Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

John Feeney, a convicted felon, was charged with unlawfully possessing two pistols and carrying explosives, specifically modified fireworks shells, during the commission of that felony. Feeney pleaded guilty to both offenses. During sentencing, the court and the parties disagreed on the applicable base offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines for Feeney’s conviction of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court sided with the government and applied a higher base offense level to Feeney’s sentence.The district court calculated the total offense level for the firearm possession conviction to be 15, which combined with a criminal history category of IV, yielded a guideline range of 30 to 37 months of imprisonment. The court imposed a within-guidelines sentence of 30 months for the firearm possession offense and a mandatory consecutive sentence of 120 months for the offense of carrying explosives while committing a felony.Feeney appealed his sentence, arguing that the district court erred when it applied a base offense level of 18 under the Sentencing Guidelines instead of a base offense level of 14. He contended that the court's decision resulted in him being punished twice for the same conduct, which is prohibited by the Sentencing Guidelines.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with Feeney's interpretation of the relevant guideline and application note. The court found that the district court had erred in applying a higher base offense level based on Feeney's possession of an explosive. The court concluded that such an application constituted an "enhancement" prohibited by the Sentencing Guidelines, which aim to prevent duplicative punishment. The court vacated Feeney's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing. View "United States v. Feeney" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Denny Anderson, who was sentenced in 2012 for possessing a firearm as a felon, after shooting at a man and using racial slurs. The maximum penalty for the illegal-possession offense is typically 10 years, but the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) mandates a 15-year minimum sentence for anyone with three prior convictions for a "violent felony." Anderson was sentenced to an agreed-upon term of 180 months (15 years) in prison. He was resentenced in 2021, following a successful habeas petition he filed in 2013. The government maintained that he was subject to a 15-year minimum sentence due to his prior convictions.The district court agreed that Anderson's convictions for burglary, robbery, and Florida aggravated assault qualified as violent felonies, triggering a 15-year minimum sentence. Anderson did not object to his designation as an armed career criminal. The court then resentenced him to 188 months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that Anderson’s Florida conviction in 2001 is not a predicate violent felony and that the government may not substitute one of Anderson’s other prior convictions as an alternative predicate offense. Because Anderson does not have three predicate convictions, the ACCA enhancement was improper. The court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for resentencing. View "United States v. Anderson" on Justia Law

The case involves Thomas Brooks, II, who was charged with and pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. The incident occurred when Brooks was leaving an apartment complex and saw police officers waiting outside to arrest him due to several outstanding warrants. Brooks began to run and during the chase, he threw a loaded firearm and an extended magazine into the grass. The police apprehended him and retrieved the discarded items.Prior to his sentencing, the United States Probation Office prepared a Presentence Investigation Report, which calculated an offense level of 19 and a criminal history category VI, yielding an advisory guidelines range of 63 to 78 months in prison. Brooks argued that the reckless endangerment enhancement should not apply because the government could not demonstrate that his actions created a substantial risk of serious bodily harm. The district court disagreed and applied the two-level reckless endangerment enhancement.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Brooks challenged his sentence on three grounds: the application of a two-level enhancement for reckless endangerment while fleeing from police, the district court's failure to address one of his key mitigation arguments, and the district court's decision to sentence him above the Guidelines range. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, finding that the district court did not err in its application of the enhancement, adequately addressed Brooks's mitigation arguments, and provided a sufficient explanation for the above-Guidelines sentence. View "United States v. Brooks" on Justia Law

Shamar Betts was indicted for inciting a riot in violation of the Anti-Riot Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2101, after he posted a flyer on Facebook calling for a riot at a mall in Champaign, Illinois. The riot resulted in damage to several businesses. Betts moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the Anti-Riot Act was overbroad and violated the First Amendment, but the district court denied his motion. Betts then pled guilty and was sentenced to 48 months’ imprisonment and ordered to pay $1,686,170.30 in restitution to 35 businesses under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3663A.On appeal, Betts challenged the constitutionality of the Anti-Riot Act, the application of a sentencing guideline by analogy, and the district court's order of restitution. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the Anti-Riot Act, finding no compelling reason to overrule its previous decision in United States v. Dellinger, which upheld the Act. The court also found no error in the district court's application of a sentencing guideline by analogy to the Anti-Riot Act.However, the court agreed with Betts's argument that the government failed to meet its burden of showing that he directly and proximately caused damages to all businesses included in the restitution order. The court vacated the sentence with regard to the amount of restitution ordered and remanded the case for the limited purpose of reconsidering the amount of restitution. View "United States v. Betts" on Justia Law

In 2014, Allan Kustok was convicted of murdering his wife, Anita “Jeannie” Kustok. Kustok claimed that his wife had accidentally shot herself or committed suicide. However, the state argued that Kustok had shot his wife and presented evidence of his extramarital affairs, his purchase of the gun used in the shooting, and inconsistencies in his account of the incident. After his conviction, Kustok sought a new trial, arguing that new evidence cast doubt on the testimony of an expert witness for the prosecution. His motion was denied, and his subsequent appeals were unsuccessful.Kustok then filed a state postconviction petition, arguing that his trial counsel had been ineffective for failing to discover exculpatory evidence before the trial. The state courts found that Kustok had waived this claim by not raising it on direct appeal. Kustok then filed a federal habeas corpus petition, presenting the same claim. The district court held that the state-court waiver meant Kustok had procedurally defaulted the claim for federal-court purposes.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed that Kustok had procedurally defaulted his claim. The court also concluded that Kustok did not qualify for any exception to the procedural-default rules, and therefore affirmed the dismissal of his petition. The court found that even if Kustok's lawyer had introduced evidence about a certain soot stain at trial, it was not substantially likely that the jury would have returned a different verdict. View "Kustok v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Keith Henyard was charged with eight drug-related felonies in Wisconsin. During his preliminary hearing, Court Commissioner Frank Parise presided. Later, Henyard hired Parise as his attorney. Parise secured a plea deal for Henyard, who pleaded guilty to four of the eight charges. The remaining four charges were dismissed but considered during sentencing. Henyard did not raise any objections about Parise's potential conflict of interest during these proceedings. He was sentenced to 12 years in prison followed by 5 years of extended supervision for one count, and 6 years of probation for the other three counts.Henyard later petitioned the Kenosha County Circuit Court for postconviction relief, arguing that Parise's previous role in his preliminary hearing constituted a conflict of interest, rendering his representation ineffective. The circuit court denied his petition, finding that Henyard had not demonstrated an actual or serious potential conflict of interest. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals also rejected Henyard's petition, stating that he had failed to show that Parise's alleged conflict of interest had adversely affected his performance. The Wisconsin Supreme Court denied Henyard's petition for review.Henyard then sought a writ of habeas corpus from the federal district court, which also denied his petition. The court found that Henyard needed to show a conflict that affected counsel's performance, as per the precedent set by the United States Supreme Court. The court concluded that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals' decision complied with this precedent and reasonably applied the law to deny Henyard relief.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Henyard argued that Parise's conflict of interest rendered his representation ineffective. The court affirmed the lower courts' decisions, stating that Henyard had not demonstrated that Parise actively represented conflicting interests or that the alleged conflict adversely affected his performance. The court concluded that the state court's denial of Henyard's petition was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. View "Henyard v. Eplett" on Justia Law

The case involves Robert Sylvester Kelly, a music industry professional, who was accused of sexually abusing underage girls in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The victims, referred to as Jane, Pauline, and Nia, were introduced to Kelly through various connections. The abuse, which included explicit phone calls, oral sex, and intercourse, was often recorded by Kelly. The victims' testimonies, along with three videos of Jane and Kelly, were presented as evidence during the trial.Prior to this case, Kelly had been acquitted in a 2008 criminal trial for similar conduct involving different victims. In 2019, federal prosecutors secured an indictment against Kelly, which included thirteen counts of producing and receiving child pornography, inducing minors to engage in sexual activities, and obstructing justice in the state case. The jury convicted Kelly on six counts, including inducing Jane, Pauline, and Nia to engage in sexual activities, and three child pornography production counts corresponding to the three videos in evidence. The jury acquitted Kelly on the other seven counts.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Kelly raised three arguments: a statute of limitations defense, a request for severance of his trial, and a challenge to his sentence. The court rejected all three arguments. It ruled that the current statute of limitations for sex crimes against children, which extends through the life of the victim, applied to Kelly's case. The court also found no error in the district court's decision to conduct a single trial on all charges against Kelly. Finally, the court affirmed Kelly's sentence, which was calculated based on the Guidelines range in place at the time of his offenses, and varied upwards to 240 months considering the nature of his crimes and his history. The court concluded that the sentence was procedurally proper and substantively fair. View "United States v. Kelly" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Dylan Ostrum, who was under investigation for drug dealing and possession of firearms. During a search of his home, Ostrum revealed that he had moved his belongings, including his car, to his father's house. However, the car, which was reported stolen by a rental company, was found nearby with Ostrum's belongings inside, including a gun, methamphetamine, and marijuana, all stashed in two safes. The key issues on appeal were whether Ostrum had standing to challenge the search of the stolen car and whether the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights.The investigation into Ostrum began after law enforcement agents found text messages between him and another individual, Ricky Blythe, showing that they repeatedly sold each other methamphetamine and marijuana. Based on this evidence and information from confidential informants, law enforcement obtained a valid warrant to search Ostrum’s residence. However, the search turned up little, and Ostrum informed the officers that he had moved his belongings to his father's house. The officers later located the car, which was reported stolen, and discovered the safes inside.Ostrum was charged with multiple counts related to drug possession and distribution, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. He moved to suppress the evidence found inside the car, arguing that it was the fruit of an illegal search. The district court denied the motion, finding that Ostrum lacked standing to challenge the search because the car was stolen, and that the search was valid under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. Ostrum was convicted on all counts and received a 240-month sentence.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that Ostrum failed to meet his burden on standing and that the existence of probable cause justified the search under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. The court concluded that Ostrum had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the stolen car or its contents, and thus no standing to object to its search. View "USA v. Ostrum" on Justia Law

David Perez, while on federal supervised release, was recorded by a police surveillance camera holding what appeared to be a firearm. His conditions of release, as well as federal law, prohibited him from possessing a firearm. At a revocation hearing, the government presented the surveillance video as evidence. The district judge asked Perez's probation officer to narrate the video, to which Perez objected and requested to cross-examine her. The district court denied this request, asserting that the probation officer was not a witness and that the narration was only for the hearing transcript. Perez's counsel did not take up the judge's offer to suggest questions for the probation officer.Perez appealed, arguing that the probation officer was effectively an adverse witness and that his rights were violated by the refusal to allow cross-examination. He also contested the district court's finding that he possessed a firearm and the subsequent revocation of his supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed that Perez should have been allowed to cross-examine the probation officer. However, the court found this error to be harmless, as the district court did not rely on the probation officer's testimony in its finding that Perez possessed a firearm. The video provided ample evidence of Perez's possession of a firearm, and the court did not abuse its discretion in revoking his supervised release. Therefore, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "USA v. David Perez" on Justia Law

The case involves William Campbell, who, along with his cousin, burglarized an Indiana home and stole over 25 firearms. They sold these firearms to another person. Law enforcement was able to recover eight of the stolen firearms, but the rest remain unaccounted for. Campbell was indicted for possessing the eight recovered firearms as a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 96 months of imprisonment by the district court. The court, in its explanation for the sentence, remarked that the missing guns were likely in the hands of other felons, as they are the people who buy stolen guns.The district court adopted the presentence investigation report, which calculated an adjusted offense level of 29 and a criminal history category of III, resulting in an advisory Guidelines range of 108 to 120 months’ imprisonment. The court, however, decided to sentence Campbell to a below-Guidelines sentence of 96 months’ imprisonment. The court explained its sentence with reference to the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, discussing the mitigating and aggravating circumstances of Campbell’s case.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Campbell argued that the district court's statement about the missing guns being likely in the hands of other felons amounted to impermissible speculation, requiring the sentence to be vacated. The appellate court, however, disagreed. It reviewed the procedural challenge de novo and found that the district court did not rely on speculative or inaccurate information in imposing the sentence. The court's concern was that the firearms are now unaccounted for, somewhere in the public, where authorities cannot track their owners and whereabouts. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "USA v. Campbell" on Justia Law