Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves Jay Liestman, who was convicted for transporting child pornography, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1). Liestman had a prior conviction for possessing child pornography under Wisconsin law. The district court imposed an enhanced mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment under § 2252(b)(1) due to his prior conviction. The main issue was whether the state conviction qualifies as a predicate conviction under § 2252(b)(1), which prescribes enhanced penalties for certain recidivist child sex offenders.Previously, the district court had ruled that Liestman's prior conviction for possessing child pornography triggered 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1)’s enhancement for repeat sex offenders, which increases the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment from 5 to 15 years if the defendant has a prior conviction “under the laws of any State relating to ... the production, possession, receipt, mailing, sale, distribution, shipment, or transportation of child pornography.” Liestman argued that the enhancement did not apply because the Wisconsin statute reached offense conduct that Congress did not expressly enumerate in the text of § 2252(b)(1). The district court disagreed and sentenced Liestman to the enhanced mandatory minimum of 15 years.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the phrase “relating to” in § 2252(b)(1) brings within the ambit of the enhancement any prior offense that categorically bears a connection with the conduct enumerated in § 2252(b)(1), regardless of whether it sweeps more broadly than that enumerated conduct in some respects. Therefore, Liestman's prior offense of conviction for possessing child pornography under Wisconsin law can serve as a predicate offense under § 2252(b)(1). View "United States v. Liestman" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit heard an appeal from Christopher Tate and Sandra Kellogg, who were charged with conspiracy to distribute illegal drugs and other drug offenses. They were tried jointly, and the jury convicted them on all counts. The district court imposed substantial, yet below-guidelines, prison sentences. On appeal, both defendants challenged the sufficiency of the evidence on one of the counts of their convictions and the enhancements used to determine their guidelines sentencing ranges.The court affirmed the convictions and sentences of both defendants. It concluded that the jury could have found that Tate at least jointly possessed the methamphetamine found in his car. The court also held that although Kellogg argued that she was not part of the larger conspiracy, she failed to establish prejudice resulting from the supposed variance between the larger conspiracy charged in the indictment and the smaller conspiracy proven at trial.Furthermore, the court held that the sentencing enhancements applied by the district court were justified. It found that the evidence supported the application of a 2-level firearm-possession enhancement against Tate, and that any error in its application would have been harmless. Similarly, the court found that Kellogg's challenge to the application of a 3-level enhancement for her role as a manager or supervisor of criminal activity was unavailing. Despite Kellogg's argument that she was not a "manager or supervisor" and that the criminal activity did not involve five or more participants, the court found sufficient evidence to support the district court's findings. View "United States v. Kellogg" on Justia Law

In the case under review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences of two defendants, Christopher Tate and Sandra Kellogg, charged with conspiracy to distribute illegal drugs and other drug offenses. The government had charged twelve people with these offenses. Ten of them pleaded guilty, while Tate and Kellogg chose to go to trial. They were tried jointly, and the jury convicted them on all counts. Both defendants appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for one of their conviction counts and objecting to one of the enhancements used to determine their sentencing guidelines.The court found that the evidence was sufficient for both defendants' convictions. For Tate, the jury could have reasonably found that he at least jointly possessed the methamphetamine found in his car. For Kellogg, even if a juror could not have found a larger conspiracy connecting her, Harris, Mr. Tate, and others, she did not establish prejudice from the supposed variance between the larger conspiracy charged and the smaller conspiracy proven at trial.In terms of sentencing enhancements, the court found that the district court correctly applied the firearm-possession enhancement for Mr. Tate and the manager-supervisor enhancement for Ms. Kellogg. The court concluded that Mr. Tate's total offense level would have been the maximum under the Guidelines with or without the enhancement. As for Ms. Kellogg, she did not raise an objection to the enhancement in the district court and thus the matter was waived. View "United States v. Tate" on Justia Law

The case arose from a drug trafficking operation led by Keith White in an Indiana prison. White, along with others, was indicted for conspiracy to distribute heroin after three inmates died of drug overdoses. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced under enhanced penalties due to his criminal history, which included two felony convictions for cocaine dealing. This was his second appeal challenging his sentence.White argued that his status as a career offender under the Sentencing Guidelines was improperly determined based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Kisor v. Wilkie. He contended that the guideline’s definition of a “controlled substance offense” unambiguously excluded inchoate offenses, such as conspiracy, and thus the application note expanding this definition deserved no deference.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit disagreed. It noted that the Supreme Court’s decision in Kisor did not unsettle Stinson v. United States, which provided that commentary in the Guidelines interpreting or explaining a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the Constitution, a federal statute, or is inconsistent with the guideline. Thus, the court deferred to the Sentencing Commission’s interpretation of the career-offender guideline.Additionally, the court rejected White's argument that the “major questions doctrine” invalidated the application note. The court concluded that the application note was not a “transformative expansion” of the Sentencing Commission’s authority, and, therefore, the doctrine did not apply. The court affirmed the judgment. View "USA v. White" on Justia Law

The case concerns Thomas Osadzinski, who was convicted for providing material support to a terrorist organization. In 2019, Osadzinski, a computer science student, developed a software program to facilitate the rapid duplication of terrorist propaganda videos for ISIS. He shared this program with people he believed were ISIS supporters, taught them how to use it, and used it to assemble and distribute a large collection of ISIS media. Osadzinski appealed his conviction, arguing that it violated the First Amendment because his actions constituted free expression. He also contended that he lacked fair notice that his actions violated the material-support statute.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit disagreed with Osadzinski's arguments. The court held that although Osadzinski's actions could be regarded as expressive activity, this activity was coordinated with or directed by ISIS, a known terrorist organization, and therefore was not protected by the First Amendment. The court also rejected Osadzinski's claim that he lacked fair notice that his actions violated the material-support statute. The court affirmed Osadzinski's conviction, ruling that his conduct fell outside First Amendment protection, clearly violated the material-support statute, and provided a reasonable basis for the jury to return a guilty verdict. View "USA v. Osadzinski" on Justia Law

The case involves an appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, made by Shazariyah Hibbett, the defendant, who was sentenced for being a felon in possession of a firearm. The defendant contested his sentence, arguing that the district court had wrongly applied a two-level enhancement under the United States Sentencing Guideline § 3C1.2 for reckless endangerment during flight. Hibbett claimed that he was merely a passenger in a vehicle that evaded police, and he did not encourage the driver to flee.The United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit found that the district court had not erred. The court noted that evidence, including video footage of the vehicle evading police and statements from the driver, supported the enhancement to Hibbett's sentence. The court also rejected Hibbett's argument that the Northern District of Illinois Local Rule 79.1, which pertains to control of trial exhibits, conflicted with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 55. The court stated that Hibbett had not demonstrated how the application of the local rule to his case caused him any harm.Therefore, the court upheld the district court's judgment, affirming Hibbett's sentence. The court also suggested that Hibbett's concerns about Local Rule 79.1 should be directed to the Advisory Committee for the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. View "USA v. Hibbett" on Justia Law

In this case, the petitioner, Tony Rogers, convicted of sexually assaulting his daughter, DAR, appealed his conviction alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Rogers claimed his trial lawyer failed to move for in-camera review of DAR’s medical records, which he believed contained information about her mental health that could have impacted the credibility of her testimony. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected Rogers's claim, and the Supreme Court of Wisconsin denied review.Rogers then filed a federal habeas corpus petition, asserting that the state court decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of established federal law. He contended that his trial counsel's failure to obtain DAR’s medical records or at least file a motion for in camera review violated his rights. The district court denied Rogers's petition, concluding that the state court decision did not contravene federal law and that the state court's application of the federal standard to Rogers's case was not unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court. It found that Rogers's counsel was not ineffective for failing to make a motion for in camera review of DAR’s medical records. The court held that such a motion would have been meritless because Rogers could not make the preliminary showing of the records’ materiality required under state law. The court also found that Rogers's claim that he made a plausible showing for in camera review of DAR’s medical records was based on speculation and devoid of context. The court held that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals' decision was not an unreasonable application of federal law. View "Rogers v. Wells" on Justia Law

LaTonya Foxx, along with two others, was charged and convicted for engaging in a fraudulent tax scheme. Foxx pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud and was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment, one year of supervised release, and ordered to pay $1,261,903 in restitution. The scheme involved filing fraudulent tax returns to generate improper refunds for clients and the defendants. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit heard Foxx's appeal of the restitution order.The court noted that any power to award restitution must come from a statute. In this case, the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act authorizes restitution for wire fraud offenses. The court noted that restitution is limited to the actual losses caused by the specific conduct underlying the offense, and the government must establish those losses by a preponderance of the evidence.Foxx argued that the district court failed to adequately delineate the scheme and make specific findings that the losses included in the restitution derived from the same scheme for which she was convicted. The court found no fatal deficiency in the district court's findings and concluded that Foxx failed to demonstrate a plain error. The court held that Foxx could be ordered to pay restitution for all the losses she caused during the scheme, not just those relating to the specific wire transactions to which she pleaded guilty. The court affirmed the restitution order. View "United States v. Foxx" on Justia Law

The case before the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit involves an appeal by Shamone White, who had been convicted by a jury of possessing marijuana with intent to distribute, possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and possessing a firearm as a felon. White appealed his firearm convictions, arguing that the prosecution presented inadequate evidence to establish possession. He also argued that the district court incorrectly instructed the jury, allowing them to find him guilty based solely on his admission that he touched the gun a week before his arrest.White was arrested after a vehicle he was a passenger in was pulled over. Inside the vehicle, the police found two bags, one of which White admitted to owning. This bag contained cash and cannabis, while the other bag, which White denied ownership of, contained a firearm, ammunition, scales with cannabis residue, and other items.The court found that the evidence was sufficient for each conviction and that the jury instruction was not misleading. The court highlighted that possession could be either actual or constructive. The court determined that a reasonable jury could infer that White constructively possessed the firearm due to its proximity, the presence of scales with drug residue in the same bag, and the fact that the contents of the two bags collectively formed a complete set of drug trafficking tools. The court also found that White's admission to having previously touched the gun did not mislead the jury. The judgement of the district court was thus affirmed. View "USA v. White" on Justia Law

In a case heard by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the defendant, Deny Mitrovich, was indicted for possession of child pornography following a multinational investigation that used a software program to unmask his computer. Mitrovich requested detailed technical information about the software program, which was used by Australian and New Zealand authorities, to aid his defense. However, the United States government did not have this information and was unsuccessful in obtaining it despite repeated efforts. Mitrovich argued that the government was obligated to provide this information under Rule 16(a)(1)(E) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.The court disagreed with Mitrovich, stating that Rule 16 does not require the production of documents held exclusively by foreign authorities. Furthermore, Mitrovich was unable to demonstrate that the government's inability to provide the requested information resulted in prejudice, a necessary condition to establish a Brady violation. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's decision not to impose sanctions on the government for failure to disclose the requested information.The court also clarified that while the doctrine of constructive possession could extend to co-participants in a joint international investigation under the Due Process Clause, this would not apply if the U.S. lacks the capacity to access or obtain the information through reasonable means. The court also emphasized that mere speculation about the content of the missing information is not sufficient to establish prejudice under Brady. View "United States v. Mitrovich" on Justia Law