Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Kohl was convicted of three federal controlled substance offenses, 21 U.S.C. 841 and 846. The court assigned Kohl criminal history category IV, including one criminal history point for a 2016 Wisconsin conviction for operating a vehicle with a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in his blood. Kohl argued that a first violation of the Wisconsin statute does not carry a criminal penalty and should not have been counted. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the 36-month sentence. The Sentencing Guidelines provide that certain listed misdemeanors and petty offenses, including local ordinance violations that are not also violations of state criminal law, are not to be counted, U.S.S.G. 4A1.2(c)(2), but an Application Note qualifies that exclusion by requiring that convictions for driving under the influence and similar offenses are always counted. Although the Wisconsin statute does not require proof that the offender was impaired or under the influence, Kohl’s offense was sufficiently similar to driving while intoxicated or under the influence to qualify for inclusion. The court noted that the sentence was well below the Guideline range for category IV (77-96 months) and was also below the Guideline range for category III (63-78 months), the category to which Kohl would have been assigned if the disputed conviction was not included. View "United States v. Kohl" on Justia Law

Hamdan was arrested after a 2014 traffic stop revealed he was driving on a suspended license. Hamdan consented to a search of his car. Officers found a shoebox containing $67,000 in cash. Police found a card for a Public Storage business inscribed with unit and access code information. Hamdan denied knowledge of the storage unit. Police obtained a search warrant. A key Hamdan was carrying opened the unit. Hamdan's passenger, Yahia, told police that he was employed by Hamdan and alerted officers to a second storage unit, rented in Yahia’s name, but controlled by Hamdan. Another of Hamdan’s keys opened that unit. With Yahia’s consent, police searched that unit and discovered boxes marked with Hamdan’s name and address. In the storage units, officers discovered 20,000 packages of the street drug, “spice,” plus tools and ingredients to make spice, including the synthetic cannabinoid XLR-11. Hamdan was convicted of controlled substance offenses, 21 U.S.C. 841 & 846. Hamdan had planned to argue that he did not know spice was illegal by introducing evidence that he was previously arrested, but not prosecuted for activities related to spice. Hamdan sought to subpoena two Wisconsin state troopers who arrested and interviewed him in 2012. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Hamdan’s proposed evidence was largely irrelevant to the issues. The synthetic cannabinoid involved in the 2012 arrest was not at issue here. The two incidents were remote in time and Hamdan’s knowledge of XLR-11’s illegality could have changed. The testimony could have caused confusion and prejudice. View "United States v. Hamdan" on Justia Law

Bostock pleaded guilty to distributing methamphetamine and was sentenced to 125 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The statute distinguishes by purity in setting minimum and maximum sentences, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A)(viii). The Sentencing Guidelines drug quantity table, U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(c), similarly distinguishes among “Methamphetamine”, “Methamphetamine (actual)”, and “Ice”. Bostock conceded distributing 63.8 grams of ice. Given his criminal history, the Guidelines recommended a sentencing range of 130-162 months’ imprisonment. Bostock argued that the judge should have proceeded as if he had sold 64 grams of “methamphetamine” rather than 64 grams of “ice,” for a recommended range of 77-96 months. The court rejected arguments that the distinction between “methamphetamine” and “ice” or “methamphetamine (actual),” is outmoded because most sellers have higher-purity products and that the distinction never had a sound empirical footing. A judge is not required even to articulate a reason for sticking with the Guidelines. The 10-to-1 ratio between “ice” and “methamphetamine” does not denigrate from marginal punishment for more serious criminals. There is no problem with holding Bostock, who did not receive a supervisory enhancement, responsible for the amount or purity of the drug he distributed. In addition, the judge found Bostock undeterrable; Bostock was fortunate, given the judge’s observations, that his sentence is below the USSG range. View "United States v. Bostock" on Justia Law

In 2000 Balsiger took the helm of IOS, a large coupon processing companies. IOS contracted with large retail chains and small, independently owned stores to collect and sort coupons redeemed at their stores and to submit invoices for reimbursement either directly to the manufacturer or indirectly to the manufacturer’s agent. For his role in designing and implementing a scheme to defraud those manufacturers, Balsiger was charged with 25 counts of wire fraud and conspiracy both to commit wire fraud and obstruct justice. After a decade of litigation, Balsiger represented himself at a bench trial with the assistance of stand-by counsel. The district court convicted Balsiger on 12 counts and sentenced him to 120 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Balsiger’s argument that the court deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to retain the counsel of his choice by failing to grant an 18-month continuance and by refusing to order the government to remove a lis pendens on his home—a notice to potential buyers that title to the property might be impaired by the outcome of his criminal prosecution. The court upheld the district court’s conclusion, following the death of Balsiger’s attorney, that Balsiger waived his right to counsel and its decision to require him, over his objection, to proceed pro se. View "United States v. Balsiger" on Justia Law

During a drug deal, Bishop was pepper sprayed by his customer and shot her. He was convicted of discharging a firearm during a drug transaction, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). He argued that the warrant authorizing a search of his cell phone violated the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that every warrant “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized” by describing the “place to be searched” as the cell phone Bishop carried during the attempted sale, and describing the things to be seized as: any evidence (including all photos, videos, and/or any other digital files, including removable memory cards) of suspect identity, motive, scheme/plan along with DNA evidence of the crime of Criminal Recklessness with a deadly weapon which is hidden or secreted [in the cellphone or] related to the offense of Dealing illegal drugs. The Seventh Circuit upheld the denial of Bishop’s motion to suppress. While the warrant permitted the police to look at every file on the phone and decide which files satisfied the description, the warrant was not too general. It is enough if the warrant confines the things being looked for by stating what crime is under investigation. A warrant need not be more specific than knowledge allows. View "United States v. Bishop" on Justia Law

The Chicago gang called the Imperial Insane Vice Lords controlled drug operations near Thomas Street and Keystone Avenue. In l2010, the government began investigating the gang’s activities, which led to the indictment of two dozen people for various offenses, including racketeering conspiracies, firearm offenses, narcotics offenses, and murder. Defendants were among the indicted. Trial testimony described the gang’s hierarchy and specific murder plots. After trial and before sentencing, the government disclosed evidence that it had obtained from a confidential informant. The district court held that the late disclosure did not violate Brady v. Maryland because the suppressed evidence was neither exculpatory nor material. The Seventh Circuit affirmed that ruling and the Defendants’ convictions. The court rejected Martin’s claim that the district court violated the Confrontation Clause when it admitted a statement made by a non‐testifying codefendant and erred when it imposed his sentence, treating attempted murders, described at trial, as relevant conduct, and imposing disparate sentences. View "United States v. Martin" on Justia Law

Roundtree was sentenced to life in prison for selling heroin that led to a user’s death, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(C). Seven years later the Supreme Court held (Burrage) that a judge must tell a jury that the death-resulting condition is satisfied only if the drug was a but-for cause of the fatality; a contributing cause is not enough. The jury charge at Roundtree’s trial did not satisfy Burrage. He filed collateral attacks on his sentence in the Northern District of Iowa (where his trial occurred), 28 U.S.C. 2255, and the Southern District of Indiana (where he is confined), 28 U.S.C. 2241. Both judges rejected his contentions. The Eighth Circuit held that, because Burrage is retroactive, Roundtree is entitled to use section 2255 to contest his conviction despite the lapse of time, but that his failure to dispute the jury instruction at trial forfeited any benefit from a later Supreme Court decision. The Eighth Circuit recognized that a procedural default may be excused if the accused is innocent but found that Roundtree had not met that requirement. He never argued that a properly instructed jury would have been compelled to acquit him of either selling heroin or the death-results enhancement; Roundtree was not prejudiced by the error, The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that Roundtree would have been convicted even under the Burrage instruction and that the Supreme Court is the proper place for review of the Eighth Circuit decision. View "Roundtree v. Caraway" on Justia Law

Sanders pleaded guilty to a federal drug offense. About 20 years earlier, she had been convicted of a felony drug offense in California, so the government sought to impose a 10-year mandatory minimum term of imprisonment under a recidivist enhancement provision, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(B). After her guilty plea, but before sentencing, a California state court reclassified Sanders’s state drug offense as a misdemeanor under Proposition 47. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the imposition of the enhancement and the 120-month sentence. Sanders both committed a federal drug offense and was convicted of a prior felony drug offense in California that had become final. California’s later decision to reclassify the felony as a misdemeanor does not alter the historical fact of the prior state conviction becoming final—which is what section 841 requires. The court also rejected challenges under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses and the Tenth Amendment’s federalism principles. Federal law, not state law, dictates the meaning of a federal statute. View "United States v. Sanders" on Justia Law

Taylor pleaded guilty to one count of possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B). His plea agreement contemplated an offense level of 31, which reflected a two-level reduction because Taylor had not sought to distribute child pornography. In preparing the PSR, the probation officer concluded that this two-level reduction was not available under the Guidelines. At the sentencing hearing, the parties stated that they had no objection to the PSR. The district court accepted the probation officer’s offense level calculation of 33 and sentenced Taylor to 135 months’ imprisonment, the low end of the guidelines range for a level 33 offense. On appeal, Taylor argued that the government was bound to advocate for a sentence within the lower range contemplated by the plea agreement and that its advocacy for a within-Guidelines sentence based on the corrected calculation constitutes a breach of the plea agreement. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Under the plea agreement, the government was bound to advocate for a within-Guidelines sentence; it fulfilled that obligation. View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Hatch illegally brought handguns into Chicago three times. Over the next year, Chicago police recovered five of these guns—some from felons and one from a minor. Hatch told his friend Driver, who had used her identification to purchase some of the guns in Indiana, not to divulge any information, but she admitted that she purchased guns for him. Hatch told a probation officer that he was a straw buyer for Kemp: he bought the guns for Kemp and did not know why Kemp wanted them. Hatch pleaded guilty to unlawfully transporting firearms, 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(3), 924(a)(1)(D). The judge calculated a Guidelines range of 30-37 months, then applied the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and imposed a 55-month sentence. The judge said that Hatch’s family, job, and lack of prior felonies “appear to be in his favor,” but the nature of the offense was “troubling,” and Hatch failed to accept responsibility fully because he denied knowing what the guns were for. The judge gave statistics, attributing the spike in Chicago’s homicides to guns from Indiana, and discussed the effect of gun violence in the city, concluding that the Guidelines did not adequately reflect the seriousness of Hatch’s offense or sufficiently deter firearm trafficking. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A judge may depart from the Guidelines based on locality-specific factors. View "United States v. Hatch" on Justia Law