Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Maier was convicted of threatening Wisconsin state court judges in 2006. In 2011, Maier mailed a handwritten letter to the jurors in that case, stating that after being “skrewed” and serving two years in prison, Maier was “going for a Pardon.” Maier addressed various injustices he believed he suffered during his prosecution, trial, and incarceration, closing the letter by encouraging the jurors to mail their questionnaires to the governor’s Pardon Advisory Board with a copy to Maier. The letter did not included direct threats. Maier sent a second letter, encouraging the jurors to contact his state representative or the governor’s office, and signed off as “Your friend from Planet of the Apes Courthouse In downtown Zappenville[.]” Convicted of six counts of stalking, Maier was sentenced to 15 years in prison. After exhausting state remedies and unsuccessfully seeking Supreme Court review, Maier sought federal post-conviction review under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of the petition; the Wisconsin Court of Appeals’ decision was not objectively unreasonable. The statute criminalizes behavior that ʺwould cause a reasonable person under the same circumstances to suffer serious emotional distress, so failing to introduce evidence of non-jurors’ impressions could not have harmed Maierʹs defense to such an extent that it changed the outcome. The court rejected an argument that the jury instructions misstated Wisconsin law, relieving the state of its burden of proof. View "Maier v. Smith" on Justia Law

Four men conspired to sell heroin to an undercover officer. Arturo and Enemicio had phone conversations with the officers, arranging to sell 995 grams of heroin for $180,000. Enemicio drove Arturo to the officer’s car. Arturo instructed him to drive to another location, where Omar verified that the officer had the cash. Tomas arrived carrying a firearm and the heroin. The men were charged with conspiracy to possess and distribute a mixture containing 100 grams or more of heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846, and distribution of 100 or more grams of heroin. Enemicio, additionally charged for a previous heroin deal, had one prior burglary conviction and was sentenced to 65 months. Tomas, additionally charged with possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, was sentenced to 110 months. Arturo pleaded guilty to Count Two. The court calculated Arturo’s criminal history using his 2009 conviction for manufacturing and delivering cocaine, based on charges filed in 1990, and more recent convictions for possession of a controlled substance and of an altered identification card. Arturo committed the 2016 offense while on parole; he had two much older convictions. His advisory range was 100-125 months, with a statutory mandatory minimum of 60 months. Arturo argued, under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), that the calculation “over-represented” his criminal history due to the time between the 1990 crime and his conviction, that his co-defendants played a larger role in the conspiracy, and a lower sentence would avoid a disparity between his sentence and Enemicio’s. Arturo also cited age, poor health, low likelihood of recidivism, and that he would face harsh conditions because his status as a deportable alien would prevent him from accessing prison programs and resources. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Arturo's 100-month sentence. The district court thoroughly considered the facts and Arturo’s arguments. View "United States v. Bustos" on Justia Law

In 1977, Peoria police officers arrested 14-year-old Savory for the rape and murder of Cooper and the murder of Cooper’s 14-year-old brother. Savory claims that officers subjected him to an abusive 31-hour interrogation; fabricated evidence; wrongfully coerced a false confession; suppressed and destroyed exculpatory evidence; fabricated incriminating statements from alleged witnesses; and ignored evidence pointing to other suspects. Savory was tried as an adult. His conviction for first-degree murder was overturned. He was convicted again in 1981 and was sentenced to 40-80 years in prison. Savory exhausted state remedies; he unsuccessfully sought federal habeas corpus relief. He repeatedly sought clemency and DNA testing. He was paroled in 2006. In 2011, the governor commuted the remainder of Savory’s sentence, terminating his parole but leaving his conviction intact. In 2015, the governor issued a pardon that “acquitted and discharged” Savory’s conviction. Less than two years later, Savory sued the city and police officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Under Supreme Court precedent (Heck), Savory could not bring suit until he obtained a favorable termination of a challenge to his conviction; he had to file suit within two years of accrual. The defendants asserted that the Heck bar lifted when Savory’s parole was terminated in 2011. The Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of the claims as untimely. Savory’s claims, which closely resemble malicious prosecution claims, could not accrue until “the conviction or sentence ha[d] been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal … or ... by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” View "Savory v. Cannon" on Justia Law

Chicago police officers stopped a Toyota after it sped out of an alley. The driver fled, leaving several passengers. Officer Morlock pursued the driver. The Toyota rolled and wedged itself against Flaherty’s squad car. Passenger Grant tried to escape but his legs got stuck between the cars. Flaherty ordered the other passengers to “quit moving.” Brown, age 13, attempted to flee but stopped hanging out of a window. Officers Proano and Habiak arrived. Proano had his weapon cocked and aimed at the Toyota. Seconds later, passenger Bates reached over the console, put the car in reverse, and pressed the gas pedal. The Toyota moved and a BB gun fell out. No one was in its path. Habiak picked up the gun. Proano fired shots as the Toyota pivoted and rolled into a light pole. Ten of Proano’s 16 bullets entered the Toyota; one hit Bates’s shoulder, others grazed his face. Two bullets hit another passenger in his leg and foot. No other officer fired shots. Proano reported that he shot because of an “imminent threat of battery.” Proano did not identify the BB gun as a contributing factor. Proano was convicted for willfully depriving the passengers of their right to be free from unreasonable force, 18 U.S.C. 242. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Proano’s arguments regarding the admission of training and policy evidence and the jury instruction on willfulness. The court upheld the denial of a “Garrity” motion. Under Garrity, when a public official must choose between cooperating in an internal investigation or losing his job, his statements during the investigation cannot be used against him in a criminal trial. Federal prosecutors were never exposed to Proano’s protected statements. A dashcam video, other witnesses, and police reports all provided independent bases from which they could have learned the facts. View "United States v. Proano" on Justia Law

Neilitz purchased $125,000 worth of ECS stock; Rawah Partners invested $350,000. In 2008, Corrigan, ECS’s President and CEO, negotiated a sale of ECS. Because of the worldwide financial downturn, the sale fell through. Shortly thereafter, ECS's board authorized Corrigan to manage ECS as he saw fit. Corrigan was negotiating another sale when ECS began to suffer cash flow problems. ECS had difficulty paying expenses and officers’ compensation. It closed its Chase Bank account and opened a new LaSalle Bank account that excluded the Vice President from its signatories. ECS's employee healthcare policy was canceled in January 2009, for nonpayment. Corrigan began soliciting Neilitz and Rawah for additional investments announcing that ECS was close to closing a sale but needed funds for healthcare insurance premiums. Per Corrigan’s instructions Neilitz and Rawah each wired $50,000 to an account which, unbeknownst to them, was Corrigan’s personal account. Corrigan spent the funds for personal expenses. Corrigan was terminated from ECS in 2011. Corrigan contacted Neilitz and Rawah, attempting to buy back the fraudulently sold stock but reaffirmed his original lie. Corrigan was convicted on four counts of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction and an order of restitution in the full amount of the investments. The indictment adequately alleged a scheme to defraud; the evidence supported the conviction. View "United States v. Corrigan" on Justia Law

Mitchell enrolled in an Elgin Community College online criminal-justice course. The instructor, an Elgin police officer, eventually advised her that she was failing the course. Soon after, the police department received anonymous threats and a harassing email targeting the officer. Another officer swore out a complaint accusing Mitchell of electronic communication harassment. She was arrested, immediately bonded out, and two years later was acquitted. Mitchell sued the city and several officers seeking damages for wrongful prosecution. A district judge dismissed the case, concluding that the federal claims were either untimely or not cognizable. Mitchell appealed. The Supreme Court’s 2017 decision, Manuel v. Joliet, overturned circuit precedent that defeated Mitchell’s Fourth Amendment claim below, clarifying that pretrial detention without probable cause is actionable under the Fourth Amendment, via 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Court did not decide when the claim accrues. A Seventh Circuit panel then held that a Fourth Amendment claim for unlawful pretrial detention accrues when the detention ends. The court did not determine the timeliness of Mitchell’s claim because the parties did not adequately address whether and under what circumstances a person who is arrested but released on bond remains “seized” for Fourth Amendment purposes or what conditions of release, if any, were imposed on Mitchell when she bonded out. View "Mitchell v. City of Elgin" on Justia Law

Hagen was convicted twice under Illinois law for failing to get her children to school (Guardian Allows Child Truancy). She later pleaded guilty in federal court for conspiring to distribute methamphetamine. The district court counted her two convictions for allowing child truancy toward her criminal history score. The Seventh Circuit reversed, applying a five‐factor test to confirm that Guardian Allows Child Truancy is similar to, but less serious than, the offense of non‐support (failing to provide for a child’s basic needs); Sentencing Guidelines section 4A1.2(c)(1) therefore required its exclusion from the criminal history score. Non‐support bears so many obvious similarities to Guardian Allows Child Truancy that the court plainly ought to have considered it; the court committed plain error, affecting a substantial right. View "United States v. Hagen" on Justia Law

Beltran-Aguilar, a citizen of Mexico, applied for cancellation of removal. The BIA affirmed the denial of his application. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. Beltran-Aguilar’s conviction for Wisconsin battery involving domestic abuse was a crime of domestic violence, rendering him ineligible for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1)(C). A “crime of violence” is “an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another,” 18 U.S.C. 16(a). The elements of the crime for which a defendant was convicted, not his underlying conduct, are determinative. Beltran-Aguilar was convicted under Wisconsin Statute 940.19(1), which prohibits “caus[ing] bodily harm to another by an act done with intent to cause bodily harm to that person or another without the consent of the person so harmed.” “Bodily harm” means “physical pain or injury, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.” Rejecting an argument that certain types of non-qualifying conduct theoretically might be prosecuted under the statute, the court stated that there must be “a realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility," that the state would prosecute conduct that falls outside the generic definition of a crime. Beltran-Aguilar has not identified any case in which Wisconsin’s definition of “bodily harm” has been applied in a way that does not accord with precedent defining crimes of violence. View "Beltran-Aguilar v. Whitaker" on Justia Law

During a traffic stop, Kentucky officers found marijuana and a gun in Sheperd’s car. He pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and two counts for criminal forfeiture. The judge applied an Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) enhancement based on his prior Kentucky burglary convictions and sentenced Shepherd to the mandatory minimum 15 years in prison, 18 U.S.C. 924(e). The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Though his case originated in Kentucky, Shepherd is in an Indiana federal prison. After his challenges to his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255 were rejected by the Kentucky district court and the Sixth Circuit, Shepherd filed a 28 U.S.C. 2241 motion in Indiana. A section 2241 habeas petition may be allowed if the prisoner can show “that the remedy by motion [under section 2255] is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” The Seventh Circuit did not address whether Shepherd’s plea agreement waived his right to bring the collateral challenge or whether section 2241 should be available to him and if so, which precedent should apply. The court resolved the case on the merits: the Sixth Circuit held recently that Kentucky second-degree burglary qualifies as a predicate offense for an ACCA enhancement. View "Shepherd v. Julian" on Justia Law

After pleading guilty to preparing false tax returns for her clients, 26 U.S.C. 7206(2), Johnson was sentenced to 18 months in prison plus $79,325 in restitution—the amount that Johnson’s clients unlawfully avoided paying (with respect to the counts of conviction) that had not been collected from the taxpayers before sentencing. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Johnson’s argument that the prosecution should have told the judge how much more it might collect from her clients, which she characterized as exculpatory material that should have been revealed under "Brady." The collections were not concealed. The presentence report showed that the government already had collected substantial sums (the original loss exceeded $150,000) and was trying to obtain the balance from taxpayers. Johnson was free to ask how much more had been collected by the date of sentencing but did not. Brady does not apply when information is available for the asking. The restitution statute, not the Constitution, determines the prosecution’s duty—one of credit against the judgment, not of disclosure during the sentencing hearing. Johnson will receive credit against the restitution award for whatever the government collects from the taxpayers; it was unnecessary to disclose the details of collection activities before the judge determined the base restitution award. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law