Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for eight counts related to his possession of child pornography. The court held that the district court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress fruits of the Network Investigative Technique (NIT) warrant based on the court's opinion in United States v. Eldred, 933 F.3d 110, 111 (2d Cir. 2019), where the court concluded that suppression of the evidence derived from an NIT warrant was not required; the warrant at issue was supported by probable cause; even assuming that the government had improperly suggested that the Playpen site was a "hidden" website and could not be accessed without prior knowledge, multiple additional pieces of evidence supported the issuance of the warrant; and the description of the site's logo was support for the probable cause determination, not the triggering event.The court also held that the district court properly denied defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment and rejected defendant's contention that the government's operation of the Playpen site was outrageous government conduct. Finally, the court held that defendant's below-Guidelines sentence of 90 months in prison and 20 year term of supervised release was not substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Caraher" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for one count of racketeering conspiracy (RICO conspiracy count) and two counts of murder in aid of racketeering (VCAR murder counts) based on his involvement with the 10th Street Gang in Buffalo, New York and his role in the 2006 murders of two individuals. The jury also found that defendant was guilty of two special factors that, as part of the RICO conspiracy count, charged defendant with intentionally causing the deaths of the two individuals in violation of New York Penal Law 125.25(1) and 20.00.The Second Circuit held that the evidence was insufficient to convict defendant of aiding and abetting the two murders. However, the court held that the government adequately proved defendant's knowing agreement to participate in a racketeering enterprise; there was no error in the district court's Batson ruling; and there was no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of defendant's motion to sever his trial from that of his co-defendants. Accordingly, the court affirmed defendant's RICO conspiracy count; reversed the VCAR murder counts and the murder enhancements of the RICO conspiracy count; and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Anastasio" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's decision finding petitioner removable as an aggravated felon for having been convicted of fraud involving a loss to the victims exceeding $10,000 pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), 1101(a)(43)(M)(i). Defendant was convicted of insurance fraud and grand larceny, and was ordered to pay $77,199 in restitution without any indication as to whether the restitution order was for the benefit of victims of the insurance fraud, the grand larceny, or both.The court held that the BIA relied on inadequate analysis in concluding that the $77,199 restitution order, on its own, showed that petitioner's insurance fraud caused more than $10,000 in victim losses. In this case, where petitioner was convicted of two separate crimes and ordered to pay an overarching restitution amount without indication of what part, if any, was for the insurance fraud, the court held that the restitution order, without more, is insufficient to demonstrate that more than $10,000 in losses were caused by the insurance fraud count as distinct from the larceny count. Furthermore, the BIA gave no explanation why it concluded that more than $10,000 of the restitution award was attributable to losses caused by the insurance fraud. Accordingly, the court vacated the BIA's decision and remanded for further proceedings. View "Rampersaud v. Barr" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for conspiracy to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), as well as narcotics-conspiracy and firearm-possession charges related to his membership in the 10th Street Gang of Buffalo, New York. Defendant, who was seventeen years old at the time, participated in a double murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment.The Second Circuit rejected defendant's challenges to the introduction into evidence of a gun seized from his home; the denial of his motion for a mistrial based on a Bruton violation; the denial of his Batson challenges, and the denial of his requests for certain jury charges. However, the court held that the district court imposed defendant's sentence without explicitly considering his age at the time of the double murders, and thus violated the principle recognized in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012), that children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing. Miller stated that those under the age of eighteen are different because the distinctive attributes of youth diminish the penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders, even when they commit terrible crimes. Therefore, the court affirmed defendant's conviction but vacated his sentence, remanding for resentencing in light of Miller. View "United States v. Delgado" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's finding that petitioner was removable for having been convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs) under section 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.The court held that petitioner's conviction for two counts of felony possession of narcotics with intent to sell, in violation of Connecticut General Statutes 21a5 277(a)(1), qualify as CIMTs. Although the court acknowledged that Connecticut's legislature has broadly defined "sale" to encompass exchanges, gifts, and offers of a narcotic substance even for no consideration, the court concluded that the plain meaning of the statute encompasses every instance in which a defendant offers to, or does in fact, "barter, exchange or gift" narcotics to another. The court explained that the fact that the statute may cover scenarios in which a defendant "offered," "exchanged," or "gifted" a narcotic substance, even a small amount, to a friend for no or little renumeration does not foreclose its conclusion under the categorical approach. View "Mota v. Barr" on Justia Law

Under 28 U.S.C. 2253, in a habeas corpus proceeding or a proceeding under section 2255 before a district judge, the final order shall be subject to review, on appeal, by the court of appeals for the circuit in which the proceeding is held.The Second Circuit determined, sua sponte, that it lacks jurisdiction to hear petitioner's appeal because a district court's order denying a certificate of appealability is not an appealable final order. In this case, petitioner moves for a certificate of appealability and for leave to file an oversized motion for a certificate of appealability, challenging the district court's order denying a certificate of appealability. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and denied petitioner's motion as moot. View "Lasher v. United States" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit denied petitioner's motion to file a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence following his conviction for Hobbs Act robbery and being a felon in possession of a firearm pursuant to a guilty plea.The court held that, because Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), resolved only a question of statutory interpretation, it did not announce a new rule of constitutional law as required by 28 U.S.C. 2255(h)(2). Therefore, petitioner has not made a prima facie showing that the requirements of section 2255(h) are satisfied. View "Mata v. United States" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit vacated defendant's sentence and restitution imposed after he pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud. The court held that the district court erred at sentencing by applying the commercial bribery sentencing guideline based on an uncharged bribery scheme that the government dropped in exchange for defendant pleading guilty to the wire fraud. The court explained that vacatur is warranted because the court could not be confident, despite the district court's statement to the contrary, that it would have imposed the same sentence had it instead used the correct guideline. The court also held that the district court erred by ordering $19 million in restitution to be paid to the Corrections Officers Benevolent Association, an entity that was not a victim of the convicted conduct under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act. The court remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Huberfeld" on Justia Law

The district court decided that the government was not authorized under 8 C.F.R. 241.14(d) to continue holding petitioner in immigration detention pending his removal from the United States and ordered the government to release him. The government appealed and argued that section 241.14(d) is not inconsistent with its authorizing statute, 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(6), and that it provides adequate procedural due process.The Second Circuit granted the government's motion for a stay pending appeal, holding that the government has made a strong showing that it is likely to succeed on the merits of its argument that the district court erred in holding that section 241.14(d) is inconsistent with section 1231(a)(6) and does not provide adequate procedural due process. The court also held that the government has made a strong showing of a likelihood of success on its argument that the district court erred in holding that section 241.14(d) is not a permissible reading of section 1231(a)(6). Furthermore, considerations of irreparable harm and the equities favor a stay of petitioner's release pending appeal. View "Hassoun v. Searls" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for six counts of unlawful possession of child pornography.The court held that the police delayed unreasonably long in violation of the Fourth Amendment when they waited without good cause for 31 days to seek a search warrant after seizing defendant's tablet computer. However, the court held that the exclusionary rule does not apply because the police's unreasonable delay was due to isolated negligence and because an objectively reasonable police officer would not have known that the delay amounted to a violation of the Fourth Amendment in light of then-existing precedent. The court also held that defendant's 212 month sentence was not procedurally or substantively unreasonable in light of the large amount of child pornography that defendant possessed as well as his history of sexually abusing children. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law