Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Cherry drove into a Markham, Illinois parking lot to obtain cocaine that his supplier had just picked up at O’Hare airport. Unbeknownst to Cherry, his supplier had been arrested picking up the cocaine and was cooperating with DEA agents. Cherry was arrested mid‐deal and eventually sentenced to 240 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Cherry’s arguments that the agents lacked probable cause to arrest him and search his vehicle and failed to preserve exculpatory evidence. The informant did not have any history of cooperation but was not an anonymous tipster. He was implicating himself in a drug deal and was motivated to cooperate. Agents obtained significant detailed information that was corroborated as events unfolded. With respect to the car search, the court upheld a finding that the drugs were in plain view after Cherry opened the door while trying to flee. In any case, agents were entitled to open the door to conduct a limited protective sweep, so the drugs were admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine. Regarding an officer’s sale of his personal camera, which had been used to photograph the evidence, the court noted that the defense never sought to inspect the camera or its metadata until long after the suppression hearing nor did Cherry ask the government to preserve the data. In any case, any debate about the order in which the photographs were taken and whether the bag was opened or closed was irrelevant. View "United States v. Cherry" on Justia Law

Officer Sweeney pulled Lewis over for following too closely. Sweeney processed a warning while Lewis, who seemed unusually nervous, sat in the squad car. After learning Lewis was on federal supervised release for a cocaine conviction, Sweeney requested a drug‐sniffing dog roughly 5 minutes into the stop. About 10 minutes and 50 seconds after Lewis pulled over, Sweeney handed him a warning. About 10 seconds later, a drug‐sniffing dog and its handler approached Lewis’s car. The dog alerted. Sweeney searched Lewis’s car and found heroin. Lewis was charged with possession with intent to distribute heroin. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his motion to suppress. The officer had lawful grounds to initiate the traffic stop; it is irrelevant whether Lewis actually committed a traffic offense because Sweeney had a reasonable belief that he did so. Officer Sweeney did not unjustifiably prolong the traffic stop past the time reasonably required to complete the mission of issuing a warning; any delay beyond the routine traffic stop to allow the dog to sniff was justified by independent reasonable suspicion. View "United States v. Lewis" on Justia Law

In December 2016, Indiana state parole officers conducted a parole visit at Briggs’s home. After consenting to a search, he admitted to having marijuana (299 grams), cocaine (.45 grams), and three loaded handguns in the master bedroom. On a shelf next to the marijuana, the officers found a digital scale. The officers arrested Briggs and seized his cell phone, which contained pictures and texts confirming that the guns were his. Briggs was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm. Although the parties did not come to a plea agreement, Briggs petitioned to enter a plea of guilty and requested a presentence investigation report. The initial report concluded that Briggs had committed a felony drug offense in connection with the firearm possession, which warranted a four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). Briggs argued that his firearm possession was unrelated to the drugs found in his home. Applying the enhancement, the court sentenced Briggs to 84 months. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for resentencing because the trial court made essentially no factual findings connecting Briggs’s firearms to his felony drug possession. View "United States v. Briggs" on Justia Law

Colon used his Indianapolis furniture store and a mall property rental business as a front to hide his criminal operation--buying large quantities of cocaine and heroin from Arizona and reselling the drugs to Indiana dealers. Convicted of drug conspiracy, money laundering, and making false statements in a bankruptcy proceeding, Colon was sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Colon’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence of money laundering. Colon did not separate the financial aspects of his drug dealing from the financial aspects of his legitimate businesses. A reasonable jury could have inferred from the differential between Colon’s mall income and drug proceeds, the scope of his drug operation, his comingling of proceeds, and the overwhelming evidence showing that the mall was merely a front to enable and conceal his drug trafficking, that Colon was laundering money and that each cash deposit included at least some drug proceeds. While the district court erred in calculating his advisory sentencing range by applying leadership enhancements under U.S.S.G. 3B1.1, because Colon was only a middleman, the error was harmless. The sentencing transcript, read as a whole, demonstrates that the court would have imposed the same sentence regardless of the enhancements. View "United States v. Colon" on Justia Law

Garcia was convicted of distributing a kilogram of cocaine to co-defendant Cisneros, 21 US.C. 841. The government offered no direct evidence that Garcia possessed or controlled cocaine, drug paraphernalia, large quantities of cash, or other unexplained wealth. There was no admission of drug trafficking by Garcia, nor any testimony from witnesses that Garcia distributed cocaine. Instead, the government secured this verdict based upon a federal agent’s opinion testimony purporting to interpret several cryptic intercepted phone calls between Garcia and Cisneros, a known drug dealer. In those calls, the defendants talked about "work" and a "girl" in a bar, and made statements like “the tix have already walked more that, that way.” The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that: This case illustrates the role trial judges have in guarding the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases. While the government’s circumstantial evidence here might have supported a search warrant or perhaps a wiretap on Garcia’s telephone, it simply was not sufficient to support a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt for distributing cocaine. View "United States v. Garcia" on Justia Law

Wanjiku pled guilty to transportation of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A, retaining his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress photographs and videos recovered from his cell phone, laptop, and external hard drive during a warrantless border search at O’Hare International Airport. Wanjiku was caught up in a law enforcement investigation targeting men with prior criminal histories, traveling alone, and returning from countries known for “sex tourism” and sex trafficking. Wanjiku met the criteria and was chosen for a search before his plane landed; he was evasive and nervous during primary questioning. While searching his luggage, agents found syringes, condoms, medication for treating low testosterone, and oxycodone. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction. The agents acted in good faith when they searched the devices with reasonable suspicion to believe that a crime was being committed, at a time when no court had ever required more than reasonable suspicion for any search at the border. That reasonable suspicion is measured at the time of the search. Although the Supreme Court has recently granted heightened protection to cell phone data, its holdings have not addressed searches at the border where the government’s interests are at their zenith nor have they addressed data stored on other electronic devices. View "United States v. Wanjiku" on Justia Law

Kanter pleaded guilty to mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, based on his submission of bills to Medicare for non-compliant therapeutic shoes and shoe inserts. Due to his felony conviction, he is prohibited from possessing a firearm under both federal and Wisconsin law, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and Wis. Stat. 941.29(1m). He challenged those felon dispossession statutes under the Second Amendment, as applied to nonviolent offenders. The Seventh Circuit affirmed judgment upholding the laws. Even if felons are entitled to Second Amendment protection, so that Kanter could bring an as-applied challenge, the government met its burden of establishing that the felon dispossession statutes are substantially related to an important government interest in preventing gun violence. Congress and the Wisconsin legislature are entitled to categorically disqualify all felons—even nonviolent felons like Kanter—because both have found that such individuals are more likely to abuse firearms. The “bright line categorical approach … allows for uniform application and ease of administration.” View "Kanter v. Barr" on Justia Law

Walker was charged with possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. During his detention awaiting trial, the government discovered that Walker and his associates had bribed witnesses to testify falsely on his behalf at his upcoming trial. The grand jury returned a superseding indictment, adding one count charging Walker with conspiring to obstruct justice. He pleaded guilty to both counts of the superseding indictment. The district court imposed sentences of 80 months’ imprisonment for each count, to be served concurrently, plus three years of supervised release. The district court recommended to the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) that Walker should not receive credit for time served before the date the superseding indictment was filed, because of his conduct leading to the addition of the obstruction of justice charge. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the district court improperly left to the BOP the calculation of credit for his time served before trial and that he should receive credit for all the time he spent in custody between his arrest and the superseding indictment. Congress has committed the responsibility for the calculation of credit for pretrial confinement to the BOP; the court has the discretion to make a recommendation as to whether pretrial credit is appropriate. View "United States v. Walker" on Justia Law

Briggins pleaded guilty in 2017 to committing multiple bank robberies. In 1999, he had been convicted of 10 bank robberies and sentenced to 84 months’ imprisonment. The number of criminal history points to be added for the 1999 robberies depended on whether that term reflected one sentence or multiple concurrent sentences. The PSR concluded that Briggins received 10 concurrent sentences but recognized that Briggins’s criminal history points needed to account for the reality that he was charged with all 10 robberies in the same indictment, pleaded guilty in the same proceeding, and faced sentencing on the same day and recommended that Briggins receive six criminal history points: three from USSG 4A1.1(a), which requires sentencing courts to “[a]dd 3 points for each prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year and one month” and three points from 4A1.1(e), which applies where a defendant is convicted of multiple offenses charged in the same indictment or receives multiple sentences on the same day and limits the maximum number of additional points to three. Applying 4A1.1(e) meant that only three additional points were allowed for Briggins’s nine robberies not encompassed by 4A1.1(a). The resulting advisory guidelines range was 77-96 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his sentence of 96 months. View "United States v. Briggins" on Justia Law

Salgado conspired with Lorenzo (his father) and others to distribute heroin, using a Bensenville, Illinois stash house. Lorenzo, who lived in Mexico, was the leader. Salgado was arrested in 2016, indicted under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846, and pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin. The PSR recommended an aggravating role enhancement under USSG 3B1.1(b), reasoning that Salgado directed and controlled” the others and was the Chicago‐based leader of the conspiracy. Salgado objected, claiming he had “no decision making authority, acted solely at the direction of [his father] … did not arrange the importation ... did not set any of the price or quantity terms” and that the government had not proven otherwise by a preponderance of the evidence. The court applied the enhancement, stating that Salgado’s “role as the supervisor is clear from the materials that are not disputed.” The court calculated the Guidelines range as 210-262 months, discussed the section 3553 factors in detail, and stated that “the sentence ... would be the same even if the guidelines were a little bit different … even if I made a mistake in the calculation with respect to the aggravating role, the guideline sentence is going to not control the sentence here. What’s going to control is the 3553 factors. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the 192-month sentence; “whether or not the enhancement should have applied, the district court’s detailed explanation makes a remand pointless." View "United States v. Salgado" on Justia Law