Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 1998 Williams, a leader of the Gangster Disciples, was indicted under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846. Convicted, Williams was sentenced to concurrent sentences of 240 months on two counts and a life sentence on a third count; there was evidence that Williams directed a murder to further the gang’s drug dealing activities. Williams invoked the 2018 First Step Act, seeking to reduce his sentence to time served. Williams cited the revised penalty scheme for crack cocaine offenses in place before the 2010 Fair Sentencing Act, his advanced age, poor health, and record of good behavior in prison. The government argued that Williams remained affiliated with the Gangster Disciples and posed an ongoing risk to the public.The court held a hearing and reviewed photos of Williams posing in prison with other Disciples and investigative reports showing that Williams was helping distribute drugs for the gang within the prison. Williams disputed the extent of his involvement but admitted that he continued his association with the Disciples. The district court explained that Williams’s ongoing affiliation with the Disciples was “sufficient” to deny relief and found that Williams was still participating in drug dealing. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The district court acted well within the bounds of its broad discretion. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

At St. Vincent Hospital, police spoke to Banks. He told them he had been shot three times in the hip. Roland explained that he drove Banks to the hospital in his Buick, which was in the parking lot.” Officers found Roland’s Buick in the hospital parking lot and saw blood and firearms through the window. Sergeant Lewis provided all this information in his search warrant application. Pursuant to the warrant, Detective Shue searched Roland’s Buick. In addition to the visible blood and handguns, Shue and an evidence technician found ammunition in a duffel bag and a loaded magazine in the armrest console. Banks told Shue that he did not know who shot him, that he called Roland after being shot, and that Roland drove him to the hospital. None of this information appeared in the warrant application but comes from an affidavit Shue prepared to support Roland’s arrest as a felon in possession of a firearm.Roland waived his Miranda rights and stated that the car, handguns, and ammunition belonged to him. He had prior convictions for robbery and for possessing cocaine. Roland unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence seized from his Buick and his statements. The district court and Seventh Circuit rejected his arguments that there was not probable cause to issue the warrant and that the warrant application omitted material information that would have negated probable cause. View "United States v. Roland" on Justia Law

Chicago police officer Miedzianowski was convicted of conspiring to participate in racketeering activity from 1985-1998, conspiring to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute more than 5 kilograms of cocaine, more than 50 grams of cocaine base, and unspecified quantities of heroin and marijuana, conspiring to commit extortion, using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a violent or drug-trafficking crime, distributing cocaine and cocaine base, wire fraud, possessing stolen ammunition, possessing a dangerous weapon, and possessing cocaine with intent to distribute. He was sentenced to life in prison.Miedzianowski moved to reduce his sentence after the 2018 First Step Act made retroactive the lower penalties enacted in the Fair Sentencing Act, to reduce the disparities between sentences for crack-cocaine and powder-cocaine offenses. If a defendant is eligible for relief because he could have received a lower sentence had the Act been in effect at the time of the crimes, the court must exercise its discretion and weigh the sentencing factors of 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). Miedzianowski was eligible for relief. The Act modified the penalty for conspiring to distribute crack.Miedzianowski cited his post-sentencing conduct, advanced age, and family support and argued that his sentence was greater than those of co-defendants. The district court acknowledged those factors but concluded that they did not outweigh the need for general deterrence, the seriousness of his crimes, misusing his status as a police officer, perjuring himself, and threatening witnesses. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The court sufficiently addressed Miedzianowski’s arguments and did not abuse its discretion. View "United States v. Miedzianowski" on Justia Law

Pierner-Lytge, a Second Amendment supporter, walked to a public park near Walker Elementary School that contains a playground and a baseball field. Many children and families were reportedly present that evening. Pierner-Lytge carried a rifle with a spike bayonet bolted to the end of the barrel, a holstered semi-automatic handgun, plus a duty belt containing pepper spray, a baton, and handcuffs. Milwaukee County officers responded to reports. Pierner-Lytge stated that she was exercising her Second Amendment rights and confirmed that she had a concealed carry weapon license but did not have it with her. Pierner-Lytge had previously resisted arrest and threatened officers and had been the subject of six mental health detention proceedings. Officers arrested Pierner-Lytge for disorderly conduct. She complied with instructions. Officers confiscated her rifle, bayonet, handgun, and duty belt. Pierner-Lytge was released from custody and was not charged. The seized property was returned.Pierner-Lytge sued. 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the officers violated her Fourth Amendment rights by arresting her without probable cause. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment based on qualified immunity. While a reasonable officer should have known in 2020 that simply carrying a firearm in public does not constitute disorderly conduct, more is required to show that the legality of Pierner-Lytge’s conduct was “beyond debate.” To the extent the officers misjudged whether probable cause existed to arrest Pierner-Lytge, it was a reasonable decision given the Wisconsin disorderly conduct statute at the time View "Pierner-Lytge v. Hobbs" on Justia Law

Bailon accompanied Aguila on a trip to purchase cocaine. The seller was a DEA confidential source. DEA agents arrested both men and searched Aguila’s car, recovering a pistol. The agents questioned Bailon inside a DEA van; he had limited English. Bailon admitted he owned the handgun. In the DEA office, an agent spoke Spanish and translated. Bailon was given an “Advice of Rights” form written in Spanish, explaining his Miranda rights. Bailon initialed next to each of his rights and signed the form. Bailon admitted to being in the country without authorization, stated that he had seven children, and consented to searches of his home and his phone. Agents had asked him if he “want[ed] to go back to Mexico or … tell [them] the truth.” They stated that they were going to call ICE and that they would test the gun for fingerprints. Agents found a photo of a gun on Bailon’s cell phone.Bailon was charged as an alien unlawfully in the U.S. in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(5). The court excluded the statements made in the van but not those made in the DEA office, finding that the Miranda warning was not undermined by the references to his children or his lack of formal education. Convicted, he has been removed to Mexico. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Considering the totality of the circumstances, Bailon’s conduct and statements establish that he voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. View "United States v. Bailon" on Justia Law

Richardson was the driver and sole occupant of a car that was stopped for a traffic violation. He gave the police false names. Trying to identify him, officers conducted an inventory search and uncovered a firearm stashed beneath the passenger seat, within the driver’s reach. Before telling Richardson about the gun, officers asked him whether he had a firearms license; he responded, “That gun’s not mine.” The search uncovered other items belonging to Richardson, including a pay stub bearing his name. When Richardson had an asthma attack, he stated that his inhaler was in the glove box. During jail calls with his girlfriend, who owned the gun, he confirmed that the gun was “in the same place that it’s always in.”The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction and 15-year sentence, based on the Armed Career Criminal Act, which imposes a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years on any person convicted of possessing a firearm if that person has three or more prior convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses “committed on occasions different from one another.” 18 U.S.C. 924(e). Each of three robberies committed over 36 hours when Richardson was 16 was committed on a different occasion. The second robbery was committed more than an hour after and 12 miles away from the first; the third was committed the next day. Richardson constructively possessed the gun. View "United States v. Richardson" on Justia Law

Banks posted a Snapchat video of himself barbequing on his porch with a gun on the grill’s shelf. Springfield police officer Redding saw the post and knew Banks to be a convicted felon. Within minutes, Redding and other officers headed to Banks’s home and saw Banks on his porch, next to the grill. The officers struggled with Banks, eventually arresting him inside the house. A pat down revealed a loaded semi-automatic pistol in Banks’s pocket. The officers also saw a box of ammunition. They did not have a warrant to enter Banks’s porch or to search his home.At a suppression hearing, Redding stated that he did not believe he needed a warrant to enter the porch because the police had reasonable suspicion that Banks, as a convicted felon, was committing a crime by possessing a gun nor did he believe he had enough time to obtain a warrant. The district court denied Banks’s motion to suppress. Banks entered a conditional guilty plea. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Because Banks was a convicted felon, the officers needed nothing more than the video to request a warrant to arrest him. A front porch—part of a home’s “curtilage”—receives the same protection as the home itself, so the officers’ entry was illegal without a warrant. No exception to the warrant requirement applied. View "United States v. Banks" on Justia Law

Klund purports to supply electrical parts. In 1991 and in 1993, he was convicted for fraudulent misrepresentations involving defense contracts. Disqualified from the award of government contracts, from 2011-2019, Klund bid on defense contracts using shell corporations, aliases, and the names of employees and relatives. He certified that one shell company was a woman-owned business, eligible for special consideration. Klund bid on 5,760 defense contracts and was awarded 1,928 contracts worth $7.4 million. Klund satisfactorily performed some of his contracts; the Department paid $2.9 million for these goods. But he knowingly shipped and requested payment for 2,816 nonconforming electrical parts and submitted invoices for parts that he never shipped.Klund pleaded guilty to wire fraud, aggravated identity theft, and money laundering. The PSR calculated the intended loss at $5.7 million and the actual loss at $2.9 million. Since Klund fraudulently obtained contracts intended for woman-owned businesses, the PSR did not apply an offset for the cost of goods actually delivered under those contracts. An 18-level increase in Klund’s offense level applied because the loss was more than $3,500,000 but not more than $9,500,000, U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(1)(J). With an advisory range of 87-108 months, Klund was sentenced to 96 months’ imprisonment with a mandatory consecutive sentence of 24 months for aggravated identity theft. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the loss calculations. View "United States v. Klund" on Justia Law

Indiana Department of Correction (IDOC) Officers found Smallwood unresponsive in his prison cell. When he awoke, Smallwood assured a nurse that he had not taken any drugs, and reminded her that he is diabetic. Smallwood consented to a urinalysis and the results were negative. Dr. Talbot nonetheless ordered blood tests. Smallwood asked for a form to refuse the blood draw. Prison guards stated that he could not refuse, twisted his hands and wrists, placed him in a headlock, and held a taser to his chest while placing him in restraints. They held him down while a lab technician drew his blood. The blood test results revealed no illegal drugs. Smallwood alleges that the officers took him to an observation cell where they subjected him to physical and sexual abuse, then placed him in segregation. Smallwood filed a grievance but did not properly follow IDOC grievance procedures, which require that a prisoner first attempt to informally resolve the problem: a grievant need not seek informal resolution for allegations of sexual abuse. Smallwood filed a timely formal grievance, alleging sexual abuse. Smallwood’s grievance was rejected for failing to show that he had tried to informally resolve his complaint. Smallwood expressed an inability to understand the grievance process. A year later, Smallwood's attempt at informal resolution was rejected as untimely.Smallwood sued, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit vacated, finding unresolved, material factual questions regarding Smallwood’s ability to make use of the grievance procedure. View "Smallwood v. Williams" on Justia Law

The government is investigating Doe for suspected criminal violations of the Clean Water Act. With a search warrant, agents conducted a day-long search of Doe’s premises. An hour into the search, agents ordered Doe to turn off all security cameras. After the search, Doe contacted the U.S. Attorney’s Office and accused the agents of violating the Fourth Amendment in executing the search. Doe also filed an emergency motion to unseal the affidavit supporting the warrant, attaching still images from security-camera video footage of the search, showing agents pointing guns at employees.. Doe refused the government’s request to view the original video. The government served Doe with a grand-jury subpoena for the video.Doe argued that the video was irrelevant to the potential Clean Water Act violations and that the subpoena was for the improper purpose of conducting pre-trial discovery before Doe’s criminal trial or for potential civil litigation over the alleged constitutional violation. The government argued that “the grand jury is entitled to consider potential evidence of law enforcement misconduct in evaluating whether to indict” and that the video could be directly relevant, because it could provide details on what evidence was collected during the search, which employees had access to evidence, and whether anyone tampered with potential evidence. The district court quashed the subpoena. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The grand jury is entitled to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the collection of evidence relevant to its investigation. View "United States v. Doe Corp." on Justia Law