Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Macias helped move drug money from Chicago to Mexico. He had prior convictions for human smuggling. At his bench trial, he challenged a drug-conspiracy charge by testifying he thought the cash came from human smuggling, not drug trafficking. The district judge convicted him, imposed a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(b)(15)(D) for obstructing justice by testifying falsely, and sentenced him to 300 months in prison. Macias argued the enhancement did not apply to a defendant who perjures himself at trial and that the judge failed to find all perjury elements independently and explicitly, as constitutionally required. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Macias waived these challenges, foreclosing appellate review. This is not merely a case where a defendant failed to object when asked the rote question, “Any other objections?” The defense acknowledged that the enhancement applied. The decision not to challenge the obstruction enhancement makes strategic sense. The judge already found Macias untruthful and there were good reasons to avoid tainting mitigation arguments about personal history and family circumstances. View "United States v. Macias" on Justia Law

The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), provides for an enhanced sentence for an ex-felon who possesses a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), if that person has “three previous convictions … for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both … .” ACCA defines a “violent felony” to include a federal or state crime punishable by more than a year’s imprisonment that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” In 2019, the Supreme Court decided in "Stokeling," that a prior conviction could qualify if the statute of conviction requires “force capable of causing physical pain or injury.” In six cases, the Seventh Circuit previously concluded that the ACCA enhancement applied, On remand, for reconsideration in light of Stokeling, the Seventh Circuit examined Illinois statutes prohibiting robbery and armed robbery, 720 ILCS 5/18-1(a), 5/18-2, which provide that a person commits robbery when he takes property “from the person or presence of another by the use of force or by threatening the imminent use of force,” and again concluded that the defendants qualified for the enhancement. Illinois cases require that force be used as part of the action of taking or immediately leaving the scene. This can reasonably be characterized as force necessary to overcome the victim’s resistance, and is compatible with Stokeling’s definition of force. View "Van Sach v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2014, Block completed a 75-month prison term for wire fraud, based on an investment scheme, and three years of supervised release. As a special condition, the district court ordered Block “shall not solicit money for ANY purpose.” With two months left in that term, the Probation Office reported that Block had violated release conditions. An individual had attempted to wire approximately $41,000, but the bank, suspecting fraud, did not process the transaction. The FBI interviewed the individual, who explained he knew Block’s family and believed Block’s story. The Probation Office recommended a “hearing of admonishment.” About a year after the hearing, on February 3, 2017, the Probation Office reported a further violation of the non-solicitation condition and that the conduct constituted a new crime. On May 3, 2018, the district court conducted a hearing and revoked Block’s supervised release, sentencing him to 60 months’ imprisonment plus two more years of supervised release. The Seventh Circuit vacated. Block’s three-year supervised-release term expired on April 13, 2017. Under 18 U.S.C. 3583(i), a district court retains jurisdiction to revoke supervised release after the term’s expiration only if it issues a warrant or summons before the term expires. At a status hearing on February 28, the court remanded Block to custody but Block was not served with a summons. View "United States v. Block" on Justia Law

Three-month-old J.J. was left in the care of his father, Felton, for the first time. Others visited during the day. That night, J.J. was rushed to the hospital. Doctors discovered that J.J. had a skull fracture, bleeding in his brain, and retinal hemorrhages. J.J. died. Felton was taken to jail on a probation hold. Felton told police that J.J. had hit his head in the bathtub. Another inmate, House, testified that Felton said he had swung J.J. into a bathroom door. Two treating physicians testified that J.J.’s death was, in part, due to shaking. The medical examiner concluded that blunt force trauma was the cause of death. Felton was convicted of first-degree intentional homicide. Felton unsuccessfully sought post‐conviction relief in Wisconsin state courts based on ineffective assistance of counsel, citing his attorney’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s closing argument statement that House could not receive a sentence modification for his testimony, and the attorney’s failure to secure medical expert testimony. At the post‐conviction hearing, three medical experts testified J.J. had not been shaken and J.J.’s injuries were consistent with a fall of two to four feet. The district court and Seventh Circuit denied Felton’s petition for habeas relief. The state court was not unreasonable in concluding that Felton was not prejudiced; there was no substantial likelihood of a different result had counsel objected to the closing argument statement. The habeas medical testimony would not have supported the claim that J.J.’s death was caused by his bathtub fall. View "Felton v. Bartow" on Justia Law

Martov participated in a wire fraud scheme in which he collected fraudulently obtained debit card numbers and personal identification numbers and then distributed them to others who used the information to make cash withdrawals from ATMs. The conduct cost the victims approximately $1.2 million. When he was arrested, the government seized Martov’s watch, $4,035 in cash, a car, and nine firearms. In exchange for Martov’s guilty plea under 18 U.S.C. 1343, the government dropped other charges and agreed not to pursue criminal forfeiture. The government initiated administrative forfeiture proceedings, 18 U.S.C. 983, by sending notice to Martov and his attorney. Martov responded to the notice by filing claims for the car and guns. The government denied both claims and declared the property forfeited. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief while noting “reservations with the procedural path that the government took in executing the forfeiture.” The government had missed certain statutory deadlines. Martov, who only argued that the seizure was improper and that the forfeiture action violated his plea agreement, failed to advance any meritorious arguments. View "Martov v. United States" on Justia Law

Tjader purchased child pornography online from sellers in the Philippines, asking about recordings of girls under 14 years old being tortured, raped, or killed. His conduct involved over 250 different pornographic images and videos of prepubescent girls. Tjader pleaded guilty to receiving child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2),(b)(1). Tjader confirmed that he received and understood the presentence investigation report, which recommended supervised‐release terms relating to Tjader leaving the judicial district, following probation officer’s instructions, notifying third parties of risks that may be occasioned by hi’s criminal record or personal history or characteristics, providing requested financial information, undergoing psychosexual evaluations, participating in outpatient sex offender counseling, and limited interaction with persons under the age of 18. Tjader objected to only the financial information and psychosexual evaluation and counseling conditions The court addressed Tjader’s objections in detail, overruled them, and adopted the proposed conditions. Tjader “waive[d] the reading of any justification of the additional conditions that [he] did not object to,” acknowledging that he reviewed the conditions with counsel and that he understood them and their justifications. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Tjader's sentence of seven years' imprisonment and 10 years of supervised release. Tjader waived his new appellate arguments against the supervisory conditions. View "United States v. Tjader" on Justia Law

Illinois inmate Williams sued prison officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that they violated his Eighth Amendment rights by providing inadequate nutrition through a “brunch” program that served only two meals a day. Williams had filed multiple grievances complaining that the prison’s food was making him ill. He mainly objected to the use of soy protein, asserting that it caused him stomach pain, constipation, diarrhea, migraine headaches, and excessive gas; he sometimes claimed that he received only 1600 calories per day or fewer than 2800 calories per day, and requested that he be served breakfast. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the record establishes without dispute that the brunch program was adequate as designed by a licensed dietician to provide 2200-2400 calories per day, including a minimum of six ounces of protein per day. Williams lacks evidence that any of the defendants knew that he was allegedly not receiving adequate nutrition. For persons having special dietary needs, the Department allows therapeutic dietary trays as prescribed by physicians. View "Williams v. Shah" on Justia Law

LeFlore traded drugs to minors in exchange for guns— one of which he sold to a confidential informant. He pleaded guilty to illegal possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), and was sentenced to 96 months in prison, the top of a 77-96 month Sentencing Guidelines range. The Seventh Circuit dismissed his appeal and granted his attorney’s motion to withdraw. The judge did err in calculating his criminal history points. Sentences that are “imposed on the same day” are treated as one when scoring a defendant’s criminal history unless there was an intervening arrest, U.S.S.G. 4A1.2(a)(2), but any challenge based on the miscalculation would be frivolous because the error was harmless. Under the correct calculation, LeFlore would remain in the same criminal history category and the same Guidelines range would apply. The criminal history points and category actually underrepresented LeFlore’s criminality. The court reasonably categorized LeFlore’s prior Illinois convictions for second-degree murder and domestic battery as crimes of violence and appropriately considered the section 3553(a) factors, including LeFlore’s “32-year crime spree.” The court did not err in not specifically addressing LeFlore’s argument that his history of alcohol and drug use were mitigating factors. View "United States v. LeFlore" on Justia Law

Terronez pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. The district court announced a within‐Guidelines sentence of 110 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court committed procedural error by not considering his request for a variance from the Guidelines range given that the base offense level overrepresented the seriousness of his offense. The court noted that Terronez had two Illinois drug trafficking convictions, each of which subjected him to over a year in prison, plus two drug possession convictions, an aggravated assault conviction, and two driving-on-a-suspended-license convictions, and that the firearm had an “obliterated serial number.” Given that the court imposed a within‐Guidelines sentence, its explanation as to why it did not believe the sentence overstated the seriousness of Terronez’s felon‐in‐possession conviction is sufficient. View "United States v. Terronez" on Justia Law

St. Clair pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm as a felon. The court notified St. Clair in writing that it proposed to impose six mandatory and 14 discretionary conditions of supervised release. The court later sentenced St. Clair to 33 months in prison and a year of supervised release, including all 20 proposed conditions. St. Clair did not appeal. Within the first month of his supervised release, he started violating the conditions. The government moved to revoke St. Clair’s release, citing 16 violations: using marijuana, failing to submit to drug tests, and not reporting to probation. St. Clair admitted to the violations. The court revoked St. Clair’s supervised release and sentenced him to another year in prison, plus another year-long term of supervision. With no objection from St. Clair, the court included 17 proposed supervised release conditions in the revocation sentence. The Seventh Circuit upheld those conditions, rejecting arguments that the district court failed to justify the discretionary conditions and violated his due process rights by imposing a vague condition based on a superseded version of the Sentencing Guidelines. St. Clair waived his right to challenge his conditions when he acknowledged that he received prior notice of the proposed conditions and discussed them with counsel, and then told the judge that he had no objections or questions. View "United States v. St. Clair" on Justia Law