Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for four counts of receipt of child pornography, one count of possession of child pornography, and two counts of transportation of child pornography. The court held that the evidence showed that defendant downloaded child pornography files on a peer-to-peer file sharing network, thus making those files available to be downloaded by other users on the network, and that government agents downloaded two video files from his computer. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions. Furthermore, even assuming a violation of defendant's entitlement to discovery, defendant has not demonstrated that he suffered prejudice.The court also held that defendant's 120 month sentence is procedurally and substantively reasonable. Finally, the court affirmed the monetary fines imposed on defendant for costs incurred because defendant failed to show up for the first day of trial, for an assessment, for a penalty under the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act, and for a special assessment. View "United States v. Clarke" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of relief to defendant under the First Step Act. The court held that, under the First Step Act, a district court has the authority to lower a sentence only if that sentence could have been lower had the Fair Sentencing Act applied. In this case, defendant pleaded guilty to an information that charged, in its first count, that defendant committed three offenses—distributing, and possessing with intent to distribute, crack cocaine, cocaine, and heroin. The court explained that, because the Fair Sentencing Act did not alter the mandatory minimum sentences triggered by the quantities of heroin and cocaine charged in count one of the information, defendant's sentence could not have been lower than 120 months. Therefore, because defendant's sentence could not have been lower even if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act were in effect at the time the covered offense was committed, the district court correctly concluded that it lacked the authority to reduce defendant's sentence. View "United States v. Echeverry" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of habeas corpus relief to petitioner, who was detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1226(a), which provides for discretionary detention of noncitizens during the pendency of removal proceedings. The habeas petition challenged the procedures employed in petitioner's bond hearings, which required him to prove, to the satisfaction of an immigration judge, that he is neither a danger to the community nor a flight risk.The court held that the district court correctly granted the petition where petitioner was denied due process because he was incarcerated for fifteen months (with no end in sight) while the Government at no point justified his incarceration. The district court also provided the correct remedy by ordering a new bond hearing in which the Government bore the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that petitioner was either a danger or a flight risk. View "Velasco Lopez v. Decker" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit reversed the district court's grant of defendant's motion for a new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33, following defendant's conviction for conspiracy to commit securities fraud and securities fraud. The court clarified that the preponderates heavily standard requires that the district court determine whether all the evidence at trial, taken as a whole, preponderated heavily against the verdict. It does not, however, permit the district court to elect its own theory of the case and view the evidence through that lens. The court held that the weight of the evidence at trial did not preponderate heavily against the jury's verdict, and thus the district court abused its discretion in vacating the judgment and granting a new trial. The court reinstated the conviction and remanded to the district court for sentencing. View "United States v. Archer" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of accepting bribes and three counts of tax evasion in connection with a bribery scheme that he and others perpetrated while he was an employee of Con Edison. On appeal, defendant argued that the district court erred in its restitution order by incorrectly determining that his bribery conduct was "an offense against property" under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA) and incorrectly calculating the loss to Con Edison caused by the scheme.The Second Circuit rejected defendant's argument that the MVRA does not support the restitution order to Con Edison. As urged by the government, however, the court vacated the restitution order insofar as it covers investigative costs incurred by Con Edison and remanded to the district court to allow that court to address the effect of Lagos v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1684 (2018), on its calculation of the restitution amount. View "United States v. Razzouk" on Justia Law

Absent updated guidance from the Sentencing Commission, the First Step Act freed district courts to consider any potentially extraordinary and compelling reasons that a defendant might raise for compassionate release.The Second Circuit vacated the district court's denial of compassionate release to defendant and remanded for further proceedings. In this case, the district court erroneously concluded that, despite the First Step Act's changes to compassionate release, the previously enacted USSG 1B1.13, Application Note 1(D) remained good law and limited the applicable circumstances the court could consider, without input from the Bureau of Prisons, to matters of poor health, old age, and family care needs. Rather, the court held that Application Note 1(D) does not apply to compassionate release motions brought directly to the district court by a defendant under the First Step Act. View "United States v. Zullo" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for conspiring to distribute cocaine base and possession of a firearm as a convicted felon, but vacated two challenged conditions of supervised release and remanded in part.The court held that defendant's guilty plea to possessing a firearm as a convicted felon remains valid, even in light of Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), because it is plain that defendant knew of his unlawful status when he possessed the firearm and there is no reasonable probability that he would have not pled guilty had he been properly informed that such knowledge was a requirement for conviction under 18 U.S.C. 922(g). The court also held that there was no error at sentencing in the district court's consideration of potential sentencing disparities among similarly situated defendants, and defendant's 90-month sentence was not procedurally or substantively unreasonable. Finally, the court held that the two disputed conditions of supervised release imposed on defendant are not unconstitutionally vague, but the court remanded (1) the risk condition so that the district court can formally incorporate its oral amendment of that condition into the written judgment of conviction, and (2) the communication condition so that the district court may provide the necessary justification for restricting defendant's communications with his brother, or exempt such communications from that condition. View "United States v. Bryant" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed two special conditions of his supervised release stemming from his conviction for making a materially false, fictitious, and fraudulent statement and representation to FBI agents. The conditions prohibit him from: (a) engaging in conduct online that "promotes or endorses violence"; and (b) possessing or using a computer or other internet-capable device without participating in a monitoring program operated by the U.S. Probation Office.The court concluded that the challenged conditions satisfy the "reasonably related" requirements of USSG 5D1.3(b)(1) and accord with the court's caselaw interpreting that provision. However, the court concluded that because of the vagueness of the condition prohibiting him from engaging in violence-promoting speech online in its present form, it infringes upon his rights to free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated and remanded in part. View "United States v. Bolin" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction of two counts of insider trading in violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Rule 10b–5. The court held that defendant had a duty to refrain from trading on nonpublic inside information and that the evidence was sufficient to convict him. In this case, defendant served as a principal investigator for a clinical trial of a cardiac drug developed by Regado Biosciences, a publicly traded biopharmaceutical company, that was designed to prevent blood clotting. After defendant learned that patients suffered adverse effects during the trial, he traded on that nonpublic inside information to avoid a loss and earn a profit in the shares of the company. The court concluded that, taken together, the evidence of defendant's deceptive activity was sufficient for the jury to find that he was a sophisticated investor that knew his actions were unlawful under the charge given by the district court. Finally, there was no abuse of discretion in the district court's evidentiary rulings. View "United States v. Kosinski" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitioned for review of the BIA's 2018 decision finding him removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) for having been convicted of an "aggravated felony" as defined by section 101(a)(43)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The BIA found that petitioner was convicted of "sexual abuse of a minor" based on his 2010 New York state conviction under New York Penal Law 130.65(3) for sexual abuse in the first degree.The Second Circuit rejected petitioner's contention that section 130.65(3) criminalizes more conduct than the federal definition of "sexual abuse of a minor" covers. The court held that, because a conviction under N.Y. Penal Law 130.65(3) requires both that the victim be under the age of eleven and that the perpetrator's contact with the victim be "for the purpose of gratifying sexual desire," the state statute reaches no farther than the crime of "sexual abuse of a minor" as set forth in section 101(a)(43)(A) and construed by the BIA in In re Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 996. Therefore, a conviction under the state statute is an aggravated felony under the INA. View "Rodriguez v. Barr" on Justia Law