Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Second Circuit affirmed Defendants Dean and Adam Skelos' convictions on multiple public corruption charges. Dean was a Republican senator from Nassau County, and was the Majority Leader of the New York State Senate. Defendants, father and son, were convicted in 2015 of conspiracy to commit extortion under color of official right; extortion under color of official right; conspiracy to commit honest services fraud; and solicitation and acceptance of bribes and gratuities. Defendants' convictions stemmed from their involvement in the Glenwood, AbTech, and PRI schemes.In 2016, while defendants' appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided McDonnell v. United States, which narrowed the definition of the "official act" that a public official must exchange for benefits in order to be convicted of Hobbs Act extortion or honest services fraud, where those crimes have been defined by reference to the term "official act" in the federal bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. 201. In 2018, a second jury convicted defendants on all counts.The court concluded that any error in the jury instructions in the wake of McDonnell were harmless; the language in the indictment was sufficient where the language in an indictment is not required to be as precise as the attendant jury charge, nor is it required to delineate how the government will prove the elements set forth in the indictment; the district court empaneled a fair and impartial jury, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to transfer venue; there is no basis to vacate defendants' conviction under 18 U.S.C. 666 where a special verdict form specified that the jury found each defendant guilty under section 666 on both the gratuity theory and the unchallenged bribery theory; the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding to quash certain subpoenas and there was no infringement of defendants' Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights in the district court's denial of requests for documents that were irrelevant, inadmissible, obtainable by other means, or part of discovery fishing expeditions; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying an evidentiary hearing. Finally, the court rejected Adam's evidentiary challenges and his challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. View "United States v. Skelos" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence of 210 months' imprisonment for obstruction of justice based on destruction of evidence. The Second Circuit concluded that the district court did not make the findings of fact required under United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87 (1993), before imposing a two-level sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice under USSG 3C1.1 relating to defendant's trial testimony. The court remanded in part for further proceedings. The court disposed of defendant's remaining claims in a separate summary order filed simultaneously with this opinion. View "United States v. Rosario" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to the First Step Act of 2018. Defendant was one of the leaders of a Norwalk, Connecticut-based organization that trafficked powder and crack cocaine. In 2003, defendant was convicted of multiple drug- and racketeering-related crimes and sentenced to life imprisonment.The court agreed with the district court that defendant is ineligible for First Step Act relief because his existing sentence was imposed in accordance with the relevant terms of the Act. In this case, defendant's 2015 plenary resentence, the operative sentence in this appeal, was imposed after the effective date of the crack cocaine provisions in section 2 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, and the district court sentenced defendant in accordance with these provisions at the 2015 hearing. View "United States v. Burden" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order denying as untimely petitioner's motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255. Petitioner contends that this circuit's recent decision in United States v. Townsend, 897 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2018), created a newly discovered fact that extended his filing deadline under section 2255(f)(4).The court concluded that an intervening development in case law does not constitute a newly discovered "fact" within the meaning of section 2255(f)(4). In this case, a decision issued after a conviction but before the filing of a motion under section 2255 is not a newly discovered "fact" pursuant to section 2255(f)(4). Therefore, Townsend, in pronouncing a new rule of law, gave rise to no new facts and thus did not extend the limitations period for petitioner's section 2255 motion. View "McCloud v. United States" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment revoking defendant's supervised release and sentencing him principally to 24-months in prison. The court concluded that, even though the procedures used to obtain the victim's two out-of-court identifications were unduly suggestive, both identifications were nonetheless reliable. Therefore, the district court did not clearly err by admitting them. Furthermore, because the victim testified at the supervised release hearing, the district court was not required to find good cause before admitting his hearsay statements under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(b)(2)(C). The court also concluded that, although the district court erred by admitting certain hearsay statements without first finding good cause, the error was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt. View "United States v. Diaz" on Justia Law

Defendants Stillwell, Samia, and Hunter appealed their convictions for murder-for-hire and related crimes. Long after defendants filed their appeals, the NDDS filed a notice in the Second Circuit, advising the court that the district court had entered a sealed protective order upon the filing of an ex parte motion by the NDDS, which barred prosecutors in the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York and defense counsel from reviewing certain documents. The court later vacated the protective order and ordered disclosure of the material to the U.S. Attorney and then to defense counsel pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), and related authorities.In this appeal, defendants claim that the prosecution withheld exculpatory information in violation of Brady. The court declined to consider, let alone resolve, defendants' Brady claims, which are raised for the first time on appeal. Therefore, the court remanded for the district court to consider the claims in the first instance. View "United States v. Stillwell" on Justia Law

Former inmate Kotler sued prison officials, claiming that they planted a weapon in his housing area in retaliation for his activities on an inmate grievance committee. He also alleged violations of his due process rights in a disciplinary hearing over the incident. After a second remand, the district court dismissed Kotler’s due process claim as abandoned during prior appeals, and dismissed the alleged linchpin defendant, now-deceased Superintendent Donelli, finding that no one timely moved for substitution of Donelli’s successor after his death. A jury returned a defense verdict on Kotler’s retaliation claims.The Second Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part. The dismissal of Donelli was proper; under FRCP 25(a), the 90-day deadline for a plaintiff to move to substitute a defendant is triggered by service of a notice on the plaintiff of the defendant’s death, regardless of whether that notice was also served upon the decedent’s successor or representative. The district court gave Kotler a fair trial on his retaliation claim. The court asked witnesses questions, limited Kotler’s questioning of a witness, and told Kotler to hurry up numerous times but in light of the entire record, the court’s questions were attempts to clarify and organize information. A supplemental jury instruction did not constitute fundamental error. Kotler did not abandon his due process claim during his previous appeals, so the district court erred in dismissing it. View "Kotler v. Jubert" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendants' convictions for wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1343, 1349. Defendants' conviction stemmed from their involvement in a scheme to defraud universities of athletic-based financial aid when they made secret cash payments to the families of college basketball recruits, thereby rendering the recruits ineligible to play for the universities.The court held that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the wire fraud convictions where defendants have not shown that the government failed to present evidence for any rational trier of fact to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was a scheme to defraud. Furthermore, the jury was also presented with enough evidence for a rational trier of fact to find that the Universities' athletic-based aid was "an object" of their scheme. In this case, the jury could have reasonably found that defendants deprived the Universities of property -- athletic-based aid that they could have awarded to students who were eligible to play -- by breaking NCAA rules and depriving the Universities of relevant information through fundamentally dishonest means. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its evidentiary rulings and did not commit reversible error in its instructions to the jury. View "United States v. Gatto" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for conspiracy to violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), conspiracy to commit money laundering, substantive money laundering, and violations of the FCPA. Defendant, as an officer or director of a U.S.- based organization, paid bribes on behalf of a Chinese company to the leaders of Chad and Uganda in exchange for commercial advantages.The court held that the evidence was insufficient to support defendant's FCPA conviction under 15 U.S.C. 78dd-2; defendant offers no basis to disturb his money laundering convictions where a violation of section 78dd-3 is sufficient to establish specified unlawful activity under the money laundering statute, and a wire that passes through the United States can be covered by 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(2)(A); defendant's evidentiary challenges are without merit; and the indictment properly charged defendant under different sections of the FCPA. View "United States v. Ho" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion for a reduced sentence under Section 404 of the First Step Act. While the court agreed with defendant that he was eligible for relief, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion. The court explained that it was permissible for the district court to consider the fact that defendant received a below-Guidelines sentence and to consider the statements the judge made at his resentencing. Furthermore, the district court did not consider these factors to the exclusion of others. Rather, the district court made several other considerations, including defendant's past engagement in violent conduct, his offsetting exemplary conduct while incarcerated, and the relevant 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors.The court also concluded that a district court is not categorically required to hold a hearing at which the defendant is present before denying a motion for a sentence reduction under Section 404. Therefore, defendant was not entitled to a hearing at which he was present. View "United States v. Gadsden" on Justia Law