only if he (a) causes death, while (b) intending to cause at least serious bodily injury, and the Supreme Court, in United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157, 169 (2014), stated that "the knowing or intentional causation of bodily injury necessarily involves the use of physical force." Accordingly, the court vacated the panel decision, reversed the district court's grant of the section 2255 motion, and remanded with directions to reinstate defendant's original sentence and judgment. View "United States v. Scott" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of petitioner's 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion, seeking vacatur of his 1998 conviction for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A). After holding the decision in this case pending disposition of other cases presenting related questions, the court concluded that attempted federal bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. 2113(a), which requires that the attempt be made "by force and violence, or by intimidation," is categorically a crime of violence for purposes of section 924(c)(1) pursuant to United States v. Hendricks, 921 F.3d 320 (2d Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 870 (2020).Furthermore, in light of the court's recent decision in Nunez v. United States, 954 F.3d 465, 471 (2d Cir. 2020), the court found untimely and declined to reach the merits of defendant's additional arguments related to his sentencing under U.S.S.G. 4B1.2. In Nunez, the court held that the Supreme Court in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015), did not recognize a constitutional right not to be sentenced under the residual clause of the pre-Booker Career Offender Guideline. Therefore, the court concluded that defendant's petition is untimely insofar as it challenges his sentence under that pre-Booker Guideline: the right he now asserts has not yet been recognized by the Supreme Court. The court explained that no decision newly announced and now made retroactive excuses him from meeting the one-year time limitation set out in section 2255(f). View "Collier v. United States" on Justia Law