Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

A confidential informant bought cocaine from Yarber on four separate occasions near the same Champaign intersection while police watched. Each time, Yarber drove a white Dodge Charger, which was registered to his girlfriend. Immediately following two buys, Yarber drove to his girlfriend’s apartment. Police surveilled the apartment three other times and saw the Charger parked in front. Once they saw Yarber exit the Charger and go inside the apartment. Police obtained a warrant, authorizing the police to search the apartment for drugs, drug paraphernalia, and suspected proceeds from drug transactions. Nowhere did the affidavit state that Yarber lived at the apartment or that he stayed there overnight. It referred to an Urbana apartment as Yarber’s “residence.” Yarber moved to suppress evidence discovered during the search of the Champaign apartment, arguing that, failing to establish a nexus between the drug dealing and the apartment, the affidavit failed to establish probable cause. After the court denied his motion, Yarber pleaded guilty to drug possession with the intent to distribute and to possession of a firearm by a felon; he was convicted of possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking, and sentenced to 420 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The warrant contained other facts sufficient to establish probable cause and, in any event, the police acted in good faith. View "United States v. Yarber" on Justia Law

From 2002-2008 Boliaux operated EMC, a used-car dealership. He borrowed money. Most loans were secured by the cars’ certificates of title. Because there should be only one title certificate per car, the dealer cannot transfer good title to a customer without paying the lender. In 2007 Boliaux persuaded state officials to issue duplicate certificates of title on the pretense that the originals had been lost. He obtained multiple loans against single vehicles, exceeding the cars’ market value and leaving the lenders under-secured. He sold cars without repaying the loans. After a lender detected this and impounded the collateral, Boliaux persuaded the custodian to release eight cars, which he sold for his own benefit. In 2008, Boliaux’s wife incorporated Joliet Motors, which Boliaux operated from the former EMC premises. Joliet Motors received installment payments from EMC customers but did not remit them to lenders. Boliaux began check kiting. He was convicted of four counts of wire fraud and six of bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, 1344, and sentenced to 48 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the evidence was insufficient on the wire fraud counts because he did not transmit anything by wire, and on the bank fraud counts because no one from the banks testified that the banks lost money. The district judge properly declined to instruct the jury that it had to agree, unanimously, how Boliaux carried out his scheme. View "United States v. Boliaux" on Justia Law

Graham had worked at a Milwaukee Aldi for six years before being fired, for stealing, months before the first robbery. Graham used his knowledge of store procedures and that Aldi trains employees to acquiesce to robbers. Graham would enter a store minutes before closing, hide until it closed, then approach employees with his gun drawn. After his sixth robbery, Graham was arrested and pleaded guilty to six counts of Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a), and using a firearm during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). The court calculated a Guidelines range of 78-97 months for each robbery, followed by a mandatory consecutive sentence of 84 months for the firearm conviction. Graham argued that for 30 years, he had worked two full-time jobs to support his girlfriend and six children, living a crime-free life until the financial pressures of six children, one with serious medical issues, drove him to use drugs, steal food, and, finally, rob his former employer. The court noted that Graham’s criminal conduct was well-planned and executed and that there was “too much” criminal conduct to justify the sentence Graham requested. The court considered “uniformity, proportionality, certainty, and cost,” and imposed concurrent sentences of 60 months’ imprisonment for each robbery, followed by the mandatory consecutive 84-month sentence.. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding no procedural error in the imposition of the below-Guidelines sentence. View "United States v. Graham" on Justia Law

Delhorno, age 42, came to the U.S. with his parents when he was three years old. Living as a lawful permanent resident, he was pulled over for speeding. A drug-detection canine alerted to the presence of drugs. Officers discovered four kilograms of cocaine in a trap compartment. Delhorno pleaded guilty to possessing cocaine with intent to distribute. His hearing was more than a year after the Supreme Court held (Padilla v. Kentucky), that a defense lawyer provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to advise his client that his guilty plea would subject him to automatic deportation. Although the judge was informed of his status, there was no discussion about the immigration consequences of Delhorno’s guilty plea. Delhorno was sentenced to 60 months. Delhorno never filed an appeal or a habeas corpus petition. In 2017, Delhorno completed his prison sentence and was deported to Mexico. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Delhorno's petition for a writ of coram nobis without a hearing. The common-law remedy of coram nobis is available to correct errors in criminal cases, only when the error is of the most fundamental character as to render the conviction invalid, there are sound reasons for the defendant’s failure to seek earlier relief, and the defendant continues to suffer from his conviction although he is out of custody. Delhorno cannot offer “sound reasons” for failing to seek earlier relief through a direct appeal or habeas corpus petition. View "United States v. Delhorno" on Justia Law

Maclin, managing Khan’s medical practice, redirected Medicaid reimbursements from Khan’s business account to Maclin’s personal account. Maclin enrolled the practice in Medicaid’s electronic incentive program, without Khan’s knowledge, and got a one-time bonus of $21,250. About $80,000 was deposited into Maclin’s account. Khan's tax preparer noticed missing funds. Khan asked Medicaid to investigate. Maclin, charged under 18 U.S.C. 669, sought to preclude the prosecution from mentioning Khan's adult child with severe autism. The court directed the government to avoid drawing particular attention to Khan's son. Prospective jurors were asked whether they knew any of the witnesses. Prospective Juror 11 stated that she had “worked with [Khan] on developing her property. She has a home for autism” and was excused from the jury. After voir dire, Maclin unsuccessfully moved for a mistrial. The jury, instructed not to let “sympathy, prejudice, fear, or public opinion influence you,” found Maclin guilty. The court imposed a two-level sentencing enhancement because Khan was a “vulnerable victim.” Khan did not understand how to use a computer, did not bank electronically, and did not use e-mail or ATMs. The enhancement resulted in an advisory sentence of 15-21 months, which overlapped with the 10-16 month range without the enhancement. The court noted that Maclin showed no contrition and was still paying restitution for doing “basically, the same thing to another physician.” The court imposed a 15-month sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Prospective Juror No. 11 provided a vague factual statement, not an opinion about the trustworthiness of any witness. It was neither material to an issue in the case, nor inflammatory. Application of the vulnerable victim enhancement was appropriate and any error would have been harmless. View "United States v. Maclin" on Justia Law

Officers stopped Vaccaro for running a red light. Vaccaro made a “ferocious move,” leaning “his entire top torso and both arms into the back seat.” Afraid that Vaccaro might be trying to “gain control of something from the back seat,” the officers ordered Vaccaro out of his car, immediately handcuffed Vaccaro and patted him down. Vaccaro expressed frustration, stating that “people are trying to kill me” and that he merely “took [his] coat off” when he pulled over. Vaccaro appeared to be in a “real amped‐up state,” making the officers believe that Vaccaro was under the influence of drugs. There was a GPS monitor on Vaccaro’s ankle. Vaccaro confirmed that he was on supervision for “false imprisonment,” which the officers understood to be a felony. The officers noticed a rifle case in the backseat but did not want to alert an “agitated” Vaccaro that they had seen it. They locked Vaccaro in the backseat of their squad car, removed a coat on top of the rifle case, and found a rifle inside. Vaccaro conditionally pled guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon. The Seventh Circuit upheld the denial of his motion to suppress the gun. Based on Vaccaro’s “furtive movements,” the pat-down was lawful under Terry v. Ohio. The sweep of the car was permissible because Vaccaro was not under arrest and would have been allowed to return to his car; could have gained “immediate control of weapons.” View "United States v. Vaccaro" on Justia Law

Within two days of helping his co-defendants steal more than 100 guns from a train car in 2015, Moody sold 13 of them to anonymous buyers who telephoned him after they “heard about it.” He pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1); possessing a stolen firearm, section 922(j); and cargo theft, section 659, for which he was sentenced to 93 months’ imprisonment. Moody challenged a four-level guideline enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(5) for trafficking firearms to people he knew (or had reason to know) were unlawful users or possessors. The court stated that Moody sold his share of stolen guns “literally to anyone who called expressing an interest” and presumed that at least several of these people would use them in future crimes. The Seventh Circuit vacated the sentence, finding that the district court plainly erred by imposing the enhancement. Nothing in the record suggests that Moody had reason to believe that his buyers were unlawful gun users or possessors; the court plainly crossed the line that separates permissible common-sense inference from impermissible speculation. View "United States v. Moody" on Justia Law

Illinois prison officials issued a disciplinary report charging Morgan with offenses stemming from a violent assault on fellow prisoners. Morgan disputed the charges and asked to call a witness to testify at his Adjustment Committee hearing. The Committee never called Morgan’s witness. He was found guilty; the Committee imposed a punishment of one year of segregation, status and access restrictions, and revocation of three months of good-time credits. Morgan filed a grievance and appealed its subsequent denial to the Administrative Review Board, which adjusted the revocation of good-time credits but rejected a due-process claim, concluding that Morgan’s witness request did not comply with prison rules. Morgan sued three officers for damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The officers cited the “Heck” rule: When a state prisoner seeks damages in a section 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in [his] favor … would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed that the due-process claim was not cognizable under section 1983. Prisoners cannot make an end run around Heck by filing an affidavit waiving challenges to the portion of their punishment that revokes good-time credits. Judgment in Morgan’s favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of his prison discipline. The suit was premature. View "Morgan v. Schott" on Justia Law

Vargas rented a parking place for his truck in a Chicago lot without assigned spaces. Agents in Ohio arrested Hueter as he transported cocaine that, Hueter asserted, he had purchased from Vargas the previous day at his parked truck. Hueter described Vargas, the truck, and the lot. Illinois agents then entered the lot by following someone through the gate. Approaching a truck that met Hueter’s description, they sent a photo to the Ohio agents. Hueter identified the truck. A dog alerted to the odor of drugs. Agents then broke a window, opened the truck's door, and found eight kilos of cocaine. Convicted of cocaine offenses, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), Vargas was sentenced to 72 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit rejected his argument that the judge should have suppressed drugs seized from his truck. By the time the agents broke into the truck they had probable cause, based on Hueter’s statements plus confirmation from the photo and the dog. Vargas neither owned the parking lot nor had a leasehold interest in any particular spot. Vargas was entitled to park his truck in any open space but not to exclude anyone else. Agents did not need probable cause or a warrant to enter the lot. The court also rejected Vargas’s remaining arguments; the judge did not violate the Due Process Clause, which deals with only egregious transgressions of trial rules and decorum. View "United States v. Vargas" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit affirmed Fernandez’s conviction as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and his 27-month sentence. Voecks, the driver of the car in which Fernandez was found with a firearm, gave the arresting officer, Frusti, contradictory (recorded) accounts about the gun’s ownership and who had placed it in the center console of the car. When the defense attempted to ask Voecks about what Frusti had said to him and vice-versa, the district court sustained the government’s hearsay objections, essentially confining the cross-examination of each witness to his own statements. The Seventh Circuit upheld that ruling. Fernandez has not shown that any of the omitted details of the interrogations mattered enough to demonstrate reversible error; Fernandez’s failure to invoke his Confrontation Clause rights below and his ability to raise the essential points as to Voecks’ change of story defeated any claim of plain error. The court also upheld the district court’s ruling precluding Fernandez from questioning defense witness Stramowski, another passenger in the car, about the content of the texts she had purportedly received from Voecks before the trial and upheld a ruling permitting the government to establish that Fernandez was arrested during the traffic stop on an outstanding warrant for a probation violation. View "United States v. Fernandez" on Justia Law