Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Sexual assault in the third degree under CGS 53a-72a(a)(1) necessarily includes as an element the use or threatened use of violent force and thus categorically constitutes a crime of violence as defined in 18 U.S.C. 16(a).The Second Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's order of removal. The court declined to remand for the agency to consider in the first instance whether petitioner's conviction of Connecticut third-degree sexual assault is a crime of violence under the alternative definition in 18 U.S.C. 16(a), but rather considered that legal question de novo and held that it categorically satisfies that definition. The court vacated the petition and denied the pending motion for stay of removal as moot. View "Kondjoua v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's decision ordering petitioner removed based on his 2016 Connecticut state conviction for carrying a pistol or revolver without a permit, in violation of Connecticut General Statutes 29-35(a).The court held that Section 29-35(a) of the Connecticut General Statutes is not a categorical match for the generic federal firearms offense, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(C). The court held that the Connecticut statute criminalizes conduct involving "antique firearms" that the INA firearms offense definition does not, precluding petitioner's removal on the basis of the state conviction. The court also held that, under Hylton v. Sessions, 897 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 2018), the realistic probability test has no bearing here, where the text of the state statute gives it a broader reach than the federal definition. Accordingly, the court vacated the order of removal and remanded with directions to terminate the removal proceedings. View "Williams v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit vacated defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery. The court found no plain error with respect to the plea agreement, but held that the limited facts relied upon by the district court were insufficient to support application of a three-level enhancement for possession of a dangerous weapon, USSG 2B3.1(b)(2)(E), and a two-level enhancement for physical restraint, USSG 2B3.1(b)(4)(B), in calculating defendant's Sentencing Guidelines range. View "United States v. Oneal" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a previously convicted felon. The district court applied a four-level sentencing enhancement for possessing a firearm with "an altered or obliterated serial number," under USSG 2K2.1(b)(4)(B).Consistent with its sister circuits, the court held that the enhancement applies if a single iteration of a serial number has been altered or obliterated, notwithstanding whether another may be legible. Moreover, the court held that "altered" means illegible to the naked eye. In this case, the court held that the district court did not err by applying the enhancement by assessing the iteration of the serial number that was most badly scored and finding as fact that it was illegible to the naked eye. View "United States v. St. Hilaire" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order of restitution, imposed after defendant pleaded guilty to four counts of wire fraud in 2018 for submitting false expense-reimbursement forms to the Department of Labor. The court held that the restitution order was proper under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act because all of the losses resulted from the same "scheme," even though some occurred outside the limitations period for the underlying crime. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering defendant to pay $72,207.16 in restitution. View "United States v. Parnell" on Justia Law

After defendant died while his appeal was pending, counsel moved for abatement of all incidents of the prosecution, requesting that the appeal be dismissed without a decision on the merits, that defendant's conviction be vacated, and that the matter be remanded to the district court with instructions to dismiss the indictment and order repayment to defendant's estate of the $20,000 fine and $100 special assessment.Because defendant was convicted upon his plea of guilty, and he neither did nor was permitted to challenge on appeal the merits of his conviction, the Second Circuit denied as without merit so much of the motion as seeks (1) vacatur of his conviction, (2) dismissal of the count of the indictment on which he was convicted, and (3) repayment of the mandatory $100 special assessment. The court granted so much of the motion as requests dismissal of this appeal and a remand to the district court for vacatur of the imposed terms of imprisonment and supervised release and for an order requiring that the paid fine of $20,000 be repaid to defendant's estate. View "United States v. Mladen" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for distribution and possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance. The court held that the district court did not procedurally err by applying the career offender sentencing enhancement pursuant to USSG 4B1.1 because defendant's prior convictions of conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846, and attempted criminal possession of a controlled substance in violation of N.Y. Penal Law 220.16(1), qualify as controlled substance offenses, as defined in USSG 4B1.2(b). The court also held that the district court did not substantively err in sentencing defendant, because it properly considered his criminal history and accounted for his need for mental health and substance abuse treatment. View "United States v. Richardson" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of distribution and receipt of child pornography and one count of possession of child pornography. The district court sentenced him to 121 months of imprisonment, followed by five years of supervised release, and imposed a $200 mandatory special assessment under 18 U.S.C. 3013, as well as a $10,000 assessment under 18 U.S.C. 3014.The Second Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant and his sentence was substantively reasonable. The court held that the text of the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act (JVTA), 18 U.S.C. 3014, taken as a whole and in its context, is straightforwardly meant to be applied on a per-offender, not a per-count, basis. In this case, the district court erroneously applied the special assessment on a per-count, rather than per-offender, basis. Finally, the court held that the computer monitoring condition in question was reasonably related to the nature of defendant's offense. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Haverkamp" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for murder-for-hire, conspiracy to commit murder-for-hire, murder through use of a firearm, and possession of a firearm during a murder-for-hire conspiracy. Defendant owned Czar Entertainment, a music management company that represented hip-hop, rap and R&B artists such as Jayceon Taylor, also known as "The Game." Taylor was a member of G-Unit, a rap group run by Curtis Jackson, also known as "50 Cent." Defendant's crimes stemmed from a rivalry with Violator Records, the company that managed G-Unit.The court rejected defendant's contention that his attorney was ineffective because he conceded that defendant paid for the victim to be shot, even though he told counsel not to make this concession. The court held that defendant failed to show that this was objectively unreasonable or that he would have been found not guilty had a different argument been advanced. In this case, there was ample evidence supporting counsel's strategy to concede that defendant ordered a shooting where, among other things, the government's key witness, who participated in the conspiracy and lured the victim to be shot, testified that defendant agreed to pay the shooter. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its broad discretion by admitting prior bad-act evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1). View "United States v. Rosemond" on Justia Law

Holloway sought reduction of his 168-month prison sentence and 10-year term of supervised release under Section 404 of the 2018 First Step Act, 132 Stat. 5194. The district court applied the framework of 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), including U.S.S.G. 1B1.10. Because Holloway was sentenced as a career offender, the district court concluded that his Guidelines range after application of the First Step Act was equivalent to his original Guidelines range, so that Holloway was ineligible for a reduction of his term of imprisonment. The district court did not address supervised release. While his appeal was pending, Holloway completed his prison term and was released from custody.The Second Circuit vacated, holding that Holloway’s appeal was not mooted by his release. Holloway remains eligible for a reduction in his term of supervised release and was eligible for relief under the plain language of the Act: The court had previously sentenced him for an offense covered by the Act, and Holloway was not otherwise barred from relief under the Act’s limitations; 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(B), rather than section 3582(c)(2), provides the correct framework for consideration of a motion for a reduction of a term of imprisonment under the First Step Act; so U.S.S.G. 1B1.10 does not prevent a district court from considering a First Step Act motion made by a defendant whose new Sentencing Guidelines range is equivalent to his original range. View "United States v. Holloway" on Justia Law