Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for one count of escape. The court held that venue was proper in the Western District of New York where, on the undisputed facts of this case, the extended limits of defendant's confinement required him to report to the VOA RRC in Rochester, New York by a designated time and his failure to appear there as required constituted an escape from the custody of the Attorney General under 18 U.S.C. 751(a) and 4082.The court also held that the district court's statements regarding defendant being in custody did not violate his right to a fair and impartial trial in violation of due process, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying a mistrial. Finally, the court held that defendant failed to show a reasonable probability that a lower criminal history category and advisory range would have affected the ultimate sentence imposed; defendant also failed to show plain error in the district court's calculation of his guidelines range; the court upheld special conditions of supervised release that relate to substance abuse and mental health programs, construing the conditions to provide that the requirement that defendant contribute to services rendered is contingent upon a finding that he is able to pay such a contribution; and the court declined to consider defendant's challenge to the standard risk-notification condition. View "United States v. Rasheed" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's 55-year sentence imposed for his conviction of participating in a pattern of racketeering activity evidenced by his role in the murder of four teenagers. Defendant was 15 years old at the time of the offense and a member of the MS-13 gang when he participated in the execution-style murders of four members of a rival gang.The court assumed, for purposes of this appeal, that the district court was required to consider the factors in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), in determining that a sentence of 55 years, not subject to parole, was warranted for a defendant fifteen years old at the time of the homicide crimes. Even with this assumption, the court concluded that the district court considered the Miller factors and reasonably concluded that a further departure was not warranted. Acknowledging the broad scope of a sentencing judge's discretion and taking into account the care taken by the sentencing judge in exercising that discretion, the court concluded that defendant's sentence is not unreasonable in any legally cognizable sense. Finally, the court noted that defendant's sentence illustrates the unfortunate consequences of eliminating parole. Nevertheless, it is a sentence that a conscientious district judge concluded was appropriate and, upon review, the court affirmed. The court considered defendant's remaining arguments and found them to be without merit. View "United States v. Portillo" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for international parental kidnapping and passport fraud. After determining that defendant's vagueness challenge fails insofar as it is premised on deficient notice, the court held that the International Parental Kidnapping Crime Act (IPKCA) is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to him. In this case, the IPKCA is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to someone who retains children abroad without first abducting them, when the children had not been in the United States for several years prior to the unlawful retention.The court also held that the district court properly applied two Sentencing Guidelines enhancements for substantial interference with the administration of justice and for fraudulent use of a United States passport. View "United States v. Houtar" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit denied the petition for appealability, holding that assaulting a federal officer, an offense under 18 U.S.C. 111(b), is a categorical crime of violence within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3)(A), using a firearm during and in relation to any crime of violence. The court held that petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. In this case, petitioner pleaded guilty in 2012 to assaulting a federal officer, in violation of section 111(a)(1) and (b), and to using a firearm during that assault, in violation of section 924(c). View "Gray v. United States" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's 24-month sentence following a violation of supervised release, holding that calculation of the term of imprisonment under USSG 7B1.1(a)(1)(B) includes state law enhancements that increase the maximum penalty for recidivists. Therefore, defendant's crime of second-degree manslaughter was "punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding twenty years" – a Grade A violation under section 7B1.1(a)(1)(B).The court also concluded that the district court did not err in calculating the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range, and disagreed with defendant's assertions that the district court committed other procedural errors during the sentencing hearing. In this case, defendant's procedural challenges essentially reduce down to two main points: the district court based its sentencing decision on improper evidence and the district court primarily sentenced her based on the severity of her state offense and not her breach of trust. The court concluded that neither of these arguments has merit. View "United States v. Ramos" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed Defendants Scott and Santiago's convictions for their role in the assault of an inmate at the Downstate Correctional Facility and its subsequent cover-up. Defendants were former correction officers with the New York State Department of Correction and Community Supervision.The court held that there is no set time for a conspiracy to form under 18 U.S.C. 241, for conspiracy to violate civil rights, so long as the surrounding facts and circumstances support the existence of an agreement. The court also held that a violation of 18 U.S.C. 1519 for falsifying records does not require knowledge of an impending federal investigation. Furthermore, the court found that the statute is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to this case. It is clear that the statute was not vague as applied to Scott's conduct, which involved the filing of a false injury report and the orchestration of false use-of-force reports and photographs designed to mislead prison administrators and others into believing that the inmate was the aggressor, as opposed to the victim of a brutal assault. View "United States v. Scott" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed Defendants Requena and Raymond's conviction for one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute a controlled substance analogue. Defendants were convicted under the Controlled Substance Analogue Enforcement Act, which provides that substances with chemical and pharmacological properties "substantially similar" to those of substances listed on schedule I or II are treated for the purposes of federal law as controlled substances.The court held that the Analogue Act's instruction to treat a substance with chemical and pharmacological properties “substantially similar” to those of a scheduled substance as a controlled substance in schedule I is not unconstitutionally vague on its face, certain Supreme Court decisions notwithstanding. The court also held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction; the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the government's expert to testify; the district court correctly instructed the jury that it need not unanimously agree on which of the six synthetic cannabinoids charged in the indictment meet the statutory definition of a controlled substance analogue; the district court made all of the factual findings necessary to calculate defendants' base offense level at sentencing; and, because defendants are entitled to no relief in connection with their drug conviction, their money laundering conviction likewise stands. View "United States v. Requena" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for charges related to his operation of an illegal payday-loan scheme. The jury found that defendant violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), and federal wire fraud and identity theft statutes from 2004 through 2014.As to the RICO counts, the court rejected defendant's contention that the district court erred as a matter of law by instructing the jury that, as to his business's loans to New York borrowers, New York usury laws governed the transaction rather than the laws of the jurisdictions specified in the loan agreements, which set no interest rate caps. Rather, the court ruled that New York law applies and that the district court was correct when it so instructed the jury. As to the TILA conviction, the court rejected defendant's contention that his loan agreements disclosed the "total of payments" borrowers would make, as TILA requires, and that the evidence was insufficient to show that these disclosures were inaccurate. The court held that the evidence supported the jury's guilty verdict under TILA. The court rejected defendant's remaining contentions, finding them unpersuasive. View "United States v. Moseley" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for creating a "loud or unusual noise or a nuisance" in the courthouse, in violation of 41 C.F.R. 102-74.390(a) (the "Noise Regulation"). Defendant's conviction stemmed from her engagement in a loud argument with a court security officer in the lobby of the Binghamton courthouse.The court concluded that defendant forfeited her challenge to the conspicuous posting of the Noise Regulation by not raising the argument on appeal to the district court. The court also concluded that, under United States v. Weintraub, 273 F.3d 139, 147 (2d Cir. 2001), the Noise Regulation carries only a general intent requirement, and that the evidence supports that defendant acted with this mens rea. Finally, the court determined that the Noise Regulation is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant's conduct. View "United States v. Wasylyshyn" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for one count of bank fraud based on a conditional guilty plea. Defendant argued that the 11-year delay between his 2007 indictment and 2018 arrest violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.The court applied the Barker factors and held that the district court did not violate defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. In this case, the district court did not clearly err in finding that the delay was attributable to defendant fleeing to Brazil in 2006 to avoid prosecution; the government exercised reasonable diligence in determining whether defendant returned to the United States despite its failure to detect his periodic travel into and out of the United States from 2012 until his arrest in 2018, and defendant has shown no prejudice from the delay. Furthermore, the district court properly balanced the Barker factors in concluding that the delay, though lengthy, did not violate the Sixth Amendment. View "United States v. Debarros Cabral" on Justia Law