Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Police released the footage of a bank robbery to the media. Several tipsters identified Garcia as the robber. Garcia was arrested without a warrant. Two days later Detective Spano submitted a “Probable Cause Statement and Judicial Determination” (CR-215) form to a court commissioner (essentially a magistrate) to establish a basis for Garcia’s continued detention. The form references the Fourth Amendment and Wisconsin Statute 970.01, “Initial Appearance Before a Judge.” Spano indicated that he had “probable cause to believe that [Garcia] committed” bank robbery and violated his parole," citing a description of the surveillance footage and the tips. The commissioner checked a box stating: “I find probable cause to believe that the arrested person committed the offense(s),” and set bail at $50,000. Garcia, in jail, was not present for the CR-215 determination.Hours after the probable cause finding—without counsel for Garcia—the police conducted an in-person lineup with two tellers. Three days later, Wisconsin prosecutors charged Garcia with bank robbery. Garcia appeared in court that day represented by a public defender; 10 days later Garcia appeared at a preliminary hearing; the court ordered him detained pending trial.The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed Garcia’s conviction, determining that the right to counsel had not attached at the time of the lineup. The Seventh Circuit affirmed a grant of habeas corpus relief (28 U.S.C. 2254). The state court's resolution of Garcia’s Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel claim was objectively unreasonable, even applying "vast deference" under 2254(d)(1). The court cited the “Supreme Court’s long line of cases on the attachment of the right to counsel.” The judicial machinery of the state’s adversarial process necessarily began to turn against Garcia after the commissioner executed the CR-215 form. View "Garcia v. Hepp" on Justia Law

Officers executing a warrant at Johnson’s address found a rifle and drugs. He spoke with police in a recorded proffer session on the condition that it be inadmissible except for purposes of impeachment. In April 2020, Johnson was charged in state court. His speedy trial requests were complicated by the COVID-19 pandemic and the state’s adjournment of jury trials. Before his December 9, 2020 trial date, the prosecutor notified the state court that he expected Johnson to be charged in federal court. The state court rescheduled the case; on January 19, 2021, the state charges were dismissed without prejudice. Johnson was indicted on federal drug and firearms charges on January 20. The district court denied his motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds because time spent in state custody is not considered under the federal Speedy Trial Act. Johnson had received a written summary of his proffer months earlier but had received a digital recording just days before trial and was unable to watch it at the jail. Johnson was able to view the recording before the second day of trial. He did not testify.The Seventh Circuit affirmed his convictions, rejecting Johnson’s arguments that his speedy trial rights were violated by the delay between his arrest on state charges and his federal trial and concerning the proffer. While an officer testified improperly to an admission from the proffer, the error was harmless, given the overwhelming evidence of guilt. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Police discovered a loaded firearm, cocaine, and more than 800 methamphetamine pills on Jones’s person and in his car during a traffic stop. Federal charges followed. Counsel declined to make frivolous challenges to the court’s jurisdiction at Jones’s request. Jones sought to represent himself. Magistrate Long conducted an extensive Faretta colloquy, covering Jones’s education, mental health, and prior legal experiences. Jones confirmed his understanding of the charges and agreed to follow the Federal Rules of Evidence and Criminal Procedure. He claimed that he understood the perils of self-representation, which Long explained in detail. The court allowed Jones to represent himself and appointed his public defender as standby counsel. Jones spent months before trial challenging the court’s jurisdiction in frivolous filings, advancing “sovereign-citizen” arguments.Concerned with the incoherence of the filings, the government requested a second Faretta colloquy. District Judge Mihm conducted the colloquy. Jones insisted he did not “consent” to jurisdiction and would not participate in his trial. While he acknowledged understanding the “letter” of the charges against him, he also expressed confusion about whether the proceedings were criminal, civil, administrative, or even “statutory maritime.” Mihm concluded that Jones’s waiver of counsel remained valid. Jones did not deliver opening or closing statements, cross-examine witnesses, or lodge any objections. His testimony had no bearing on the charges against him. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction and 138-month sentence. Jones knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

Thomas was wanted by Indiana officials and warrants had been issued for his arrest. Thomas obtained fake identification documents, including one issued by North Carolina under the name “Alredius”. Using that fictitious identity, Thomas leased an Atlanta condominium. Federal officials arrested him outside the building. Thomas’s landlord stated that she had rented the unit to “Alredius Frieson.” With the landlord’s consent, officers searched the condo, finding drugs, drug paraphernalia, and cell phones. After obtaining warrants to search the phones, the officers discovered evidence that Thomas was trafficking methamphetamine. Charged under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), 846, Thomas unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence.The Seventh Circuit reversed. A tenant lawfully may exclude others, even when the landlord consents to a search. Using an alias to sign a lease does not deprive a tenant of a legitimate expectation of privacy. A Georgia tenant who deceives or even defrauds a landlord is entitled to retain possession of the residence until the landlord has provided notice and obtained a judicial order. Thomas’s landlord could not summarily terminate his protections without violating Georgia law, nor could she consent to a warrantless search of his condo. A breach of a rental agreement does not automatically deprive the breaching party of a legitimate expectation of privacy. View "United States v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Hise was charged with two counts of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343. Hise was employed by the victim's construction company as an office manager and bookkeeper for more than 12 years. An FBI investigation revealed that Hise had embezzled over $1.5 million from that company. Hise entered an open guilty plea to those charges. The district court sentenced her to 63 months’ imprisonment and ordered $200 in special assessments and $1,550,379.14 in restitution, subject to a set-off ($21,953.55), which reflected the proceeds of a Sheriff’s Sale.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the district court violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(1)(A) and(C) in that it failed to ensure that Hise and her attorney had read and discussed the amended PSR and any addendum to it before imposing the sentence. Hise fails to identify any objection that could have been made to the revised PSR. She has not pointed to any aspect of the PSR that was incorrect or which could be subject to an objection. The court also rejected Hise’s argument that she was denied her right to be represented by counsel because her attorney failed to make any objection to the PSR and failed to appear at the final determination hearing regarding the imposition of the final restitution amount. View "United States v. Hise" on Justia Law

Williams was a key facilitator in a years-long cocaine trafficking scheme. In 2001, he was convicted of federal drug and conspiracy charges, 18 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846 and given life sentences. Williams appealed the denial of his 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A) motion for a reduced sentence, arguing that the district court erred in holding that it was not permitted to consider whether Williams’s unconstitutionally imposed mandatory life sentence contributed to “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for the reduction of his sentence.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, declining to reconsider its 2021 "Thacker" decision, stating it would make no difference to Williams’s case. The district court held in the alternative that even if Williams was eligible for a reduction in his sentence, this relief was not warranted in light of 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)'s factors. The court acknowledged different approaches among the circuits regarding the bounds of court discretion to find extraordinary and compelling reasons for early release— specifically, whether the two-step process employed by the Seventh Circuit is correct or if a more holistic approach is called for. The court noted that the U.S. Sentencing Commission is in the process of studying the issue, and recently has proposed defining “extraordinary and compelling reasons” to include circumstances in which “[t]he defendant is serving a sentence that is inequitable in light of changes in the law.” View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

Vivirito solicited sexual images and videos from young girls. Minor A, then age 12, expressed reluctance to provide videos; Vivirito threatened to expose their sexual text exchanges unless she complied. He also threatened to kill himself. That prompted Minor A to send Vivirito videos of herself penetrating her vagina and anus with the handle of a hairbrush.Vivirito pleaded guilty to receiving child pornography, 18 U.S.C.2252A(a)(2)(A), and was sentenced to 216 months in prison. The district judge added four offense levels, finding that the videos of Minor A portray “sadistic or masochistic” conduct, U.S.S.G. 2G2.1(b)(4)(A). Neither the Guideline nor the accompanying commentary defines those words. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting its precedent that, under an objective standard, pictures of a minor penetrating her vagina with the handle of a screwdriver qualify for the enhancement. The district judge did not commit clear error or abuse her discretion in finding that these videos depict sadistic or masochistic conduct. A district judge need not decide whether a given incident actually was painful or could have caused long-term injury because much sadomasochism harms the psyche rather than the body. View "United States v. Vivirito" on Justia Law

In July 2013, Koger began serving a 300-day sentence in Cook County Jail. While incarcerated, he received 42 books by mail. Per Jail policy, contained in the Inmate Information Handbook, inmates can keep no more than three books or magazines (excluding religious texts) in their cell at any time. Koger received a copy of the Handbook. Inmates with excess books can mail them out of the Jail using supplies available at the Jail commissary, can have someone outside the Jail pick up personal property, and are free to donate their books to other inmates. The policy was not strictly enforced during Koger’s stay.In October 2013, Jail administrators warned Koger they would soon search cells and take excess books. On October 5, officers searched the cells and took all but three books from Koger’s cell. Koger did not file a grievance. The Jail acknowledges the search but disputes whether any books were taken and what became of them. The Jail has no policy for dealing with confiscated books. The Jail released Koger on October 24, 2013; he died in 2020.Koger’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 has twice previously been before the Seventh Circuit, which affirmed the district court’s summary judgment rejection of Koger’s claim that the county deprived him of his books without due process. Koger received constitutionally sufficient due process surrounding any property deprivation, and presented insufficient evidence to hold the county liable under “Monell.” View "Orozco v. Dart" on Justia Law

The primary source of incriminating information against Taylor was “Doe,” a woman with whom Taylor and his wife were intimately involved. Law enforcement presented a warrant application to an Indiana judge, seeking to search Taylor’s residence for evidence of child pornography and bestiality. The affidavit did not disclose that two officers involved in the investigation had been competing with Taylor for Doe’s affection. The judge signed a typed warrant that authorized the search of Taylor’s residence for evidence of child pornography; it did not mention bestiality. At a time unknown and under unknown circumstances, the lead detective apparently made handwritten alterations, adding “bestiality” to the warrant’s scope. When officers executed the altered warrant, they found substantial evidence that Taylor was producing and distributing child pornography. They found no evidence relating to bestiality. Taylor's motion to suppress and request for a Franks hearing were denied. Taylor pled guilty and was sentenced to 324 months.The Seventh Circuit vacated. An evidentiary hearing is needed to determine whether the judge approved the alterations before the warrant's execution. Questions surrounding those alterations are relevant to the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule so the hearing must encompass false statements and material omissions in the affidavit and law enforcement’s subjective good faith in seeking the warrant. The affidavit did not support probable cause to search for evidence of child pornography but did support probable cause to search for evidence of crimes of bestiality. View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Another detainee threw hot coffee on King while the assigned tier officer, Szul, was gone, assisting another officer. When Szul returned, King stated that he needed medical attention. King was not examined until the next day. He was transferred to Stroger Hospital. A jail employee gave King an Inmate Grievance Response/Appeal Form for his failure-to-protect grievance, stating: “Your allegation(s) have been forwarded to the Offices of Professional Review [OPR] and Divisional Superintendent for review and/or investigation. You may follow-up with [OPR]”; “[t]o exhaust administrative remedies, grievance appeals must be made within 15 calendar days." The response to his delayed-treatment grievance stated only that he had been treated at Stroger Hospital and referred to exhausting administrative remedies. King appealed that response. King was later interviewed for the OPR investigation and signed a “Detainee/Complaint Notification,” stating, “I understand that if I do not file a complaint register within 10 days that OPR will close the investigation.” King did not file a complaint register.In King's section 1983 suit, the court granted the defendants summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Although King appealed his delayed-medical-treatment grievance, he failed to give the defendants notice of the claim because it did not allege wrongdoing by any correctional officer. The Seventh Circuit reinstated the failure-to-protect claim. Because the jail’s procedure for grievances that are referred to OPR is so obscure that no ordinary prisoner could understand it, the remedy was unavailable. View "King v. Dart" on Justia Law