Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In late 2016, Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) agents began investigating individuals sharing child pornography over peer-to-peer file-sharing networks. Using a proprietary software program called "eMule," HSI agents identified and downloaded child pornography files from Warren Siepman's computer on three separate occasions between October 2016 and March 2017. The software operated automatically, searching for specific child pornography files and downloading them without human intervention. Forensic examination of Siepman's hard drives revealed over one thousand child pornography files, and Siepman admitted to viewing and sharing these files on the network.A grand jury indicted Siepman on three counts of transportation of child pornography and one count of possession of child pornography. The case proceeded to trial in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, where the jury was instructed on the elements of the transportation charge. The court also provided an additional instruction defining "transports" in the context of peer-to-peer file sharing, which Siepman objected to. The jury found Siepman guilty on all counts. Siepman moved for a judgment of acquittal or a new trial, arguing that the court's instruction was erroneous and that the evidence was insufficient. The district court denied the motion, finding the instruction accurate and the evidence sufficient.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the instruction accurately reflected the law, stating that making files available for download on a peer-to-peer network constitutes "transportation" under federal law. The court also found that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, noting that the automated software's involvement did not negate the fact that an individual ultimately facilitated the download. The convictions were affirmed. View "United States v. Siepman" on Justia Law

Ji Chaoqun, a Chinese national, came to the United States in 2013 to study electrical engineering. In 2022, he was indicted for conspiring to commit an offense against the United States, failing to register as a foreign agent, wire fraud, and making a false statement. Evidence presented at trial showed that Ji was recruited by the Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS) before leaving China and engaged in various activities on their behalf, including purchasing background reports on U.S. scientists and attempting to infiltrate the U.S. Army Reserves.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois convicted Ji on all counts and sentenced him to 96 months in prison. Ji appealed, arguing that the government should have to prove he was not engaged in a legal commercial transaction as an element of the offense and that the jury should have been required to unanimously agree on the specific act he committed. He also challenged the district court’s evidentiary and sentencing decisions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the specific act a foreign agent commits under 18 U.S.C. § 951 does not require jury unanimity and that the legal commercial transaction exception is an affirmative defense, not an element of the offense. The court also found no error in the district court’s evidentiary rulings or in its sentencing decisions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Ji’s conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Chaoqun" on Justia Law

The case involves Refugio Avila, who was found with a loaded handgun during a traffic stop. Avila, a known member of the Satan's Disciple gang, was in a vehicle with his girlfriend when they were stopped by Chicago police officers conducting proactive policing. The officers observed several traffic violations and initiated a stop. During the stop, the officers conducted three pat-downs on Avila, discovering a loaded handgun during the third pat-down. Avila was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm.Avila filed a motion to suppress the firearm and a motion to dismiss the indictment, alleging violations of the Speedy Trial Act. The district court denied both motions. Avila entered a conditional plea to the felony charge, reserving his right to challenge the district court's denial of his motions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling on the motion to suppress, finding that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle and to frisk Avila, and the stop was not unlawfully prolonged. However, the court found that the district court erred in denying Avila's motion to dismiss the indictment. The court concluded that the district court had improperly excluded over 300 days from the Speedy Trial Act's seventy-day clock, violating the Act. The court reversed the district court's denial of Avila's motion to dismiss the indictment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "United States v. Avila" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Terrell Esco, who alleged that he was unlawfully detained and maliciously prosecuted by the City of Chicago police officers. The officers arrested him for weapons and drug violations, but Esco claimed that the officers knew he was not the person they saw in possession of a gun. He further alleged that the officers' body-worn camera video evidence would support his claim. However, the district court judge viewed the video and held that the officers had probable cause to detain Esco, thereby dismissing his claims.The case was then brought to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The court agreed with the district court's assessment that Esco failed to allege any plausible claims. The court noted that the determination of probable cause is based on an objective assessment of what a reasonable officer could conclude based on information known to officers at the scene. The court found that the video provided definitive evidence that the officers had probable cause to believe that Esco was the person who possessed and then discarded the weapon.Furthermore, the court found that Esco failed to prove that the proceeding terminated in his favor, a necessary element for a malicious prosecution claim under Illinois law. The court noted that the mere fact that the state court entered a nolle prosequi order, without explanation of why the court entered the order, was insufficient evidence of a favorable termination of criminal proceedings. As a result, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court, dismissing Esco's claims. View "Esco v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Anthony D. Lee, Sr. was convicted of aggravated kidnapping and aggravated sexual assault in 1996 and sentenced to 100 years in prison. Lee's defense was that the victim had voluntarily entered his car and that any sexual activity was consensual. He later sought postconviction relief, arguing that his attorney, Richard Friedman, had failed to interview several potential witnesses who could have corroborated his testimony. Lee supported his motion with six affidavits from these potential witnesses. The trial court denied Lee's ineffective-assistance claim, and the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the decision.Lee then sought relief in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court denied his petition, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit disagreed with the lower courts' decisions. The appellate court found that the state court had based its prejudice analysis on the flawed assumption that each witness would have merely repeated their affidavits and refused to say another word if called to testify. The appellate court vacated and remanded the case to the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing on Lee's claim.After a three-day hearing, the district court again denied Lee's § 2254 petition. The court concluded that Lee failed to establish that Friedman's performance fell below an objective standard of professional competence. Alternatively, the court concluded that any errors Friedman might have committed did not meaningfully compromise Lee's defense given the strength of the state's case. Lee appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court found that Lee failed to demonstrate a "reasonable probability" that the result of his trial would have been different had Friedman not committed professional errors. The court noted that none of the affidavits provided an explanation for the severity of the victim's injuries, and that the additional testimony from the witnesses may have ultimately weakened Lee's defense by contradicting his testimony or their own affidavits. View "Lee v. Galloway" on Justia Law

The case involves Anthony Carr, who was convicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm. His offense level and sentencing range were increased due to his three prior convictions in Illinois for armed robbery, which the district court treated as a crime of violence. Carr argued that this was an error, contending that he could have been convicted as an aider and abettor to robbery rather than a principal, and thus his conviction was not for a crime of violence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected Carr's argument. The court held that each of Carr’s Illinois convictions was for armed robbery, and the pertinent elements of that offense matched those of generic robbery. The court found that the abstract possibility that Carr could have been convicted as an aider and abettor rather than a principal was irrelevant. The court also noted that although Illinois articulates its “common-design” iteration of accomplice liability in broad terms, it was not convinced that Illinois was an outlier in the way it applies common-design liability.Carr also requested a sentence reduction to account for the time he spent in custody prior to his federal sentencing. The district court declined to entertain this request, leading to Carr's appeal. The Court of Appeals vacated and remanded the sentence for the limited purpose of reconsidering Carr’s request for a sentencing reduction. View "United States v. Carr" on Justia Law

The case involves fourteen members of the Bomb Squad, a street gang, who were charged with violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), among other crimes. One member pleaded guilty, while the remaining defendants were convicted by a jury. The defendants appealed their convictions, arguing that the district judge violated Batson v. Kentucky when selecting the jury. The court of appeals retained jurisdiction of the appeal and ordered a limited remand to allow the district court to make supplemental findings on this issue. The court of appeals found no reversible error in the remaining arguments raised by the defendants and affirmed their convictions.The Bomb Squad was a street gang that used violence to protect its reputation, territory, and drug sales. The gang members were charged with numerous crimes, including murder, attempted murder, drug trafficking, and multiple robberies. The defendants argued that the district judge violated Batson v. Kentucky when selecting the jury, which prohibits a prosecutor from using a peremptory challenge to strike a prospective juror because of their race.The court of appeals ordered a limited remand to allow the district court to make supplemental findings on the Batson issue. The court of appeals found no reversible error in the remaining arguments raised by the defendants and affirmed their convictions. The court of appeals also noted that if the district court orders a new trial, much of its opinion would become moot. However, it addressed the remaining issues raised by the defendants in the interest of judicial economy. View "USA v. Williams" on Justia Law

Robert Townsend was convicted for attempted enticement of a minor, under 18 U.S.C. §2422(b), and was sentenced to 10 years in prison, followed by 10 years of supervised release. Townsend argued that the district judge erred by allowing the seriousness of his crime to influence the length of his supervised release.The district court had considered the seriousness of Townsend's crime in determining the length of his supervised release. Townsend argued that this was an error, citing United States v. Wilcher, a Seventh Circuit case that held the duration of supervised release cannot rest solely on the seriousness of the crime. Townsend sought to extend this ruling to argue that the seriousness of an offense should not be considered at all in determining the length of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit disagreed with Townsend's interpretation of the Wilcher ruling. The court noted that while the seriousness of the crime cannot be the sole factor in determining the length of supervised release, it can be one of several factors considered. The court pointed out that the nature of the offense, the need for deterrence, and the need to protect the public all correlate with the seriousness of the offense. The district judge had considered these factors, emphasizing the danger Townsend posed to the public and the nature and circumstances of his offense.The court held that the district judge had not erred in considering the seriousness of Townsend's crime as one of several factors in determining the length of his supervised release. The court affirmed the district court's decision, upholding Townsend's sentence of 10 years in prison followed by 10 years of supervised release. View "United States v. Townsend" on Justia Law

The case involves Millard Williams, who was convicted for orchestrating the shipment of a package containing furanyl fentanyl, a Schedule I controlled substance, while in a Georgia jail. Williams was found guilty of conspiring to possess and possessing at least 100 grams of furanyl fentanyl. The jury also determined that furanyl fentanyl is an “analogue of fentanyl,” triggering a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(vi). Williams appealed, arguing that furanyl fentanyl is not an “analogue of fentanyl” as defined in the statute, and that the district court’s definition of “analogue” renders the provision unconstitutionally vague.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit disagreed with Williams. The court held that the term “controlled substance analogue” is distinct from the term “analogue of fentanyl,” and therefore, the court must look to the ordinary meaning of the word “analogue.” The court found nothing problematically vague about the definition that emerges as applied to furanyl fentanyl. The court also rejected Williams’s other challenges to his conviction and sentence, including his argument that the district court should have suppressed the evidence found inside the intercepted package. The court concluded that the district court made no errors requiring resentencing. View "USA v. Williams" on Justia Law

Jerome Ford was sentenced to 96 months in prison for possessing a firearm despite his felony conviction, followed by three years of supervised release. The judgment included a condition that Ford must pay a fine of $250 immediately, even though this condition was not mentioned during sentencing or in the presentence report.Ford appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, arguing that the payment condition was unauthorized because it was not mentioned during sentencing or in the presentence report. He requested that the payment condition be removed from the judgment. The court noted that when there is a conflict between the oral pronouncement and the written judgment in a criminal case, the oral pronouncement usually prevails. However, there is an exception for conditions of supervision required by law, which do not need to be announced orally.The court found that the payment condition was not required by law, but was included in a list of mandatory conditions in the Sentencing Guidelines. Ford argued that these guidelines ceased being mandatory after a previous case, United States v. Booker, declared them to be advisory. The court noted that this argument was not necessarily true, as the conditions of supervised release were not affected by the Booker decision.However, the court accepted the prosecutor's implied concession that the payment condition may not be mandatory. As a result, the court decided that the payment condition must be vacated. The court noted that this decision may not benefit Ford, as a statute provides that people who do not pay their fines may be returned to prison. The court also noted that the district judge could add the payment condition to the judgment at any time. The court modified the district court's judgment to delete the payment condition. View "United States v. Ford" on Justia Law