Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2007, Hogsett was convicted of crimes, including being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The court found that Hogsett was an armed career criminal, with three prior convictions for violent felonies, and sentenced him to 295 months. In 2021, the Supreme Court (Borden) interpreted “violent felony” in 924(e) to exclude crimes that can be committed with a mens rea of recklessness. Hogsett sought to challenge his sentence under Borden. To collaterally attack a conviction or sentence, a federal prisoner files a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion, not a habeas petition, 28 U.S.C. 2241. Hogsett had filed a 2255 motion in 2010. A prisoner can only file another 2255 motion in two circumstances: newly discovered evidence sufficient to establish innocence or a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court. Hogsett argued that he was eligible to file under 2255(e), the “saving clause,” which applies when “the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.”The Seventh Circuit ordered the dismissal of Hogsett’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. The court cited the Supreme Court’s intervening Jones holding: “The inability of a prisoner with a statutory claim to satisfy” 2255(h)’s requirements “does not mean that he can bring his claim in a habeas petition under the saving clause … he cannot bring it at all.” Borden is a statutory interpretation decision. View "Hogsett v. Lillard" on Justia Law

While serving a 55-year sentence for murder, Love assaulted a correctional officer, resulting in state convictions for felony battery. The Indiana Department of Correction also found Love guilty of violating prison rules and imposed sanctions including revocation of 5,700 days of his accrued good time credit, which extended Love’s release date by more than 15 years. Love unsuccessfully pursued prison appeals. The district court denied his 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Love procedurally defaulted his constitutional claims and forfeited them by failing to present them in administrative proceedings or the district court.One argument concerned Executive Directive 17-09, under which the Department must revoke all accrued good time credit from inmates found guilty of qualifying offenses. There is no additional hearing; the inmate is not provided an opportunity to argue why revocation of less time is appropriate. Love argued that the Department cannot, consistent with due process, predetermine how it will use its discretionary power over sanctions without first considering arguments in mitigation. Love also argued that Directive 17-09 is facially arbitrary in tying punishment to the amount of good time credit an inmate has rather than the severity of his misconduct. Love offered two examples where other inmates presumably should have been punished in accordance with the Directive but were allegedly shown leniency instead. View "Love v. Vanihel" on Justia Law

Otradovec pleaded guilty to producing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251, an offense subject to section 3014, which directs certain “non-indigent” sex offenders to pay a $5,000 special assessment within 20 years from the entry of a criminal judgment or their release from imprisonment. He argued that his financial condition rendered him indigent under section 3014 because he had spent the last of his money paying for a private attorney, although he qualified for appointed counsel. The government focused on his future prospects and underscored that his college degree, military service, and consistent work history would probably allow him to secure a job after his release. Without explaining how it considered Otradovec’s present and future financial condition, the district court imposed the special assessment and order Otradovec to pay $100 a month starting after his release, while acknowledging that Otradovec could not afford to pay other criminal fines.The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded. It is uncertain how the district court understood the term “non-indigent” and whether it considered Otradovec’s future earnings capacity within the appropriate boundaries. Indigency covers two things: eligibility for appointed counsel and the financial capacity to provide for oneself. View "United States v. Otradovec" on Justia Law

As a Chicago gang member, States participated in drug trafficking and kidnappings. Officers went to his apartment to arrest him. States fired five shots through the door and hit an officer in the finger. A jury convicted him on 12 counts. The court sentenced him to life in prison, plus 57 years in consecutive sentences under 18 U.S.C. 924(c)—two for carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, and one for carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime. States subsequently moved to vacate his sentence, 28 U.S.C. 2255. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the reimposition of his sentence.The Supreme Court subsequently held (Johnson) that the ACCA residual clause, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B), was unconstitutionally vague. Section 924(c) has an analogous residual clause (later struck down). States filed a successive 2255 motion to vacate his 924(c) convictions. His predicate crimes of violence were Hobbs Act extortion and attempted murder of a federal officer, 18 U.S.C. 1113–1114. The court vacated the extortion-predicate conviction but denied the motion with respect to the conviction predicated on attempted murder; then-controlling circuit precedent established that an attempt to commit a crime of violence is a crime of violence under 924(c)'s elements clause. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his sentence--concurrent 20-year terms plus two consecutive five-year sentences for the 924(c) convictions. The district court correctly held that attempted murder of a federal officer is a crime of violence and that drug trafficking and kidnapping offenses could not be grouped. View "United States v. States" on Justia Law

FBI agents created a profile for a fictitious individual, “Clay,” on the dating app “Grindr.” Grindr does not allow users under age 18, so the agent represented that Clay was 18. Agent Carter testified that he exchanged messages with Leal, telling him that Clay was 15 years old. Grindr deleted Clay’s profile. Carter created a new profile for “Corey.” Leal initiated contact with Corey. The ensuing discussion concerned a meeting, Corey’s age and the risk of going to jail, and condoms. When Leal arrived for the meeting, an officer pulled up behind the car Leal had described; the car accelerated. Officers stopped the vehicle and found Leal driving. Leal admitted to planning to receive oral sex from Corey—who he believed was under 18–and stated that he deleted the Grindr app as he was being stopped because he knew it was wrong to meet with a 15-year-old.Leal was charged with attempted enticement of a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b). At Leal’s request, the district court charged the jury with the pattern instruction regarding the entrapment defense. The court also provided the jury with the pattern instruction regarding the permissibility of the government’s use of undercover and deceptive investigative techniques. Convicted, Leal was sentenced to the mandatory minimum of 120 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the jury instruction and the sufficiency of the evidence submitted to prove that Leal was not entrapped. View "United States v. Leal" on Justia Law

Snowden, staying at a hotel, received a call asking him to visit the lobby to pay for the room. When Snowden arrived, DEA Agent Henning pushed him into a door and onto the ground. Snowden did not resist. Henning punched him several times. Snowden suffered two black eyes and a fractured left eye socket.Snowden sued Henning, alleging a Fourth Amendment excessive force claims. The court construed the complaint to allege a “Bivens” claim (an implied damages remedy against federal officers for certain constitutional violations), then dismissed that claim, noting factual distinctions between Snowden’s case and Bivens–the location of the arrest, the presence of a warrant, and the number of officers involved. Bivens involved allegations concerning the rights of privacy implicated in an unlawful warrantless home entry, arrest, and search, the court reasoned, while Snowden alleged excessive force incident to a lawful arrest, and special factors weighed against recognizing a new Bivens context, including the availability of an alternative remedy.The Seventh Circuit reversed. While the Supreme Court has declined to extend the Bivens remedy beyond specific Fifth and Eighth Amendment contexts, Snowden’s claim does not present a new context. Agent Henning operated under the same legal mandate as the Bivens officers and is the same kind of line-level federal narcotics officer. Like Bivens, Snowden seeks damages for violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The legal landscape of excessive-force claims is well-settled. Nor does allowing a Bivens claim here risk a “disruptive intrusion” into the “functioning of other branches.” View "Snowden v. Henning" on Justia Law

Agents intercepted calls via a wiretap on Jose’s phone. Despite Jose’s use of coded language, they learned that he was arranging with a supplier to bring "new product" into town on a semi-truck; a distributor would help sell the product upon its arrival. Jose’s brother, Marcos, was to arrange a location and contacted “Juanito,” who had access to a private parking space big enough for a semi-truck. The brothers offered him $500 and informed Juanito of the meeting’s purpose. On the day of the deal, Jose and Marcos exchanged multiple calls about logistics. Authorities watched Marcos leave home and head to the parking space. Jose and Juanito joined him. A semi-truck arrived and parked. The group disbanded. Later, Marcos called Jose and relayed that Juanito was “scared.” The next day, authorities observed Jose meet with the courier under a bridge. Jose got into the courier’s car carrying a plastic bag. Within minutes, he exited the car empty-handed and left. Officers pulled the courier over and found the bag. It contained cocaine.At Marcos’ trial, an expert in drug-dealing practices and terminology interpreted some of the wiretap transcripts. Marcos called no witnesses, portraying himself as a pawn in Jose’s scheme. The jury found Marcos guilty of conspiracy. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and a claim that the government’s expert witness testified beyond the scope of his expertise. View "United States v. Bahena" on Justia Law

Fears was charged with conspiracy to commit sex trafficking, 18 U.S.C. 1594(c), and four counts of sex trafficking, 1591(a), (b)(1). The 1591(b)(1) counts carry 15-year mandatory minimums. Fears pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy and one count of trafficking under 1591(a), (b)(2), which carries a 10-year mandatory minimum. Fears admitted to the factual bases of the charges. The plea agreement included a broad appellate waiver; Fears could only attack his conviction on the basis of “involuntariness or ineffective assistance of counsel” and seek to reduce his sentence if there were changes to the applicable law. Over two years after Fears pleaded guilty, but before he was sentenced, he filed pro se motions to withdraw his plea, claiming his guilty plea was not "knowing and voluntary" because of ineffective assistance of counsel. He claimed that his attorney pressured him to plead guilty.The district court rejected his motions, noting the plea colloquy “where Fears affirmed, time and again,” that he understood the charges and potential sentence; that his attorneys explained the charges and answered all his questions; that he had no complaints about his representation; and that he had not accepted responsibility. The Seventh Circuit dismissed Fears’ appeal from his 30-year sentence, citing the plea waiver. Consideration for the agreement “abounds.” View "United States v. Fears" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s criminal history included a 1998 guilty plea to felony mail fraud. After maintaining an otherwise clean record for 24 years, he decided he wanted a gun. But 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(1) bars gun possession for anyone who, like Plaintiff, has a conviction for “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” So he brought this suit under 18 U.S.C. Section 925A to challenge the constitutionality of Section 922(g)(1) as the law applied to him. Relying on pre-Bruen framework, The district court granted a motion from the government and dismissed the case.   The Seventh Circuit remanded to allow the district court to undertake the Bruen analysis. The court explained the parties may be unable altogether to find answers to certain questions, may find incomplete information in response to others, and perhaps in some instances, may identify substantial historical information pertinent to one or another dimension of the required inquiry. In the end, the district court will have to give the best answer available to whether the government has carried its burden of “affirmatively proving that its firearms regulation is part of the historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the right to keep and bear arms.” View "Patrick Atkinson v Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(6), which makes it a crime to "knowingly to make any false or fictitious oral or written statement" in connection with certain firearm purchases. Initially, Defendnat entered a guilty plea, but then sought to withdraw his plea, arguing that 18 U.S.C. 922(n), which makes it a crime to purchase or receive a firearm while under indictment for a felony, violates the Second Amendment. The district court granted Defendant's motion and dismissed the indictment. The government appealed.On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed. Defendant was not charged under 18 U.S.C. 922(n). The government is permitted to enact a law that penalizes providing an untruthful answer, which is the question the court was presented with. Whether Section 922(n) violates the Second Amendment remains unresolved. View "USA v. John Holden" on Justia Law