Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Spivey was convicted of predatory criminal sexual assault, which required him to register under the Sex Offender Registration Notification Act. In 2014, Spivey pleaded guilty to knowingly failing to register, 18 U.S.C. 2250(a). The district court sentenced him to 41 months in prison and five years of supervised release, with a condition that he truthfully answer his probation officer’s inquiries. The court struck that condition and others in an amended judgment issued two weeks later. Spivey began serving supervised release. Probation officers submitted reports reflecting 18 separate violations of Spivey’s conditions. The court conducted multiple "show cause" hearings. Spivey claimed that because he was homeless, he had challenges registering as a sex offender and that he could not fulfill his supervised release conditions due to his work schedule, lack of funds, and illnesses. In March 2018, Spivey failed to appear before the court on three separate occasions. Officers arrested Spivey at his girlfriend’s house, where she lived with her children. The court revoked Spivey’s supervised release and sentenced him to 24 months in custody. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Spivey’s due process argument that the court relied on a violation of a non-existent supervised release condition when imposing his sentence: that he truthfully answer all inquiries of his probation officer. Nothing indicated that the court considered the nonexistent condition when imposing sentence; the focus was on the fact that Spivey had been living with children, aged 8 and 10. View "United States v. Spivey" on Justia Law

A person “who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” is forbidden to possess a firearm, 18 U.S.C.922(g)(1). Kanter was convicted of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, for bilking the Medicare program, and was sentenced to 366 days in prison. After release, he contended that section 922(g)(1) was invalid, as applied to him because fraud is not a violent crime. Reversing the district court, the Seventh Circuit upheld section 922(g)(1), The Supreme Court has specifically upheld “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons” and fraud is a thought‐out crime that demonstrates disdain for the rights of others and disrespect for the law. Section 922(g)(1) may be applied to a felon convicted of fraud, whose maximum sentence exceeded a year, even if the actual punishment was less. The court noted that it is not possible to separate persons with felony convictions into two categories: dangerous and harmless and rejected an argument that the section was invalid because Congress has declined to fund a statutory (18 U.S.C. 925(c)) program that would permit the Attorney General to lift the prohibition for persons who demonstrate that they would not present a danger to others. View "Hatfield v. Barr" on Justia Law

Buncich, the Sheriff of Lake County, Indiana, solicited and accepted payments from towing companies. He was convicted of five counts of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, 1346, and one count of accepting bribes, 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1)(B). To establish wire fraud, the government must prove the defendant participated in a scheme to defraud, intended to defraud, and used interstate wires in furtherance of the fraud. An honest services fraud scheme covers only bribery or kickbacks. To prevail, the government must show that the bribe in question “entail[ed] a plan to change how the employee or agent does his job.” The Seventh Circuit vacated as to Counts I‐III, which relied on “Federal Reserve payroll funds transfer[s]” on three dates; the evidence failed to establish the wire transfers that were the basis of those counts. The court affirmed as to Counts IV and V, which relied on JP Morgan Chase wire transfers dated April 8, 2014, and October 21, 2014, and the bribery count. View "United States v. Buncich" on Justia Law

Arrested on drug conspiracy charges, Hardy led DEA agents to his drugs and guns and provided information that Hardy purchased methamphetamine from Huskisson six times over the preceding five months, for $8,000 per pound, at Huskisson’s house and at his car lot. Huskisson had stated that Huskisson’s source expected a shipment of methamphetamine the next day. Hardy called Huskisson. Agents recorded that conversation. Huskisson agreed to deliver 10-12 pounds of methamphetamine. The next day, the two agreed during additional recorded calls that the deal was to occur at Huskisson’s home that night. Agent Cline followed Hardy to Huskisson’s house; watched Hardy enter, with an entry team on standby; and saw a car pull into the driveway. Two men exited the car with a cooler and entered the house. Minutes later, Hardy walked outside and gave a prearranged signal to indicate he had seen methamphetamine in the house. No search warrant had yet been issued.The entry team entered the house and arrested Huskisson, who refused to consent to a search of his residence, and the other men. Officers saw in plain sight an open cooler with 10 saran-wrapped packages of a substance which field tested positive for methamphetamine. DEA agents then filed the warrant application, which stated: “The law enforcement officers observed an open cooler with ten saran wrapped packages that contained suspected methamphetamine. The suspected methamphetamine later field tested positive for the presence of methamphetamine.” The warrant issued four hours after the initial entry. The Seventh Circuit upheld denial of a motion to suppress. The entry was unlawful. Ordinarily, the evidence would be excluded but because the government had so much other evidence of probable cause, and had already planned to apply for a warrant, the evidence is admissible. Though the government should not profit from its bad behavior, neither should it be placed in a worse position. View "United States v. Huskisson" on Justia Law

Shipman pleaded guilty in 2003 to conspiring to manufacture and distribute methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 846. His presentence report used the 2002 Sentencing Guidelines, which then required courts to increase the offense level of a “career offender.” Shipman had three prior Arkansas convictions for residential burglary in 1986 and 1987. The district court sentenced him to 262 months’ imprisonment as a “career offender.” Neither the presentence report nor the court explained whether Shipman’s career-offender designation rested on the enumerated-offenses clause or the residual clause. In 2005, the Supreme Court rendered the Guidelines “effectively advisory.” In 2015, the Court’s Johnson decision struck down the Armed Career Criminal Act’s residual clause as unconstitutionally vague, subsequently holding that the change applied retroactively on collateral review. Within one year of the Johnson decision, Shipman sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The Seventh Circuit remanded the denial of his petition. While the Guidelines’ residual clause is unconstitutionally vague, the record does not conclusively show whether Shipman was sentenced under the residual clause or the enumerated-offenses clause. All viable bases for Shipman to attack a career-offender designation under the enumerated-offenses clause were available at sentencing and within the one-year limitations period of section 2255(f)(1); there has been no change in the law since then. View "Shipman v. United States" on Justia Law

Bloomington Illinois Officer Squires received a crime-in-progress notification. The 911 operator informed him that a caller from the Tracy Drive Apartments reported a group of persons outside her apartment engaged in suspicious activity and that a short black male wearing a hoodie had a gun in his front pocket. Arriving two minutes later, Squires saw the group, approached, and observed that Adair roughly fit the 911 caller’s description (he did not have a hoodie) and had a large bulge in his front pants’ pocket. Adair sought to evade Squires by moving through the larger group. Squires then stopped and patted down Adair, finding a gun in his front pocket. The district court rejected a Fourth Amendment challenge. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Under the totality of circumstances facing Squires at the Apartments, he had reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk Adair under the Terry v. Ohio standard. Squires reasonably believed that he was responding to an emergency 911 call in a high-crime area. Squires testified he had previously encountered Adair many times and immediately recognized him as not living at the Apartments, and the only person wearing clothing resembling the 911 caller’s description. Squires knew Adair had a prior felony conviction and Adair acted evasively. View "United States v. Adair" on Justia Law

Turner persuaded Bell to help him sell several stolen firearms. Turner later cooperated with law enforcement, provided information about the sale, and aided the government in targeting Bell. Upon Bell’s arrest, an officer opened Bell’s flip phone and viewed a photograph of a firearm on the home screen in what was likely an unconstitutional search. The district court declined to suppress the evidence obtained from the phone because the government subsequently obtained valid search warrants for it. The Seventh Circuit upheld the suppression decision and rejected a speedy trial argument that was based continuances granted by the district court and the nearly two‐year delay between his indictment and trial. There was an independent source for admitting the photo and the police later obtained a valid warrant. Before the search, Turner had stated that Bell had texted him a photo of a stolen AK‐47 and provided officers with the photo. Bell did not point to any time that was improperly excluded from the speedy-trial clock. The delays were attributable primarily to the defense and Bell was not prejudiced by the continuances. View "United States v. Bell" on Justia Law

Pierson was convicted of possessing drugs with intent to distribute and two related firearm crimes. Because of Pierson’s prior criminal record, his mandatory sentence was life in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction and sentence. While the admission of evidence of a gun found in Pierson’s kitchen may have amounted to a constructive amendment of the two firearm charges in his indictment, which charged him with possession of one particular gun found in Pierson’s car, it was not a “plain error” that would warrant reversal. Given the “ample evidence,” the error did not affect Pierson’s substantial rights. Pierson’s argument that the court erred under Apprendi v. New Jersey, by imposing the mandatory life sentence without having the jury find that he had two prior felony drug convictions is foreclosed by controlling Supreme Court precedent that recognizes an exception to that rule for evidence of prior convictions, Almendarez‐Torres v. United States. The First Step Act, Pub. L. No. 115‐391, 401(a)(2)(A)(ii), which was enacted while Pierson’s appeal was pending and which lowered the mandatory minimum sentence, does not apply to Pierson, whose sentence was imposed before the Act took effect. View "United States v. Pierson" on Justia Law

Fennell took kickbacks while employed as facilities and transportation director for Indiana’s Vigo County School Corporation. The evidence showed an actual loss amount of $110,600 in kickbacks that he and a codefendant received for steering government contracts to a favored bidder. The presentence investigation report recited that amount as restitution, which the district court imposed, but the court referred to that amount orally as the “intended” loss. Fennell sought a remand, arguing that 18 U.S.C. 3664(a) requires that the presentence report contain its own detailed accounting rather than incorporate the trial evidence by reference and that the district court erred by imposing restitution for the intended loss instead of actual loss. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. There was no plain error in the district court’s restitution calculation, and despite the mistaken oral reference to an intended loss, the record showed beyond reasonable dispute that the amount awarded was the victim’s actual loss. View "United States v. Fennell" on Justia Law

Coleman was convicted for a 1994 armed robbery, home invasion, residential burglary, and aggravated sexual assault. Three witnesses linked Coleman to the crimes. The court sentenced Coleman to 60 years’ imprisonment. Fifteen years later, a group of men came forward claiming they were responsible for the crimes. The Illinois Supreme Court vacated Coleman’s convictions and remanded for retrial. Rather than retry the case, the prosecution dropped it. Coleman was released in 2013; a later judicial order certified his innocence. Coleman sued the City of Peoria and four police officers, claiming that they elicited a false statement from an alleged accomplice through coercive interrogation techniques, employed improper and unduly suggestive identification procedures, and suppressed impeachment evidence. After three years of civil litigation, the district court granted defendants summary judgment on Coleman’s federal claims and state law malicious prosecution claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Coleman failed to present evidence supporting a reasonable inference that defendants knowingly fabricated false evidence, caused unreliable eyewitness identifications to taint his criminal trial, withheld material evidence, or arrested him without probable cause. A vacated criminal conviction does not automatically establish that an individual’s constitutional rights were violated, or that police officers and prosecutors are necessarily liable under 42 U.S.C. 1983. View "Coleman v. Peoria" on Justia Law