Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Officer Sandoval encountered inmate Hacker, who is almost totally deaf, and ordered him to return to his bed. Hacker, unable to hear, did not comply. Sandoval shoved Hacker, who awoke handcuffed to a bed. He filed an administrative grievance and received notice that it had been referred to the Office of Professional Responsibility and the Divisional Superintendent, with a form allowing Hacker to appeal within 15 days. Neither document gave any timeline for OPR’s disposition of Hacker’s grievance. More than three months later, an OPR investigator concluded he could not substantiate Hacker’s claims; his superior officer signed the memorandum to approve the closure of the referral. The document does not state that the grievance process as a whole had ended, nor mention an appeals process. Hacker apparently received no communication from the Superintendent.Hacker had already filed suit. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment, citing failure to exhaust claims under the Prison Litigation Reform Act and to comply with other PLRA requirements, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). The Seventh Circuit vacated. The jail’s grievance procedures became unavailable to Hacker after the jail involved OPR; various communications forced Hacker to “go beyond the established system and guess” what he needed to do. One of Hacker’s claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act failed because his grievance did not give fair notice that he was requesting a personal listening device; his other claim, concerning missing medications, was not tied to a physical injury as required to recover damages under the PLRA. View "Hacker v. Cook County, Illinois" on Justia Law

Serving a 262-month sentence for heroin-related crimes, Vaughn has repeatedly, unsuccessfully, sought compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1). He argued in his latest petition that his health conditions (asthma, obesity, and hypertension) put him at extra risk should he contract COVID-19; that he has completed classes demonstrating his rehabilitation; and that his sentence is excessive in light of current legal standards.The district judge deemed his arguments “generic” and denied his application. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. COVID-19 has been a fact of life for more than three years. Vaughn has not identified any medical data suggesting that he is at greater risk of a bad outcome inside prison than he would be outside. Taking classes while incarcerated is common rather than extraordinary. Vaughn’s lengthy sentence stems from his classification as a career offender under the Sentencing Guidelines rather than from a statutory minimum sentence. Vaughn’s arguments do not, even collectively, identify “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” The discretion to evaluate multiple circumstances resides principally in the district courts. The district judge properly rejected Vaugh’s arguments. View "United States v. Vaughn" on Justia Law

Two men entered the bank, wearing masks. One, wearing a black Pacer’s hat, presented a demand note. The other had a gun. They used zip ties to bind the employees and stole over $67,000. Surveillance footage shows the robbers getting into a Chrysler Aspe in the parking lot. Only 637 Aspens were registered in Indiana. Police found a disposable glove near the parking spot. DNA analysis revealed Tinsley’s DNA on the glove. An Aspen was registered to Tinsley. Police obtained a search warrant for the vehicle and Tinsley’s home. They conducted a traffic stop and found two loaded guns on Tinsley. Searches of his vehicle and home revealed other guns, extended magazines, baggies of marijuana, pills, and a powder, each containing methamphetamine, disposable gloves, a black Pacers hat, and zip ties. Text messages on Tinsley’s phone from around the time of the robbery show individuals asking to purchase drugs and Tinsley replying that he did not have any. Hours after the robbery, Tinsley contacted a supplier to purchase drugs. He later messaged his customers that he had restocked.Tinsley unsuccessfully moved to sever the bank robbery counts from the drug and firearms charges. The court admitted the text messages, subject to a limiting instruction. Tinsley did not object to the court’s Sentencing Guidelines calculation and was sentenced to 25 years in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to evidentiary decisions, the sufficiency of the evidence, and Tinsley’s sentence. View "United States v. Tinsley" on Justia Law

Williams sought compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1), citing as “extraordinary and compelling” circumstances the fact that a district court treated him as having a prior conviction for unlawful drug delivery, which increased his minimum sentence, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(B), while his Illinois conviction for delivery of cocaine did not satisfy the criteria of a “serious drug felony.”The Seventh Circuit rejected that argument, noting its own precedent. Section 3582(c)(1) addresses some new fact about an inmate’s health or family status, or an equivalent post-conviction development, not a purely legal contention for which statutes specify other avenues of relief with distinct requirements, such as the time limits in 28 U.S.C. 2255(f) or the need for a declaration by the Sentencing Commission that a revision to a Guideline applies retroactively. There is nothing “extraordinary” about a legal error and the law provides methods other than compassionate release for dealing with those claims.Williams also argued that he has a spotless conduct record in prison, has completed educational programs that will allow him to participate in society, and has a greater risk of contracting COVID-19 and other diseases in prison. The court rejected those claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies by presenting them to the Bureau of Prisons. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

In 2007, Llanos was convicted for possessing heroin with intent to distribute it in March-July 2007. While serving his sentence for that conviction, he was indicted for dealing heroin between 2006 and April 2007. In 2009, he pleaded guilty to those charges before a different judge and received a sentence concurrent to the one imposed in the 2007 case. In 2015, while he was on supervised release for the 2009 case, Llanos again was caught distributing heroin. He entered another guilty plea, before a third judge, who sentenced him to 120 months. Another judge revoked his supervised release for the 2009 case and imposed a new term of 30 months in prison, consecutive to the 120-month term in the 2017 case.Llanos appealed the sentence he received when his supervised release in the 2009 case was revoked. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the government should not have brought the 2007 and 2009 charges as separate cases, because they involved the same conduct and the same conspiracy, and by doing so the prosecutor artificially inflated Llanos’s criminal history for purposes of future Guidelines calculations. Llanos has two prior felony convictions of a controlled substance offense, U.S.S.G. 4B1.1(a), and is subject to the “career offender” provisions. View "United States v. Llanos" on Justia Law

Robinson let Solorzano, stay at his Chicago home. The two frequently exchanged coded text messages about cocaine deals. Robinson drove to Indiana to pick up Solorzano after a transaction ended with Solorzano getting robbed. Robinson later texted Solorzano, “You should have taken me to watch your back.” Later, Solorzano arranged a deal with an undercover officer. Robinson drove him; upon their arrival, authorities approached the vehicle to arrest them. One officer said that, during the arrest, he saw his colleague pull a handgun from Robinson’s waistband; it was loaded. The officer who interrogated Robinson said that Robinson told him he had brought the gun to avoid being robbed. A jury found Robinson guilty of conspiring to possess cocaine with intent to distribute and of possessing a firearm as a felon but found him not guilty of possessing a firearm “in furtherance of” the conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A). The court imposed a sentencing enhancement to the felon-in-possession conviction, finding Robinson possessed a firearm “in connection with” the cocaine conspiracy, U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(6)(B).The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The use of acquitted conduct to enhance Robinson’s sentence did not violate his constitutional rights and the court made sufficient factual findings to apply the enhancement. The district court’s rationale for connecting the gun to the cocaine conspiracy was clear. View "United States v. Robinson" on Justia Law

Scott was suspected of shooting and killing Bishop. Scott claims he asked for an attorney during his arrest, but no questioning occurred at that time. Approximately four hours later, Scott was taken for an interview. After the detectives read Scott his Miranda rights, he admitted in a recorded interview to murdering Bishop. Four attorneys worked on Scott’s case before trial; one moved to exclude Scott’s confession on the basis of intoxication. The judge denied the motion, doubting Scott’s testimony. The jury heard the confession and convicted Scott.In a postconviction motion, Scott unsuccessfully alleged that his attorney was ineffective for not moving to suppress his confession on the theory that, because he requested an attorney during his arrest, his confession was obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Scott's second unsuccessful postconviction motion claimed his first postconviction counsel deficiently pleaded his claim by failing to marshal facts showing he informed his trial counsel of his request for an attorney.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his federal habeas petition, in which he claimed both his trial and first postconviction attorneys were ineffective. The Wisconsin appellate court’s decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, which has never extended Miranda beyond the context of custodial interrogation to permit an accused to request an attorney at the time of his arrest so as to cut off questioning before any attempt at questioning. View "Scott v. Hepp" on Justia Law

Perry died from gunshot wounds sustained during a fight with Shirley. In 2008, Shirley was convicted of first-degree reckless homicide. Shirley uses a prosthetic device below his knee. Although he can walk, during his trial Shirley was in a wheelchair with his legs shackled. To prevent the jury from observing the shackles, fabric was draped over both counsel tables. During voir dire, Juror 34 stated, if he’s in cuffs, "he did something.” Juror 34 separately confirmed he had seen the restraints, had not mentioned them to other jurors, and that his observations did not bias him. Shirley and his counsel said they were satisfied with those responses and did not request accommodations to muffle the noise of the shackles while Shirley was on the witness stand.The Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected claims that his presumption of innocence was violated because Juror 34 noticed his restraints, that being shackled inhibited his right to present a complete defense because it limited his ability to approach exhibits, make demonstrations and show the jury which leg his prosthesis was on. The court could not locate an explanation in for the restraint decision but found Shirley “had little difficulty communicating” in an “intelligent and articulate” manner from the witness stand. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Shirley’s petition for habeas relief. No Supreme Court case clearly establishes that the decision to shackle a criminal defendant while testifying violates the defendant’s constitutional rights. View "Shirley v. Tegels" on Justia Law

Police discovered a gun in Hatley’s possession during a Gary, Indiana traffic stop. Hatley pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), which ordinarily carries a statutory maximum of 10 years. The government contended that Hatley’s criminal history exposed him to an enhanced sentence of at least 15 years under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) in particular under 18 U.S.C. 924(e), which applies to offenders with “three previous convictions … for a violent felony … committed on occasions different from one another.” Hatley’s criminal history included convictions for robbery and criminal battery under Indiana law, both violent felonies under 924(e), and eight separate federal convictions for Hobbs Act robberies committed on eight different occasions.The district court rejected an argument that those robbery convictions did not qualify as “violent felonies” and sentenced him to the 15-year minimum term mandated by 924(e). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court compared the elements of Hobbs Act robbery with the elements of a violent felony under ACCA. Hobbs Act robbery committed by using force against a person fits within ACCA’s force clause. The other way of committing Hobbs Act robbery—using force against property—does not fit within ACCA’s force clause but qualifies as a violent felony under ACCA’s enumerated definition of generic extortion. View "United States v. Hatley" on Justia Law

Worthen, Darryl, and Harris planned to rob a gun store and, if necessary, shoot the store owner, Maxie. During the robbery, Darryl shot and killed Maxie. Worthen was charged with Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a), and discharge of a firearm resulting in death, 18 U.S.C. 924(j). Because Darryl directed the robbery and killed Maxie, Worthen was charged as an aider and abettor, 18 U.S.C. 2(a). For the 924(j) charge, the government needed to show the discharge of a firearm in the course of a “crime of violence” involving “as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.” Worthen unsuccessfully argued that Hobbs Act robbery was not a crime of violence but did not mention accessory liability. Worthen then pled guilty to the 924(j) charge as an aider and abettor.On appeal, Worthen again argued that Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence and argued, for the first time, that aiding and abetting a Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence and that the 924(c) force clause was unconstitutionally vague. The Seventh Circuit rejected those arguments. Because the principal offense of Hobbs Act robbery satisfies the force clause, aiding and abetting a Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a crime of violence. The “clear” meaning of physical force is “violent force—that is, force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person.” View "United States v. Worthen" on Justia Law