Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Carrillo was involved in an extramarital relationship with Noeller. Carrillo’s family reported that Noeller called Carrillo, accused her of seeing someone else, and threatened her life; Noeller later came to her mother’s Mexico City house, where he shot and killed her. Noeller maintains that he ended their relationship after finding out about her family’s affiliation with the Los Pepes gang and Zetas drug cartel. He says that after the murder, he received warnings that Carrillo’s mother had hired hitmen to kill him. Noeller fled for the U.S. with his wife and children, who are U.S. citizens. Noeller's family members provided affidavits describing incidents after he left, in which gang members came to their homes looking for Noeller, threatened them, and beat them. During removal proceedings, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), Noeller sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. Immigration judges twice denied his applications. Noeller’s BIA appeal was pending when Mexico submitted its extradition request. Noeller challenged the warrant issued in Mexico by an “Amparo proceeding,” which is “similar to habeas corpus ... to review and annul unconstitutional judicial decisions.” Noeller claims that the court in Mexico suspended the warrant. Mexico’s government contends that the original arrest warrant remains enforceable. The district court granted extradition. Noeller sought habeas corpus relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Mexico submitted a valid request for extradition, which U.S. courts must honor. Noeller’s challenges to that request are “beyond the narrow role for courts in the extradition process.” View "Noeller v. Wojdylo" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Moreno of conspiring with others with the intent to distribute narcotics, 21 U.S.C. 846, and two counts of knowingly using a telephone in furtherance of the conspiracy, 21 U.S.C. 843(b). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Moreno’s argument there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that she conspired with the Guzman Drug Trafficking Organization but rather, the evidence merely showed a buyer-seller relationship. While large-quantity, repeat sales alone do not support an inference of conspiracy, nor do “‘occasional’ sales on credit,” Moreno and the Guzman DTO had a year-long relationship during which Moreno regularly purchased wholesale quantities of heroin. Moreno sought to protect the Guzman DTO by warning it about potential law enforcement intervention and there is evidence the Guzman DTO and Moreno shared “tools,” two vehicles with trap compartments used to transport drugs and money. The government did not need to prove Moreno was a member of the Guzman DTO to prove she knowingly agreed to participate in the conspiracy. View "United States v. Moreno" on Justia Law

Indiana requires all inmates convicted of a sex offense to complete the Sex Offender Management and Monitoring (INSOMM) program. INSOMM requires inmates to identify which illegal sexual acts they committed and how often. Based on their offense history, participants are sorted into risk groups for group therapy sessions. Higher‐risk groups must complete more hours of therapy. In therapy, participants must fill out workbooks that require them to describe all past acts of sexual violence and abuse, regardless of whether they were ever charged for those offenses. Participants enjoy neither immunity nor confidentiality for the disclosures. Inmates may not opt out of any part of INSOMM and must respond fully to all questions. A counselor who suspects that a participant has been deceptive or less than forthcoming may order polygraph testing. Failure to participate satisfactorily in INSOMM is a Major Conduct disciplinary violation. For a first offense, inmates are denied the opportunity to accrue good‐time credits to which they would otherwise be entitled by statute. Continuing violations are punishable by revocation of already‐acquired good‐time credits. Lacy filed a class action under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Seventh Circuit affirmed that the disclosures required by INSOMM and the penalties imposed for non‐participation, taken together, amount to a violation of his Fifth Amendment right to be free from compelled self‐incrimination. View "Lacy v. Butts" on Justia Law

Convicted of bank robbery in 2015, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a), Bonds was sentenced to 60 months’ imprisonment. The evidence against him included the testimony of an FBI Latent Print Operations Unit fingerprint examiner, Glass, that Bonds’s fingerprints appeared on the demand notes used in the robberies. In 2004 the Unit incorrectly identified Mayfield as a person whose fingerprints suggested involvement in a terrorist bombing in Spain. Bonds wanted to use this episode to illustrate the potential for mistakes in the “analysis, comparison, evaluation, and verification” (ACE-V) method. The district judge permitted Bonds to cross-examine Glass about the reliability of the ACE-V method and to present other evidence suggesting that the approach is more error-prone than jurors might believe. Evidence about one particular error, the judge concluded, would be more distracting and time-consuming than its incremental value could justify. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a Confrontation Clause argument. Presenting jurors with details of one wrongful imprisonment (especially on a mistaken charge of terrorism) would appeal to emotion rather than to reason. Bonds had ample opportunity to supply the jury with evidence about the reliability of the ACE-V method, including changes made in the last decade. In 2016, the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology concluded that changes in ACE-V have bolstered its accuracy. The summary provides the defense bar with paths to cross-examine witnesses who used the ACE-V approach. View "United States v. Bonds" on Justia Law

The Bureau of Prisons (BOP) released Kopp from prison and ordered her to report to a transitional services program. Kopp disregarded that directive. Days later, she was arrested and pleaded guilty to escaping custody, 18 U.S.C. 751(a). Kopp’s Guidelines range was 15-21 months' imprisonment. The court opined that the drivers of Kopp’s criminal activity were childhood trauma and drug addiction. Kopp’s attorney noted that Kopp participated in the BOP’s Residential Drug Abuse Program (RDAP) in 2016, but had not had another opportunity for treatment. The court noted that “she runs away” and that: “We’ve got to get her some more treatment, and I’m going to try again.” Kopp’s attorney told the court that Kopp had contacted a transitional living program, a sponsor through Narcotics Anonymous, and an organization that offers addiction treatment. After Kopp spoke, the court remarked that it was like a “broken record,” and announced: “The sentence ... is 18 months.... does that give Ms. Kopp time to participate in an RDAP?” The probation officer responded: “that’s probably, like, the lowest end.” The court said: "I’m going to make it 20 months.” Kopp interjected: ”RDAP is only nine months.” The court responded: ”You have to get into it. You’ve got to find a spot for it ... I’m going to make it 20 months.” The Seventh Circuit vacated. The district court improperly lengthened Kopp’s sentence to promote rehabilitation in violation of the Supreme Court’s 2011 “Tapia” holding and 18 U.S.C. 3582(a). View "United States v. Kopp" on Justia Law

Freed was the president and CEO of JFA, a real estate development company, and created and managed several real estate ventures including UGV. In 2002, UGV secured Chicago tax increment financing (TIF) for an Uptown development. The city issued a redevelopment note for $4.3 million and project note for $2.4 million. UGV was required to annually it was not in default on any loans and had not entered into any transactions that would harm its ability to meet its financial obligations. Freed thereafter obtained loans and allowed them to become double-pledged and go into default. He made false statements to obtain loan modifications. In annual requisition forms Freed provided the city under the TIF agreement, Freed claimed none of his entities were in default. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Freed’s convictions for bank fraud (18 U.S.C. 1344); mail fraud (18 U.S.C. 1341); wire fraud (18 U.S.C. 1343); and making false statements to a financial institution (18 U.S.C. 1014), rejecting arguments that two jury instructions, concerning "aiding and abetting" and "wilfully causing" were incorrect and there was insufficient evidence for several of his convictions. View "United States v. Freed" on Justia Law

Smith twice sold cocaine to a confidential informant. A search of his home uncovered 12.83 grams of cocaine base, 111.57 grams of cocaine powder, a rifle, a body‐armor vest, and a digital scale. Charged possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance; two counts of unlawful possession of a firearm; and three counts of distribution of a controlled substance, Smith had a 2004 felony drug conviction for possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base and a 2009 Indiana conviction for “Dealing in cocaine or narcotic drug.” The career offender sentencing enhancement, U.S.S.G. 4B1.1. applies where the defendant has two prior felony convictions for either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense. With the enhancement, Smith’s PSR calculated an imprisonment range as 188-235 months. Smith argued that his conviction under Indiana Code 35‐48‐4‐1 was not a “controlled substance offense” The court imposed a sentence of 188 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Arguably, the Indiana statute has the same elements as section 4B1.2(b), so the career‐offender enhancement should apply under the categorical approach; even if the statute is broader than the Guidelines’ definition, it is divisible, so the modified categorical approach would reach the same result. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

At 3:31 a.m., East St. Louis Police Officer Sherrod received a report of a vehicle playing loud music. Approaching the vehicle, Sherrod saw Cherry looking for something in the grass. Cherry stated that he was looking for the key to his tire rims. Although Cherry seemed intoxicated, Sherrod decided to help him. As he was searching, Sherrod noticed a handgun a few feet from Cherry. Sherrod handcuffed Cherry for officer safety, without arresting him. Cherry tried to run. Sherrod then arrested Cherry and took him the police station where Cherry told Officer Simon that, earlier that night, he had stopped his car to pick a CD and thought that he saw an acquaintance. After rolling down his window, he realized that he did not know the person, who had a gun; Cherry knocked it out of the man’s hands. The stranger then fled. Cherry explained that during the scuffle he lost his cell phone and got out of the car to look for it. He admitted to picking up the gun.Cherry was charged as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1); 924(a)(2) for forfeiture, 18 U.S.C. 924(d)(1). Cherry requested an “innocent possession” instruction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Cherry’s conviction, declining to recognize an innocent possession defense. Even where the defense is recognized, it applies only where the defendant immediately surrenders the firearm to law enforcement. No reasonable juror could have failed to find a nexus between the gun and Cherry’s conviction, so the court’s failure to ask whether either party wanted the jury to determine forfeitability of the firearm did not affect Cherry’s substantial rights. View "United States v. Cherry" on Justia Law

In 1998, Garcia-Martinez pleaded guilty to assault with a deadly weapon under N.J.S. 2C:12-1(b)(2). According to his plea colloquy, Garcia-Martinez’s role was minor: he stuck out his foot to trip the victim. Once the victim was on the ground, Garcia-Martinez’s friends “jumped on [the victim] and started hitting him” and “some of [Garcia-Martinez’s] friends punched [the victim], kicked him and struck him.” Garcia-Martinez stood by during their assault; he soon left the scene. The Board of Immigration Appeals has found in the past that “assault with a deadly weapon” is a generic crime of moral turpitude that makes a noncitizen ineligible for cancellation of removal, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). The Board found that there was no realistic probability that the New Jersey law could be applied to conduct outside the scope of the generic crime and concluded that Garcia-Martinez’s conviction was for a crime involving moral turpitude. The Seventh Circuit granted a petition for review and remanded. Although the New Jersey statute appears to fit the generic definition of assault with a deadly weapon, only some of the conduct covered by the statute appears to be sufficiently vile, base, immoral, or depraved to deserve the label moral turpitude. The Board speculated about the type of weapon that Garcia-Martinez’s accomplices may have possessed and did not explain why the generic definition of assault with a deadly weapon includes tripping. View "Garcia-Martinez v. Barr" on Justia Law

Patel pleaded guilty to five counts of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, for his role in selling $179 million in fraudulent loans to an investment advisor. Patel delayed his sentencing date for a year while he purported to help recover funds for his victims. While on bond, just days before he was to be sentenced, Patel attempted to flee the U.S. and seek political asylum elsewhere. Agents arrested him just before he boarded a chartered flight to Ecuador. The government discovered that while on bond, instead of earning money for his victims through consulting fees and redevelopment projects, Patel and another used fictitious identities and entities to defraud an Iowa lender out of millions of dollars. Approximately $2.2 million of the money Patel had ostensibly earned for the fraud victims was newly‐stolen money. The court imposed a below-guidelines sentence of 25 years’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the sentence as procedurally and substantively reasonable. Patel made a disparity argument, the government had the opportunity to respond, and the court addressed it on the record; nothing more is required. The court’s comments regarding Patel’s psychological state and motivations relate to factors that a court must consider at sentencing, 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(1), (2)(A). There is no indication that the court “did not like” him and sentenced him inappropriately as a result. View "United States v. Patel" on Justia Law