Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Second Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's decision denying petitioner's application for deferral or removal under the Convention Against Torture. Petitioner contended that, if he was removed to Jamaica, he would be killed in retaliation for his earlier cooperation with law enforcement.The court held that the jurisdictional provision in 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(C), which limits this court's jurisdiction, applies only to cases where the IJ has found a petitioner removable based on covered criminal activity, and that it does not apply where a petitioner's order of removal is based solely on unlawful presence. The court also held that the IJ and BIA discounted petitioner's credible testimony without proper explanation, failed to consider substantial and material evidence that petitioner is likely to be killed if removed to Jamaica, and erroneously placed a burden on petitioner to prove he could not internally relocate in order to avoid torture. Accordingly, the court remanded petitioner's application for deferral of removal for further proceedings. View "Manning v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's vacatur of defendant's sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act and the district court's decision to resentence defendant to time served.The court held that the district court properly concluded that New York first-degree manslaughter is not a predicate crime of violence because it can be committed by omission and therefore without the use of force, as defined in Curtis Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010). The court also held that New York first-degree manslaughter does not match any of the generic offenses enumerated in the Career Offender Guideline. Therefore, defendant did not have the requisite predicate offenses and could not be sentenced under the Career Offender Guidelines. View "United States v. Scott" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of petitioner's 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion as untimely. The district court held that petitioner could not show that his motion was timely under section 2255(f)(3) because the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015), did not recognize a retroactive right not to be sentenced based upon the residual clause in the Career Offender Guideline of the pre-Booker Sentencing Guidelines.The court held that Johnson did not itself render the residual clause of the pre-Booker Career Offender Guideline unconstitutionally vague and thus did not recognize the right petitioner asserted. Therefore, the district court properly denied the petition. View "Nunez v. United States" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a legal permanent resident, sought review of an agency order of removal based on a finding that he committed an "aggravated felony" within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G). Under section 1101(a)(43)(G), to establish an aggravated felony, the government must show by clear and convincing evidence that a noncitizen committed a "theft offense" that resulted in a term of imprisonment of "at least one year." Petitioner was a member of the U.S. Army when he pleaded guilty to four violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), one of which was larceny of military property. Under the military's customary practice of unitary sentencing at the time, the military judge issued a general sentence that imposed a punishment for all four of petitioner's convictions for 30 months' confinement.The Second Circuit held that, under the military's traditional unitary sentencing scheme, a military judgment in which a single sentence of confinement is imposed in connection with multiple counts of conviction may not be presumed to be equivalent to equal, full‐term, concurrent sentences as to each count of conviction. Because the government has not carried its burden, the court granted the petition for review and remanded for further proceedings. View "Persad v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint against the BOP and Warden Quay in an action alleging that defendants' curtailment of inmate-attorney visits at the MDC in early 2019 violated the Administrative Procedure Act, and the constitutional right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment.The court held that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's APA claim by failing to consider applicable BOP regulations in its zone-of-interests analysis. Furthermore, the district court misconstrued plaintiff's Sixth Amendment claim. Plaintiff brought this claim under the federal courts' inherent equitable powers, but the district court treated the claim as purporting to arise directly under the Sixth Amendment. The court thought it was prudent to defer ruling on the merits of the Sixth Amendment claim because plaintiff raised novel questions of constitutional law. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings and directed the district court to consider appointing a master to mediate the parties' differences at the earliest possible time to ensure that plaintiff has meaningful, continuous access to clients. View "Federal Defenders of New York, Inc. v. Federal Bureau of Prisons" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence on five counts related to sex trafficiking. The court held that the fact that there has been no suggestion that defendant's false testimony warrants a sentencing guidelines adjustment does not impede the court's consideration of that false testimony in determining an appropriate sentence in accordance with 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). The court also held that defendant's sentence was substantively reasonable and the evidence was sufficient to support her conviction on one count. View "United States v. Almonte" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence after he pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and obstructing justice. The court held that defendant's prior conviction for New York first degree robbery was a violent felony as defined in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), because the forcible‐takings element common to New York robbery in every degree requires the use or threatened use of physical force as defined by the Supreme Court in Curtis Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, and Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 544.The court explained that Samuel Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, which invalidated the ACCA's residual clause definition of violent felony as unconstitutionally vague, does not undermine this court's precedents, both before and after Samuel Johnson, recognizing attempted drug sales or attempted drug possession with intent to sell in violation of New York law as serious drug offenses under the ACCA. Finally, the court held that the district court correctly followed controlling precedent in identifying defendant's two prior New York State drug convictions, one for attempted drug sale and the other for attempted drug possession with intent to sell, as serious drug offenses under the ACCA. View "United States v. Ojeda" on Justia Law

Nikolla and two codefendants were charged in connection with the extortion of restaurant proprietors and other businesses in and around Astoria, Queens in 2012-2013. A third superseding indictment specifically charged the defendants with threatening physical violence. Nikolla pleaded guilty to two counts of Hobbs Act extortion conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a), one count of threatening physical violence in furtherance of an extortion plan, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a), and one count of brandishing a firearm during and in relation to, or in furtherance of, a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). Nikolla was sentenced principally to 216 months; the “brandishing” count increased the mandatory penalty from five years to seven years of imprisonment. The Second Circuit affirmed, rejecting Nikolla’s challenge to his section 924(c) conviction. The predicate offense for that conviction — Hobbs Act threat of violence in furtherance of extortion under 18 U.S.C. 1951(a) — does qualify as a “crime of violence” under the Elements Clause of section 924(c). The court noted that Nikolla conceded in the district court that this offense constituted a “crime of violence” under section 924(c). View "United States v. Nikolla" on Justia Law

Defendant's prior convictions for attempted assault in the second degree under N.Y. Penal Law 120.05(2) and federal narcotics conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. 846 constitute predicate offenses for purposes of the career offender sentencing enhancement under USSG 4B1.1. The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence, holding that the district court's application of the career offender sentencing enhancement was appropriate. The court held that the district court correctly concluded that the New York conviction constituted a predicate "crime of violence" and that the federal conviction constituted a predicate "controlled substances offense." View "United States v. Tabb" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's revocation of defendant's term of supervised release after finding by a preponderance of the evidence that he had violated the conditions of his supervised release by committing a state crime.The court held that the exclusionary rule does not apply in revocation of federal supervised release proceedings. The court explained that the deterrent effects of the exclusionary rule are significantly outweighed by the costs involved in applying the rule in this context. The court also held that defendant's remaining argument, that the district court erred in refusing to give him access to grand jury minutes, was without merit because he impermissibly seeks to attack his underlying conviction. View "United States v. Hightower" on Justia Law